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ABSTRACT 
Directors Duties and Liabilities in Corporate Insolvency in England and the US 
Mohammad Reza Pasban 
This thesis is an examination of directors duties and liabilities in the event of 
"0, 
insolvency in England including Wales and the US. The main aim of the study is 
to compare the two legal systems' stance towards directors when their company 
is in financial depression or technically insolvent. 
The thesis consists of ten chapters. The first chapter is a general introduction 
which draws a picture of the structure and scope of the study. Chapter two and 
six consider directors duties in general and in the event of corporate financial 
depression in England and the US respectively. Chapter three and seven 
examine the liabilities of directors of an insolvent company for breach of their 
duties in those two legal systems. In chapter four, disqualification of corporate 
directors in English law is studied. Chapters five and eight are an attempt to 
answer the question how directors of an English or American ailing company, 
accordingly, are provided with appropriate protection against the many liability 
provisions imposed by common law or statutes. in chapter nine, the unique 
device of the business judgment rule and its function in the US is reviewed. 
Finally, in chapter ten a detailed comparative study of the two laws concerned is 
carried out to analyse the solutions of each law for the questions and 
uncertainties in this area of the law. 
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Acknowledgement 
In conducting my research, I am very grateful to my supervisors Professor John 
Birds and Mrs Clare Campbell. I am obliged to Professor John Birds for his 
guidance, and fruitful comments he has made throughout my study. I am also 
greatly indebted to Mrs. Clare Campbell, without whose caring supervision, 
comments and encouragement I would have been unable to complete this work. 
I feel duty bound to appreciate the kindly help of the staff of the law library as 
well as the main library of the Sheffield University. I take opportunity to thank 
the librarians of the British Library and the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies 
in University of London. 
I would like to offer my warmest gratitude to my wife Mansoureh for her 
patience and support during hard and busy time of my study. 
Finally, I am thankful of the NEnistry of Culture and Higher Education of Iran 
for sponsoring this research. 
iv 
CONTENTS 
Abstract 
Acknowledgement 
Table of Cases 
Chapter 1: 
General Introduction 
1.0b. 
Chapter 2: 
Directors Duties in English Law 
2.1 Introduction 
2.2 Duty of Care and Skill 
2.2.1 Duty of Care Implications 
2.2.1.1 Duty of attendance and attention 
2.2.1.2 Reliance and delegation ofpowers 
2.2.2 Standard of Conduct 
2.2.2.1 Traditional or subjective view 
2.2.2.2 Objective test 
2.2.2.3 A third alternative 
2.3 Fiduciary Duties 
iii 
iv 
xv 
I 
12 
12 
13 
14 
15 
17 
20 
20 
21 
22 
25 
V 
2.3.1 A Fiduciary Relationship 25 
2.3.2 To nom Directors Owe Aeir Duties? 27 
2.3.3 Implications of Fiduciary Duties 31 
2.3.3.1 Fiduciary duty of goodfaith and bonafide 32 
2.3.3.2 Duty to actfor proper purposes 33 
2.3.3.3 Prohibition against conj7ict of duty and 
personal interests 35 
2.4 Directors Duties in Insolvency 38 
2.4.1 Directors'Duties before Insolvem-y 39 
2.4.2 Directors'Duties to Creditors in Insolvency 41 
2.5 Conclusion 44 
Chapter 3: 
Fraudulent- Wrongful Trading and Misfeasance 47 
3.1 Introduction 47 
3.2 Fraudulent Trading 48 
3.2.1 Elementsfor Fraudulent Trading 49 
12.1.1 mens rea- mental element 49 
3.2.1.2 actus reus- actual element 53 
3.2.1.3 Statutory element and its development 
including civil remedy 55 
3.2.2 JVho Is Creditor? 59 
3.2.3 Miscellaneous Matters in Case Law 
Development 61 
"1.3 
Wrong(ul Trading 65 
3.3.1 Philosophy Behind the New Provisions 66 
3.3.2 Director- Shadow Director 69 
I 12.1 Creditor or director? 70 
3.3.2.2 Controlling shareholder 73 
vi 
3.3.3 Re Produce Marketing Consortium- A Turning 
Point 77 
3.3.4. Objective Test- Departureftom Common Law 
Rule 81 
3.3.5 Particular Duties under Wrong(ul Trading 
Provisions 83 
3.3.5.1 Duty ofmoniforing andprediction 84 
3.3.5.2 'Every step'to be taken 86 
3.3.6 General Conclusion on Wrongful'Trading 90 
3.4. Misfeasance 92 
3.4.1 Statutory Background 93 
3.4.2 Concept and Nature of Proceedings 96 
3.4.2. lMeaning 96 
3.4.2.2 Nature of misfeasance 98 
3.4.3 Groundsfor misfeasance- A case law review 99 
3.4.3.1 Breach offiduciary duty 100 
3.4.3.2 Negligence 106 
3.4.3.2.1 Types of negligence 107 
\j 3.4.3.2.2 Situations giving rise to a negligence 
action 109 
3.4.4 Genýral Conclusion on Misfeasance 112 
3.5 Conclusion 113 
Chapter 4: 
Disqualification of Directors 116 
4. .1 Introduction 116 
4.2 Background 117 
4.3 Nature and Aim ofDisqualification 120 
4.3.1 Nature of disqualification 121 
vii 
4.3.2 Aim of disqualification 124 
4.4 Applyingfor a Disqualfcation Order 128 
4.5 Groundsfor Disqualification 132 
4.5.1 Section 6- unfitness 132 
4.5.1.1 Mandatory disqualfcation 133 
4.5.1.2 Matters to determine unfitness 135 
4. J. 1.2.1 Breach of commercial moralityforfailing 
to pay the crown debts 136 
4.5.1.2.2 Misfeasance SWI& 139 
4.5.2 Wroneul Trading 141 
4.5.3 Fraudulent Trading 143 
4.6 Relieffrom Disqualification 145 
4.6. 
. 
/Limited and Conditional Orders 145 
4.6.2 Mitigating Factors 147 
4.6 2.1 Reliance on professional advice 147 
4.6.2.2 Effects on employees 148 
4.6 2.3 Otherfactors 149 
4., 7 Effects of Disqualification 149 
4.8 Conclusion 152 
Chapter 5: 
Protection of Directors in English Law 155 
5.1 Introduction 155 
5.2 Exemption, Insurance and Indemnity 156 
5.2.1 Eremptionftom Liability 156 
5.2.1.1 Statutory andjudicial background 156 
5.2.1.2 Extent of exemption under section 310 161 
5.2.1.3 Validity of ratification and approval 164 
5.2.1.4 Section 310(l) andArticle 85 of Table A 167 
viii 
5.2.2 Indemnification and Insurance 169 
5.2.2.1 Desirability of insurance 170 
5. Z 2.2 Scope of section 310: insurance and 
indemnification 172 
5.2.2.3 Changes of market or crisis? 175 
5.3 Relief under Section 72 7 176 
5.3.1 Background 176 
5.3.2 Scope of Section 72 7 177 
5.3.2.1 Relationship between section 7T7 and section 
214 178 
5.3.2.2 Applicability ofsection 72 7 to misfeasance 180 
5.3.2.3 Extending the relief to other cases 184 
5.3.3 Extent of the Court Discretion 188 
5.4 Conclusion 190 
Chapter 6: 
Corporate Directors Duties in the U. S. Law 193 
6.1 Introduction 193 
6.2 Duties in General 196 
6 2.1 Duty of Care 196 
6.2.1.1 Standard of duty of care 197 
6. - 2.1.2 Functions of duty of care 200 
6.2.1.2.1 Duty of inquiry 201 
6 2.1.2.2 Duty of attention and attendance 202 
6 2.2 Duty ofLoyalty 205 
6.2.2.1 Definition of directorfiduciary status 205 
ix 
6.2.2.2 Functions of and miscellaneous issues on 206 
duty of loyalty 
6.3 Duty in Insolvency 209 
6.3.1 Is a Corporate Creditor Owed A Duty Before 209 
Insolvency? 
6.3.2 An exception to the Rule- Directors Duties 211 
Upon Insolvency 
6.3.2.1 Trust Fund Doctrine v. Agency Theory 213 
6.3.2.2 Steps to be taken 218 
6.4 Conclusion and Suggestions 219 
Chapter 7: 
Directors Liabilities for Breach of Their Duties 223 
7.1 Introduction 223 
7.2 Liabilityfor Negligence 224 
7 2.1 Defining a Negligent Conduct 224 
7.2.2 Standard of Liabilityfor Negligence 227 
7 2.3 Pre- Van Gorkom Cases 229 
7.. 2.4 Van Gorkom Case: More Man a Turning Point 232 
7.2.4.1 The Supreme Court v. Chancery Court 235 
7.2.4.2 Rejudging the Van Gorkom decision 237 
7.2.4.3 Me impact of the Van Gorkom case on 
development of the law 238 
7.2.5 Post- Van Gorkom Cases 240 
7.3 Liabilityfor Breach of Duty of Loyalty 243 
7.3.1 Appropriation of Corporate Opportunity 243 
7.3.2 Involvement in Conflict of Interest 246 
7.3.2.1 Liabilityfor conj7ict of interest 246 
7.3.2.2 no is interested 251 
x 
7.3.3 Standard of "Fairness" to Assess a Set(- 
interestedness 252 
7.4 Liahilityfor Quasi- Fraudulent and Wrong(ul 
Conduct 255 
7.5 Conclusion 259 
Chapter 8: 
Insurance and Indemnification against, and 
elimination of Directors' Liabilities 262 
8.1 Introduction 262 
8.2 Indemnification and Insurance 263 
8.2.1 Indemnification 264 
8.2.1.1 Statutory andjudicial authorisation 265 
8.2.1.2 Expenses of defence 268 
8.2.1.3 Mandatory or discretionary indemnification? 270 
8.2.1.4 Expanded and non- exclusive indemnification 272 
8.2.2 Insurance 275 
8.2.2.1 Statutory authorisation 276 
8.2.2.2 Limits on insurance 277 
8.2.2.3 Expenses ofdefence 280 
8.2.2.4 Insurance crisi's 281 
8.2.2.5 Alternatives to insurance 284 
8.2.2.5.1 Captive insurance companies 284 
8.2.2.5.2 Captive groups insurance 286 
8.2.2.5.3 Fronting arrangement 286 
8.2.2.5.4 Advisory board 286 
8.3 Elimination and Limitation ofLiahility 287 
8.3.1 Delaware Approach: Amendment of S. 102(b) 288 
8.3.2 Other States and Institutes 291 
xi 
8.3.3 Impact of an Elimination or Limitation 
Provision 293 
8.4 Conclusion 295 
Chapter 9: 
The Business Judgment Rule 299 
9. ]Introduction and Background 299 
9.2 Definition and Presumption of the Rule 300 
9.3 Formulation and Standard of the R-u7e 304 
9.4 Requirements 306 
9.4.1 Due Care Requirement 307 
9.4.2 Loyalty Requirement 308 
9.4.3 Independence Requirement 310 
9.5 Functions of the Rule 311 
9.5.1 Defensive Use 312 
9.5.2 Offensive Use 313 
9.5.3 As a Measurement ofDue Care 313 
9.6 Special Litigation Committee- Offensive Use of 
the Rule 314 
9.6.1 The Disinterestedness and Power of the 
Committee 316 
9.6.2 Yhe Zapata Case- the New Trend 320 
9.6.3 Demand Rule 324 
9.7 The Business Judgment Rule in Judicial Scrutiny 326 
9.8 Conclusion 329 
xii 
Chapter 10: 
Comparative Study and Conclusion 333 
10.1 Introduction 333 
10.2 Different Societies Still within the Same Legal 
System? 
334 
10.3 Directors'Duties- The main Similarity of the Two 
Laws 338 
10.3.1 A Conceptual Question 339 
10.3.2 Standard of Conduct- Objectivear Subjective? 340 
10.3.3 Duties to Creditors in Insolvency: English Law 
Stance Is Clearer 
342 
10.4 Liability of Directors- English Law in Upper 
Hand 346 
10.4.1 The Source ofDabIlIty 346 
10.4.2 no Takes the Action? 348 
10.4.3 Fraudulent and Wrong(ul Trading, and 
Misfeasance- the American Perception 351 
10.5 Disqualification ofExecutives: New But Arguable 
in the US Law 355 
10.5.1 The US Introduces Its Own Version of 
Disqualification 
355 
10.5.2 Ae Court or a Regulatory Agency to Decide 
Unfitness? 
356 
10.5.3 Purpose and Nature ofDisqualification 357 
10.5.4 Other Comparative Aspects of 
Disqualification 358 
10.6 US Law Is More Protective 362 
10.6.1 Indemnification and Insurance 363 
10.6 2 Elimination ofLiability 366 
xiii 
10.6.3 Section 72 7 and the Business Judgment Rule 367 
10.7 The Business Judgment Rule and the Foss v. 
Harbottle Case 368 
10.8 Final Conclusion and Suggestionfor the Future 
Researches 378 
10.8.1 The Application of This Study to the US and 
English Laws 380 
10.8.2 Suggestionsfor the Future Researchers' 382 
Table of Statutes 385 
Publications 386 
Bibliography 387 
xiv 
English Cases 
Aberdeen Rly. Co. Blaike Bros., [ 185411 Macq 46 1. 
Al- Nakib Investments (Jersey) Ltd. & Another v. Longcroft and Others, [1990] 3 All E. R. 
321. 
Alexander v. Automatic Telephone Co. Ltd., [ 190012 Ch. 56. 
Anglo-American Printing and Publishing Unio7r, [189512 Ch 891. 
A nns v. Merton London Borough Council [ 19781 A. C. 728. 
Augustus Barnett & Son Ltd. [ 19861 BCLC 170. 
B. Johnson & Co. (Builders) Ltd, [195511 Ch 634. 
Bamford v. Bamford 1197011 Ch. 212. 
Bath Glass Ltd. [ 19881 BCC 13 0. 
Bentinck v. Benn, 11887112 App. Cas. 652. 
Brady& Avon. v. Brady& Avor., [1987] 3 BCC535. 
Bray v. Ford, 11896] A. C., 44,5 1. 
Brazilian Rubber Plantations & Estates Ltd. 119111 Ch. 425. 
Burland v. Earle, [ 19021 A. C. 83. 
Calman v. Arational Associationfor Mental Health., 1197 11 Ch. 317. 
Canadian Land Reclaiming and Colonizing Co.; Coventty & Dixon's Case, [ 18801 14 Ch. D 
660. 
CardiffSaving Bank (Bute's Case), [ 189212 Ch. 100. 
Cargo Agency Ltd, [ 19921 BCC 989, BCLC 686. 
Cedac Ltd., 119901 BCC 555. 
Charitable Corporation v. Sutton, 1174212 Atk. 400. 
Charterbridge Corp. Ltd. v. Lloyds Bank Ltd. 119701 Ch. 62. 
Churchill Hotel (Plymouth) Ltd., [ 1988] BCLC 34 1. 
City Equitable Fire Insurance Company Ltd., [ 192511 Ch. 407. 
Civica Investments Ltd., 119831 BCLC 456. 
Cladrose Ltd. 119901 BCLC 204. 
Claridge's Patent A sphalte Company [192111 Ch 543. 
Co v. New Mashonaland Exploration Co. [ 189 11 N. W. 165. 
xv 
Company (No 005009 of 1987)) Er Parte Copp. andAnother, [19881 BCC 424. 
Company (No. 00359 of 1987). [198713 BCC 160, or as International Westminster Bank Plc 
v. Okeanos Maritime Corp (1987) BCLC 450. 
Company No. 001418 of 1988, [19901 BCC 526. 
Cook v. Deeks [ 191611 A. C. 5 54. 
Corbenstoke Ltd. (no. 2) [198915 BCC 767, 
Corbenstoke Ltd. (no. 2) [198915 BCC 767. 
County Marine Insurance Company, Rance's Case- [ 187016 Ch. App. 104. 
Covenhy & Dixon's Case [ 1880114 Ch. D 660. 
Craven-Ellis v Canons Ltd [ 193 612 All ER 1066. 
Cresyqy Products Ltd, (Secretary ofState v Godard and others) 119901 BCC 23. 
CSTC Ltd., (Secretary of State for Trade and7ndust? y v. Van Hengel & Anor) [19951 BCC 
171. 
Cunliffe v. Goodman [ 195012 K. B. 237. 
Customs & Excise Commissioners v. Hedon Aloha Ltd. & Others [ 198112 W. L. P- 79 1. 
Cyona Distributions, [ 19671 Ch 889. 
D'. Jan ofLondon Ltd. 1199411 BCC 56 1. 
Daniels v. Daniels 119781 Ch 406. 
DavidNeil & Co. Ltd. v. Neil (1986) 3 N. Z. C. L. C. 99. 
Dawson International Ple. v. Coats Patons Plc. [ 198814 BCC 305. 
Dawson Print Group Ltd. - [198714 BCLC 601. 
Denham & Co [ 1883125 Ch. D. 752. 
Devlin v. Slough Estates Ltd., [ 19831 BCLC 497. 
DKG Contractors Ltd. - 119901 BCC 903. 
Donoghue v. Stevenson., [ 19321 A. C. 562. 
Dorchester Finance Co. Ltd. v. Stebbing, [ 19891 BCLC 498. 
Douglas Construction Services Ltd., [ 19881 BCLC 3 97. 
Dovey v. Cory, [ 190 11 A. C. 477. 
DronfieldSilkstone Coal Co. (1881) 70 Ch. D. 76. 
Duomatic Ltd, [ 1969] 1 All ER 16 1. 
Edwards v. Halliwell, 1195012 All ER 1067. 
Elgindata Ltd., [ 199 11 BCLC 959. 
Etic Ltd [ 192811 Ch 861,874. 
Ex p. Dale & Co., West of England and South Wales District Bank, ex. p. Dale & Co. 118791 
11 Ch. D. 772. 
xvi 
Firedart Ltd. [ 199412 BCLC 340. 
Forest ofDean Coal Mining Company 11878110 Ch. D. 450. 
Foss v. Harbottle, 1184312 Hare 46 1. 
Franklin & Son Ltd., [ 193 71 All. E. L. R. 43. 
Gaiman v. Nat. Assco. for Mental Health, 11971]Ch. 317. 
General Cooper Chemicals [ 197812 All ER 49. 
Gilt Edge Safety Glass, Ltd. 119401 Ch. D. 23 7. 
Grant- United Switchback Railways Co. (1888) 40 ChD 13 5. 
Greenhalgh v. Ardene Cinemas, [ 195 11 Ch. 286. 
GSAR Realisations Ltd. 11993 ] BCLC 409. 
Guinness Pic v. Saunders &Another, 119881 BCLC 43, denied [19901 BCLC 402. 
Gurney & Co. v. Gibb. [ 18721 LR 5 (11L) 480. 
Hay's Case [1875] 10 Ch App. 593. 
Hedley Byrne v. Heller, [ 19641 A. C. 465. 
Heskell v. Continental Express Ltd. - [ 195011 All E. R. 1033. 
Heypak Homecare Ltd. (No. 2) [19901 BCC 117. 
Heyting v. Dupont, 1196411 W. L. P, 843. 
Hivac Ltd. v. Park Royal Scientific Instruments Ltd., [ 1946] Ch. 169. 
Hogg v. Cramphorn Ltd, [ 19671 Ch. 254. 
Horsely, Ayerst v. C. & K. (Construction) Ltd. [ 19761 A. C. 167. 
Horsley & Weight Ltd, 1198213 All E. P, 1045. 
HowardSmith Ltd. v. AmpolPetroleum Ltd., [19671 Ch. 254. 
Hutton v. West Cork Railway Co. [ 1883123 Ch. D. 654. 
Hydrodan (Corby) Ltd., [ 199412 BCLC 180. 
Imperial Mercantile CreditAss. v. Coleman (1873)LR6HL 189,1187116 Ch. App. 558. 
Industrial Development Consultants Ltd. v. Cooley, [ 197211 W. L. R. 443. 
Instrumentation Electrical Services Ltd. [ 19881 BCLC 550. 
International Westminster Bank PIc v. Okeanos Maritime Corp (1987) BCLC 450. 
Ipcon Fashion Ltd. [ 198915 BCC 773. 
IRC v Heaver Itd [ 194912 All ER 367. 
Keech v. Stanford, (1726) 25 E. P, 223. 
Kinsela &Another v, Russell Kinsela Pty. Ltd., (1986) 4 N. S. W. L. PL 722. 
Kirbys Coaches Ltd., [ 199 11 BCC 130. 
KuwaitAsia Bank ECv. National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd. - [19901 BCC 561. 
xvii 
L Todd (Swanscombe) Ltd. -[ 19901 BCLC 454. 
Land Credit Co. ofIreland v. Lord Fermory [ 18701 LR 5 Ch. App 763. 
Languas Nitrate Co. Ltd. [ 1899] 2 Ch. 3 92. 
Leeds Banking Company [ 18661 L. R. I Ch. App. 56 1. 
Line Electric Motors Ltd. & Others [ 1988] 1 Ch. 477. 
Lo- Line Electric Motors Ltd., [ 19881 BCLC 698. BCC 477. 
London and Mashonaland Exploration Co. v. New Mashonaland Exploration Co. [ 189 11 W. 
N. 165. 
Lonrho Ltd v. Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd., [ 198011 W. L. P- 627. 
MacDougall v. Gardiner, [ 187511 Ch. D. 13. -, -. 
Maidstone Building Provisions Ltd. - 1197 111 WLR 1085. 
Majestic Recording Studios Ltd. [ 19891 BCLC 1. 
Matthews Ltd., [ 1988] 4 BCC 513. 
MC Bacon Ltd., [ 1990] BCLC 324. 
MontrotierAsphalte Company (Perry's Case) [1876134 L. T. 716,717. 
Moorgate Metals Ltd., [ 199511 BCLC 502. 
Moorgate Metals Ltd. 1199511 BCLC 502. 
Motivex Ltd. v. BuIrIeld, [ 19881 BCLC 104. 
Mozley v. Alston, (1847) 1 Ph 790. 
Multinational Gas & Petrochemical Co. v. Multinational Gas & Petrochemical Services Ltd., 
11983] Ch. 258,288. 
Murphy v., firentwood District Council 1199012 All E. R. 908. 
National Bank of Wales, Ltd. [ 189912 Ch. 629. 
National FundAssurance Company [1878] 10 Ch 118. 
Nicholson v. Permarkraft Ltd. (1985) 1 NZLR 242. 
Norman andAnother v. Theodore Goddard (afirm) & Others, [19911 BCLC 1028. 
North Australian Territory Company, Archer's Case [ 189211 Ch 3 22. 
Morth- West Transactions Co. v. Beatty [ 1887112 App Ca. 589. 
Overend & Gurney Co. Ltd. v. Gibb. [ 18721 LR 5 HL 480. 
Pamstock Ltd. [ 1994] 1 BCLC 716. 
Parke v. Daily Alews Ltd., [ 19621 Ch 927 
Patrick and Lyon Ltd. [ 193 311 Ch. 786. 
Pavlides v. Jensen 11956] Ch. 565. 
xviii 
Peabody Donation Fund v. Sir. L Parkinson & Co. [ 198413 All E. R. 529. 
Pearson's Case [ 187715 Ch. D. 336. 
Percival v. Wright 1190212 Ch. 42 1. 
Polly Peck International Plc (? Vo. 2), (Secretary of State for Trade & Industry v. Ellis & 
Others) [ 1994] 1 BCLC 574. 
Probe Data Systems (No. 1), [ 1989] BCLC 56 1. 
Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd. [ 1989] 5 BCC, 569. 
Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. & Others (No. 2), [198012 All ER 
841. 
Purpoint Ltd., [ 199 11 BCC 12 1. 
R v. Campbell., [ 19841 BCLC 83. 
R v. Landy & Others 1198111 All E. R., 1172. 
R. v. Ghosh (1982) 2 All ER 689. 
R. v. Grantham, [ 198412 WLR 815. 
R. v. Kemp [198814 BCC 203. 
R. v. Seillon, [1982] Crim. L. Rev. 676. 
R. v. Sinclair [1968] 1 W. L. R. 1246. 
Regal(Hastings) v. Gulliver, 1194211 All E. R. 378, [196712 A. C. 134. 
Rolus Properties Ltd. [ 19881 BCC 446. 
Russell v. Wakefield Waterworks Co. [ 18751 L. R. 2 Eq. 474. 
S C. W. S. v. Meyer, [1959] A. C. 324. 
Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd. 11887] AC 22 
Sam Weller & Sons Ltd., [ 19901 BCLC 80. 
Sarflax Ltd., 119791 Ch. 592. 
Saunders &Another 119881 BCLC 43, denied 119901 BCLC 402. 
Savoy case, Second Savoy Hotel Investigation, Report of June 14,1954. 
Scott v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner [ 19751 A. C., 8 19. 
Secretary of Statefor Trade & Industry v. UcTighe & Another [ 199412 BCLC 284. 
Secretary ofStatefor Trade and Industry v. Langridge, 1199112 W. L. P, 1343. 
Sevenoak stationers (Retail) Ltd. [ 19901 BCC 765, [1991] 2 W. L. K 1343. 
Shaw -& Sons (Salford) Ltd. 193 50 1 K. B. 113. 
Sherbornes Associate Ltd., 19951 BCC 40. 
Shuttleworth v. Cox Bros. & Co. -[ 192712 K. B. 9. 
Smith & Others v. Croft & Others (No 2), [198713 All ER 909. 
Smith andFawcett, [1942] Ch. 304. 
Southard & Co. Ltd. - [ 197911 WLR 1198. [19781 BCLC 607,3 BCC 326.. 
xix 
Stanford Services Ltd. & Others 1198713 BCC 3 26. 
Swift 736 Ltd. f 19921 BCC 93, [19931 BCLC 19. 
Tasbian Ltd., 1198915 BCC 729. 
Tett v. Phoenix Property & Investment Co. Ltd. [ 19841 BCLC 559. 
Thomas v. Quartermaine 11887118 Q. B. D. 685. 
TravelMondial (U. K) Ltd. [19911 BCC 224. 
Turquand v. Marshall 11869] 4 Ch App. 3 76. 
Wallersteiner v. Moir (No. 2) 1197511 All E. R. 849,857. 
Walworth v. Holt (1841) 4 Myl. & Cr. 619. 
Wedgwood Coal and Iron Co. [ 1882147 L. T. 6T2. 
Wetfab Engineers Ltd., 11990]BCC600, [1990]BCLC833. 
Welham v. Director ofPublic Prosecutions [ 196 1]A. C. 103. 
West Mercia Safetywear v. Dodd, [1988]BCLC, 250. 
West ofEnglandandSouth Wales DistrictBank, ex. p. Dale& Co. [1879111 Ch. D. 772. 
"ite & Osmond (Parkstone) Ltd. [ 1960130 July (unreported). 
Hithtaker v. Bamford (A 11sop), [ 191411 Ch 1. 
William C. Leitch Brothers Limited (NO. 2)- [193 31 Ch 26 1. 
William C. Leitch Brothers Ltd. 1193212 Ch, 7 1. 
Wilson v. Brett, [ 1843 ]IIM&W 113. 
Wincham Shipbuilding & Boller Co. [ 187819 Ch. D. 3 22. 
Winkworth v. Edward Baron Development Co. Ltd., [ 198611 W. L. R 1512. 
2 US Cases 
A. C, Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1986) 103. 
Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 444 U. S. 1017; 100 S. Ct 670; 1980 U. S. LEMS 314; 62 L. 
Ed. 2d (1980) 647, (603 F. 2d (8th Cir. 1979) 724, cert denied, 444 US- (1980) 1017). 
Abramowitz v. Posner, 513 F. Sup. (S. D. N. Y. 1981) 120. 
A Ilaun v. Consolidated Oil Co., 16 Del. Ch. 318,147 A. (1929) 257. 
Allied Chemical & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., 14 Del. Ch. (Ch. 1923) 1. 
American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Werfel, 230 Ala. (1935) 552. 
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A. 2d (1983) 805. 
Ash v. LB. M. Inc., 353 F. 2d (3d Cir. 1965) 491. 
xx 
Asmussen v, Quaker City Corp., 18 Del. Ch. (1931) 28,156 A (Del. Ch. 1931) 180. 
Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N. Y. 2d (1979) 619. 
Bailey v. Bush Terminal Co., 46 N. Y. S. 2d 877. 
Bank Leumi- Le Israel, B. M. v. Sunbett Industries, Inc., 485 F. Sup. (S. D. Ga. 1980) 556. 
Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. (S. D. N. Y. 1924) 614. 
Baron v. AlliedArtists Pictures Corp., 337 A. 2d (Dcl. Ch. 1975) 653. 
Bates v. Dresser, 25 1, U. S. (1920) 524. 
Bayer v. Beran, 49 N. Y. S. 2d (Sup. Ct. 1994), r. 
Beech A ircra -2U. S Tax Cas. (CCH) 85,400, Affd, 797 . 
ft Corp. v. United States, 84 
F. 2d(lOth Cir. 1986) 920. 
Bennett v. Propp, 187 A. 2d (Del. Sup. Ct. 1962) 405. 
Blasius Industries Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1988) 651. 
Bodell v. General Gas & Electric Corp. 15 Del. Ch. 420,140 A. (Sup. Ct. 1927) 264. 
Bovay v. H. M Byllesby & Co., 38 A. 2d (Del. 1944) 808. 
Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 US (1891) 13 2. 
Burks v. Lasker, 441 U. S. (1979) 47 1. 
Capital Motor Lines v. Loring 239 Ala. (1939) 260. 
Cede & Co., Inc., v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A. 2d (1993) 345. 
Cinerama, Inc. v. Technocolor, No. 8358,1991 W. L. 111134. 
Clark v. Lawrence, 5 F. Cas. (C. C. D. Mass. 1856) 888. 
Clarkson Co. Ltd. v. Shaheen, 660 F. 2d. Cir. (1981) 506. 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub. 471 U. S. (1985) 343. 
Condec Corp. v. Lunkenhelmer Co., 143 Del. Ch., (1967) 353. 
Conley v. Gibson, 355 US. (1957) 4 1. 
Conrick Houston Civic Opera Assn, 99 S. W. 2d (Tex. Cin. App. 1936) 382. 
Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206, N. Y. (1912) 7. 
Cooke v. Teleprompter Corp., 334 F. Supp. (S. D. N. Y. 1971) 467. 
)OU 
Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U. S. (1903) 455. 
Cramer v. General Telephone & Electronics Corp., 582 F. 2d (3d. cir. 1978) 259. 
Credit Lyonnais Bank N. V Netherland v. Pathe Communication Corp., NO. 12150 (Del. Ch. 
1991) Lexis 215- 
Dinsmore v. Jacobson, 242 Mch. (1928) 192. 
Du Duy v. Crucible Steel Co., 288 Fed. (W. D. Pa. 1923) 593, (Quoted by Bishop, op cit at. 
1066). 
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 3 04 U. S. (193 8) 64. 
Farber v. Servan Land Co., 662 F. 2d (5th Cir. 1971) 375. 
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F. 2d (4th Cir. 1982) 973. 
Fitting Co. v. United States, 606 F. Sup. (N. D. Ohio 1985) 136. 
Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A. 2d (Del. 1976) 218. 
Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Association, 42 Cal. 3d. (1986) 490. 
Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 43 2 A. 2d (N. J. 1981) 814. 
Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub., 471 U. S, (1985) 343. 
Galef v. Alexander, 615 F. 2d (2d cir. 1980) 5 1. 
Gall v. Exxon Corp. 418 F. Supp. (S. D. N. Y. 1976) 508. 
Galler v. Galler, 32 111.2d 16, (1965) 27. 
Gearhar Industries,. Inc. v. Smith International, Inc., 741 F. 2d (5th Cir. 1984) 707. 
Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 276 A. 2d (Del. 1970) 883. 
Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 621 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1992) 784. 
Gimbel v. Signal Companies, Inc., 316 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1974) 599. 
Godbold v. Branch Bank, II Ala. (1847) 19 1. 
Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., A. 2d (1952) 57. 
Graham v. A llis(Alice)- Chalmers Mfg. Co. 41 Del. Ch. 78,188 A. 2d (Sup. Ct. 1963) 125. 
xxii 
GreenfleldSave. Bank v. Abercrombie, 211 Mass. (1912) 252. 
Grobow v. Perot, 526 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1987) 914,539 A. 2d (Del. 1988) 180. 
Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. (1939) 255,5 A. 2d (Del. 1939) 503.. 
Haber v. Bell, 465 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1983) 353, 
Har: ffv. Kerkorian, 324 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1974) 215. 
Hollins v. Brerfleld Coal & Iron Co. 150 U. S. (1893) 37 1. 
Insurance C. off Am. v. Sam Harris Constr. Ot, 22 Cal. 3d (1978) 409. 
James v. Getty Oil Co., 472 A. 2d 33 (Del. Sup. 1983). 
Johne- Manville Corp., 801 F. 2d (2d Cir. 1986) 60. 
Johnson v. Suckow, 53 111. App. 3d (1977) 277. 
Kaplan v. Centex Corp. 284 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1971) 119. 
Kaplan v. Goldsmat, 380 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1977) 556. 
Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc. 508 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1986) 873. 
Kerrigan v. Unity Sav. Association, 68 111.2d. (1974) 20. 
Klinicki v. Lundgren, 67 Ore. App. (1984) 160. 
Kmin v. American Express Co., 383 N. Y. S. 2d (1943) 807. 
Lewis v. Aronson, 466 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1983) 375. 
Lewis v. Fuqua, Unreported case, No. 7188. Spring, 1986 (Cited in II Del. I Corp. L., (1986) 
928. 
Lewis v. S. L&E, Inc., 629 F. 2d 764, (2d Cir. 1980) 769. 
Lewiss v. Honeywell Inc., Dd CH. (July 28 1987) 93. 
Libofv. Wotfson, 437 F. 2d (5th Cir. 1971) 12 1. 
Litwin v. Allen, 25 N. Y. S. 2d (Sup. Ct. 1940) 667. 
Logue Mechanical Contracting Corp., 106 Bankr. (1989) 436. 
xxiii 
Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. (S. D. Tex. 1980) 348. 
Maldonado v. Flynn 1,413 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1980) 1251. 
Maldonado v. Flyyn, 485 F. Supp. (S. D. N. Y. 1980) 274 
Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A. 2d (Del. 1987) 400. 
Meinhardv. Salmon, 249 N. Y. (1928) 459. 
Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. (1846) 503. 
Miller v. Miller, 3 01 Minn. (1974) 207. 
Montgomery Light Co. v. Lashey, 121 Ala. (1899) 13 1. 
Mooney v. Willys- OverlandMotors, Inc., 204 F. 2d (3d Cir. 1953) 888. 
Moricoli v. P. S. Mgt. Co., 104,111. App. 3d, (1982) 234. 
Munson v. Syracuse Geneva & Corning R., 103 N. Y. (1886) 59. 
N. Y. Dock Co. v. McCollom, 173 Misc. (193 9) 1069,16 N. Y. S. 2d (Sup. Ct. 193 9) 847. 
Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp. (D. Neb. 1972) 240. 
Norlin Corp. v. Booney, Pace, Inc., 77 F. 2d 255, (2d Cir. 1984) 564,744 F. 2d (2d. Cir. 
1984)255. 
Northern National Gas Co. V. McNulty, 307 F. 2d (5th cir. 1962) 432. 
Nussbacher v. Continental 111. National Bank & Trust Co., 518 F. 2d (7th Cir. 1975) 873. 
Panter v. Marshal Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. (N. D. 111.1980) 1168 
Pennsylvania Co. for Insurance v. South Broad Street Theatre Co., 20 Del. Ch. (193 4) 220, 
174 A. (Del. Ch. 1934) 112. 
Pepper v. Litton, 3 08 U. S. (193 9) 295. 
Percy v. Millaudon, 77 (La. 1829) 78. 
Petty v. Penntech Papers, Inc., 347 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1975) 140. 
Platt Corp. v. Platt, 249 N. Y. S. 2d (Sup. Ct. 1964) 1. 
Pool v. Pool., So. 2d (La. Ct. App. 1943) 132. 
Prokson v. Bettendorf, 218 Iowa (1934) 1376. 
xxiv 
Puma v. Marriott, 283 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1971) 693. 
Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corp., 547 A. 2d(1986) 960,498 A. 2d(1985) 1099. 
Ransome Concrete Mach. Co. v. Moody, 282 F. (1922) 29. 
Revlon Inc. v. McAndrews & Forbes Holding Inc., 506 A. 2d (Del. 1986) 173. 
Ritter v. Mutual Life Co., 169 U. S. 139, (1898) 154. 
Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Refining Corp., 283 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1971) 693. 
Science Accessories Corp. v. Summagraphics Ctqp., 425 A. 2d (Del. 1980) 957. 
SEC v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 855 F. 2d 677 (10th Cir. 1988). 
Shamrock Holdings, Inc., v. Polaroid Corp., No. 10075 (Del. Ch. Mar. 17,1989). 
Simon v. Gogan, A. 2d (Del. 1988) 300. 
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A. 2d (Del. 1971) 717. 
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A. 2d (Del. 1985) 858 
Sohland v. Baker, 15 Del. Ch. 431,141 A. (1927) 277. 
Solimine v. Hollander, 19 A. 2d (1941) 344. 
Spring's Appeal, 71 Pa., (1872) 11. 
Stanford Fork & Tool Co. v. Howe Brown & Co., 157 U. S. (1895) 312. 
Stoner v. Walsh, 772 F. Supp. (1991) 709. 
Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., 402 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1979) 382. 
Thicho Timber v. Sayer, 23 6 Nfich. (1926) 40. 
Thomas v. Kempner, 398 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1979) 320. 
Tomczac v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., Del. Ch. Ap., (1990) 5. 
Treadway Cos., Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F. 2d (2d Cir. 1980) 357. 
Twin- Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 US (1875) 587. 
U. S, Spitzer, 261 F. Sup. (S. D. N. Y. 1966) 754 
Uccello v. Golden Foods, Inc, 352 Mass. (1950) 319. 
xxv 
United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U. S (1917) 26 1. 
United States v. Swift & Co., 286 US. 106, (1932) 119. 
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 494 A. 2d (Del. 1985) 946. 
Warshaw v. Chalhoun, 43 Del. Ch. 148,221 A. 2d (Sup. Ct. 1966) 487 
niyileld v. Kern, 192 A. (1937) 48. 
Wood v. Drummer, 30F. Cas (1824) 93 5. 
A. Mý 
Xonics, Inc., 99 B. P, (Bankr. N. D. 111.1989) 870. 
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A. 2d (Del. 1981) 779,473 A. 2d (Del. 1984) 805. 
Zirn v. VLI Corp., 621 A. 2d (Del. 1993) 773. 
xxvi 
Chapter 1: General Introduction 
In undertaking a subject for research, it is intended to answer one or some particular 
questions, or to examine one or more specific aspects of the area concerned. This 
examination requires a different method of evaluation when more than one 
jurisdiction is involved. That is because after reviewing the materials relevant to 
each system and through the imposition of 
Yialectical 
reasoning, it is intended to 
consider the response of each legal system to the question, or its solution to the 
problem. The fruitful end of such a study is to make an evaluation of the solutions 
offered by the laws under consideration and to reveal advantages and disadvantages 
of one against the other in order to determine which legal system's solution is more 
advantageous. 
Some advantages can be suggested for a law comparative study. The result of the 
work can be used as an aid to the legislators, and also as a component of the 
curriculum of law departments. The main use of a comparative work is its 
contribution to the systematic unification' or harmonisation of different laws. 
A comparative study can be undertaken in different ways. In a comparative study of 
law, if the author just describes some aspects of two or more legal systems without 
comparing any feature of them, it is only "descriptive comparative" law. 2 But a 
comparative study of law in its real sense is to critically compare some specific 
aspects of the laws concerned, in order to suggest a solution for the problems in 
questiodor deficiencies of each legal system. Our study is based on the second or 
critical comparative study. 
I Konrad Zweigert & Kein Kotz, Introduction W-Comparative La , (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) at 15. 
2 Ibid at 6. 
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The question may be raised as to the purpose of undertaking a subject- study for 
research. In the modem commercial relations, the role of corporations is a key one, 
not only in domestic but also in international relationships. That is because 
company's liabilities are guaranteed not just by its own assets but they are also 
recoverable from the controlling shareholders' as well as directors' personal assets in 
the case of fraud, breach of duty of loyalty and gross negligence. Moreover, dealing 
with a legal entity with a registered centre of administration or principal place of 
business is easier and more desirable than a natural person who may refuse to fulfil 
his contractual obligations. ^&. 
In a company, two organs are very important, shareholders whose decisions are 
made in general meetings in the form of resolutions, and directors who control and 
manage the company in collective co- operation within the board of directors. This 
situation requires more consideration where both organs are dominated by the same 
persons. It is when directors or managing directors are controlling shareholders, and 
the privilege of limited liability may be abused. 
The business and affairs of a company are managed by or under the direction of a 
board of directors. 3 The relationship between a corporate directors and the company 
and its stockholders stems from the fact that directors have the control and guidance 
of corporate business affairs and property, and hence the interests of the corporation 
and stockholders. 4 
From the early history of company law, the company's directors have owed duties 
and obligations to its members. Such duties have also been owed, as the new trend 
3 Section 141 (a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law (Amd. 1992). See also the New York 
Business Corporation Law section 701 (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1986). Likewise, the Revised 
Model Business Corp. Act (1984) in section 8.01 (b) provides: 
"All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of 
the corporation managed under the direction of, its board of directors, subject to any limitation set 
forth in the articles of incorporation. " 
Likewise, in England Article 80 of Table A of the Companies Regulation Act 1995, provides that: 
"Subject to the provisions of the Act, the memorandum and the articles and to any directions given 
by special resolution, the business of the company shall be managed by directors who may exercise 
all the powers of the company. " 
4 Ashman v. Miller, 10 1 F. 2d (6th Cin. 1939) 85,90- 9 1. 
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of law, to its creditors and society at large whose interests should be protected. 
However, sometimes those company's constituents have suffered from loss and 
damage through the abuse of the privilege of limited liability by its directors. The 
anxiety has attracted the attention of the legislature as well as lawyers that the 
company's directors may take shelter behind the company, and by abusing that 
privilege and escaping their responsibility, suffer no personal liability when the 
company is sinking into massive debts. 
As a corporation approaches financial difficulties, a conflict of interests of 
shareholders and creditors becomes evident. 11at is because shareholders who find it 
a disadvantage to put their capital at risk, are reluctant to invest in the corporation, 
and sometimes particularly when they are shareholder- creditors or control the board 
of directors, may transfer its assets in a fraudulent way. In this situation, the 
deterrent role of law is the only means to protect the creditors' interests. 
Global competition has also had an impact on the role of the modern board. 
Corporations have shed layers of their hierarchical structures to meet the demands of 
the world economy. In addition, directors have begun emphasising their policy and 
oversight function with greater vigour to meet foreign competition. 
The reason why I chose the US, as the country that possesses "perhaps the most 
complicated legal structure that has ever been devised in man's effort to govern 
himself, " as the comparator to English law, was to see how this member of common 
law fan-dly has developed and to what extent it has departed from its English 
common law roots, and finally to answer the question whether the solutions offered 
by one can be implemented by the other- 
In studying US corporate law, it is not possible to examine all the States' laws, 
because 51 jurisdiction together with federal law can not be considered in a single 
work. The focus in the US part of research is on Delaware State law. That is because 
the governing law is that of the State of corporation. This State of corporation, as 
5 Griswold, Law and Lanyers in the-United States. The CommmLaw under Pressure, (1967) 264. 
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the cases indicate, is Delaware. 6The Delaware court system has been described as 
"the mother court of corporate law", 7where fifty percent of Fortune 500 companies 
are incorporated. 8 Moreover, the Delaware corporation model has been the choice of 
40% of all New York stock exchange companies, more than 50% of all fortune 
companies, and more than 8% of all companies incorporated in the past twenty five 
years. 9 Therefore, this legal system is the most appropriate choice for the purposes 
of this thesis. Other main jurisdictions such as New York law are referred to when 
necessary. State law not only determines the duties of directors but also determines 
how they may be found liable for their breacr of such duties. 10 Furthermore, where 
appropriate, some institutions' projects or recommendations particularly American 
Law Institute's proposed draft on corporate governance and the Revised Model 
Business Act are used throughout the thesis. 
At first, the rules of common law developed in both English and American laws are 
to be analysed. 
In English law, the Companies Act 1985 and its predecessors, the Insolvency Act 
1986 and the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 are employed as the 
statutory measures in the English part of this research. However, where necessary, 
the legislative background of each statute appeared in the reports prepared by the 
relevant committees such as Jenkins, Greene and Cork Comn-dttees are referred to 
accordingly to interpret the legislators' intention in enacting a particular provision. 
In the US part of the research although, unlike the UK, the US has a written 
constitution, this advantage in the area of our study does not cover the obvious lack 
of statutory provisions, and the situation is not as clear as it seems at first. That is 
6 For the judicial references see Dennis J. Block, Nancy E. Barton and Stephen A. Radin, The 
Business Judgment Rule- Fiduciajýý of Corporate Directors (New Jersey Prentice Hall Law & 
Business 1993) 2 footnote 8. 
7 Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc, 908 F. 2d [199011338,1343. 8 Franklin Balotti & Frankelstein, The Delaware-Law of Coll2orations and Business Organisations, 
d. 1990 & Supp. 1992), F- 1. 
Curtis Alva, "Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency", 15 I? g! -L Qrpj, (1990) 885,887. 
Y-Willis L. M. Reese & Edward M. Kaufman, "The Law Governing Corporate Affairs: Choice of Law and Impact of Full Faith and Credit", 58 Colum. L. Rev. (1958) 118,1124. 
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because the Bankruptcy Code 1978 which one may expect to be the main statutory 
tool for this study, is not helpful. This problem lies in the philosophy behind the 
enactment of the Code itself Congress adopted Bankruptcy Reform Act with the 
view to pushing managers of financially troubled firms toward reorganisation rather 
than liquidation. This view was based on the very fact that, reorganising a company 
was financially more efficient than liquidating it, because this not only preserves jobs 
and assets but it also prevents the imposition of considerably high expenses and costs 
on stockholders as security holders, employees, suppliers, and communities. " 
Chapter II is intended to provide a framew(Irk within which interested parties may 
negotiate for a financial reconciliation, 12 the scheme that has been always used 
versus liquidation. 13 
Other federal statutes are not more helpful than the Bankruptcy Code. The Securities 
Act 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act 1934 as other main federal acts do not 
refer to directors liabilities or duties in insolvency. Because the aim of those acts is 
described as protecting the investing public from losses due to the unavailability of 
relevant and reliable information, "and this aim was implemented by requiring that 
such information be publicly disclosed". 14 
Consequently, our main statutory source in the US part of the research is the 
Delaware General Corporation Law, though we utilise other States statutes 
particularly New York Business Corporation Law. As was mentioned, institutional 
efforts specially ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and 
Recommendations are widely used. 
The major difficulty inherent in the US part of study is that both federal and State 
statutes including the Delaware General Corporation Law are silent as to the 
II MichaelBradley and Mchael Rosenzweig, "The Untenable Case for Chapter 11", 101 Yale L. J. 
(1992) 1043- 44. 
12 Christopher W. Frost, "Running the Asylum: Governance Problems in Bankruptcy 
Reorganisations". 34 Arizona L. Rev, (1992) 99,92. 
13 Lynn M. Lopucki & William C. Whitford, "Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy 
Reorganisation of Large, Publicity Held Companies", 141 U. Pa. L. R. (1993) 669,800. 
14 Note, "Indemnification of Directors: the Problems Posed by Federal Securities and Antitrust Legislation", 76 Hary. L. Rev. (1963) 1412. , 
Corporate Directors'Duties &Liabilities in Insolvency in England and the US 
directors' liabilities in insolvency. This problem in some extent can be also seen in the 
American case law. It has been acknowledged even by the American lawyers that 
one reading US law in corporate insolvency area, will soon find that only a "few 
judges or scholars have taken this observation to heart. " 15 
For the purposes of this study insolvency in English law means that defined in 
section 214(6) of the Insolvency Act 1986.16 In US law, the insolvency is considered 
as a combination of definition given by section 1302 of the Delaware General 
Corporation Law, 17 and section 101(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, 18 to the effect that 
filing any petition under chapter II for Mrganisation or under chapter 7 for 
liquidation means insolvency. 
This thesis consists of three parts, English law, US law and comparative study. All 
these three parts are discussed under three main concepts, duties, liabilities, and 
protection of directors. 
In order to study directors' liabilities, the reader should first become familiar with the 
preliminary* concepts of liabilities related to their duties since violation of duty, and 
liability are considered as opposite sides of the same coin. 19 In other words, a 
director's liability is a result of his breach or disregard of his duty. Because the 
centrepiece of this research is directors' liabilities, their duties are reviewed to the 
extent that is necessary to explain those liabilities. Having an observation helps to 
answer this claim that directors duties "specially of large corporations not only do 
not do what the law envisages of them but, indeed, cannot fulfil the law's 
15 Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, "Corporate Reorganisations; and the Treatment of 
Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in 
Bankruptcy. " 51 U. Chicago L. Rev., (1984) 97. 
16 Section reads: (6) For the purposes of this section a company goes into insolvent liquidation if it 
goes into liquidation at a time when its assets are insufficient for the payment of its debts and other 
liabilities and the expenses of the winding up. 17 The section reads: "a person is insolvent when the present fair saleable value of his assets is less 
than the amount that will be required to his probable liability on his existing debts as they become 
absolute and matured. " The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act s. 2,7A U. L. A. 427,442 (19 18), 
offers a similar definition. 
Is IIU. S. C. A. 10 1(3 1), which reads: "the sum of ... [the] entity's debts is greater than all of such entity's property, at a fair valuation. " 
19 Claus J. Hopt, Directors' DutielAo Shareholders. Employees and Other Creditors: A View from 
the Continent, (Mt. Ewan McKendrick) (New York: Claran-den Press 1992) 115,12 1. 
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requirements. 0120 Even if this statement is academically correct, directors liabilities 
must be appropriate response to such breach of duties. Therefore, the concepts of 
duties and liabilities are truly opposite sides of the same coin. 
One may question my study on the protection of directors as a matter out of the 
scope of the research and an additional work. Perhaps considering the title of the 
thesis may justify this view, but as will be seen, in many cases on directors' liabilities, 
whether in England or in the US, the judges even without application from the 
defendant director(s) have acknowledged the necessity of resorting to the available 
protective provisions or rules that means the two concepts are twin features of the 
same legal invention. Moreover, the law in both countries, particularly in the US 
have been showing a tendency for a more liberal perspective of directors liability 
which at the same time requires protection. 
In the next chapter, duties of an English corporate director are examined. These 
duties in insolvency are apparently hanging over creditors' interests as the vulnerable 
group in this event, to whom directors' duties shift from shareholders. Before 
beginning with such responsibilities in insolvency, a review of duties in general is 
made to explain the roots of common law duty of care and skill and equity duties 
under the concept of fiduciary duties on the one hand, and the development led to 
the recognition of duties towards creditors, on the other hand. 
Chapter three considers different liabilities provided by common law and several 
statutory provisions in the Companies Act as well as Insolvency Act. The liabilities in 
English law are defined under three well- recognised headings, namely fraudulent 
trading, wrongful trading, and misfeasance. Other concepts such as fraudulent 
conveyance are considered only when they have been decided under one of those 
concepts. The interesting result of this chapter is to show how traditional English 
common law has developed a well- statutory system abandoning even some of its old 
20 Christopher S. Axworthy, "Corporate Directors- Who needs them? ", 51 hLR (1988) 273. 
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principles. Perhaps the provisions set out in section 214 for wrongful trading suffice 
to prove this radical departure. 
In chapter four, disqualification of directors in insolvency, based on the Company 
Directors Disqualification Act and its predecessors, is to be reviewed. It is true that 
this concept is a special feature or an additional liability and supplementary 
punishment against delinquent directors and should be thus considered within liability 
chapter, because of its significant impact upon companies management, it is studied 
in a separate chapter. In this chapter, there has been an attempt to look at the subject 
in detailed from a new sight, and elaborate-the fact that how this concept as a 
supplementary punishment has affected the directors' personal as well as business 
life. The noteworthy feature of this chapter is a detailed review of the historical 
development of law in this area. 
The fifth chapter is an attempt to answer the question what kind of protection is 
available to an English director against these wide range of liabilities, and whether he 
is properly protected. Comparing the attitude of the English legislature on this issue 
with directors' liabilities and disqualification leads the reader to the conclusion that 
the protection provided is not appropriate. Even there are still some serious 
uncertainties about the extent of the available protective devices which necessitate an 
amendment of the statutory law. 
Chapter six, as the first chapter of section two and a parallel to the same chapter in 
English law, considers the duties of US corporate directors. This chapter reveals the 
many common senses in this regard shared by both English and US laws rooted in 
the traditional common law. 
In chapter seven, the debate on liabilities of the American corporate directors 
examines that how undeveloped and unclassified this legal system is in this area and 
how the lack of judicial and statutory recognition of a set of concepts for this 
purpose is evident. 
The main advantage of US law which is a very well established protective system for 
its company directors, is evaluated in chapter eight, where a review of several 
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statutory mechanisms shows the liberal and generous attitude of the legislature 
towards directors. 
The final chapter of the second part, chapter nine, is a detailed examination of the 
business judgment rule as another advantage of this legal system. Although the rule 
reveals a particular protective feature of the US law, because it has some other 
functions such as being used as a measure for standard of due care, it is reviewed in 
a separate chapter. 
The final chapter, which is the only chapter of the third part of the thesis, compares 
different aspects of the two laws, and evaluates the solutions offered by each law to 
the problems of the other. After considering advantages and disadvantages of one 
legal system against the other, in final conclusions some suggestions are offered to 
solve and overcome the deficiencies inherent in the two laws respectively. 
At the end, there are some suggestions by the author for those who are willing to 
research in this field of law in the future. 
As to the methodology of my work, a brief examination is necessary. This study is 
virtually theoretical based on library work. Cases as the main source, most 
particularly in US law, have been used throughout the thesis. 
The main problem with which I faced during my research was the unavailability of 
materials related to the US law. This problem was more serious as to Delaware 
cases. Not only Delaware cases were not available in the Sheffield University 
libraries but also some main libraries throughout the country such as British Library, 
the library of the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies did not have this jurisdiction's 
cases, which was my choice of the US law. 
To overcome these difficulties, I had visited British Libraries a numerous times. I 
had also visited the library of the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies as well as 
other research centres located in London. 
I had to become an expert in using Lexis through which I extracted hundreds of 
Delaware cases and articles which I could not find in any library in the UK. 
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The Inter- Library Loan enabled to receive the materials which were not available in 
the UK, though for the ordered material to arrive, it took sometime 3-6 months. 
To complete my search, I used other computing services such as Bids and internet. 
The Legal Journals Index was the most available way of search to make sure that no 
article or case was missed. 
As a lawyer from a civil legal system where the higher education is heavily based on 
analytical study and taught courses, I needed to fan-dliarise myself with the common 
law system, its rules and solutions, and the new way of academic work which is an 
absolutely research study. . A. 
On the other hand, coming from a Persian country where the only official language is 
Persian and English is a foreign language, I had to overcome my difficulties and 
improve my skills of reading, understanding, interpreting and writing in English. 
This point should be noted that English law is central to the thesis, therefore, in the 
case of any ambiguity or confusion the reference is to be made to that law. 
English law for the purposes of this thesis includes Wales and excludes Irish as well 
as Scottish law. 
ARO. 
PART ONE: 
ENGLISHLAW 
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Chapter 2: Directors Duties in English Law 
1 Introduction 
In English law, directors owe duties to the company, to its shareholders and 
creditors, which may lead to civil proceedings for compensation. Additionally, they 
may find themselves criminally liable for over two hundreds offences arising from 
breach of such duties. ' As will be seen, the rules relating to directors duties concern 
controversial matters. 
The attitude of courts has radically changed so that while in the past the courts were 
reluctant to impose liability on directors for breach of their duties unless it gave rise 
to gross negligence, nowadays they seem stepping in the line with the new legislation 
of 1986 by demanding a more objective standard of conduct from corporate 
directors. Their duties which are classified under duty of care and skill on the one 
hand, and fiduciary duties on the other harid, should be considered in relation to 
misfeasance, specifically-npgligence, and wrongful Qr-fraudulent trading accordingly. 
The purpose of this chapter is not to engage to a great extent in a detailed debate of 
directors duties, but rather to introduce their duties so far as related to the next 
chapters on directors liabilities, namely wrpngfiul!! ý -. 
1raudulent trading and 
misfeasance, and disqualification. Moreover, as different aspecfs of breach of due 
care and skill in general and in insolvency will be examined under statutory 
provisions of misfeasance, fraudulent and wrongful trading respectively, such duties 
are to be studied in connection with and as an introduction for the above liabilities. 
David McIntosh, ". Open Declared an Company Directors", Tho-Independent (1990 Jan. 9) 19. 
Corporate Directors'Duties & Liabilities in Insolvency in England and the US 13 
In this chapter, first directors duty of care and skill and fiduciary duties In general are 
reviewed. The second part considers directors duties in insolvency or when their 
company has faced financial difficulty which focuses on duties to the company's 
creditors. 
2.2 Duty of Care and Skill 
Duty of care deals with the manner of exercise of the powers and discretion of a 
director. 2 The duty of skill refers to the Vpects and functions of expertise and 
qualification of directors, and to the standard applicable to the level of skill. 
As to the history of duty of care, much credit has been granted to Lord Atkin, whose 
"neighbour principle" has been viewed as the foundation of duty of care. His 
principle that 'you are to love your neighbour' was introduced in Donoghue v. 
Stevenson. 3 The principle is submitted as the foundation of the law of negligence, 4 
since in common law it is rare a single statement of a judge in a single case so 
significantly affects the development of the law, 5 as it happened in that case. 
However, the cause of action, in the instant case, was damages for personal injuries 
which is difficult to apply to financial loss. Moreover, the decision was neither 
intended, nor can be treated as being a general formula which will explain every 
conceivable case of negligence. 6 Therefore, as is suggested by Smith and Bums, it is 
the time that "the case was laid gracefully to rest in the tombs of the law reports. " 
The most important step to introduce a test for the existence of duty of care was 
taken by Lord Wilberforce in Anns v. Merton London Borough Council. 8 In this 
2 The concept of duty of care was criticised by Buckland who thought that the duty of care was a 
"superfluous notion". W. Buckland, "The Duty to Take Care", 51 LQR (1935) 637. 
3 [19321 A. C. 562,590. 
4 In Peahody Donation Fund v. Sir. L. Parkinson & Co. [198413 All E. R. 529,534 Lord Keith 
expressed that the law of negligence was founded on Lord Atkin's principle. 5 j. C. Smith and Peter Bums, "Donoghue v. Stevenson- The not Golden Anniversary", 46 hLR 
983) 147. 
R. F. V. Heuston, "Donoghue v. Stevenson in Retrospect", 20 = (1957) 1,23. 7 Smith and Bums, op cit at 163. 8 [19781 A. C. 728. 
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case, the judges referring to Lord Atkin's judgment in Donoghue v. Stevenson, 9 as 
the proper solution, agreed with Lord Wilberforece who said: 
" ... in order to establish that a duty of care arises in a particular situation, it is 
necessary to bring the facts of that situation within those of previous situations in 
which a duty of care has been held to exist. " 10 
This view is now described as "out of fashion" in modem English law. " Likewise, 
Davies J. gave an example as to the existence of duty of care, when he said: 
"[A] duty of care exists only if X when making his statement knew or ought to have 
known that Y would rely on it for the purpose of such a transaction as Y did, in fact, 
enter into. " 12 
Although the "neighbour principle" was an appreciated introduction to define the 
duty of care. and the concept of negligence in its general sense, it is difficult to 
recognise such significance of the rule in some specific areas of the law, particularly 
corporation relationship. For example, in such an analogy the question is, who is the 
neighbour, to whom a corporate director's duties are owed, the company as a strictly 
separate personality, its shareholders, or its Qj4ors? To answer this question, it 
seems an attempt is necessary to apply a more appropriate principle to directors 
duties than "neighbour principle". We will later address the question in our 
discussion of'to whom directors owe their duties. ' 
2.2.1 Duty of Care Implications 
It is believed that Common law imposes a very light duty upon directors, as to their 
level of care and skill and competence which they may reasonably be expected to 
demonstrate. 13 The main characteristics of such common law duties are; lack of 
9 [19321 A. C. 562. 
10 lbid at 580. See also Anns v. Merton London Borough Council 119781 A. C. 728,751- 2. This 
case was overruled by House of Lords' decision in Murphy v. Brentwood District Council [ 199012 
All E. R. 908. 
11 Stephen Quinlan and David Gardiner, "New Developments with Respect to the Duty of Care in 
Tort". 62 Aus. L. J. (1988), 3 47,3 6 1. 
12 Al- Alakib Investments (Jersey) Ltd. & Another v. Longcroft and Others, [ 199013 All E. R. 321 
at 366. 
13 Kevin Wardman, "Directors, Their Duty to Exercise Care and Skill: Do the Provisions of the 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 Provide a Basis for the Establishment of a mere 
objective Standard"? Bus. Law. Rev. (1994) 7. This can be seen particularly in cases such as 
'I 
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expertise, non- attendance at general meetings and reliance on others etc., which had 
been regarded as matters of justification rather than fault. 14 The traditional common 
law, . thus, seems operatifilto give directors a remarkable freedom to run companies 
even in some occasions incompetently. Provided that their behaviour falls short of 
the grossest negligence, they are unlikely to be held accountable. 15 
The main functions of duty of care which are duty of attention, attendance and 
reliance on others, and delegation of powers are discussed in the following sections. 
Z 2.1.1 Duty of attendance and attention ' 
In the past, it could be said that a director was not obliged to attend meetings 
because his appointment did not imply any obligation of attendance. In the absence 
of any contract or provision in the articles to this effect, a director was not required 
to devote whole or indeed any particular part of his time to the company. 16 For 
example, in re Cardiff Saving Bank (Bute's Case) 17 this question was considered. In 
this case, the Marquis of Bute became president of the Cardiff Saving Bank when he 
was only six month old, inheriting the office from his father. He attended only once 
in board meeting in thirty- eight years. Furthermore, he was unaware of irregularities 
which had occurred, and had received copies of reports and circulars issued by the 
bank which, in the court's view, justified him to believe the company's affairs were 
being conducted in conformity with the rules. The court was not prepared to hold 
1ýrn liable because it believed: 
" ... omission to attend the meetings of the bank was not the same as neglect or 
omission of the duties which ought to have been performed at those meetings; and that 
under circumstances B. was not liable" 18 
Overend & Gurney Co. Ltd. v. Gibb. [18721 LR 5 HL 480 at 487, re Brazilian Rubber Plantations 
&Estates Ltd. [19111 Ch. 425,436, Languas Nitrate Co. Ltd. [1899] 2 Ch. 392,435. 
14 L. S. Sealy, "Reforn-drig of the Law on Directors Duties", 12 Co. Law. (1991) 175,176. 15 Vanessa Finch, "Who Cares about Skill and Care? " 55 (1992) 179. 16 Re Forest ofDean Coal Mining Company 11878110 Ch. D. 450,452. 17 [189212 Ch. 100. 
18 Ibid at 101. 
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Here, Stirling J. was not prepared even to recognise that attending at meetings was a 
duty failure of which would lead to liability for breach of duty of care. 
The second proposition of Romer J. in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Company 
Ltd. 19 is a very well- known formula representing this view as follows: 
"A director is not bound to give continuous attention to affairs of his company. His 
duties are of an intermittent nature to be performed at periodical board meetings, and 
at meetings of any committee upon which he happens to be placed. He is not, however, 
bound to attend all such meetings, though he ought to attend whenever in 
circumstances he is reasonably able to do so. "20 
The implication of this head is that the non- attendance at general meetings is not a 
sufficient ground to hold a director liable for losses suffered by his company as a 
result of his non- attendance. However, in the last phrase of the proposition, a 
director is required to attend whenever he is reasonably able to do so. In this part of 
proposition, the expression "ought to attend" implies a somehow mandatory duty 
which seems inconsistent with the first line of that statement. 
Gore- Browne is of the view that this part of Romer's judgment can, expressly or 
implicitly, be displaced by a contract between the company and its directors. In the 
absence of such agreement, the implication of the proposition is that a director 
whose non- attendance has caused losses to the company will not be held liable for 
those losses, neither will he be accountable because his attendance may have 
prevented his colleagues from taking a negligent decision giving rise to the JOSS. 21 
In re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates Ltd 22 Neville J. went further to say: 
"He is not, I think, bound to take any definite part in the conduct of the company's 
business, but so far as he does undertake it he must use reasonable care in its despatch. 
Such a reasonable care must, I think be measured by the care an ordinary man n-dght 
be expected to take in the same circumstances on his own behalf"23 
Even long before Romer J. 's famous judgment, Lord Bacon stated that a director's 
"business or pleasure may call him elsewhere and it would be a most unheard of 
19 [192511 Ch. 407, 
20 lbid at 429. 21 Gore- Brown -- (Jordans 44th ed. ) Para. 27.19.2. 22 [ 19,111 Ch. D 425. 
23 lbid at 437. 
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thing to say that if anything wrong was done at a board meeting he being named 
among the directors but not present, he is liable for what is done in his absence. "24 
The question normally arises whether such a traditional approach can still be applied. 
It seems that in today's complicated and highly specialised business relationships, as a 
result of the rapid development of technology and commerce, there is no room for 
the principle developed in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd, when the 
appointment of a director was part- time or honourable in nature. It is, thus, not 
justified to apply the requirement of attention and attendance to directors of different 
companies or different classes of directors in the same company equally. In other 
words, to apply the requirement, a distinction should be drawn between public and 
private companies, and between executive and non- executive directors. 
The first and the most significant, and perhaps the only judicial precedent that took a 
different stand from the traditional view was Charitable Corporation v. Sutton, 25 
where it was held that if directors were sued for gross non- attendance, and leaving 
the management entirely to others, they might have been guilty of the breaches of 
trust committed by others. 26Similarly, in Dorchester Finance Co. Ltd v. Stebbing, 21 
the court held that it was not acceptable for directors not to attend board meetings, 
therefore, they were liable for losses incurred. 
2.2.1.2 Reliance on and delegation oftowers to others 
Directors particularly in large companies are not obviously able to carry out all 
functions themselves either because of lack of time or skill, therefore, they are 
entitled to rely on others. That is because business "can not be carried on upon 
principles of distrust. Men in responsible positions must be trusted by those above 
them, as well as by those below them, until there is reason to distrust them. "28 
24 re MontrotierAsphalte Company (Perry's Case) 11876134 L. T. 716,717. 
25 [174212 Atk. 400. 
26jbjj, j4, - ý0_5, z 
27 119891 BCLC 498. 
28 Re National Bank of Wales, Ltd. [ 189912 -Ch. 629,673. 
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Romer J. in his third proposition in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. Ltd. 29 
acknowledged such a power conferred on directors as follows: 
"In respect of all duties that, having regard to the exigencies of business, and the 
articles of association, may properly be left to some other official, a director is, in the 
absence of grounds for suspicion, justified in trusting that official to perform such 
duties honestly. " 
However, if some specific powers or areas of responsibility are delegated to 
directors under a company's articles or through any process, then they will not 
normally be entitled to sub- delegate them to others. Except when such specific 
powers or discretion are vested in director, -*, -there is no limitation on the extent to 
which directors can delegate their powers to others. 30 But it is not to be accepted as 
a good defence unless it is reasonable. 31 In order to recognise such a reliance as 
reasonable, there should be no ground for suspicion. 32 In Dorchester Finance Co. 
Ltd v. Stebbing, 33 the court, for example, dismissed the defendant directors' 
argument that non- executive directors with some accounting experience were 
I entitled to rely on the diligence of the auditors and do nothing themselves. 34 
It is also submitted that when there is no ground for suspicion, no supervision is 
necessary, 35 as it was pointed out by the Earl of Halsbury in Dovey v. Coi. V6 where 
he said: 
"it can not be expected of a director that he should be watching the inferior officers of 
the bank or verifying the calculations of the auditors himself. The business of life could 
not go on if people could not trust those who are put into a position of trust for the 
express purpose of attending to details of management. "37 
29 [19251 Ch. 407,429. 
30 M. J. Trebilcock , "The Liability of Company Directors For Negligence", 32 hmL (1969) 499, 507, Allan Mackenzie, "A Company Director's Obligations of Care and Skill", ML, (1982) 460, 
462, see also Leeds Banking Company [ 18661 L. P, I Ch. App. 56 1. 
31 Land Credit Co. of1reland v. Lord Fermory [ 1870] LR 5 Ch. App 763. 32 Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. Ltd. [ 19251 Ch. 407,429. 
33 119891 BCLC 498. 
34 lbid at 505. 
35 Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. Ltd. 11925] Ch. 407 at 430. 36 [19011 A. C. 477,493. 
37 lbid at 486. 
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Because the so- entrusted officials are the agents and servants of the company but 
not of the directors, the directors are, thus, not responsible for their misdeeds, 
However, the directors may be held liable for personal negligence. 38 In Land Credit 
Company of Ireland v. Lord Fermoy, 39 Lord Hatherley L. C. confirmed the 
argument advanced by the counsels for plaintiff that the defendant director was 
appointed and paid by shareholders to protect them, and that he could not be 
allowed to say that he was not liable because he did not attend, or because he trusted 
his colleagues. Flis Lordship went on to state: 
"I am exceedingly reluctant in any way to exAmerate directors from performing their 
duty, and I quite agree that it is their duty to be awake and their being asleep would not 
exempt them from the consequences of non- attending to the business of the 
company.,, 40 
Similarly, in Norman and Another v. 7heodore Goddard (a firm) & Others, 41 
Hoffmann J. held that a director was entitled to trust persons in positions of 
responsibility until there was reason not do so. 
With regard to the line of decisions made by the courtS, 42 it is justified for directors 
to trust officers or employees in performing administrative or subordinate functions 
within the company to discharge their duties honestly. In the result, directors in some 
cases could have escaped liability when accountants or other executive officers to 
whom they delegated functions of company's affairs, misrepresented the company's 
financial state or have breached other duties. 43 
The delegation of powers, in comparison with other implications of duty of care 
which so far have been reviewed, can be described as the only one on wl-kh there is 
38 Gower's Principles of Modem Company La (London: Sweet & Maxwell 1992) 588. 39 [1870] L. K5 Ch. App. 763. 
40 Ibid at 770. Likewise, in more recent case of Department ofHealth and Social Security v. Wayte 
[ 197911 W. L. P, 19, it was held that a director should have had an eye on others. 
41 [19911 BCLC 1028. 
42 Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. Ltd. [ 19251 Ch. 407, Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and 
Estates Ltd. [ 191111 Ch. 425, Dovey v. Cory, [ 190 1]A. C. 477,485, Re Denham & Co [ 1883125 
Ch. D. 752. 
43 Gore- Browne on c mpanies., at 27- 043. 
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an unammous agreement, and both traditional and modem common law are of 
sin-dlar position in its application or - general definition. 
2.2.2 Standard of Conduct 
To assess the duty of care and skill some different standards of conduct have been 
recognised as subjective, objective and partly objective. 
2.2.2.1 Traditional or subjective view 
This view which still follows the propositian delivered by Romer J. in re City 
Equitable Fire Insurance Company Ltd., 44 denies the possibility of the application 
of even a partly objective standard of conduct. The courts have often applied the rule 
that directors are not required to demonstrate a special care and skill in serving on 
the board. However, it does not mean if they have possessed a special knowledge, 
they are not expected to give the advantage of that knowledge to their company 
while taking a business decision, specially in transacting a contract. The first case 
which referred to this standard was re Brazilian Rubber Plantations & States Ltd., 45 
where four directors of the company were induced to join the company as directors. 
Although they were said to have been ignorant, Neville J. did not hold them liable for 
losses incurred in a ruinous speculation in rubber plantations by concluding: 
"A director's duty has been laid down as requiring him to act with such care as is 
reasonably to be expected from him to act, having regard to his knowledge and 
experience. He is, I think, not bound to bring any special qualifications to his office. He 
may undertake the management of a rubber company in complete ignorance of 
everything connected with rubber, without incurring responsibility for the mistakes 
which may result from such ignorance"46 
However, the court stated that if the director possessed any special acquaintance 
with the rubber business, he was supposed to give the company advantage of his 
knowledge when transacting its business. 
44 [192511 Ch. 407. 
45 [ 191111 Ch. D. 425. 
46 lbid at 437. - 
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It is widely agreed upon that the first proposition advanced by Romer J. in re City 
Equitable Fire Insurance Company Ltd. 47 represents this approach as follows: 
"A director need not to exhibit in the performance of his duties a greater degree of skill 
than may reasonably be expected from a person of his knowledge and experience. "48 
As will be seen, there is some disagreement among legal writers as to the implication 
of this part of Romer J. 's judgment. Most of leading commentators agree upon the 
point that this head implies nothing but simply a subjective formula for duty of care 
and skill. 49Therefore, a director's knowledge, skill, and experience is the criterion to 
assess his performance. 
IWP. 
2.2.2.2 Ob/ective test 
The proponents of the objective test are of the view that in assessing a director's 
performance of his duty of care and skill, applying a merely subjective test not only 
leaves the interests of different constituencies of the company open to abuse on the 
part of unqualified directors, but it may also encourage incompetent individuals to 
join the board of directors. This opinion also takes account of the needs of modem 
business relationships which can no longer be satisfied by employing a subjective 
test. The first case representing this view was Charitable Corporation v. Sulton, 50 
the case which was never followed. 
In the light of this approach, the first proposition of Romer J, has been interpreted in 
a special way. Gower expressly points out that the proposition "prescribes a test 
which is partly objective (the standard of reasonable man), and partly subjective (the 
reasonable man is deemed to have the knowledge and experience of the particular 
individual), "51 the interpretation which has received other commentators' support. 52 
47 [1925] 1 Ch. 407. 
48 Ibid at 428. See also Gurney & Co. v. Gibb. [18721 LR 5 (HL) 480. 49 L. S. Sealy, "Refonning the Law" 12 Co. L (1991) 75, Farrar's Company Law, (London: 
Butterworth 1991) 397, Gore- Browne on Companies, (44th ed. ) para. 27.19.1. 50 11742] 2 Atk 400. 
51 Gower. Princi ompany-L-aw at 587. 52 Mackenzie op cit at 46 1. 
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It is surprising to see both Gower's and Mackenzie's opinions were first posed prior 
to the enactment of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 and the 
Insolvency Act 1986. However, comparing the language employed by Romer J. in 
that case and section 214(4) of the Insolvency Act, leads to the conclusion that in 
Romer J. 's holding, unlike that section, a negative language is employed. In other 
words, the proposition of Romer J. does not require a director to show a grater 
degree of care and skill expected of a reasonable man, but in contrast, it draws a 
ceiling on the performance of his duties where he is not bound to exhibit a greater 
degree of skill "may be expected from a persm of his knowledge and experience. " 
2.2.2.3 A third alternative 
This prospect impressed both by the traditional and objective views, is based upon 
the argument that the attitude of today's business world to and, thus, its expectation 
from a corporate director has radically changed, so that a director is considered as a 
professional person with some managerial and accounting knowledge and minimum 
level of skill and diligence necessary to manage a company. Such minimum of skill 
and diligence varies depending upon the complication and size of the company. 
However, as a director possessing some particular knowledge, a minimum level of 
care and skill in serving public or specialised companies is inevitable. For example, a 
director is now required to lay the company's accounts before the company in 
general meeting. 53Having some financial knowledge and accounting information is, 
thus, very necessary if a director is to manage a business competently. 54 
This view has been acknowledged by Mr. Justice Lightman who suggests that to 
mitigate the damaging consequence of corporate failure and insolvency, directors, 
specially those of publicly- held corporations should be required to be licensed as fit 
and proper persons to be directors. This licence should not be renewed in the case of 
53 Section 241 of the Companies Act 1985. 
54 John Bouch, "Directors' Accounting Duties", JBL (1985) 447. 
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proven criminal conviction for an offence of dishonesty or a proven responsibility for 
a failure to file annual report. 55 
It has been suggested that an objective test should be applied but the one which does 
not discourage directors from improving their level of skill. Such a test varies with 
size of the company and complication of its activity. In other words, based on this 
formulation, a director is expected to exhibit the care and skill reasonably expected 
of a person who has undertaken their kind of role in their kind of company. 56 
Moreover, this formulation empowers the courts to apply a reasonable test to 
mr- particular facts of each case. 
Under this view, even Romer J. 's first two propositions should be regarded in 
connection with the 1986 legislation. Farrar suggests that the propositions must be 
reconsidered in the light of the wrongful trading provisions, 57 the fact which has also 
been acknowledged by other legal writers. Finch, with reference to Farrar, making 
attempts to justify a relationship between section 214 and duty of skill, finds it 
difficult to do so, because this section only applies to insolvent liquidation cases but 
not to the company's whole trading life. However, she reaches the conclusion that it 
is "arguable that standards set by the duty of skill and care should be raised to reflect 
the objective nature of section 214. "58 
Hoffinann L. J. 's holding in re D'Jan of London Ltd, 59 is a turning point in this 
regard, who for the first time adopted the measure provided in section 214 as an 
appropriate test for directors' conduct, and stated: "In my view, the duty of care 
owed by a director at common law is accurately stated in section 214(4). "60 
This judgment which deserves to be considered as a significant move in the history 
of English case law, raises the question whether this holding should be viewed as 
55 Mr. Justice Lightman, "The Challenges Ahead: Address to the Insolvency Lawyers Association" 
JBL (1996) 113,125. 
3-6 Finch op cit at 202- 3. 
57 Farraes Company Law, 397- 398. 
58 Finch op cit at 203. 
59 [199411 BCLC 561,563. 
60 The emphasis added. 
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violating the provisions of section 214(4) or as a development of the common law? 
In a civil law system, one can easily hold that judgment inconsistent with the 
statutory provisions, because section 214 limits the application of that hybrid 
standard only to insolvency cases. However, a common law lawyer finds no difficulty 
to argue that the limits provided in that section does not block the way of common 
law system to operate, and the judges are still empowered to deliver their opinions in 
the form of judgments as the main ground of common law. Moreover, the section 
does not prohibit the test concerned to apply in non- insolvency cases. 
In proposing an appropriate standard of conduct some considerations should be 
taken into account: 
i- The complexity and nature of the company operation. It is not easy to challenge 
the fact that the level of performance required from directors of a small family 
company can not be the same as that from directors of a giant multinational 
corporation with a complicated financial communication and astronomical tum-over. 
Today's courts are required 'to consider the size and the nature of the enterprise and 
the skills reasonably to be expected of a director in the role they have assumed. '61 
ii- The qualifications possessed by director, the nature and the kind of task he is 
employed to perform. This point deals with the skill and qualification which a 
director has actually possessed on the one hand, and the level of expertise which his 
job requires from him on the other hand. A judgment cannot be regarded as 
consistent with justice principles if it holds a director, whose task is only to manage 
the employment affairs of the company with no accounting knowledge, to 
demonstrate the same level of performance as a finance director with a high 
accounting expertise. 
iii- Being executive or non- executive director, since the latter is not required to 
demonstrate the same depth of experience as to the company's affairs as a full- time 
director. The importance of the role of non- executive directors which should be 
61 Finch op cit at 203. 
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encouraged is a significant point. In Birds' view, in applying a proper managerial 
standard which is lighter for non- executive directors, the difficulty that the courts 
face is their traditional reluctance to interfere with business decisions. Referring to a 
three propositions stated by Foster J. in Dorchester Finance Co. Ltd. v. Stebbing'62 
which are similar to those proposed by Romer J. in re City Equitable Fire Insurance 
Company Lid. 63, he believes that they can safely be applied to a non- executive or 
part- time director, but not to an executive director who is also an employee of the 
company. 64 In that case, the same test of skill and care applied to both executive and 
non- executive directors. Likewise, Gower i&-of the opinion that the second head of 
Romer J. 's proposition applies only to non- executive directors from whom nothing 
more is expected than attendance at meetings. 65 
At the end, itAyorth noting that under the Cadbury Code, the responsibilities 
imposed on directors have been increased. Moreover, the Cadbury Committee has 
proposed a representative- system to monitor the corporate affairs. These 
developments will require a new definition of the duty and standard of care. 
2.3 Fiduciary Duties 
2.3.1. A Fiduciary Relationship 
Fiduciary concept as a concept of equity was the trustee and the trusts being creature 
of the Court of Chancery and under its exclusive jurisdiction. 66 Although the law of 
trusts is a separate branch of law with its own textbooks and principles, the 
expression "fiduciary" was used and still is sometimes used in an indefinite and 
descriptive sense which embraces all trust- like status situations including the trust 
itself. 67 The term "fiduciary" is derived from the Latin "fiduciariUs", implying a 
62 [19891 BCLC 498. 
63 [192511 Ch. 407. 
64 John Birds, "A Code of Directors' Duties", hU (1974) 1163,1165. 65 Gowees Principles of Modem-Company Law at 589. 66 j. PL Maurice Gautreau, "Demystifying the Fiduciary Mystique" 68 Can. Bar. Rev. (1989) 1. 67 L. S. Sealy, "Fiduciary Relationships", 
_CU 
(1962), 69,72. [Thereafter Sealy, M, (1962)] 
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trustee or one in a position of trust and as used in the law includes anyone holding 
the character of a trustee or the like'68while trust relationship falls within fiduciary 
concept. 69 
Corporate directors are fiduciaries and even in certain circumstances trustees as to 
any assets come into their hands and are not allowed to enter into contract with their 
company unless empowered by articles. This relationship described by Fry J. in Ex p. 
Dale & CO. 70 as follows; 
"What is a fiduciary relationship ? It is one in respect of which if a wrong arises, the 
same remedy exists against the wrongdoer on behalf of the principal as would exist 
against a trustee on behalf of the cestui que trusV171 
This statement is considered as a description of a common feature of fiduciary 
relationship rather than a pervasive definition, when it is obvious that in order to find 
a general definition of fiduciary relationship they should be defined class by class to 
find out the rule or rules which govem on each clasS. 72 
In an interesting analogy, fiduciary relationships have been described as children of 
the forced marriage of agency and trust law, being drawn respectively from common 
law and equity concepts. 73 In dealing with conflict of interests, in respect of whether 
trustees or corporate directors are parties to such a conflict, the turn is to fiduciary 
concept. 
The main element of a fiduciary duty is considering berieficiary's interests which 
operates not only as "a goal toward which the fiduciary must direct his assertions, 
but also provides a yardstick against which to assess the fiduciaries assertions of 
loyalty". 74 
To explain a fiduciary relationship, a range of theories such as "property theory", 
"unjust enrichment", "undertaking or contractual theory", and "undue influence" 
68 Ernest Vinter, "Histoly and Law of Fiduciaa Relationship and Resulting Trusts" (Cambridge: 
W. Heffcr & Sons Ltd., 1955) 1. 
69 Robert Flannigan, "The Fiduciary Obligation", 9 Oxford J. L. S- (1989) 285,30 1. 
70 re West ofEngland and South Wales District Bank, ex. p. Dale & Co. [ 1879111 Ch. D. 772. 71 Ibid at 778. 
72 Sealy, M, (1962) at 73. 73 j. C. Shepherd "Towards an Unjustified Concept of Fiduciary Relationships" 97 LM (1981) 5 1. 74 Ross Grantham, "Reforming the Duties of Company Directors" 12 Co. Law. (1991) 27,28. 
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have been suggested. The first theory, "property theory", which seems to be the 
leading doctrine, includes all the situations where one person has control over 
property which in the court's view belongs to another. Guardians, bailiffs, and 
stewards as well as a person who receives a property for a purpose which can not be 
carried out, fall into this category. 75 
2.3.2 To Whom Directors Owe Their Duties 
As was earlier mentioned in our discussion of "neighbour principle", the question is 
important that to whom a corporate direct6r owes his duties. This question applies 
to both fiduciary and care duties. 
It is well- recognised that directors owe their fiduciary duties to the company only 
and not to its individual shareholders, or afortiori to a person who has not become a 
member as potential purchaser of shares. 76 Prentice is of the view that this statement 
does not mean that the interests of shareholders or creditors should not be taken into 
I account by directors, rather it means that directors do not owe a 
"free- standing" 
duty because of their status to creditors or shareholders. 77 
It seems Prentice rightly believes that directors' duties to those constituencies are 
mediated through the corporation, and are not owed directly. Some judicial 
authorities have introduced the concept of the "corporate as a separate identity" as 
beneficiary. 78 
Although directors are required to act in the interests of the company as a separate 
personality, they are not expected to act on the basis of what is recognised as an 
economic advantage of the corporate entity, disregarding the interests of the 
members. In other words, when the members are entitled to receive a benefit, e. g. a 
75 For a detailed discussion of different theories defining a fiduciary relationship see Sealy L. S. 
"Some Principles of Fiduciary Obligation", M (1963) 119, J. C., Shepherd op cit at 63, Gareth 
Jones, "Unjust Enrichment and the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty", 84 LM (1968) 472. 76 Percival v. Wright [190212 Ch. 421, Dawson International Plc. v. Coats Patons Plc. [198814 
BCC 305. 
77 D. D. Prentice, Directors. Creditors. and Shareholders (Edit. Ewan McKcndrick) (Oxfor: 
Clarendon Press 1992) 73. 
78 Charterbridge Corp. Ltd. v. Lloyds Bank'Ltd. 119701 Ch. 62. 
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payment of dividends, the directors should not use such a payment by directing all to 
the company so as to increase the size and wealth of the company. 79 
Because directors' duties towards the company have, at various times, been in 
conflict with their position to its individual members, or a particular group of the 
members, or its creditors, it is traditionally accepted that towards each of them 
directors owe no legal duties whatever, least of all towards the company's 
creditors. 90 This sense can be seen in Jenkins Committee report which stated: 
"no fiduciary duty is owed by a director to individual members of his company, but 
only to the company itself, and a fortiori that'none is owed to a person who is not a 
member. "81 
Under the old rules of company law, directors' duties were regarded as being owed 
to the company only, and for this purpose the company's interests were equal to 
those of the members collectively, but not to the other groups' interests such as 
employees, creditors, customers and suppliers. According to this traditional 
approach, the law equates members of company to its shareholders until the statute- 
determined point of insolvency, unless the members agree otherwise. 82However, the 
traditional view that directors' duties are owed to the company and its shareholders 
but not other groups, has been challenged as "too narrowly focused. "83 The best 
guideline in this regard is section 309 of the Companies Act 1985 which reads: 
"The matters to which the directors of a company are to have regard in the 
performance of their functions include the interests of the company's employees in 
general as well as the interests of its members. " 
However, the section expresses that "the duty imposed by this section on the 
directors of a company is owed by them to the company (and the company alone). 1184 
79 Ibid at 554. 
80 L. S. Sealy, "Directors Wider Responsibilities- Problems: Conceptual, Practical and Procedural", 
13 Monash (1987), 164,166. [Thereafter Sealy Monash UL (1987)] 81 Jenkins Comn-dttee Report, Cmnd. 1749 (1982) Para. 89. 82 David A. Wishart, "Models and Theories of Directors' Duties to Creditors", 14 N. Z. L. U. L. 
Rm (1991) 323,353. 
ý3 L. S. Sealy, Monash UL (1987) at 169. 84 Subsection 2 of section 309 of the Companies Act 1985. 
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It seems the header of the section does not quite accord with its footer. In the header 
it refers to the interests of "the company's employees in general as well as the 
interests of its members", whereas in subsection (2) it emphasises on "the company 
(and the company alone). " 
The only justification for employing this language is that because the legislature is 
not expected to contradict itself in the same section, the latter statement should be 
interpreted in compliance with the former by reasoning that the legislature's intention 
is to expressly exclude other parties, particularly employees from taking actions 
which in long term may destabilize the bushtess relationship, and to put the right of 
taking action in the hands of the company alone, whether exercised by the board of 
directors or general meeting of its shareholders. 
The development of the law has proved the need for broadening the scope of the rule 
to other groups in a company. When it is said 'the interests of the company wholly', 
the expression should be interpreted as company itself, its members, as stated by 
Lord Evershode in Greenhalgh v. Ardene Cinemas: 85 
think it is now plain that "bonafide" for the benefit of the company as a whole" 
means two things but not one thing. It means that the director must proceed upon 
what, in his honest opinion, is for the benefit of the company as a whole. The second 
thing is that the phrase, "the company as a whole" does not (at any rate in such case as 
the present) mean the company as a commercial entity, distinct from corporators: it 
means the corporators as a general body. " 
The recent judicial approach not only has showed a trend towards the concept "the 
company as a general body or as a whole" by admitting the present members within 
this concept, but it has also recognised an equivalent position for the prospective 
members. Such a stand can be seen in Mr. Justice Megarry in Gaiman v. Nat. Assco. 
for Mental Health, 86 where he pointed out that: 
"The interests of some particular section or sections of the company can not be equated 
with those ones of the company and I would accept the interest of both present and 
future members of the company as a whole ... . 
47 
85 [19511 Ch. 286. 
86 [19711 Ch. 317. 
87 Ibid at 330. 
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Although in such cases as Parke v. Daily News Lid, 88 directors' obligation to have 
regard to the interests of employees was virtually rejected, having regard to some 
other cases such as Re Wetfab, 89 the evolution of legislation on the issue, and more 
importantly the needs of modem business world, gives rise to the conclusion that 
directors are not only under a fiduciary obligation to consider the interest of the 
company itself and members, present and future, but also they must have regard to 
those of the company's employees as a part of the concept of "company as a whole 
or as a general body". 
Modem management is of the view that aTThough directors in running a company 
owe a duty to act bonafide in the best interests of the company and such a duty is 
owed primarily to the company but not to the individual shareholders, the concept of 
company is defined in equity by reference to shareholders as a whole but not to the 
company as identity distinct from its members. 90 
In the Savoy case9l it was stated that the company meant both present and future 
members of the company, and directors had to strike a balance of long- term view 
against short- term interests of the present members, a view which was followed by 
Megarry J. in Caiman v. National Associationfor Mental Health. 92 
The interesting point, founded as a rule in Foss v. Harbottle, 93 is that if directors 
breach their duty, it is the company which can sue them but not shareholders. 
"Company" as an intact concept should be referred to in the case of uncertainty and 
in the end, it is the company who can sue for breach of its directors duty. 91 
88 119621 Ch 927. 
89 (1990) BCC 600,603. Here although among three offers directors concerned accepted the lower 
price offer only because it provided the company's employees security, Lord Hoffman J. did not feel 
that the directors' conduct to take into account the interests of the company's employees was in 
breach of their fiduciary duties. 
90 Palmer's Company Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell 1992) v. 2, at 8.505. 
91 Second Savoy Hotel Investigation, Report of June 14,1954, by Miller Holland, Q. C. (Quoted by 
ýImar'c Company Law at 8- 505). 
] Ch. 317,330. 
93 [184312 Hare 46 1. 
94 For a detailed discussion of the development of the nde and its implications see the final chapter 
on "Comparative Study". 
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As a rule, so long as a company is a going concern, directors do not have to take 
creditors interests into account as was the case in Multinational Gas & 
Petrochemical Co. v. Multinational Gas & Petrochemical Services Dd., 95 where it 
was held that the directors owe their duties to the company only but not to the 
creditors, whether present or future, nor do they owe any duty to individual 
shareholders. However, as will be seen later, there is a tendency to consider the 
interests of creditors prior to insolvency. 
As to the concept of a fiduciary relationship in context of company law, it seems the 
expression "future members" needs an exptanation. With respects to those judges 
and commentators who have included this expression within the concept of 
"company" along with the present members, it seems some difficulties are inherent in 
such an interpretation. First, in none of those decisions or commentaries a definition 
or descriptive explanation has been given for "future or prospective members". 
Although one may say that "future member" is confined only in the future 
shareholders, it is not still clear while it leaves future employees and creditors 
behind. Secondly, it raises the question of why a company directors should take the 
interests of a group of unknown and non- existent members into their account when 
these members not only have no investment in the company yet, but are assumed as 
outsider to the company in its current and running situation. The argument that 
directors should sacrifice the interests of the present members for the prospective 
members' intereStS, 96 needs a highly justifiable reasoning. The only justification for 
considering the interests of future members is to interpret the word "company" as the 
economic and social interests of the society as a whole. 
2.3.3 Implications offiduciary Duties 
95 [1983] Ch. 258,288. 
96 Second Savoy Hotel Investigation, Report of June 14,1954, (Quoted by Palmer's Company Law 
at 8- 505). 
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2.3.3.1 Fiduciary duty of goodfaith and bonafide - 
A corporate director is required to exercise the powers and discretion conferred on 
him by the company's Articles of Association or memorandum in good faith and 
bonafide in what he considers is in the best interests of the company and not for any 
collateral purpose as expressed by Lord Greene in re Smith and Fawce, 197 where his 
Lordship said: 
"they must exercise their discretion bonafide in what they consider- not what a court 
may consider- is in the interests of the company, and not for any collateral purpose. "98 
This implies that directors are expected to use their powers for which they were A. M. 
vested in them, otherwise they are to be held to account. If they abuse such authority 
by exercising it for an improper purpose they have breached their fiduciary duty of 
good faith. 99 
In respect of duty of good faith and bonafide, the main point is that this duty, unlike 
e. g. duty of care and skill which has some external demonstration, is something 
relevant to mental element of individuals as well as what they have done. The kind of 
test applicable to this duty should, thus, be consistent with the nature of the duty. 
The fact that acting in good faith and bonafide is subjected to the doees intention 
and his mind activity is beyond doubt. The standard should, therefore, be a subjective 
one. The most relevant reference to the question can be seen in the statement of 
Lord Greene in re Smith and Fawcett, 100 where a totally subjective test was 
adopted. Because the subjective test 'deals with intention and incentive of directors, 
the courts find it difficult to determine the proper exercise of the duty and, thus, the 
delinquent director may escape liability. 101 
Although the courts in some particular circumstances may interfere and apply a 
reasonable test in order to prevent a wrongdoing which they assume contrary to the 
97 [19421 Ch. 304,306. 
98 lbid at 306. The language employed, particularly the use of expression "any collateral purpose" 
has been criticised by Sealy as ambiguous. L. S. Sealy, Cases and Materials in Comnany Law, 
(London: Butterworth & Co. (Publishers) Ltd. 1992), 284. 
" Gower's Principles of Modem Company Law, 556. 
100 [19421 Ch. 304,306. 
10 1 Re Hutton v. West Cork Railway Co. [1 883123 Ch. D. 654,671. 
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company's interests, 102 any attempt to apply an objective test to duty of good faith 
and bonafide is bound to fail. That is because doing so is not only inconsistent with 
the nature of the duty, but also imposes a heavy and unfair burden of proof upon the 
defendant directors, the task which in applying a subjective test is upon the plaintiff. 
However, the objective test introduced in section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 
and in section 6 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 which is 
applicable in liquidation, is reviewed in our discussion of wrongful trading. 
2.3.3.2 Duty to actfor proper purposes 
In analysing the duty, the question may naturally arise that when a director is 
expected to act bonafide with loyalty, how can it be possible to conduct so but for 
an improper purpose? It has been recognised by some academic writers that the duty 
to act hona fide in the interests of the company and the duty to use powers for 
proper purposes are the same concept in different words, 103 therefore they both may 
be described as the two sides of the same coin. However, it respectfully seems these 
two duties are designated with different functions while working bonafide does not 
necessarily mean acting for proper purpose, the reverse is true. Furthermore, the 
majority of legal writers have examined these duties separately. There is also some 
judicial references to support the latter view. For example in'Hogg v. Cramphorn 
Lid, 104 referring to Lord Greene in re Smith & Fawcett, 105 Buckley J. held that his 
Lordship intended two separate duties; the duty to act honafide in the best interest 
of the company, and the duty to act for a proper purpose, the opinion which also 
received support from Lord Wilberforce in Howard Smith Ltd. v. Ampol Petroleum 
Ltd. 106 In that case, the court held that although the respondents acted honestly, 
honafide and within their powers, because the issue of new shares was intended for 
102 See for example, R. v. Sinclair 1196811 W. L. RL 1246, Tett v. Phoenix Property & Investment 
Co. Ltd. 119841 BCLC 559,62 1. 
103 L. S. Sealy, Monash ULR (1987) at 169. 104 [19671 Ch. 254. 
105 [19421 Ch. 304. 
106 [19741 A. C. 821. 
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an improper purpose, that was to reduce the proportionate shareholding of the 
majority shareholders below 50% and to maintain the board in control, it was liable 
to be set aside. It was also concluded that even if directors exercise their powers for 
a purpose different from that for which they were vested in, with a belief that such 
exercise of power is in the benefit of their company, they might still be liable. 107 
Birds suggests that English law has adopted a midway between the proper purposes 
as an aspect of 'to act bona fide' and a completely separate head of directors' 
duties. 108 However, somewhere else he acknowledges that the line between these 
two concepts is not clear, since the bona7fides test is subjective and the proper 
purposes test is objective. 119 Moreover, in Birds' view, an improper purpose is 
ratiflable whereas Mala Fides is not. I 10 
If a director exercises his power for an improper purpose, the court may interfere 
and set aside the transaction concerned. He should, thus, act within the proper limits, 
and powers vested in him for one purpose can not be used by him for a different 
purpose. "' If they abuse such authority by exercising it for an improper purpose 
they have breached their fiduciary duty of good faith and will be liable. ' 12 
Although a director is said to have been required to make attempts in order to 
control the process of maximising returns and profits of the company, 113 the proper 
purpose is not maximisation of profits, because focusing on this point as the main 
aim of corporate directorship may lead to disregarding the interests of the company's 
components or even those of "the company as a whole or a general body. "", ' For 
example, maximising the company's benefits might give rise to the environment 
pollution which is in detriment to the society' interests. 
107 lbid at 834. 
108 1 Birds, "Proper Purposes as a Head of Directors' Duties", 37 hLR (1974) 580. 
109 J. Birds, "Making Directors Do Their Duties", I Com. Law. (1980) 67,70. 
110 Ibid at footnote 46. 
111 Re Cameron's Coalbrook Steam Coal & Swansea & Lougher Railway Co., Bennett's 
case. [ 185415 De GM&G 284 ( Quoted by Mayson, French and Ryan, Company law, (London: 
Blackstone Press Ltd. (1993) 474). 
112 Gowees Principles of Modem ompany-Law, 556. 113 Gerald M. D. Bean, "The Operator as a manager: A new Fiduciary Duty, " JBL (1993) 24. 114 Keith Abbott Company law (London: Sweet & Maxwell 1992) 193. 
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Finally, if a director acts for several different or n-dxed purposes, the courts have to 
determine how to judge his conduct. It seems, the decisive factor that should be 
considered, is whether the proper purpose for which the powers and discretion 
conferred on directors was 'substantial purpose' as opposed to the other reasons. If 
the court is satisfied that the 'substantial purpose' which motivated the director to 
take an action is the proper one, it will not most likely set aside the transaction even 
if some improper purposes have motivated the directors. This view enjoys the case 
law support. For example, in HowardSmith Lid v. Ampol Ltd., 115 Lord Wilberforce 
said that the "substantial purpose" was theTactor upon which the court could decide 
the purpose by that the respondents were motivated. 
2.3.3.3 Prohibition against conflict of duty andpersonal interests 
As an established rule, a fiduciary/ director is required not to place himself in a 
position in which his personal interests may be in conflict with his duty to his 
principal/ company. In other words, he should not act with divided loyalty. The rule 
is a product of trust cases, particularly Keech v. Stanford, 116 where the trustee was 
obliged to renew a lease for the beneficiary, a minor, but he instead renewed the 
lease for himself and claimed to be entitled to it beneficially. The court ruled that it 
must be held on trust on the same terms as the original lease. This decision has been 
described as an authority for the principle upon which persons in a "fiduciary" 
position are not entitled to make a profit from their situation. 117 The rule expressly 
was stated by Lord Herschell in Bray v. Ford, I Is as follows: 
"It is an inflexible rule of a court of equity that a person in a fiduciary position ... is 
not, unless otherwise expressly provided, entitled to make a profit; he is not allowed to 
put himself in a position where his interest and duty conflict. " 
115 [19741 A. C. 821. 
116 (1726) 25 E. P, 223. 
117 Sealy, 
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(1962) at 69. 118 [19961 A. C., 44,5 1. 
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Likewise, in the leading case Alexander v. Automatic Telephone Co. Ltd. ' 19 the rule 
was viewed by the Rigby L. J. who took the view that: 
"Directors of companies are fiduciary donees of their powers, and as such are bound to 
exercise them, so as not to give themselves an advantage over other shareholders. They 
must act for the benefit of the company in every exercise of their duties. They must not 
make a secret profit out of their office. " 120 
If a director, as fiduciary, enters into a contract which was supposed to be concluded 
for his company, the court may interfere and set aside the transaction in question, as 
it was the case in Aberdeen Rly. Co. Blaike Bros., 121 where the court held the 
contract concerned liable to be set aside and Z'oncluded: 
"it is a rule of universal application, that no one, having such duties to discharge, shall 
be allowed to enter into agreements in which he has, or can have, a personal interest 
conflicting, or which possibly may conflict, with the interests of those whom he is 
bound to protect. " 122 
As was mentioned that a director as a fiduciary should not put himself in a position 
through which his own interests conflict with his fiduciary duties to the company. 
Consequently, he should avoid taking secret profit from a contract to which the 
company is a party. Where a director makes a secret profit, it must be accounted for 
the company, whether or not he has acted honestly and in the best interest of the 
company, and whether or not he has benefited. 123 However, directors may escape 
liability for making such profits if they obtain a ratification from shareholders in 
general meeting. 124 
This rule also applies where in the performance of his office, the director uses 
confidential information or deprives the company of what has been described as a 
"corporate opportunity" for his own benefit. For example in Industrial Development 
119 (1900) 2 Ch. 56. 
120 lbid at 72. 
1211185411 Macq 46 1. 
122 lbid at 47 1. See also Imperial Alercantile Credit Association v. Coleman [ 187116 Ch. App. 
558. 
123 E. g. see Regal(Hastings) v. Gulliver, 1194211 All E. R. 378, per Lord Russell of Killowen. 124 This point was acknowledged by Lord Denning in Phipps v. Boardman [196712 A. C. 46. 
Here, his Lordship stated that: "The relevant rule for the decision of this case is .... that a person in a fiduciary position must not make a profit out of his trust, which is part of the wider rule that a 
person must not place himself in a position where his duty and his interest may conflict". 
-l/ 
Corporate Directors'Duties &Liabilities in Insolvency in England and the US 37 
Consultants Ltd. v. Cooley, 125 the defendant who took a contract of project which he 
was supposed to conclude it for the plaintiff company was held liable for using 
information that came to him while managing the company. 126 
The effects of the rule as to secret profit will be removed and, therefore, no breach 
of fiduciary duty is at issue if a director has disclosed his involvement as such and it 
is approved by the relevant organ of the company. Such a secret profit can, 
moreover, be ratified by shareholders in a general meeting. 127 
A director may be compelled to disgorge to his company any profit he gained by 
abusing opportunities arisen from his position as fiduciary. When a fiduciary/ 
director has turned "trust" property to his own pocket, he is to account as trustee. If 
he benefits -himself from the company's facilities and opportunities, he will be also 
obliged to account as trustee. 128 
The courts' anxiety is to prevent any breach of loyalty by imposing the most stringent 
duty of loyalty upon a fiduciary based on the view that a fiduciary must be 
safeguarded from any unhealthy temptation and deterred from the mere 
contemplation of profiting from his position. 129 
Duty of directors not to compete with their company is, indeed, another form of 
non- conflict duty. According to this duty, a situation whýich may give rise to a 
conflict between directors' interests and his duties takes place when he is involved in 
a business competing with that of the company. However, Sealy believes that in the 
absence of an express provision in the terms of a director's service contract or an 
implied prohibition in a special case, for example where a business is highly 
competitive or the market is very restricted, no rule prevents him from being a 
director or a member of a rival company or from competing with the company for 
125 [197211 W. L. R. 443. 
126 lbid at 453. 127 A. J. Boyle "Fiduciary Duties: The continuing Problem of Effective Enforcement", EQ= 
Int; rnationale (1987) N 105. See also Regal(Hastings) v. Gulliver, [ 194211 All E. R. 378. 128 L. S. Sealy, "The Directors as Trustee",. M, (1967), 91,98. [Thereafter M (1967)]. 129 Jones, op cit at 472. 
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his own benefit. 130 However, the case of Hivac Lid v. Park Royal Scientific 
Instruments Lid., 131 challenged the above rule, where it was held that in a master/ 
servant fiduciary relationship, the latter is precluded from acting for a rival. 132This is 
applicable where the director has an employment contract in particular company. 
It is generally believed that this opinion does not apply to the directors in the modern 
company law. A person cannot be restrained from acting as a director of a rival 
company and, thus, "what he could do for rival company, of course, he could do for 
himself'. 133 However, this flexible opinion is increasingly becoming impossible when 
a director of two rival companies are always at risk of not dealing with both fairly. 134 
particularly it is true when a director of two rival companies likely finds one of his 
positions more advantageous than other, and takes one's side against the other. 
2.4 Directors Duties in Insolvency 
Directors' duties in insolvency is subjected to their duties to the company's creditors. 
As to the question whether creditors' interests fall within the concept of the 
company's interests Lord Diplock said in Lonrho Ltd. v. Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd. ", 
that "the best interests of the company are not necessarily those of the shareholders 
but may include those of the creditors. "136 But, Dillon J. in Multinational Gas & 
Petrochemical Co. v. National Gas & Petrochemical Services Ltd., 137 seemed 
suggesting creditors interests are not included, where his Lordship stated that: "A 
130 Sealy, M (1967) at 97. This rule was clearly pointed out in London and Mashonaland 
Exploration Co. v. New Mashonaland Exploration Co. [ 189 11 W. N. 165, where the court held: 
"there was nothing in the articles which ... prohibited him from acting as a director of any other 
company; neither was there any contract, express or implied, to give his personal services to the 
ýIaintiff company and not to another company. " 31 [19461 Ch. 169. 
132 Lord Denning in S. C. W. S v. Meyer, [1959] A. C. 324 was of the same opinion. 13 3 London and Mashonaland Exploration Co v. New Mashonaland Exploration Co. [ 189 11 N. W. 
165. 
134 Gower's Principles of Modem Company Law, 571. 
135 [1980] 1 W. L. K 627. 
136 Ibid at 634. 
137 [19831 Ch. 258. 
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company owes no duty of care to future creditors ... so 
long as the company is 
solvent the shareholders are in substance the company. " It should be noted that in 
this case the company was not in insolvency. 
Insolvency is an event in which the risks shift from shareholders to creditors. It is, 
thus, reasonable to expect that all duties owed to the company and its members be 
confined within duties to its creditors. It is because on the onset of insolvency, the 
company's shareholders who have nothing to lose but have everything to gain, are 
motivated to continue trading, which is a perverse incentive created by the well- 
recognised principle of limited liability. 138 The courts have increasingly recognised 
that the creditors' interests may be harmed by directors transferring losses to 
creditors at the onset of insolvency so as to insulate shareholders from loss. 139 
2.4.1 Directors'Duties Before Insolvency 
Creditors in corporate law are considered as contractual claimants and shareholders 
as owners of the corporation. Creditors are, thus, treated as not being entitled to 
anything more than what has been agreed under the particular debt/ sale/ service 
contract and shareholders as being entitled to unlimited claims on the remaining 
assets of the corporation. 140 
There seems to be a confusion and uncertainty over the stance of English law as to 
directors duties to creditors prior to liquidation. The traditional view was that 
directors duties are owed to the company and they are not trustees for the creditors, 
and therefore, have no duty to them. 141 The courts' reluctance to recognise directors 
duties to creditors prior to insolvency is a result of a traditional view, that in earlier 
cases the judges were not prepared to recognise any obligation to shareholders 
138 D. D. Prentice, "Creditor's Interests and Director's Duties", 10 Oxford J. L. S. (1990) 265. 13 9 Ross Grantham, "The Judicial Extension of Directors' Duties to Creditors", JDL (199 1) 1. 140 Razeen Sappideen, "Fiduciary Obligations to Corporate Creditors", ML (1991) 365,366. 
141 Wincham Shipbuilding & Boiler Co. 1187819 Ch. D. 322, Re Dronfileld Silbtone Coal Co. 
(1881) 70 Ch. D. 76, J. H. Farrar, The Obligation of a Company's Directors to Its Creditors Before 
Liquidation" ML (1985) 413. 
V 
Corporate Directors'Duties &Liabilities in Insolvency in England and the US 40 
separate from the company. 142 Such sense is stated by Dillon I in Multinational v. 
Multinational Services: 143 
"A company, as it seems to me, likewise owes no duty of care to future creditors. The 
directors indeed stand in a fiduciary relationship to the company, as they are appointed 
to manage the affairs of the company and they owe fiduciary duties to the company 
though not to the creditors, present or future, or to individual shareholders. " 144 
It should be noted that in that case the company was not insolvent, therefore, this 
holding can not apply to insolvency cases. The same view was taken by Nourse L. I 
in Brady & Avon. v. Brady &A vor., 145 where the company was in financial difficulty, 
as follows: V 
"Adn-tittedly existing creditors are interested in the assets of the company as the only 
source for the satisfaction of their debts. But in a case where the assets are enormous 
and the debts minimal it is reasonable to suppose that the interests of the creditors 
ought not to count for very much. " 146 
However, there is now a clear tendency in English law to include a company's 
creditors within the group of interests. 147 In England, 148 following New Zealand141 
and Australia, '" recent cases have indicated that such a duty is owed by directors to 
creditors even before company is insolvent, and even perhaps owed to them 
directly. 151 In WestMercia Safetywear v. DoddI52 it was, as claimed"53 intended that 
directors owed a duty to creditors before winding up. 
142 Percival v. Wright [ 190212 Ch. 42 1. 
143 [19831 Ch. 258. 
144 Ibid at 288. 
145 [198713 BCC 535, reversed [ 1988] 2 W. L. R. 1308. 146 Ibid at 552. Likewise, in re Horsley & Weight Ltd. [ 198213 All E. K 1045,1055, Buckley L. J. 
was of the view that: 
"It is a misapprehension to suppose that the directors of a company owe a duty to the company's 
creditors to keep the contributed capital of the company intact ... 
It may be somewhat loosely said 
that the directors owe an indirect duty to the creditors not to permit an unlawful reduction of capital 
to occur but I would regard it as more accurate to say that the directors owe a duty to the company 
in this respect ... . 147 Edward Jacobs, "Duties to Creditors", 7 Litigation (1987- 8) 3 10,3 11. 
148 Lonrho Ltd v. Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd., [19801 1 W. L. P- 627, re Horsley & Weight Ltd, 
198213 All E. K 1045. 
49Nicholson v. Permarkraft Ltd. (1985) 1 NZLR 242, David Neil & Co. Ltd. v. Neil (1986) 3 
N2. C. L. C. 99,658. 
150 Kinsela & Another v, Russell Kifisela Pty. Ltd., (1986) 4 N. S. W. L. P- 722, Jeffree v. N. C S. 
C. (1989) 15 A. C. L. R., 217. 
151 David A. Wishart, "Models and Theories of Directors' Duties to Creditors", 14 N. Z. L. U. L. 
Em (1991) 323,325. 
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Although in other common law jurisdictions the tendency requiring a duty to 
consider creditors interests is clearer, this attitude seems also imported into English 
law. 151 For example, the statement of Street J. in the Australian case of Kinsela & 
Another v, Russell Kinsela Pty. Ltd., 155 which was confirmed by Dillon J. in West 
Mercia, may represent the English and Australian laws' stand. These jurisdictions are 
said to have gone further to recognise creditors interests as requiring protection at a 
stage much earlier than the onset of insolvency. 156 
With regard to the above opinions, it can be said that directors may have a duty to 
consider the interests of creditors. They may, thus, to be held liable for breach of 
duty if they, in running the company as a going concern, exclusively consider the 
interests of its shareholders even on the basis of general meetings guidelines. 
This view is more justified if the plaintiff creditors can show that there have been 
some indications of financial depression which had been intentionally or 
unintentionally slipped by the defendant directors. 
2.4.2 Directors'Duties to Creditors in Insolvency 
Once a company becomes insolvent or even doubtfully solvent, the position of 
directors shifts from shareholders to creditors, and. the primary interested persons are 
its creditors, 157 as was well stated in Brady & Avon. v. Brady &Avor: 158 
"where the company is insolvent, or even doubtfully solvent, the interests of the 
company are in reality the interests of existing creditors alone. "159 
The leading case of West Mercia Safetywear v. Dodd, 160 is a good example for this 
purpose, where the plaintiff, a subsidiary company owed 00,000 to its parent 
152 [19881 BCLC, 250. 
153 Vanessa Finch, "Directors Duties Towards Creditors", 10 Co. Law. (1989) 23. 
154 Denis Petkovic, "Directors' Duties and the Intrusion of Creditors' Interests". 4 ML (1989) 166, 
167. 
155 (1986) 4 N. S. W. L. R. 722. 
156 Sappideen, op cit 365. 157 Re Horsley, Ayerst v. C. & K. (Construction) Ltd. [19761 A. C. 167, re Instrumentation 
Electrical Services Ltd. [ 19881 BCLC 550, re Corbenstoke Ltd. (no. 2) [198915 BCC 767. 158 1198713 BCC, 532 reversed [ 198812 W. L. R., 1308. 159 Ibid at 552. 
160 [19881 BCLC 250. 
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company. Dodd who was director of the two companies, both clearly insolvent, had 
guaranteed with a bank the debts of the parent company. As a result of the director's 
persuasion, the subsidiary company paid 14,000 into the parent bank account as a 
part of repayment of its debts to the parent company. Dillon L. J. agreed with the 
liquidator's claim that the respondent breached his fiduciary duty towards his plaintiff 
subsidiary company because, in his Lordship view, while the company is insolvent 
the company is for all purposes "the creditors", the fact which was ignored by the 
defendant director, instead he attempted to guarantee his own position by requiring 
the parent company's debts. In this case, the learned judge referring to the well- 
known Australian case Kinsela & Another v, Russell Kinsela Pty. Ltd, 161 as his own 
opinion, adopted that judgment as a voice of English law, where Street J. said: 
"In a solvent company the proprietary interests of the shareholders entitle them as a 
general body to be regarded as the company when questions of the duty of directors 
arise. If, as a general body, they authorise or ratify a particular action of the directors, 
there can be no challenge to the validity of what the directors have done. But where the 
company is insolvent the interests of the creditors intrude. ... It is in a practical sense 
their assets they are not the shareholders' assets that through the medium of the 
company, are under the management of the directors. "162 
In WeýVab Engineers Dd, 163 the company which operated profitably until 1979 
began a slow financial deterioration. The board reached the conclusion that if the 
company was to continue trading, its principal asset, a freehold property, would have 
to be sold. Among various offers, the directors accepted the lower, Thermaspan's 
offer, which undertook the whole company with a requirement to employ all of the 
company's employees including its directors. Hoffmann J. rejected the liquidator's 
claim that by turning down the higher price offer, Bell & Webster's offer, the 
directors breached their fiduciary duty to the company's creditors because, in his 
Lordship's viewpoint, the higher offer was uncertain, whereas by the Thermaspan's 
offer, the Welfab's liability for redundancy reduced the value of the higher offer. 
161 (1986) 4 N. S, W. L. P, 722. 
162 Ibid at 730. 163 [19901 BCC 600. 
IJ 
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Hoffinann J., moreover, considered the fact that accepting the Bell & Webster's offer 
would have prevented Welfab's business from continuing. 164The learned judge was 
of the opinion that if directors had not taken the concerned decision, the best 
alternatives were liquidation or receivership, while the decision was, in his opinion, 
in accordance with the recent developments in insolvency which intend to save 
business rather to destroy it. However, his Lordship taking the view that the 
directors were not "entitled to sell the company to save their jobs and those of other 
employees on terms which would clearly leave creditors in a worse position than a 
liquidation", went on to say that he did not think that an honest attempt to save T", 
business should have been judged by a strict standard, particularly with regard to the 
widespread unemployment and industrial devastation in the Mdlands at the time. 
The defendant directors were, thus, not held liable for the alleged breach of duty. 
This decision which raised the question as to what precisely is the concept of 
directors' duties to the company's creditors, 165 can be looked at from two different 
perspectives. According to the first view, although the well- established rule is that in 
insolvency all directors should benefit the company's creditors, here the court 
recognised a very wide discretion for directors to take the society's interests such as 
"unemployment" and "industrial devastation" into their account. This view accords 
with today's developing law and new modem business relationship. Second approach 
which was referred to by Hoffinann J. is a strict application of directors duties to 
creditors in insolvency based on which the first priority in taking a decision in such 
circumstances is creditors' interests alone. This view under which directors are not 
entitled to sell the company to save their own jobs or those of other employees is a 
strict application of interests of the company and its creditors. 
The decision of Lord Templeman in Winkworth v. Edward Baron Development Co. 
Lid., 166 that seemed to be a plain attempt to clarify directors' duties to creditors, 
164 Ibid at 602. 
165 Ross Grantham, "The Directors' Duties and Insolvent Companies", 54 MLR (1991) 576,578. 166 [19861 IW. L. R. 1512. 
k/ 
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raised some questions and criticisms, specially for the wide language employed in 
that case, 167where he said: 
"... a company owes a duty to its creditors, present and future. The company is not 
bound to pay off every debt as soon as it is incurred and the company is not obliged to 
avoid all ventures which involve an element of risk, but the company owes a duty to its 
creditors to keep its property inviolate and available for the repayment of its debts. The 
conscience of the company, as well as its management, is confined to its creditors. A 
duty is owed by the directors to the company and to the creditors of the company to 
ensure that ... its property is not dissipated or exploited for the benefit of the directors 
themselves to the prejudice of the creditors. " 168 
Lord Templeman, in dismissing the plaintiffs claim (the wife) that she was entitled to 
an equitable interest of the property concerned, reasoned, inter alia, that the 
claimant's failure to carry out her duties as a director to ensure hat the affairs of the 
company were properly conducted, gave rise to the prejudice of the creditors' 
interests, and prevented her from claiming an equitable proprietary interest in priority 
to the claims of creditors. 169 Sealy with regard to this decision rightly believes that if 
such a statement had prevailed over the past century and half, the principle of limited 
liability of company would never have begun. 170 
Lord Templeman, here, seems indicating that directors owe a duty to the company's 
creditors separate from the company itself, a duty which is directly owed to them. 
Moreover, the language employed in this judgment is so wide171 that one may 
wonder it extends to cover creditors even during trading life of the company. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, so long as a company is solvent, in the absence of fraud or disloyalty, 
ratification or authorisation of a director's act in a general meeting may remove any 
167 John H. Farrar, "The Responsibility of Directors Shareholders for a Company's Debts" 4 Can. L. 
B-m (1989) 13,15 
168 Ibid at 1516. 169 Ibid at 1517. 
170 L. S. Sealy, "Directors' Duties- An Unnecessary Gloss",. W (1988) 175,176. 171 C. A. Riley, "Directors' Duties and the Interests of Creditors", 10 Co. Law. (1989) 87,91. 
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doubt about the validity of that act. However, once the corporation faces insolvency, 
the creditors' interests become relevant, and at this stage the shareholders and 
directors are no longer entitled to deal with the company's assets freely. 172 
It appears that some uncertainties undermine the effectiveness of the rules governing 
corporate directors duties, and as it has rightly stated by Farrar, the common law in 
this area "has failed to keep pace with modem developments and presents a 
lamentable out of date view of directors' duties. "173The main ambiguity is the proper 
standard applicable to the duties. The standard introduced by the 1986 Act, 
particularly section 214, is not enough hZelpful to resolve the problem, since it is 
workable only in the course of liquidation. 
The position of directors towards creditors prior to insolvency is another question. 
The traditional rule which does not require a director to consider the interests of 
creditors in normal life of the company as a going concern, now seems to have been 
challenged. The stand taken in such cases as Wetfab Engineers Lid, 174 and 
Winkworth v. Edward Baron Development Co. Ltd., 175 is a turning point in this 
respect. Although the new tendency represented by these two cases, particularly with 
their own facts, is not strong enough to shake the old rule, the matter is of such 
importance to concern the judges and commentators. 
English law in the area of corporate directors duties requires a reconstruction as well 
as a clarification, the point which has already attracted the attention of the legal 
community. The change of the structure of corporate governance is at the top of 
various recommendations and proposals suggested by the EC and the Cadbury 
Committee. The Fifth Draft of Directive of the EC recommends some forms of 
control such as shareholders representation, either creditors or employees 
representation, 176 none of which can be regarded as the solution to the problem. 
172 Neil Hawke, "Creditors' Interests in Solvent and Insolvent Companies", JBL (1989), 54,56. 173 Farrar's Company La , at 396. 174 [19901 BCC 600.14 
175 [198611 W. L. P, 1512. 
176 j. Welch, " The Fifth Draft Directive- A False Dawn? " ELJR. L. R. (1983) 101. 
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Central to the Cadbury Code177 is a code of best practice which is intended to 
achieve the necessary high standard of corporate behaviour. 178 The code also 
contains some recommendations as to the structure of the directorship board. The 
code which is a proposed best practice for listed companies, has been described as 
unenforceable, because it is unlikely that the companies which are unwilling to 
comply with the recommendations, will voluntarily join the code. 179 
Perhaps if such proposals as Cadbury Committee be extended to cover other aspects 
of corporate governance and its enforceability be guaranteed by the legislature, it can 
be used as guideline by the courts to avoid differing decisions on corporate directors 
duties. 
177 In 1992 May the Cadbury Committee published its final draft on the Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance. The code contains four headings; Board of Directors, Non- Executive 
Directors, Executive Directors, and Controls of Reporting. Apart from the narrowness of the code 
which deals only with financial aspect of corporate governance, the Committee's reliance on self- 
regulation is highly optimistic. See V. Finch, "Board Performance and Cadbury on Corporate 
Governance", IDL (1992) 581,594, V. Finch, "Corporate Governance and Cadbury: Self- 
regulation and Alternatives", 1BL (1994) 5 1. 
178 Blenyth Jenkins, "Cadbury's Crunch", 89 UQ (1992 Dec. 9) 11. 
179 Charlotte Villiers, "Draft Report by the Cadbury Committee on the Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance", 13 Co. Law. (1992) 214. 
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Chapter 3: Fraudulent- Wrongful Trading and Misfeasance 
1 Introduction 
One of the main problems of dealing or contracting with a failed or troubled party is 
the risk of a limit on availability of resources for the payment or recovery of 
damages. This risk is increased in the case of a limited company when there is a legal 
limit resulting from the shareholders' limited liability. ' 
As an experience elicited from a very long line of decisions- making process, th re is 
a general consensus among lawyers, bankers, and other groups, directly or indir ctly, 
involved in the corporate activities, that the privilege of limited liability enjoyed 
.0 
the members of a company has been abused by dishonest, incompetent and even 
unreasonable businessman. One of the primary aims of company law is to protect 
creditors against this abusive use of the privilege of limited liability by corporate 
directors and managers. 
Since 1920's- 1930's in the line with the necessity of supporting business through 
Salomon principle'2 that company as a legal person with separate identity and its 
own duties, liabilities, rights and assets, is responsible for its own debts, there have 
been concerns over the question of how to avoid the ruinous consequences of 
abusive use of such privilege at the expense of the company's creditors. These 
concerns constituted a heavy pressure from various bodies interested in this field, 
particularly the courts and lawyers, demanding an essential review as to liability of 
those who conduct the business wrongly, by looking behind the corporate identity so 
I Leo Flynn, Statutoly Liability for culp ble Mismanagement (ed. H. Rajak) Insolvency Law & 
Practice, (Sweet & Maxwell 1993) 135. 
2 Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd. [ 18871 AC 22 
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that its owners or officers be held liable for running its business improperly not 
merely dishonestly. Those efforts impressed the legislature, in particular with regard 
to the position of unsecured creditors as the most vulnerable sector affected by the 
insolvency, when secured creditors, specially financiers, have the ability to control or 
monitor the financial activities of the company. 
To assure creditors in their dealing with a company, to safeguard the proper use of 
limited liability, and prevent the corporate directors and officers of abusing or 
misusing this privilege, the legislators on the basis common law rules, introduced 
. Wb. 
various legal measures. 
Misfeasance, which now includes negligence is the oldest common law remedy for 
this problem. It was also the earliest matter which was the subject of legislation. 
In this chapter the three leading concepts of directors liability, namely fraudulent 
trading, wrongful trading and misfeasance are studied. 
Fraudulent trading will be examined first, both as a crin-dnal offence and as a civil 
action, then the issue of the beneficiary of the proceedings, and other matters 
considered in judicial decisions. 
In the second section, wrongful trading will be reviewed, including philosophy and 
the development of wrongful trading through statutory and case law, particularly the 
duties of directors in approaching insolvency with the view to minimising the loss to 
the company. 
Finally, it is intended to review the different aspects of directors' breach of duty of 
care and loyalty under misfeasance including negligence. 
3.2 Fraudulent Trading 
Fraudulent trading is both criminal and civil liability whose successful prosecution 
may lead to the perpetrator being fined or imprisoned, and whose aim is to protect 
persons, properties and community from dishonest use of corporate form. Thus, 
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fraudulent trading provisions are important as a mechanism for protecting business 
relationships, as has been shown by the large number of determined cases. 
The offence of fraudulent trading may in some aspects seem a vague concept, 
specially its very tough standard of proof has caused the courts to be reluctant in 
making a liability order of fraudulent trading. However, the chief importance of the 
section is not in relation to the breadth but to the muscle of the law. 3 
3.2.1 Elements For Fraudulent Trading 
. 0. Although it is true that the word 'fraud' has different meaning in different contexts, 
there is no doubt that the essentials of the concept in all situations are the same. 
A fraudulent trading offence, like other crimes, requires three basic components, 
mental element, actual element, and statutory element. 
3.2.1.1 mens rea- mental element 
The mental element, as the main component part of fraudulent trading involves 
dishonesty, or a deliberate intention which itself is described as an'intent to defraud'. 
In determining whether the offence of fraudulent trading has occurred, an ingredient 
of dishonesty is essential, and no judge is entitled to convict a defendant of offence 
of fraudulent trading unless such a dishonesty is proved. Such a view can be seen in 
the unreported case of R. v. Poster Plywood Co. Ltd., 4where the Common Sergeant 
stated: 
"What must be proved is that this man took a deliberate part in the calculated carrying 
on of the business at the expense of the creditors of that business knowingly perfectly 
well that was no prospect of the creditors being paid.... All you have got [in this case] 
is the fact that [this company] continued to trade when .... 
it would have been better if it 
had not. Well, this is nothing like enough to charge a director or a person concerned in 
the management of it with fraudulent trading. " 
3 Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (London-, Stevens & Sons 2ed ed. 1983) 900. 4 Cited by Nfichael Levi Phantom of Capitalists (London; Heinemann 1981) 148. 
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It is true, as said Conti, that in the absence of a "specific liability statute irrespective 
of intent, criminal liability will not as a general rule be imputed without dishonesty in 
the part of the directors. "5 
It has been suggested that from view of complications of proving the existence of the 
mental element, and the fact that the relevant conduct is adequately covered by other 
areas of criminal law, the most appropriate course is to abolish the offence, or failing 
that, never to charge it. Arguments such as these have led some commentators to 
suggest the abolition of the proceedingS. 6 
An interesting description of the words 'derraud' and 'fraudulent purpose' has been 
put forward as "those words connote actual dishonesty involving, according to 
current notions of fair trading among commercial men, real moral blame. "7 In re 
Gerald Cooper Chemicals Ltd. 8 the word "intent" was used in the sense that a man 
must be taken to intend the natural or foreseen consequences of his act. 
In the civil case of re Williams C. Leitch Brothers Ltd. 9 Maugham J. described "the 
carrying on 
0ý 
, 
ýhe business of the company" as a sufficient course of conduct for this 
purpose: 
" .... if a company continues to carry on business and to incur debts at a time when 
there is to the knowledge of the directors no reasonable prospect of the creditors ever 
receiving payment of those debts, it is in general, a proper interference that the 
company is carrying on the business with intent to defraud ...... 
10 
But the difficulty of proving whether the director believed that there was a 
reasonable prospect of paying the debts, which is to be assessed by a subjective 
standard, still exists. The defendant directors may advance any justification based on 
5 Richard Conti, "Criminal Liability of Directors under Company Law", The Australian Directo 
986)37,38. 
Peter Allderidge "The Mental Element of the Crime of fraudulent Trading"JD-L-(1984), 505,509. 7 re Patrick andLyon Ltd. [193311 Ch. 786,790, See also Cunliffe v. Goodman 1195012 K. B. 237 
at 253, re a Company No. 001418 of 1988, [19901 BCC 526, Welham v. Director of Public 
Prosecutions [ 196 11 A. C. 103 at 123 per words of Lord Radcliffe. 8 [197812 All E. R. 49. 
9 11932] 2 Ch 71,77. 
10 Ibid at 77. 
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that they honestly believed for example that there would be prosperity after 
depression. 
In the criminal case of R. v. Grantham, " the mental element of fraudulent trading 
was defined as: 
##a man intends to defraud a creditor, either if he intends that the creditor shall never be 
paid or alternatively if he intends to obtain a credit or carry on obtaining credit when 
the rights and interests of the creditor are being prejudiced in a way which the 
defendant himself has generally regarded as dishonest. " 
The Cork Committee in its recommendations suggested that a fraudulent trading 
should be defined as "an offence to carry on the business dishonestly; and fight that 
in the absence of dishonesty, no offence should be committed. "12 
The House of Lords has suggested the view that "intent to defraud" should have a 
standard meaning, which includes dishonesty. 13 
The crime could be committed even by deceiving creditors into making payment for 
goods which had never been ordered by them14. 
Although there has been no clear statement as to whether the words of 'dishonesty' 
and 'intent to defraud' are precisely the same in meaning, it seems both those 
expressions are the result of a calculated action emerging from a deliberate intention 
and naturally involve malafide. Some commentators have felt that 'dishonesty' is 
distinguishable from 'fraud', but not as its element and that the word "dishonesty" is 
chosen because it was something which layman could easily recognise when they see 
it, whereas the word "fraud" may involve technicalities which have to be explained 
by a lawyer. 15 According to this view, if one tries to pin down "dishonesty" in 
English case law, he will soon realise that he is aiming at a constantly moving 
target. " 
II[ 198412 WLR 815. 
12 Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency and Practice Cmnd 8558, par. 1777,1982. 13 Scott v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner [ 19751 A. C. ', 819,83 8. 14 R. v. Kemp [ 198814 BCC 203. 
15 D. W. Elliott, "Dishonesty in Theft: A Dispensable Conccpt", Cl& (1982) 396. 16 Ibid at 395. 
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The meaning of dishonesty should, indeed, be defined as something relevant to the 
state of mind but not a course of conduct, which could not be established 
independent of the knowledge and belief of the respondent. To determine whether a 
person has acted dishonestly, first his conduct should be measured by the ordinary 
standards of reasonable and honest people and, if so, the fact should be taken into 
account that whether the defendant himself was aware that his conduct was, 
according to those standards, dishonest. 17 
As to the question how to determine a dishonesty, some guidelines have been 
suggested in the crirninal case R v. Landy & OthersIs as follows: 
-0, 
"The dishonesty to be proved was dishonesty in regard to the defendant actual beliefs 
and intentions in the particular circumstances. Accordingly, in directing the jury the 
judge was required to stress the ingredient of dishonesty and should have directed the 
jury that what mattered was the state of mind of the defendants themselves and not 
what reasonable men in their circumstances would have believed or intended19 .... The 
dishonesty to be proved must be in the minds and intentions of the defendants. It is to 
their states of mind that the jury must direct their attention. "20 
A consideration of the judgments and decisions which so far been have made, 
particularly the above- mentioned cases, reveals how far the views taken by the 
courts to determine the matter differ. It can be said that the standard of proof 
required for fraudulent trading is an subjective one, which should be proved by 
positive steps. In one case such standard of proof is 'notions of fair trading among 
commercial men which requires real blame' but not merely the existence of 
knowledge, 21 whereas in another case the state of mind of defendant, but not belief 
of reasonable people is sufficient. 22 
17 R. v. Ghosh (1982) 2 All ER 689. 18 [198111 All E. K, 1172. 
19 Ibid at 1173. 
20 Ibid at 118 1. 
21 re Patrick and Lyon Ltd. [19331 1 Ch. 786,790, See also In Cunfiffe v. Goodman 1195012 K. B. 237,253. 
22 R v. Landy & Others [ 198 111 All E. R., 1172. 
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As it was suggested in the case of Re While and Osmond Parkslone Lid . 23 the 
criterion to determine real intention of the company's directors should be that what 
was their view at the relevant time. For this purpose all circumstances such as 
financial position, the accounting and filing system of its documents, the knowledge 
of the directors of business accounts and the like should be taken into account. 
3.2.1.2 actus reus- actual element 
By actual element it is meant that the respondent in question has done something 
which can be described as an external demonstration of what he had in mind. In the 
case of fraudulent trading, carrying on the business of the company in fraudulent 
manner suffices to establish a presumption of fraudulent trading offence. 
The expression of actus reus has been chosen as an equivalent meaning of criminal 
act or actual element of an offence. Therefore, this element has been described as a 
'conduct' required to be proved. 24 
In order to be a party to fraudulent trading, a person must do something positive, 
mere intention or inadequate action will, thus, be insufficient. In Re Maidstone 
Building Provisions Lid. 25 it was alleged that the applicant, who had been secretary 
and financial adviser to the company which subsequently became insolvent, had not 
adequately performed his duties of advising the directors on financial matters and 
that, consequently, he should bear personal responsibility for the company's debts. 
Although that case was in relation to civil liability under section 332, the same 
reasoning would apply to the criminal offence. In this case, Pennycuick VC held, 
however, that even if these allegations could be proved, no liability could fall on the 
applicant under section 332 since: 
23 Unreported case [19601 June 30, cited by John Farrar, "Fraudulent Trading and Creditors Duties" ML (1976) 221,222 
24 Williams "Textbook of Criminal Law" at 146. 25 [197111 WLR 1085. 
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"... someone is not party to carrying on a business if he takes no positive steps at all, so 
in order to bring a person within the section must show that he is taking some positive 
steps in carrying on the company's business in a fraudulent manner". 
The meaning of expressions "carried on" and "carried out" of the company's business 
were contrasted by Templeman I re General Cooper ChemicaIS26 where he stated: 
"[Section 3321 is aimed at the carrying on of a business .... and not at the execution of 
individual transactions in the course of carrying on of the business. I do not think that 
the words "carried on" can be treated as synonymous with "carried out 
In re Sarflax Ltd. 27 it was held that "the collection of assets acquired in the course of 
business and the distribution of the proceedg- of theses assets in discharge of business 
liabilities, " could be considered as a carrying on of the business. 
The question may arise, if a director carried on the business of the company with 
intent to defraud credito rs, namely with obvious and real dishonesty, for a while 
without incurring further debts and liability, would he still be liable? 
Here, two approaches may be distinguished. According to the first, as a rule of 
criminal law or at least in some offences, an act is not always necessary to constitute 
a crime. For example, where there is a duty to be fulfilled, the mere omission or 
failure of doing so is sufficient. To support the argument, the point should be 
referred to the manner of enactment of sections 45828 and 630 of the Companies Act 
1985 which were presented in separate provisions and under different headings. By 
such an enactment it was, under section 458, meant to impose criminal punishment 
but not civil liability, when a crime has been committed but no loss has been 
incurred. 
The second approach relies on the nature of the crime of fraudulent trading itself On 
the basis of this view, the criminal action in fraudulent trading is 'carrying on 
business of the company'which is a positive step with obvious external effects. There 
26 1197812 All ER 49,53. 
27 [19791 Ch. 592. 
28 Section reads: "If any business of a company is carried on with intent to defraud creditors of the 
company or creditors of any other person, or for any other fraudulent purpose, every person who 
was knowingly a party to the carrying on of the business in that manner is liable to imprisonment 
or a fine or both. 
This applies whether or not the company has been, or is in the course of being, wound up. " 
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is no question of failure or omission in the case of fraudulent trading, when no duty 
to do something is required. In other words, the duty relating to fraudulent trading is 
a negative act which is not to carry on the business. More importantly, having a 
review of the decisions made on the matter shows the reluctance of the courts to 
oy')el 
make anýqf liability for fraudulent trading, unless they are fully satisfied that both 
actual and mental elements are proved. 
Furthermore, it is not often possible to carry on a troubled business without causing 
more liabilities, while it means more expenses for employees' salary, rent and 
maintenance expense and other current expenses. 
Both those views face some difficulties. The former does not seem consistent with 
the legislators' intention, when a positive action as 'carrying on business' is required, 
when in the latter, one may argue that deciding to cease trading is a positive action, 
but not a negative duty. 
3.2.1.3 Statutory element and its development including civil remedy 
The introduction of the criminal offence of fraudulent trading was, for the first time, 
recommended by the Greene committee on Company Law Amendment as follows: 
"Our attention has been directed particularly to the case (met with principally in 
private Companies) where the person in control of the company holds a 'floating 
charge and, while knowing that the company is on the verge of liquidation, "fills up" 
his security by means of goods obtained on credit and then appoints, a receiver ... We 
consider that not only should the person whom the Court finds to have been guilty of 
fraudulent trading, etc., be subjected to unlimited personal liability, but any security 
over assets of the company held by him or on his behalf, and assigned to anyone save a 
bonafide holder for value, should be charged with the liability. Further, trading of this 
character should be made a criminal offence". 29 
The committee intended to deal with a particular aspect of the crime of fraudulent 
trading which was holding floating charges by a debenture holder in order to secure 
his own interests over creditors. But what appeared in the section of fraudulent 
29 Greene Comn-dttee Report on Company Law Amendment, Cmrid. 2657, at p. 28 (1926). 
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trading in the Companies Act 1928 was a concept with a wider scope so as to enable 
the courts to consider any act with intent to defraud creditors in winding up. 
As a result of Greene Committee's recommendations, fraudulent trading as a legal 
sanction both with criminal and civil liabilities for the first time appeared in the 
Companies Act 1928, section 75. These provisions were repeated in section 275 of 
the Companies Act 1929. 
Section 332 of the Companies Act 1948, which repeated section 275, played a 
significant role up to the enactment of the Companies Act 1985 and the Insolvency 
Act 1986. The only changes appeared in tire new Act, were the addition of a year to 
the period of imprisonment and giving the court a discretion to consider either the 
imposition of a fine or imprisonment or both. 
Although a limited number of cases for fraudulent trading were brought before 
courts during 1928's- 1948's, it is not clear why the legislators felt the penal sanction 
set out in the Act 1929 were not satisfactory. Such an increase in the criminal 
penalty was a result of Cohen Committee's recommendations in 1945. Moreover, the 
committee recommended the extension of the section 'to other persons who were 
knowingly parties to the frauds'. These recommendations appeared in the Companies 
Act 1947 which subsequently repealed by the Companies Act 1948. 
It was suggested by Jenkins Committee in 196230 that the provisions to be extended 
so as to include directors who had acted recklessly or incompetently in relation to 
the company's affairs. Furthermore, the Committee recommended a power to be 
granted to the courts on the basis of which they could order the public examination 
of all directors or other officers of an insolvent company, where there was a prima 
facie case of culpability or of such impropriety, reckless or incompetence which 
could lead to disqualification. 31 These proposals were not, however, implemented in 
the Companies Act 198 1. 
30 The Report of the Company Law Committee, Cmnd. 1749, para. 497 (1962). 31 lbid at Para. 503. 
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The fraudulent trading provisions of the Companies Act 1981 was a repetition of its 
predecessor. However, a small change appeared in the Act on the basis of which the 
liability could apply to the subjects irrespective of whether the company was in the 
course of winding up. 
The Cork Committee's recommendations in 1982 were a great achievement in the 
history of company law, particularly in relation to company directors' duties and 
liabilities. The committee intended to draw a strong line between fraudulent trading 
and the newly introduced concept 'wrongful trading. The committee was of the view 
that the civil liability should have been traMsn-iitted to the new section as wrongful 
trading and what was left of the section 332 of the Companies Act 1948 to be 
reintroduced as fraudulent trading. 32 However, what appeared in the Companies Act 
as a result of those recommendations were significantly different from the proposals. 
In the new legislation, besides civil liability introduced as wrongful trading in a 
separate section, fraudulent trading again constituted both civil and criminal liability. 
It was to happen when in the Cork Committee's view the fraudulent trading 
provisions were intended to include only criminal punishment, since 'the phrase " 
fraudulent trading" should in future be reserved for trading which is of such a nature 
that it constitutes an offence under what is left of section 332'. 33 
The enactment of 1985 was a startling evolution on the matter. Under the Act, not 
only fraudulent trading was, with minor amendments, left untouched, 34 but also a 
civil liability termed as 'wrongful trading' with its own effects and grounds was 
introduced. 35 
There were some ambiguity as to sections 458 and 630 of the Companies Act 1985 
which could give rise to confusion. Section 458 of the Act was concerned with 
criminal liability for fraudulent trading, whereas section 630 dealt with civil liability. 
The question may arise whether enactment was intended to apply those sections in 
32 Ibid at Para. 1779. 
33 Ibid at Paras. 1779 and 178 1. 
34 Sections 459 and 630 of the Companies Act 1985. 
35 Schedule 6 of the Insolvency Act 1985, and Insolvency Act 1986. 
Corporate Directors'Duties & Liabilities in insolvency in England and the US 58 
different situations depending on whether or not the company was in course of 
winding up. In other words, the first section imposing penal liability was applicable 
in the event of fraudulent trading irrespective of whether the company is being 
wound up, whereas the latter only dealt with civil liability in winding up. 
To support the view, it can be said; (i) Those sections, unlike their predecessor, were 
presented in two different chapters and under different headings. This could mean 
that the purpose of each section was different; (ii) The main requirements including 
'carrying on the business of the company' and ' intent to defraud creditors.... or for 
any fraudulent purpose' in both sections were precisely the same. This is contrary to 
the rule to the effect that the legislators is then supposed to avoid of any unnecessary 
and fruitless repetition; (iii) Section 630 dealt with the matter in the event of winding 
up, whereas section 458 is concerned with the liability in all occasions. 
With respect to the legislato%it seems those two sections should be read together in 
all cases where a fraudulent trading offence takes place, and to be enacted in a single 
section providing both civil and criminal liability. 
The enactments of 1986 is usually considered as a significant statutory evolution on 
the subject. Section 21336 of the Insolvency Act repeated section 630 of the 
Companies Act 1985 and schedule 6 of the Insolvency Act 1985 and now contains 
the applicable provisions of fraudulent trading. It deals with civil liability of 
fraudulent trading, while section 458 of the Companies Act 1985 deals with the 
criminal aspect of fraudulent trading. 
The main characteristic of this section is that it empowers the court to declare a 
defendant, "liable to make such contribution (if any) to the company's assets as the 
court thinks proper, " while in the old Act, the court could make such declaration 
36 The section reads (1) [Application] If in the course of winding up of the company it appears that 
any business of the company has been carried on with intent to defraud creditors of the company or 
creditors of any other person, or for any fraudulent purpose, The following has effect. 
(2) [Court may hold person liable] The court on the application of the liquidator may declare that 
any persons who were knowingly parties to the carrying on of the business in the manner above- 
mentioned are to be liable to make such contributions (if any) to the company's assets as the court 
thinks fit". 
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with no "limitation of liability for all or any of the debts or liabilities of the 
company. 1137 
3.2.2 Who Is a Creditor? 
Under this heading the question is, who is a creditor? More specially, who is to take 
benefit from a fraudulent trading proceedings? 
The meaning of word "creditor" has attracted a great deal of attention of the courts. 
There has been a consensus among judges that the expression "creditors" should 
include present as well as prospective or p7tential creditors, the expression which is 
used to describe customers. In the criminal case R. v. Seillon38 it was held that the 
expression 'creditor' includes 'contingent creditors. Here, the jury was directed that 
"creditor" should be interpreted to include "persons whom defendant feared would 
pursue him with legal claim in court". 
In another criminal case, R. v. KeMp, 39 Henry J. suggested that word "creditors" 
must include 'potential creditors. Relying on the re Seillon case he went on to say 
that 'on any construction one could exclude potential creditors by ignoring the 
additional words to be found in the statute, which is impermissible. If the words 
added anything to the section, they must apply to potential creditors as being the 
nearest thing to creditors and, therefore, they must apply to customers'. 
It should be noted that the word "creditor" may have different meaning in different 
contexts. In company law the word should simply mean any person to whom the 
company owes some money. For example, unpaid suppliers of goods can be viewed 
in this category. Such a sense can be implied from R v. KeMp, 40 where it was held 
that fraudulent trading could be committed simply by deceiving customers into 
paying for goods that had not been ordered by them. 
37 ny Rajak, "Company Directors- The End of an Era? - V, 139 NLJ (1989) 1374,1375. 38 [19821 Crim. L. Rev. 676. 
39 [198814 BCC 203,209. 
40 [198814 BCC 203. 
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Now, the question is, how the courts indicate that the sums recovered should be 
distributed among the beneficiaries. The courts used, before the legislation 1986 
came into force, to have a wide discretion to order distribution of the recovered 
moneys from the respondent among creditors. In William C Leitch Brothers 
Limited4l Maugham J. did not think that it was open to him to decide whether the 
recovered amount of money (if any) must be distributed by the liquidator among the 
creditors, who have been defrauded; or whether it should have gone into the general 
assets in the liquidation; but he believed that he had to fix an amount for which, 
under the declaration, the respondent was responsible. The learned judge seemed of 
the view that it was the court's discretion to distribute the sum to one or some 
particular creditors. In re Cyona Distributions , 
42 it was expressed by two of the 
judges that whereas the moneys recovered will normally accrue for the benefit of 
creditors, generally this was not so where an individual creditor takes the action. The 
third judge disagreed. 
However, in Re William C. Leitch Brothers Limited (NO. 2)43 the court ordered the 
proceeds of the fraudulent trading action go to the general assets available for 
distributing among all creditors but not to be paid to the applicant creditors. 
Under section 213, the court may declare the wrongdoer " liable to make such 
contributions (if any) to the company's assets as the court thinks proper". It is, 
rightly, suggested that such statement makes it clear that any sum recovered must go 
to the general funds for the benefit of the whole body of creditors, whereas under the 
previous provisions the court was empowered to order the particular recovered 
money go to the account of a particular creditors. 44 
However, the courts seem still to recognise some discretion to order a distribution to 
a particular party as they think fit. In Re L Todd (Swanscombe) L045 where the 
41 [193212 Ch 71,77. 
42 [19671 Ch 889. 
43[19331 Ch 261. 
44 L. S. Sealy & D. Milman, Annotated Guide to the 1986 Insolvency Legislation ( London, CCH 
Editions Limited, 2cd ed 1988), 228. 45 [19901 BCLC 454. 
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fraudulent act was selling scrap metal for cash without making a separate charge for 
VAT, Harman J. took the view that the defendant defrauded the VAT authorities 
and real blame would be attached to him, and he was, thus, liable to the Crown. 
3.2.3 Miscellaneous Matters in Case Law Development 
Despite rapid case law development in many areas of law, the evolution of fraudulent 
trading through judicial decisions has been slow. Nevertheless, this fact does not 
affect the importance of its part as a legal device within company law development 
as a whole. -a. 
In the civil case of re William C Leitch Brothers Ltd., 46 which was the first case on 
fraudulent trading, Maugham J. thought that the lack of reasonable prospect of being 
able to pay debts to the directors' knowledge was sufficient to establish a case of 
fraudulent trading, whereas he took a different view in re Patrick & Lyon Ltd. 47 In 
the former case an "actual dishonesty" or "real blame" was not required to satisfy the 
allegation. In other words, the learned judge applied a considerably wide concept of 
fraudulent trading by which a defendant could easily be caught by the provisions. But 
in the latter case, he dismissed the summons when in his opinion the strict standard 
of proof which was "actual dishonesty" was not available. Here, he narrowed down 
the concept from the description he made in the case of re William C Leitch. 
Such an attitude by the same judge within only one year and in two cases with 
similar facts seems odd. To justify the complexity stemming from such treatment, it 
has been suggested that those two decisions can be reconciled by arguing that the 
statement in re Patrick & Lyon reflects the true substantive legal position while the 
earlier only gives practical guidance on the evidence required4g. Such a reasoning not 
only does not respectfully clarify the ambiguity arising out of the court's conduct in 
46 [193 212 Ch 7 1. 
47 [19331 Ch 786,790. 
48 John Farrar, "Fraudulent Trading" ML, 119801,43 1. 
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its decision- making, but also highlights the need for a more clarification of the 
reasoning itself 
In the unreported case of Re nite & Osmond Parkslone Ltd. 49 Buckley J. 
acknowledging the interpretation of Maugham J. in Leitch, pointed out that there 
was nothing wrong with carrying on the business of the company by directors, when 
to their knowledge, it was not able to meet all its liabilities as they fell due, but it 
would be wrong if they allowed the company to incur credit by carrying on the 
business when it was clear to them that the company would never be able to satisfy 
its creditors. However, in his lordship's view it was not a blame if directors carried 
on the business with belief that the situation will be improved, and "the clouds will 
roll away and the sunshine of prosperity will shine upon them again. " 
It has been suggested that on the basis of this judgment, trading with the lack of 
liquidity and even in a situation of actual insolvency is not sufficient to satisfy the 
requirement of fraudulent trading. 50 
In comparison with those two cases, re William C. Leitch Brothers and re Patrick & 
Lyon Ltd., re nite & Osmond is a moderate judgment. However, in this case, the 
court's decision is rather in the line with the judgement of re Patrick & Lyon, 
requiring a full and strict satisfactory proof is an obvious feature of both judgments. 
As a result, continuing to trade with the belief that such crucial situation will be 
improved, is not sufficient to establish a presumption of the charge even when the 
company is faced with depression. 
In re L Todd (Swanscombe) Ltd. 51 the liquidator of the company which went into 
voluntary winding up sought a declaration under section 630 of the Companies Act 
1985 that M, a director of the company, had knowingly been a party to the carrying 
on of the company's business with intent to defraud its creditors and was liable for 
debts of the company of some 00,000. The defendant admitted that he had been 
49 (1960) 30 June. 
50 John Farrar "The Meaning of Intent" to defraud in Section 332 of the Companies Act 1948" 
JBL [19841359. 
3-1-119901 BCLC 454. 
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convicted of fraudulent evasion of VAT, and he had intended to defraud HM 
customs and Excise but not other creditors. 
In this case, Harman J. found the respondent guilty of carrying on the business with 
intention to defraud the creditors and, therefore, held him liable for 00,000, being 
the value of VAT debts and penalties owed by the company, but would not extend 
liability to cover all debts incurred during carrying on trading while insolvent. Here, 
it had not been proved that the defendant had intended to defraud all other creditors. 
The question may arise whether a single transaction suffices to establish the offence 
of fraudulent trading. The point was scrutinised in re Gerald Cooper Chemicals 
Dd. 52 In this case, the respondents contended that a single transaction could not 
amount to "carrying on the business to defraud creditors" within the meaning of 
section 332 (1), and that they could not knowingly be parties to the carrying on of 
the business with intent to defraud the company's creditors, because they had no 
powers of management or control over the carrying on of the business and did not 
assist it. The court found that the respondent, C Ltd., would have carried on its 
business with intent to defraud its creditor, H Ltd., where it obtained the purchase 
price in advance knowing that it could not supply the subject of contract, indigo, and 
would not repay the deposit. 
In that case, it was held that to establish an offence as such, it was sufficient even if 
only one creditor was defrauded by one transaction or action, provided that the 
transaction could properly be described as a fraud on a creditor committed in the 
course of carrying on the business. 
The relationship between a parent and subsidiary company and liability of the former 
for the latter's debts for fraudulent trading has been discussed in some cases. There 
was an attempt by Templeman L. J. in re Southard & Co. Dd. 53 to explain such a 
relationship where he stated: 
52 [197812 All E. R., 49. 
53 [197911 WLR 1198. 
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"A parent company may spawn a number of subsidiary companies, all controlled 
directly or indirectly by the shareholders of the parent company. If one of the 
subsidiary companies ... declines 
into insolvency to the dismay of its creditors, the 
parent company and the other subsidiary companies may prosper to the joy of the 
shareholders without any liability for the debts of the insolvent subsidiary. "54 
Such a statement implies no liability for a parent company or its directors for the 
debts of its subsidiary. Moreover, the words seem do not distinguish between 
different situations. 
In Augustus Barnett & Son Ltd. 55 an order was sought by the liquidator of Augustus 
Barnett Ltd, a subsidiary of Ramasa, to make the parent company liable for the debts 
of Augustus under section 332 of the Companies Act 1948, The allegation was that 
Rumasa had induced the customers of Augustus into continuing to deal with it by 
issuing letters of comfort and making statement of continued support. However, 
there was no allegation of fraudulent conduct against the subsidiary' directors when 
they, with good faith, continued to carry on trading on the basis of Rumasa's 
promises. Hoffman J. dismissed the case, because, in his Lordship's opinion, in order 
to establish a liability under the current section of fraudulent trading, a finding of 
fraudulent intent was necessary. More importantly, here, there was no allegation of 
fraudulent conduct. 
There was no doubt that the creditors of Augustus continued to deal with it only and 
only on the basis of promised support on the part of Rumasa, and they suffered from 
losses when Rumasa refused to fulfil its assurances. In this case, no one could say 
that the parent company had no responsibility. Given there was no actual intention to 
defraud the Augustus' creditors, particularly when the existence of such an intention 
was not alleged, those creditors could seek an order under other legal causes of 
action, particularly under tort law rules. 
Nowadays, the courts are likely to consider such an activity within the provisions of 
wrongful trading under concept of 'shadow directorship. ' However, in this case, if 
54 lbid at 1208. 
55 [19861 BCLC 170. 
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fraudulent trading conduct was proved, the directors of the parent company, 
Rumasa, would have been made liable as shadow directors and as parties to the 
carrying on the business of the subsidiary company, Augustus, in fraudulent manner. 
There was an attempt by His Honour Bromley QC in re a Company No. 001418 of 
198856 to clearly distinguish between the two concepts of compensatory and penal 
damages in a fraudulent trading proceedings. 
In this case, an application was brought by the liquidator against director of the 
company for fraudulent trading. The company went into creditors' voluntary winding 
up in 1986, when an estimated deficiency Owed to unsecured creditors of some 
1212,000 was proved. In 1984, the company was not in a position to pay the Crown 
and ordinary debts. However, the respondent continued to receive a significant sum 
as remuneration. In the instant case, His Honour Bromley QC found the amount of 
remuneration very high "for a company in such a state. " The learned judge found 
that from the end of July 1984 the respondent had no reason to think that the 
company could pay its debts as they fell due or shortly thereafter. Therefore, there 
was "real blame according to current notions of fair trading" in his causing the 
company to continue to trade. 57 The learned judge took the view that so far as the 
sum for which the respondent was declared to be responsible is compensatory, it was 
appropriate to limit it to the amount of the debts of creditors proved to have been 
defrauded by fraudulent trading. The maximum compensatory sum was the amount 
of trading loss during the period of fraudulent trading. 
As was seen, this view was also taken by some other judges such as Harman J. in re 
L Todd (Swanscombe). 58 
3.3 Wroneul Trading 
56 [19901 BCC 526. 
57 lbid at 55 1. 58 [19901 BCLC 454. 
I 
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5. ý Vi r-oý -1 tj--ý 13.1 Philosophy Behind the New Provisions 
As is clear from the above examination of fraudulent trading, the necessity of 
proving dishonesty was a very difficult task for the applicant. The result was 
disappointing for the applicant as well as creditors who suffered loss through 
directors' delinquency and looked to justice for recovery. 
Prior to the introduction of the wrongful trading provisions, a director could carry 
on trading while insolvent with merely the genuine belief that the clouds would be 
roll away and the sunshine of prosperity would shine upon him and his company 
again. 51 Many cases brought under fraudule'n"it trading section failed, and this left the 
burden of costs as a result of the unsuccessful proceedingS. 60 Such expenses had to 
be paid by whole body of creditors, when action was taken by liquidator, and if the 
applicant was an individual creditor, the expenses were to be paid from his own 
pocket. However, the courts required a higher degree of proof than what was 
established by the applicant. Consequently, an owner- director, like the respondent 
of the case of re Patrick & Lyon Ltd. '61 who 
had allowed his company to continue 
trading while insolvent only for the purpose of validating a floating charge in his own 
favour, would escape liability for fraudulent trading because his action was not 
proved to be motivated by a dishonest design. 
The other problem was the lack of clear grounds available to the courts to determine 
the main element of fraud, dishonesty. Making contrasting decisions with almost 
similar facts by the same judge was, thus, not surprising. 62 
With regard to those considerations, the provisions relating to fraudulent trading 
appeared to be ineffective to protect the interests of company's creditors. The penal 
element together with the reference to fraud, caused the courts to demand a strict 
59 re White & Osmond (Parkstone) Ltd. [1960130 July (unreported). 60 re Patrick & Lyon Ltd. 119331 Ch 786,790, Augustus Barnett & Son Ltd. 119861 BCLC 170, re 
General Cooper Chemicals 1197812 All ER 49,53. 
61 [19331 Ch 786,790. 
62 For example compare re William C. Leitch Brothers Ltd. [193212 Ch, 71 and re Patrick & 
Lyone Ltd. 119331 Ch 786. 
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standard of proof which could deter possible winning- claimants for recovering 
compensation from delinquent directors, even when there was a strong ground. 
As a result, the Cork Committee proposed an alternative basis for seeking 
compensation as wrongful trading which is based on unreasonable rather than 
fraudulent behaviour. The Committee considered that requiring the victims to prove 
dishonesty was inappropriate. Compensation, in their view, ought have been 
available to those who suffered predictable loss not only as a result of fraudulent 
conduct, but also unreasonable behaviour. 63 The Committee, therefore, proposed a 
wholly civil remedy without need of proving dishonesty and, thus, the criminal 
standard of proof was not required. 64 The belief was that this remedy would be 
found attractive by the bankers concerned as monitoring the conduct of doubtfully 
solvent companieS. 65 
An examination of the contents of the Committee's recommendations, however, 
leads to the conclusion that what appeared in the ACt66 was significantly different 
from those proposals. Some of recommendations were totally or partly ignored by 
Parliament. In the final "Proposed Draft Clause"67 for wrongful trading, carrying on 
to continue the business wrongly would be established if 'any business of the 
company is carried on with intent to defraud creditors of the company or creditors of 
any other person or otherwise for any fraudulent purpose'. 68. 
As to this part of proposal, one may raise the question that whether part (a) is a 
requirement for liability under wrongful trading provisions, or merely an alternative 
63 Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency and Practice Cmnd 8558, Para. 1777'(1982). 
64 Ibid Para. 1778. 
65 Ibid Para. 1779. 
66 Section 15 of the Insolvency 1985. 
67 The 'proposed draft Clause' as Responsibility for Wrongftd Trading cited in Para. 1806 as 
follows: 
(1) A company shall be trading wrongfully within the meaning of this section if: 
(a) any business of the company is carried on with intent to defraud creditors of the company or 
creditors of any other person or otherwise for any other fraudulent purpose, or 
(b) at a time when the company is insolvent or unable to pay its debts as they fall due it incurs 
further debts or other liabilities to other persons without a reasonable prospect of meeting them in 
full. 
68 Para. 1806 (1) (a). 
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for part (b). It will be a very odd conclusion if part (a) was intended as a requirement 
for wrongful trading. It will be odd and unjustifiable because the Committee 
introduced the concept of wrongful trading due to meet criticisms and inadequacies 
emerged from the fraudulent trading provisions, particularly its requirement of a 
strict standard of proof. 69 Moreover, such a requirement appears to be in 
contradiction not only with the committee's intention of introducing a new merely 
civil personal liability 'without proof of fraud or dishoneSty"70 but also it seems the 
same as the main element of fraudulent trading offence in section 213(l) of the 
Insolvency Act 1986. -&. 
The other possibility is to take part (a) as an alternative for part (b), or an option for 
legislators to choose one of them as a ground for wrongful trading. However, 
accepting the second possibility as the Committee's intended choice, does not either 
absolve it from criticism. If the Committee intended the part concerned to operate as 
an option or alternative, it should have been clarified. Furthermore, when the 
concept of wrongful trading was aimed at resolving the difficulties of strict standard 
of proof necessary in fraudulent trading cases, introducing part (a), even as an 
alternative seems in obvious contrast to such an objective and, therefore, 
unacceptable and unnecessary. 
According to the Cork Comn-dttee, an application for wrongful trading could be 
brought by the company's liquidator, its Official Receiver, receiver, manager, 
administrator, and even individual creditors or contributors, but under section 21471 
69 paras. 1759,1776. 
70 para. 1778 (a). 
71 Section reads: 
"(I) Subject to subsection(3) below, if in the course of winding up of a company it appears that 
subsection (2) of this section applies in relation to a person who is or has been a director of the 
company, the court, on the application of the liquidator, may declare that person is to be liable to 
make such contribution (if any) to the company's assets as the court thinks proper. 
(2) This subsection applies in relation to a person if - 
(a) the company has gone into insolvent liquidation, 
(b) at some time before the commencement of the winding up of the company, that person knew or 
ought to have concluded that there was no reasonable prospect that the company would avoid going 
into insolvent liquidation, and 
(c) that person was a director of the company at that time; 
\/ 
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the only person entitled to bring the action is liquidator. Perhaps the reason for this, 
was that Parliament intended to put the right of taking such a serious action in the 
crucial event of insolvency into the hands of a qualified authority, liquidator, and to 
prevent individuals to harass directors by abusing the right. Section 214 is a copy of 
its forerunner, section 15 of the Insolvency Act 1985. However, the addition of 
'shadow director' is the only change to the new section. 
It is noteworthy that section 214 is not entitled as "wrongful trading" in the 
Insolvency Act, and wrongful trading is a side- noted of "Penalisation of Directors 
and Officers" in that Act, which was an inv6n'tion of the Cork Committee in chapter 
44 and several related paragraphs in that chapter. 
The first case in which there was a statement on wrongful trading was re a Company 
(No. 00359 of 1987). 72 In this case Gibson J. was of the view that there was a 
reasonable possibility that the liquidator might be successful in bringing an action 
under section 214. Although the case was not an action for wrongful trading, the 
interesting point was the suggestion of the learned judge of such a possibility. 
3.3.2 Director- Shadow Director 
The concept of the 'shadow director' was first introduced by section 3 of the 
Companies Act 1917. According to the section, the expression "director" "shall 
include any person who occupied the position of a director and any person in 
accordance with whose directions or instructions the directors of a company are 
accustomed to act. " 
While section 214 (7) provides that "In this section 'directoe includes a shadow 
director. it is, thus, necessary to make a distinction between the concepts of 'director' 
and 'shadow director'. The extension of liability to a shadow director is of 
considerable importance, not only due to its affect on the financier or financial 
advisors / creditors, but also on a parent company which may be held liable for its 
72 [198713 BCC 160, or as International Westminster Bank Plc v. Okeanos Maritime Corp 0 987) BCLC 450. 
Is, 
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subsidiary, where it has been involved to a considerable extent in the management of 
a company: 
3.3.2.1 Creditor or director? 
The problems of interpretation were to some extent caused by the failure to 
implement the clear provisions suggested by the. Cork Committee. The main 
problems created are, how to apply wrongful trading provisions to directors and, 
more importantly, how to distribute amount of money recovered. 
What has attracted the judges concerns in some wrongful trading cases, is to clarify 
the position of a creditor, financier or financial or advisor / creditor on one hand, and 
legal person liable as shadow director under wrongful trading section on the other 
hand. The clarification of the matter becomes more significant and complicated when 
a financial advisor / creditor, e. g. a bank, is a debenture holder and at the same time 
might become liable to contribute to the company's assets as a shadow director. 
In the Cork Committee Report, the expression "officer" was suggested to include 
any person in accordance with whose directions the directors had been accustomed 
to act. This definition appeared in section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 under 
'shadow director' which was defined by section 741(2) of the Companies Act 1985, 
and incorporated into the insolvency legislation by section 251 of the Insolvency Act. 
Thereafter, it was often used in Companies Act, 73 Insolvency Act 1986,74 and the 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.75 
The case of re a Company (No 005009 of 1987)) Ex Parle Copp. and Anolher76 is 
of great importance in this respect, because it was the only case in which a claim was 
brought against a bank as shadow director. Moreover, in this case, the bank's 
application to strike out a liquidator's claim against it for wrongful trading failed. 
73 Sections 309(3), 317(7), 320- 324. 
74 Sections. 206,208,209,211,214,216,249, and 25 1. 75 Section 4,6.9, and 22(5). 
76 [19881 BCC 424. 
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Here, the company had for a while traded profitably until it lost its major customer 
which seriously affected its financial position. Prior to the loss, the bank allowed the 
company substantial unsecured overdraft on its current account, After financial 
deterioration and on the basis of a report made by the inspectors appointed by the 
bank, the latter took a debenture secured by a fixed charge on the company's 
receivable and other property and a floating charge over what was left. Thereafter, 
all the proceeds of trading were paid into a particular account operated by the bank 
and no drawings were allowed without its consent, The crucial point was that the 
company followed recommendations in the report as required by the bank. 
Subsequent to insolvent liquidation of the company, the liquidator sought a 
declaration holding the bank liable for wrongful trading as shadow director for its 
direct involvement into the company's affairs prior to the insolvent liquidation. I 
In that case, the liquidator based his claim on the ground that " the actual directors 
of the company did not exercise any real authority or free will in the direction of its 
affairs. "77 The court, acknowledging that the debenture was basically invalid, since 
according to section 245 of the Insolvency Act there was no consideration, refused 
to strike out the claim because on the materials available, the liquidator's claim for 
wrongful trading was not "obviously unsustainable". 
Knox J. seemed prepared to take the view that the definition of shadow director 
under section 25178 was wide enough in scope to apply to the case when the 
directors in question acted in accordance with the recommendation of the bank by 
creating security for its overdraft. Although in the end the bank was not held liable as 
shadow director, the court's treatment was an obvious sign of the possibility of 
holding a bank liable for wrongful trading and alarming for the bank to deal with 
such companies more carefully and not interfere in their affairs. 
77 Ibid at 426. 
78 Section states: 
"Shadow director in relation to a company, means a person in accordance with whose directions or 
instructions the directors of the company are accustomed to act. " 
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The holding caused anxiety among legal writers who were concerned with its impact 
on professional advisors, 79 so that some called for amendment of the definition of 
"shadow director" 80 
In Re Lo- Line Electric Motors Ltd. 81 the court disagreed with Official Receiver's 
argument that the respondent was a shadow director within the meaning of section 
741 (2) of the Companies Act, because the definition referred to a board of directors 
acting in accordance with a person's instructions. 82 
As to the case of a bank as shadow director some points should be carefully taken 
into account: 
i) Interpreting the section so as to impose liability on such a financial institution as 
shadow director is not envisaged as an outcome of wrongful trading cases. The only 
reported case containing a claim against such a person under section 214 is re a 
Company (No 005009 of 1987) Ex Parte Copp. and Another. 83 Although the 
importance of the case is beyond doubt, it does not suffice to establish a rule to be 
followed in the future casef. 
H) In relation to a financier or financial advisor / creditor, more particularly a bank, 
there should be some specified factors on the basis of which liability of a bank be 
decided. The mere recommendation from a bank which attempts to support an ailing 
company to carry on trading, should not establish an inference of 'shadow 
directorship position'. The more acceptable ground can be the nature of legal 
relationship between the company and a financial institution as creditor. The account 
should, as suggested by a legal writer, be takenof84whether their relationship is a 
contractual one. If so, whether it does imply a subordinative relationship, on the 
ground of which there is an obligation imposed on the company to follow the bank. 
79 Stephen Gillespie, "Wrongful Trading: Policy and Practice", 6 J. I. B. L., (1989) 272. 80 Stephen Girvin, "Statutory Liability of Shadow Directors", Jurid. Rev. (1995) 414,417. 81 [19881 BCLC 698. 
82 Ibid at 706. 
83 [1988) BCC 424. 
84 Edward Jacobs, "Wrongful Trading", 10 DULjgU 
" (1989) 180,181. 
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iii) It has widely been recognised that for this purposes acting in compliance with a 
bank or parent company should be continuous or habitual not occasional. 
Therefore, acting in accordance with an instruction or direction on only one occasion 
does not establish a subordinative relationship. 
It seems the courts should not impose wrongful trading liability if a debtor company 
followed a bank's recommendations even habitually, only because it had a fear that 
the bank might take step to put it into liquidation. However, if reconunendations 
backed by threat of putting the company into insolvent liquidation, it may be taken as 
: -, inference of subordinative relationship. 95 
The courts should consider discouraging impact of a wide application of the concept 
of 'shadow directoe to the banks, and consider each event as a matter related to the 
particular facts of each case rather than a rule. 
3.3.2.2 Controlling shareholder 
Another form of shadow directorship could be controlling shareholder, specially a 
holding company which dominates the company by appointing directors through its 
casting vote in general meeting. Although it is submitted that a financial failure of a 
company only should affect the individual directors of that company but not 
directors of its subsidiary, 86 a holding company is at risk of being held liable as 
shadow director when the subsidiary has no separate economic existence, personnel 
or premises. Furthermore, the imposition of liability under section 214 becomes 
inevitable when the directors of the former are also those of the latter. 
A particular circumstances may arise when a holding company decides to withdraw 
its support from a financially troubled subsidiary, with the knowledge of strong 
possibility of the subsidiary falling into insolvent liquidation, as it was the case in 
Augustus Barnett & Son Dd. 97 
85 Harry Rajak, " Shadow Director", 3 Law for Business [ 1991154,55. 86 R. E. Adkins, "The Liability Attaching to Directors and Other Officers of a Parent Company 
where a Branch or subsidiary Fails in Another Country", 11. L. & Practice (1985) 71,72. 87 119861 BCLC 170. 
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The important point in the recent case of re Hydrodan (Corby) Lld. 88 was the 
question on the relationship of a parent company with its subsidiary, in which there 
was an exhaustive statement delivered by Nfillett J. on different types of directors 
and their responsibility. Here, Hydrodan (Corby) was a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Landsaver, which in turn was indirectly a wholly owned subsidiary of Eagle Trust 
Pic. The company went into liquidation and its liquidator sought a declaration to 
make two directors of the Eagle Trust liable as shadow directors. The application of 
two directors to strike out the claim was successful. However, if an allegation had 
been made against the parent company as a shadow director, it would by implication 
have been successful. 
In this case, two respondents were indeed directors of Eagle Trust, but Millett J. did 
find it difficult to extract a relationship as such between the respondents and the 
company. 99 
The main point emerged from the case was that, even when a body corporate was a 
shadow director of a subsidiary it does not lead to the conclusion that its directors 
are liable as shadow director of the subsidiary. Nfillett J. disagreed with the 
Nquidatoes submission that where a body corporate is a director of a company, 
whether it be dejacto, dejure or shadow director, its own directors must ipsofacto 
be shadow directors of the company. 
In his application, the liquidator claimed that the two respondents "personally acted 
as de facto or shadow directors" of Hydrodan. Nfillett J. did not agree with the 
reasoning and pointed out that the definitions of Ve facto and shadow director" 
were different. However, he held that: 
"Attendance of board meetings and voting with others, may in certain limited 
circumstances expose a director to personal liability to the company of which he is a 
director or to its creditors: But it does not , without more, constitute 
him a director of 
any company of which his company is a director. "90 
88 [199412 BCLC 180. 
89 lbid at 185. 
90 lbid at 184. 
Corporate Directors'Duties &Liabilities in Insolvency in England and the US 75 
The problem may arise that in such a situation a parent company would be held liable 
to contribute to the subsidiary's assets as shadow director under section 214. In 
other words, the parent company would be liable to pay for its subsidiaries directors 
wrongful activities. 
The holding of Millett J. in this case appears to be more justified when both parent 
company and the subsidiary are insolvent. This holding leads to the conclusion that a 
contribution to the subsidiary's assets does not have to be made by the parent 
company at the expense of its creditors. Such a conclusion seems intended in 
enacting section 214. Here, although the com'pany was a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Eagle Trust p1c., it did not seem to the court sufficient to establish a shadow 
directorship relationship. The conclusion reached and test taken by Millett J., here, 
has been criticised as higher than the statutory definition. 91 
In Re Kuwait Asia Bank EC v. National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd. 92 the issue was 
an appeal from a New Zealand Court of Appeal. There was an allegation against a 
bank. The two employees of the bank were directors of an insolvent company of 
which the bank was shareholder of 40 per cent of shares. Moreover, those two 
directors out of five directors of the company were appointed by the bank. 
In this case, a New Zealand money broker ("AICS") which went into liquidation in 
1986 took deposits of which National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd. ("NMLN") was 
the trustee for the depositors. The depositors sued "NMLN" for breach of trust and 
sought contribution in proceedings against the bank and AICS's directors and 
auditors for allegedly acting fraudulently and/ or negligently by giving certificates 
containing false and misleading representations and breaching their duties. 
The reason for suing the bank was that it was substantial shareholder and allegedly a 
shadow director of the company and, therefore, responsible for monitoring proper 
business conduct of AICS's business. 
91 N. K Campbell, "Liability for Shadow Director". ML (1994) 609,613. 92 [19901 BCC 561. 
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Lord Lowry held that the bank was not vicariously liable to NNEN as employer or 
principal or personally liable for breach of trust, because in the absence of fraud or 
bad faith the bank as a person controlling the appointment of those directors had no 
duty to make sure that its nominees discharged their duties as directors properly. 
Consequently, it was held that the bank could not be liable as shadow director simply 
because the directors were not accustomed to act on the directions and instructions 
of the bank. In this case, the claimants could not provide the court with any evidence 
that the two respondents acted or were accustomed to act in accordance to the 
bar&s directions or instructions. 
One may argue that to hold a parent company liable as shadow director, its situation 
while insolvent should be distinguished from its trading life. As a result, in the former 
situation the imposition of a liability on the parent company is unlikely to benefit the 
creditors of the subsidiary while the company itself has some creditors. Neither is it 
fair to benefit the creditors of the subsidiary at the expense of those of its parent. 
Likewise, the case of Augustus Barnett & Son Ltd. 93 is a good example of such a 
relationship. The creditors of Augustus Barnett (subsidiary) continued to deal with it 
only on the basis of promised assurances of Rumasa (parent company), and they 
suffered losses when Rumasa refused to fulfil its assurances. The court took the view 
that the assurances made by Rumasa may have constituted it a party to the carrying 
on the business of its subsidiary and liable as shadow director. Thus, in this case, had 
wrongful trading been a possible cause of action, the conclusion would be that it 
would have been likely to be successful. 
Apart from the case of a financier or financial advisors/ creditors, it seems under any 
circumstances the judges should not consider an advisor, whether legal or individual, 
as shadow director under section 214 when their relationship is merely an advisory 
one. There should be a strong distinction between being a party to the carrying on 
the business and giving merely some advice or recommendations. 
93 119861 BCLC 170. 
L/ 
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This point has been considered by the legislature at the end of its statement on 
'shadow director as "person is not shadow director by reason only that the directors 
act on advice given by him in a professional capacity. 1194 
3.3.3 Re Produce Marketing Consortium- A Turning Point 
The case of re Produce Marketing Consortium Dd. 95 should be classified as the 
leading case on the issue of wrongful trading. Some issues have emerged from the 
case which have attracted the attention of the legal community. The question of a 
financier or financial advisor/ creditor as s5adow director, discussed in previous 
section, is followed by the question of the beneficiary of such a contribution. 
In this case, Knox J. was of the view that the floating chargee would take all sum 
recovered under the proceedings and if there were any remaining amount, would go 
to the ordinary creditors' account. This holding was influenced by the misfeasance 
case of re Anglo- American Printing and Publishing Union96 as one of the oldest 
ones on misfeasance in which the sum recovered was swallowed by floating charge 
security. A review of misfeasance case law proves that the re Anglo- American 
judgment was recognised as a rule in subsequent misfeasance proceedings. 
The Knox J. 's judgment may be supported by the reasoning that in both statutory 
sections in relation to wrongful trading and misfeasance, the contribution is to be 
made to "the company's assets". However, the judgment of Knox J. has been 
criticised. It has been claimed that the admission of this judgment as a rule frustrates 
the purpose of wrongful trading provisions. 97 
Sealy also believes that although this part of judgment to order the proceeds of a 
wrongful trading to go to the floating chargee rather than unsecured creditors, is 
justified by the wording of section 214 and previous case law stand in such cases as 
94 Section 251 of the Insolvency Act 1986. Section 742 (1) the Companies Act 1985, and section 
22 (5) of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. 95 [198915 BCC 569. 
96 [189512 Ch 891. 
97 Andrew Hicks "Advising on Wrongful trading"- pt. 1 14 Co. Law. (1993), 16,18, pt. 2,14 C. Q. 
LM [ 1993155, see also generally Fidelis Oditah, "Wrongful Trading", LMCLO, (1990) 205. 
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Re Anglo- Austrian Printing & Publishing Union, 98 where proceeds of misfeasance 
were paid to the holder of floating chargee, Knox J. 's holding is contrary to the 
ph. ilosophy of the section which is to protect trade creditors. 99 
In re Produce Marketing Consortium Lid. 100 Knox J. did not seem prepared to 
establish a rule as such, when in the same case he described the intention of 
Parliament in enacting the section as requiring a director to make contribution to the 
assets of the company which, in his Lordship's opinion, was its creditors. 101 He 
restated the matter in the same judgment as follows: 
"what is ordered to be contributed goes to the 'c"ornpany's assets for the benefit of the 
general body of creditors". 102 
This part ofjudgment seems inconsistent with the final view of the learned judge that 
the recovered sum had to go to floating chargee. 
However, the holding is consistent with the old system as evidenced by re William 
Leitch Brothers Ltd. (No. 2), 103 where it was held that the recovered money was to 
go to the general assets available for distribution among all creditors. 
Moreover, in agreement with Sealy's view there is another point in the construction 
of section 214 which can be taken in support of the judgment in question. In Cork 
Committee's proposed draft, an action for wrongful trading could be brought by the 
ýompany's liquidator, Official Receiver, receiver, manager, administrator, and even 
individual creditors or contributory, whereas under section 214 such an action can be 
taken only by liquidator. Does this mean Parliament intended the proceeds of the 
action be available to the liquidator for distribution among all creditors rather than to 
a secured creditor or particular group of creditors? 
98 [189512 Ch 891. 
99 L. S. Sealy, "Wrongful Trading", M (1989) 357,377. 
100 1198915 BCC 569. 
10 1 Ibid at 594. 
102 lbid at 597. 
103 [19331 Ch. 261. 
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The judgment of His Honour Judge Jack QC in the recent case of Re Sherbomes 
Associate Ltd., 104 is a good example of this wide discretion of the courts under 
section 214. In that case the learned judge said: 
"Section 214 provides in effect that if a liquidator can establish a factual situation, he 
may request the court to declare the director should make a contribution to the 
company's assets, the amount of which is in the court's discretion. " 105 
Any attempt to recognise the holding of Knox J. in re Produce Marketing 
Consortium Ltd. 106 as a principle applicable to other cases not only frustrates the 
purpose of the wrongful trading section, but it also makes a liquidator operate on 
behalf of a debenture holder, and take action at the expense of the general body of 
creditors in order to only benefit a floating chargee. Is that the effect which the 
section intended to give, and is it fair? The answer is certainly negative. Nobody can 
argue that the Cork Committee and Parliament intended the section to benefit a 
floating chargee to the detriment of unsecured creditors, particularly those who 
suffered loss as a result of wrongful trading. There is no doubt that the main 
objective of the Committee's proposals and the statutory provisions in relation to 
insolvency by Parliament was to protect the general body of creditors in general, and 
unsecured creditors in particular. The manner of drafting the Act and the wording of 
wrongful trading section appears to be a source of confusion. To satisfy the real 
intention of the legislators, the courts should exercise their discretion conferred on 
them in section 214 in the words "as the court thinks proper", the discretion which 
should, at first stage, benefit creditors who suffered loss after the financial 
depression. 
The complexity inherent with the judgment of Knox J. in the concerned case is that a 
beneficiary, in almost all cases a financial advisor/ creditor, of a contribution order 
under section 214 may, at the same time, be held liable as shadow director to make 
104 [19951 BCC 40. 
105 lbid at 46. 
106 [1989] 5 BCC 569. 
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such a contribution to the company's assets, in simple words to repay itself This 
does not seem to be what the section intended to give effect. 
The other interesting point emerged from this case, was the question over nature and 
purpose of wrongful trading provisions. Prior to this case, there was no challenge 
over the purpose of the proceedings as purely civil. However, in this case the 
respondents contended that the character of section 214 was both compensatory and 
penal, 107 whereas the counsel for liquidator took the view that the provisions gave a 
purely civil remedy. 108 In Knox J. 's view the jurisdiction under section 214 was 
primarily compensatory rather than penal. 109 
The wording of judgment does not appear to totally deny the provisions as having a 
somehow penal feature. It may seem odd. But a mandatory disqualification which is 
imposed as a result of a contribution order should not be ignored. By considering the 
nature and aim of a disqualification order"O the treatment of Knox J. to the purpose 
of wrongful trading proceedings might be justified. 
Finally, as to the amount for which the respondent to be declared liable, Knox J. said 
that it is the amount "by which the company's assets can be discerned to have been 
depleted by the director's conduct which caused the discretion under section 214 to 
arise. " His Lordship acknowledged that Parliament had deliberately chosen very 
wide words of discretion, therefore, it would be undesirable to spell out limits on this 
discretion. In fixing the amount of declaration, he considered the fact that, in that 
case, there was no fraudulent intent. III This part of Knox J. 's judgment is partly in 
the line with the holdings of His Honour Bromley QC in re a Company No. 001418 
of 1988,112 and Harman J. in re L Todd (Swanscombe) both fraudulent trading 
cases. 113 
107 Ibid at 570. 
108 Ibid at 597. 
109 Ibid. 
110 See Chapter 4: "Disqualification of Directors"- Nature and Aim. III re Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd. 1198915 BCC 569,597. 112 [1990] BCC 526. 
113 [19901 BCLC 454. 
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3.3.4. Objective Test- Departurefrom Common Law Rule 
The main feature of the duties under section 214 which is basically different from 
those which have so far been recognised as the traditional common law duties, is its 
introduction of a new standard of conduct. It is a crucial point to be addressed 
whether the standard of proof is based on objective or subjective test for the 
purposes of the wrongful trading provisions, 
It should be noted that in English case law the traces of the idea can be found when 
the courts did not totally refused the possibility of applying such a test to the 
company directors. ' 14 
Historically, the common law has assessed directors' duty of care and skill only by 
subjective test. ' 15 The judges do not doubt to apply such a test to the cases before 
them. However, the provisions of wrongful trading seem for the first time in the 
history of English law have departed from this traditional view and built up a new 
legal approach with its own consequences. The imposition of an objective standard is 
a real departure from the traditional subjective criterion applied by the courts in 
ascertaining the level of skill and care which is expected of directors. 
The advantage of the imposition of a standard with an objective element is that 
incompetent directors may be deterred from entering into the arena of corporate 
management with the threat of personal liability catching them. 
The, Cork Committee Report was quite clear on the point that the test for wrongful 
trading should be objective and the standard of proof should be that of the ordinary, 
reasonable man. 
Section 214 (4) provides a double test for determining the facts which the directors 
ought to have known. It provides two factors as standards of conduct which 
together shows a tendency to the objective as follows: 
114 re Equitable Fire Insurance 1192511 Ch 407. 115 See for example Brazilian Rubber Plantations& Estates Ltd. [191111 ChD 425. 
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"(4) For the purposes of subsections (2) and (3), the facts which a director of a 
company ought to know or ascertain, the conclusions which he ought to reach and the 
steps which he ought to take are those which be known or ascertained, or reached or 
taken, by a reasonably diligent person having both- 
(a) the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected of a 
person carrying out the same functions as are carried out by that director in relation to 
the company, and 
(b) the general knowledge, skill and experience that director has. 
The first part obviously employes a standard which may be higher than what is 
possessed by the respondent. Therefore, such excuses as the lack of experience, 
inattendance or reliance on other officers-""in the honest belief, which under a 
subjective test are considered in favour of the defendant, under this head are not 
justifiable. 
Part (b) provides that the level of skill and care will be more difficult where a 
director has possessed a higher level of general knowledge, skill and experience than 
may be expected of a director in his position. 
This subsection should be read together with subsection (5) which provides that a 
director's function as to his company includes all those which entrusted to him 
irrespective of whether or not he carried them out personally, or a particular function 
is delegated to other officers. 
As the language of the section implies, the individuals' qualifications may impose a 
higher test on them than required by their functions. Therefore, a director with a 
particular expertise or responsibility is more at risk. The court will take account of 
all specific circumstances. For example, a director in a large company with 
sophisticated procedures and equipment is expected to perform a higher standard 
than a director with only a limited role in the company and little or no management 
function. 
Cooke believes that the wording of section 214 is an invitation to the courts to 
exercise hindsight substituting their own judgment for that of corporate directors by 
which a corporate director: 
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"is required to prove that he acted according to the standards of a hypothetical person 
with hypothetical knowledge in a hypothetical situation and with hypothetical motives. 
Such a defence must be impossible. " 116 
If his general knowledge, skill and experience exceeds that required for the job, then 
he is expected to discharge his responsibilities in accordance with those skills. He is 
, thus, judged according to the appropriate standard expected either 
for the job or 
that he possesses, whichever is higher. Therefore, it is of particular importance that 
the lack of adequate expertise necessary for a particular job does not excuse a 
director from liability to reach the inevitable conclusion. 
There should be a distinction between an executive and non- executive directors and 
between managing director and those with little involvement in the company's 
running. It also seems necessary to distinguish finance or production directors with a 
more detailed information of its business and ordinary managers. 
However, the lack of expertise necessary for a job does not excuse a director from 
failing to reach the basic standard and reaching inevitable conclusion, as for example 
to insolvency of the company. 117 
The application of objective test to directors' responsibility is a new experience in 
English company law, but the courts seem successfully overcoming the problem of 
clarifying the scope and defining the test. The main uncertainty in this respect is the 
criterion of the reasonable man. Whether a reasonable man is a person with a high 
experience, and expected to do what is the best to the company and its creditors, or 
he is required to do what reasonably could be done. It is an important point which 
should be regulated by the courts and be considered by the legislatorf in the future 
enactments, so as to be applicable as a rule with regard to the changing time and the 
need of modem business world. 
3.3.5 Particular Duties Under Wrong'41 Trading Provisions 
116 David J. Cooke, "Limited Liability Abolished", I. L. & Practice (1988) 157,158. 
117 T. E. Cooke & Andrew 11icks, "Wrongful Trading- Predicting Insolvency", ML (1993) 338, 
339. 
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Under the wrongful trading provisions, directors have a range of duties and 
responsibilities if not performed adequately, the imposition of liability most likely 
catches them. 
3.3.5.1 Duty ofMonitoring and Prediction 
The expression 'prediction' has been used as a duty of directors of a financially 
troubled company. However, such a concept is not mentioned in the Act. The Act 
expressly requires directors of a company to know or ought to have concluded that 
there is no reasonable prospect that the company avoids going into insolvent 
liquidation. Such a statement is taken in the sense of prediction. The notion of 
'prediction' reveals the main thrust of the legislature's intention. 
By monitoring the company's affairs, directors can reach a conclusion that the 
company is going into depression. Therefore, to predict the company's final 
destination before it becomes too late, it is necessary for a director to have a 
systematic and constant monitoring. How successful a director is in predicting and 
facing a financial depression depends on the existence of a proper monitoring 
system. 
In some statutory provisions, having good accounting records is described as a duty 
of companies directors, breach of which mostly leads to disqualification of the 
director in question from being a director or being involved in any form of 
management of any company, ' 18 
The Institute of Directors has recommended that directors of a company must have 
all the time financial information which is up to date and accurate. The earlier 
problem is identified the wider is the range of options. The reverse is true, the more 
serious problem becomes, the more difficult it is to deal with. Therefore, speed in 
taking a proper action is significantly essential. ' 19 
118 Section 3 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. 119 "Institute of Directors; Guidelines" Guideline 1, &LJBM, (1991) 79. 
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In re Produce Marketing Consortium Lid., 120 although the accounts were not 
available to the directors, they had an intimate knowledge of the business and must 
had known that the turnover was seriously down in the previous year. In the Knox 
J. 's point of view "the preparation of accounts was woefully late. " 
Under sections 221 (1) and (2) (a) of the Companies Act 1985, there is an obligation 
on companies to cause accounting record to be kept so as to disclose with 
reasonable accuracy the financial position of the company at any time. The directors 
are also obliged to prepare a profit and loss account for each financial year and a 
balance sheet at the endof it. 121 In re Purpoint lid. 122 the company's accounts were 
so inadequate that there was no possibility for directors to monitor the company's 
financial position. 
The main question from view of preventing liability under section 214 is how, and on 
the basis of which factors, a director can monitor and predict insolvent liquidation. 
The knowledge to be imputed in testing whether or not the director could monitor 
insolvency is not limited to the documentary materials at the given time. The factual 
information should also be ascertained. 123 
The obvious sign for this purpose is the loss of major customer or contract by the 
company. In re MC Bacon Ltd., 124 for example, the company was faced with serious 
business difficulties when its main customer terminated its business with the 
company. As a result, the lender bank pressed for a security as a condition for its 
continued support. Likewise, in re DKG Contractors Ltd. 125 withdrawal of credit by 
a major supplier was an obvious sign for the directors to conclude that their 
company was in critical position. 
120 [198915 BCC 569. 
121 Section 227 (1) and (3) of the Companies Act 1985. 122 [1991] BCC 121. 
123 re Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd. 1199915 BCC, 569,595. 124 [19901 BCLC 234. 
125 [19901 BCC 903. 
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The loss of key employees may also be considered by directors as an indication of 
their company's position as serious. 126 
More difficult question in this respect is how to determine the precise time when a 
director is expected to predict insolvency. In re Purpoint Ltd. 127 the main question 
was the date when the respondent ought to have known that there was no reasonable 
prospect that the company could avoid going into insolvent liquidation. Vinelott J. 
held that the date had to be pushed back to the end of 1986 when it was obvious to 
the respondent that the company's going into insolvency was inevitable. The 
difficulty which the court faced was that because of total failure of the respondent to 
"0, 
prepare and keep proper accounting records, it was not possible to find out the 
extent of the respondent's liabilities. In the Vinelott J. 's view, the only solution was 
to quantify the loss caused by continuation of trading after the end of 1986 by adding 
the debts owed to creditors after I January 1987 and unpaid when the company 
ceased trading. 
In re Sherhome Associates Ltd. 128 the court examined the matter as: 
"It would not be fair to the respondents to permit the liquidator to pick a series of 
subsequent dates, or to invite the court to pick a subsequent date, saying of such a date 
or dates that at least then the conclusion that there was no reasonable prospect that 
Sherborne would avoid insolvent liquidation should have been reached. Such a case 
would have required the examination of each date for this purpose. " 
It may seem unfair to attempt to push back the liability point to an earlier time when 
financW difficulty was less immediate and warning signs less obvious. By doing so 
the courts would expect a very high standard of a monitoring system and push back 
commencement of liability to an early date. 
3.3. J. 2 'Every Step'to Be taken 
126 Cooke & Mcks, op cit. 127 119911 BCC 121. 
129 [19951 BCC 40. 
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Section 214, after setting up liability for wrongful trading and its requirements, in 
providing the limit on the declaration, states a provision which reads: 
(3)"The court shall not make a declaration under this section with respect to any 
person if it is satisfied that after the condition specified in subsection (2)(b) was first 
satisfied in relation to him that person took every Step129 with a view to minimising 
the potential loss to the company's creditors as ... he ought to have taken. " 
The expression 'every step', then was referred to as a criterion to mitigate against the 
respondents liability. If the director in question satisfies the court that he has taken 
'every step' which he ought to have taken with a view to minimising the loss to the 
company's creditors, the court shall not order him liable to contribute to the 
companýs assets. 
"'0 It seems this expression wasemployed in the subsection in order to define a limit on 
Itt, extent of compensation, but rather to set out directors' responsibilities or duties, 
nor was it used as an independent legal concept. However, the expression, then, 
appeared to give effect not only as a duty of directors to minimise loss to the 
company's creditors, but more importantly it became to be a means of relieving 
against liability under the wrongful trading section. 
Sealy and Milman believe that Parliament deliberately replaced the expression of 
"every reasonable step" proposed by the Cork Committee with "every step", 130 
perhaps to widen the range of actions or steps which fall within this expression. 
The construction of this subsection is described as "clumsy", particularly the phrase 
"assuming him to have known that there was no reasonable prospect that the 
company would avoid going into insolvent liquidation" is a repetition and 
irrelevant. 131 
The discussion of monitoring and prediction of insolvency is a prelin-dnary stage for 
taking every proper step with a view to minimising the loss to the company's 
creditors. In other words, predicting an impending financial difficulty does not 
129 Emphasis is added. 
130 Sealy & N1ilman, Annotated Guide to the 1986 Insolvency Legislation, at 23 1. 131 Donna MCkenzie, "Wrongful Trading- A Paper Tiger" Jurid Rev. (1995) 519,523. 
Corporate Directors'Duties &Liabilities in Insolvency in England and the US 88 
relieve against directors' liability, when they have failed to take every necessary 
action. The question of which step should be exactly taken seems a matter left to the 
courts' discretion to determine if the steps necessary are those which have been taken 
by the respondents. However, cases which have so far been decided are not helpful. 
A corporate directors should be aware of all steps they should take before an action 
against them is filed. In this respect, the law still seems short of clarity. 
Some commentators have criticised the wording of the phrase "every step" by 
arguing that even if the liquidator suggests that one measure or step, no matter how 
small its effect, could have reduced the loss to the company's creditors, the whole 
defence fails, 132 which means "the defence is in practice unstateable". 133 
Section 214 does not provide any definition or guidance as to what is "every step". 
A variety of options can be classified within the meaning of 'every step' by taking one 
or some of which a director of a financially troubled company may safely escape 
liability under wrongful trading. The importance of monitoring the company is 
evident at this stage, when the earlier predicting financial depression or insolvency is 
a result of the better monitoring the company's activities. 
Before deciding whether carry on the business or cease trading, a director of a 
company faced with financial problem should refer to professional experts in this 
field. The only case in which reference to the advice of competent professionals has 
been suggested is re DKG Contractors Lid 134, where Mr. Justice Weeks Q. C. 
pointed out: 
"Before trading in the manner in which they did, they ought to have sought some 
advice at least, and I think it is significant that the only offer advice which was made to 
them was not taken up. " 
If such professionals, for example accountants or solicitors are available in the 
company, consulting them is more effective because they have clear background of 
the company's affairs, otherwise the directors are required to seek advice of such 
132 Cooke, op cit at 117. 133 MCkenzie, op cit at 528. 134 119901 BCC 903,912. 
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experts outside the company. The important point in seeking such advice is the level 
of expertise and care of those professionals. The best advisors in this respect are 
insolvency practitioners. 
The other possibility which may be accepted as a positive step by the court is what 
has been suggested by the Institute of Directors, that directors are entitled to seek 
advice upon whether it is feasible for the company to obtain a moratorium to enable 
it to resolve its problem without being involved in formal insolvency. 135 
A director of illiquid company should avoid causing the company to be involved in 
liquidation procedure which imposes a major cost, by resorting such insolvency 
procedures depending to the particular circumstances of the case, as voluntary 
arrangement, or administration receivership. In such a situation if he could not make 
a voluntary arrangement, petitioning to the court for an administration order may be 
the best step which he ought to have taken. 
If in the directors' belief there is possibility of keeping the company surviving, they 
may convene a meeting of company's creditors, informing them of the situation and 
seek their support for a proper arrangement. Negotiating with one or two major 
creditors may be a helpful step in the court's view, most particularly in a large 
company, for a moratorium or any reasonable solution saving the company. 136 
Resignation is unlikely to be taken as a positive step. Conversely, taking such a 
decision may deteriorate the position of the respondents. This issue was considered 
in the case of re MC Bacon Ltd., 137 where one of the respondents retired from active 
management and handed over its control to the son of one of them, when the 
company was in serious financial difficulty. Although the case was not a wrongful 
trading one, the effects of the retirement of the directors proved that the resignation 
or retirement can not be counted on in the sense of 'every step' under wrongful 
135 "Institute of Directors; Guidelines" Guideline 3,. BuLL2=, (1991) 79. 136 See generally lEcks, op cit pt. 2 at 55. 137 [19901 BCLC 324. 
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trading. Here, as the result of the resignation, the lender bank refused to continue its 
support unless its debts were secured. 
In brief, there is a considerable number of actions which can be recognised as "every 
step" under the wrongful trading proceedings. Given the actions above- mentioned 
are those which constitute the vocabulary of "every step", the question still remains 
is which one should be taken as satisfactory to the court. It seems the respondent is 
required to take the step that is most reasonable, appropriate, and effective to 
minimise the loss to the company's creditors. This view is consistent with the 
legislators' intention of "every step with the view to minin-ýising the potential loss to 
the company's creditors. " 
3.3.6 General Conclusion on Wronglul Trading 
As was seen, the result of the criticisms on the hardness of subjective test of proof 
required by fraudulent trading which was considered as a serious obstacle to the 
courts discretion, was the Cork Committee Report which introduced by the 
legislature in section 15 of the Insolvency Act 1985 and subsequently in section 214 
of the Insolvency Act 1986 under wrongful trading provisions. 
The importance of introducing the wrongful trading provisions is beyond doubt. 
Some commentators have given a major credit to the wrongful trading concept. 
Prentice describes this development as a significant development in company law 
which "greatly altered the topography of the law in this field, and as one of the most 
important development in company law in the present century. "138 He gives some 
reasons to justify his suggestion. First, the provisions of wrongful trading . 5er-+. 
ion 
is another exception to the general rule that a director is not personally liable for his 
companies' debts, and exception to the principle of limited liability, since carrying on 
trading while illiquid or insolvent even with honest belief creates liability for 
directors. Secondly, as a traditional rule of common law, duty of care and skill owed 
138 D. D. Prentice, "Creditors' interests and Directors' Duties", 10 Oxf- JLS. (1990) 265,277. 
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by directors to the company is to be assessed by a subjective standard which releases 
incompetent or inexperienced but honest directors from liability, whereas under 
wrongful trading provisions, an objective standard is also applied. 
In re Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd. 139 Knox J. explained this development as 
follows: 
"Two steps in particular were taken in the legislative enlargement of the court's 
jurisdiction. First, the requirement for an intent to defraud and fraudulent purpose was 
not retained as an essential, and with it goes the need for what Maugharn J. called 
"actual dishonesty involving real moral blame The second enlargement is that the 
test to be applied by the court has become oneender which the director in question is 
to be judged by the standards of what can be expected fulfilling his functions, and 
showing reasonable diligence in doing so.... " 
It is believed that wrongful trading section has encouraged directors to face up to 
decision- making on insolvency more responsibly and, therefore, the instrument has 
been well effective, 140 since it has threatened directors to be held liable if they abuse 
the privilege of the limited liability principle. 141 Indeed, this device which has been 
considered a "Sword of Damocles"142 for company directors has applied to several 
cases in the past ten years. 
As to the question whether this legal device has reached the result aimed at to 
resolve the problems inherent in fraudulent trading and to protect creditors 
adequately, it is said that while in 1989- 1993 there had been 92,500 companies 
insolvencies in England and Wales, having only four cases reached the courts reveals 
the fact that liquidators are reluctant to take an action as such, because of the lack of 
personal assets without which suing a director is wasting of time as well as money. 
Moreover, the high expense involved in pursuing such proceedings is described as 
another reason for such reluctance. 143 
139 [19891569,594. 
140 Andrew Hicks, "Wrongful trading- Has It been a failure"? 8 1. L. & Practice, (1993) 134,135. 141 Prentice, op cit at 277. 142 Joe Bannister, "Wrongful Trading: The Courts Speak, " 5 1. L. & Practicg (1989) 30,3 1. 
143 Patricia Godfrey and Sarah Nield, "The Wrongful Trading Provisions- All Bark and No Bite", 
1. L. & Practice (1995) 139,140. 
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Although these facts are true, considering them as the main weaknesses of the 
proceeding of wrongful trading is not justified, because in other legal proceedings 
such as fraudulent trading and misfeasance, the same difficulties exist, and such 
problems are not typical to wrongful trading cases. 
Claiming that effectiveness of the proceedings is beyond any doubt, is not only 
because it, as has been suggested, operates as a welcome additional weapon, 144 but 
also appears to be a new jurisdiction on the basis of a peculiar standard in common 
law history, imposing a minimum objective standard on the directors in the benefit of 
creditors. Most of cases brought under the section have been proceeded successfully. 
As a result, the applicants have had an extra opportunity to take an action for both 
fraudulent and wrongful trading or drop145 the former and take the advantage from 
the latter without the need to prove the strict standard of a criminal intention. Also 
worth noting that it is impossible to tell how many cases where a wrongful trading 
action has been threatened have been settled out of the courts by the directors 
concerned including an offer of compensation. 
3.4. Misfeasance 
Misfeasance was the earliest proceedings among other liabilities of corporate 
directors in insolvency, such as wrongful trading and fraudulent trading. Misfeasance 
has a very old case law background as well as a statutory history dating back to two 
and half centuries, over a century before the first statutory provisions came into 
effect in 1862. However, there has been no clear classification of the grounds or 
causes of the proceedings, nor has been an attempt to determine the boundaries and 
the exact scope of the summons. The judgments which so far have been made, reveal 
an obvious confusion in determining the extent of misfeasance. This confusion could 
144 Andrew Hicks, op cit at 60 and Fidelis Oditah, op cit at 222. 145 For example in the case of re Produce Afarketing Consortium Ltd. [198915 BCC, 569 at 571 the fraudulent trading claim was dropped at the outset of the hearing. 
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be more clearly noticed until up to 1986 Act when the section was widened so as to 
bring negligence within the meaning of misfeasance. Having regard to the length of 
the legislative process, it is not clear why no serious attempts have been made to 
regulate the provisions of the section in compliance with the needs of developing law 
and the demands of modern business relations. The statutory provisions not only 
have not been helpful to resolve some problems arisen in many cases, but they 
themselves create some ambiguities. 
Negligence is a concept of common law applicable to a wide range of matters 
including corporate directors, professionals etc. 
3.4.1 Statutory Background 
The first statutory provisions as to the liability under rnýisfeasance proceedings 
appeared in section 165 of the Act 1862. According to the section, if. 
"in the course of Winding up of any Company under this Act, it appears that any past 
or present Director, Manager, Official Receiver or other Liquidator, or any Officer of 
such Company has n-dsapplied or retained in his Hands or become liable or accountable 
for any Moneys of the Company, or been guilty of any misfeasance or breach of trust in 
relation to the Company, the Court may, on the Application of any Liquidator, or of 
any Creditor or Contributory of the Company, exan-dne into the Conduct of such 
Director, Manager, or other Officer, and compel him to repay any Moneys so 
misapplied or retained or for which he has become liable or accountable, together with 
Interest after such Rate as the Court thinks just, or to contribute such Sums of Moneys 
to the Assets of the Company by way of Compensation in respect of such 
Misapplication, Retainer, Misfeasance or Breach of Trust, as the Court thinks just. " 
Those acts were classified under heading "power of the court to assess damages 
against delinquent directors and officers". 
The Companies Act 1890146 was almost a repetition of the previous misfeasance 
provisions. However, the section was widened so as to catch any person who had 
taken part in the formation or promotion of a company. Section 333 of the 
Companies Act 1948, which repealed its forerunner, section 215 of Companies Act 
146 Section 10. 
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1908, did not introduce any change to the section. A century after the introduction 
of the first Act on misfeasance, Jenkins Committee recommended the following 
revolutionary change to the proceeding: 
"(d) Section 333(l) should be amended by substituting for "breach of trust in relation to 
the company" a reference to any breach of duty in relation to the company which would 
involve civil liability at the suit of the company. The effect of this change would be to 
bring an actionable negligence of directors and others within the scope of the 
section. "147 
Aside from some extension to the scope of the section as a result of Jenkins 
Committee's recommendations, 148 over a c=tury, the main structure of the section 
remained intact. Section 212 of the Insolvency Act 1986, which repealed section 631 
of the Companies Act 1985, followed Jenkins Committee recommendations by 
replacing the expression of "breach of trust" by the phrase of "breach of any 
fiduciary or other duty" to include negligence and any breach of other duty. It was a 
very significant statutory development in this regard. However, the wording of the 
provisions of this section bears a confusing conclusion, when it reads: 
"(1) This section applies if in the course of winding up of a company it appears that a 
person who (a) is or has been an officer of the company, .... has misapplied or retained, 
or become accountable for any money or other property of the company, or been guilty 
of any misfeasance or breach of any fiduciary or other duty in relation to the 
company. "149 
If it happens, the court may compel the defendant to contribute to the company's 
assets by the way of compensation. 
Has the legislature, by using the disjunctive word ", or" intended to draw a 
distinction between rnisapplication or retention of the company's property and others 
on the one hand, and misfeasance and other acts set out in the section on the other 
hand? 
147 Surprisingly, there is no suggestion as to misfeasance in the report of the Cork Committee 
1982. 
148 Report of the Company Law Committee Cmnd. 1749 (1962). 149 Emphasise added. 
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From view of language employed in the section it seems n-dsfeasance has been 
distinguished from those acts mentioned in the section. To support the idea; 
regarding the line of legislative process on the proceedings, beginning with section 
165 of the Companies Act 1862 in which the same language had been employed, 
reveals the will of legislators as such; there is no such proceedings entitled as 
'misfeasance, but in all enactments prior to the 1986 legislation, the word 
"misfeasance" was a sub- heading of "power of court to assess damages against 
delinquent director etc. ", and as an act under heading "summary remedy against 
delinquent directors etc. " -a. 
However, the above idea is not free from challenge. All matters set out in the section 
fall within the concept of misfeasance and counting misfeasance among others is 
intended only as an example or emphasise. Moreover, the use of the disjunctive word 
to, or" is no more than a loosely linguistic disregard since this manner is usually used 
to emphasis on a concept by setting out its different meanings; a review on the case 
law interpreting the section shows that the real intention of Parliament that there is 
no separate category of misfeasance differing from other matters in the section; 110 
finally declining to recognise the second view leaves a more complicated question, 
what is the meaning of misfeasance and which actions fall within its scope? 
The first approach seems of a stronger position. However, considering the intention 
of the legislators, the judgements so far made on misfeasance and the attitude of 
lawyers to the whole section 212 as misfeasance proceedings, and from view of 
preventing, more confusion, accepting the second argument seems more justified. 
It is appropriate to bring into treatment the provisions in Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986 relating to 'misfeasance'. Section 9 of the Act as to 
"matters for determining unfitness of directors" refers to Part I of Schedule I of the 
Act when the court is to determine whether a person's conduct as a director or 
shadow director of any particular company or companies makes him unfit to be 
150 For example see North Australian Terrjtory Company, Archer's Case [18921 1 Ch 322, 
National FundAssurance Company [ 1978110 Ch 118. 
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concerned in the management of a company. The following matters set out in Part I 
of Schedule I are applicable in all cases irrespective whether or not the company is 
in insolvency: 
"I Any misfeasance or breach of any fiduciary or other duty by the director in relation 
to the company. 2 Any misfeasance or retention by the director of, or any conduct by 
the direct giving rise to an obligation to account for any money or other property of the 
company. " 
Those matters are the same as the acts mentioned in section 212. 
-0. 
3.4.2 Concept and Nature of the Proceedings 
3.4.2. ]Meaning 
The meaning of misfeasance is to be considered prior to and after the Insolvency Act 
1986 on one hand, and both its narrow and wide concept on the other hand. 
Prior to the latest legislation, misfeasance had a meaning of any misapplication or 
retention or liability for property or money of the company or being guilty of 
misfeasance or breach of trust. The recognition of such meaning was expressed by 
James J. in re Canadian Land Reclaiming and Colonizing Co.; Coventry & Dixon's 
Case: 151 
"I am of opinion also the word "misfeasance" in that section means n-dsfeasance in the 
nature of a breach of trust, that is to say, it refers to something which the officer of 
such company has done wrongly by misapplying or retaining in his own hands any 
moneys of the company, or by which the company's property has been wasted, or the 
company's credit improperly pledged. " 152 
The inclusion of negligence in the section by previous Acts was a question which 
was answered from different approaches. Negligence expressly was excluded from 
scope of misfeasance in re B. Johnson & Co. (Builders) Ltd-. 153 
"it was not every kind of wrongftd act which was comprehended by the section and that 
a case of common law negligence was not within the section; and that on the facts, the 
151 [1880114 Ch. D 660. 
152 lbid at 670. 
153 11955] 1 Ch 634,635, 
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matter should not be allowed to proceed, since the charges did not amount to more 
than ordinary claims for negligence at law. " 
Although in some cases the courts did not refuse to accept actions for negligence 
under the section, 154 it seems until up to the Act 1986 the statutory provisions did 
not contain any right, or did not express 
meaning of misfeasance. 
any right, of bringing negligence within 
The Act 1986 appeared to widen the scope of the proceedings so as to catch a 
director guilty of breach of any fiduciary or other duty in relation to the company. 
Therefore, it became to operate as 'summary, -procedure which used 
to be called a 
misfeasance summons but has been extended to include breach of any duty including 
the duty of care'. 155 In other words, any negligence and disloyalty leading to loss to 
the company falls now within the proceedings. 
The narrow concept of misfeasance appears to be only applicable to the cases of 
misapplication or retention of the company's property, and the improper performance 
of some act which a person may unlawfully do. 156 However, there is no authority in 
English law to show the recognition of the narrow concept by the courts or 
Parliament. In its wider meaning, misfeasance includes not only any treatment of the 
company's property leading to liability, but also those acts resulting in breach of any 
fiduciary or other duty in relation to the company. However, in some cases, the 
courts have suggested that the scope of misfeasance might extend so far as to 
include acting as director without proper qualification. 157 
Such an attitude to the concept of misfeasance seems to be even wider than 
"nonfeasance" which is the omission of an act that a director ought to do. The 
reference to the nonfeasance cases by law under misfeasance proceedings, except 
154 See for example re Brazilian Rubber Plantations & Estates Ltd. [ 19111 1 Ch 425, and re City 
E uitable Fire Insurance Co. [ 1925 ]I Ch. 407. 
15 Per Hoffmann L. J. in re D. Jan of London Ltd. [ 199411 BCC 562,562. 
156 Black, Black's Law Dictionaly (St. Paul, Mn: West Publishing Co. 1990) 1000. 
157 Per. Bramwell L. J. in Coventry & Dixon's Case [18801 14 Ch. D 660 at 672. However, in 
Thomas v. Quartermaine 118871 18 Q. B. D. 685,694 Brown L. J. stating that "there is no such 
thing as negligence in the abstract" disagreed. 
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where there has been a breach of trust, has been doubted by comparing nonfeasance 
with sins of ornission and misfeasance with sins of commission. 151 
One may contend that acting as director without qualification is a positive activity in 
breach of duty. It is difficult to justify such argument within the misfeasance 
provisions. The tendency to give the language of the section a wide interpretation 
that the courts originally willing to give it, has been criticised. According to this 
view, the section was not to apply in every case in which a company in liquidation 
has or had a right of action against one of its officers. 159 
-a. 
3.4.2.2 Nature of misfeasance 
As to the nature of misfeasance, it is widely recognised that the section has both a 
procedural aspect and compensatory result. The best clarification of true nature of 
the proceedings can be seen per Bramwell, L J. in Coventry and Dixon's case: 160 
"The section authorizes the court to direct personal chargeable under it to pay a sum of 
money by way of compensation. Therefore, the official liquidator has to shcw, first of 
all, the misfeasance, and then the damage in respect of which the company is to be 
compensated. .... This is not a section for punishing a man who has been guilty of 
misfeasance, but for compensating the company in respect of the loss occasioned by his 
n-dsfeasance, " 
The section does not create any new liability or new right, but only provides a 
summary of mode enforcing rights which must otherwise have been enforced by 
ordinary procedure of the courts. 161 
A century less a quarter after the Coventry and Dixon's Case, the issue was referred 
to in the case of re B. Johnson & Co. (Builders) Ltd. 162 In that case, the section was 
described as: 
"a procedural section which created no new cause of action and that the acts covered by 
the section were wrongful according to the established rules of law and equity" 163 
158 For example, per Fry J. in re Wedgwood Coal and Iron Co. 11882147 L. T. 612,613 cited and 
su? 
s , 
ported by Maugham J. in re Etic Ltd. [ 1928 ]I Ch 861,872. 19 Per. Maugharn J. in re Etic, Ltd. [ 192811 Ch 861,87 1, 160 [1880114 Ch. D 660. 
161 Ibid at 670. 
162 [195511 Ch 634. 
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Having regard to those explanations leads us to the conclusion that the nature of 
misfeasance is distinguishable from that of other liabilities of a corporate directors 
which so far we have examined. In the case of wrongful or fraudulent trading, for 
example, there is no pre- existing right for the company. The right of suing the 
director in question is established when the director carry on trading while insolvent 
in the case of wrongful trading, or carry on to continue business with intent to 
defraud creditors of the company or those of any other person in a fraudulent trading 
case. Therefore, the provisions of misfeasance is a means or procedure for restoring 
its property or recovering damages suffered by the company, For example if the 
property of the company retained by its director, the company is entitled to sue him 
until the property has been returned to it, but not more, whereas in the case of 
wrongful trading the court is empowered to hold the respondent liable to contribute 
to the company's assets as the court thinks fit, without any limitation. 
Unlike the case of misfeasance, in wrongful trading the court is not required to 
consider that the amount of contribution is equal to liabilities and debt incurred by 
director's conduct as such. 
3.4.3 Groundsfor Misfeasance- A Case Law Review 
There are some grounds for misfeasance set out in section 212 in most of which the 
loss incurred by the respondent is obvious. Any misapplication or retention of the 
company's property requires loss to the company. As the essence of the proceedings 
is compensatory, there is no jurisdiction to make a compensation order unless a 
pecuniary loss to the company is proven. 164 This view has been criticised as 
unsatisfactory, as it confuses the need for a wrongdoing to be established on the one 
hand, with a separate need for pecuniary loss to have been resulted from the 
wrongdoing, on the other hand. 165 
163 lbid at 635. 
164 Re Efic Ltd. [ 1928] 1 Ch 861,874. 
165 Fidelis Oditah, "Misfeasance Proccedings Against Company Dircctors", ML (1992) 207. 
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In brief, to bring a misfeasance case before the court, the alleged conduct 
complained of should be actionable. 
The breach of duty as an important ground for misfeasance contains a big variety of 
directors' activities ranging from selling a car belonging to the company at an 
undervalue to depleting its assets by taking them away from the creditors' reach. The 
main feature of breach of duty is breach of duty of care, negligence, and breach of 
fiduciary duty. 
jý 
3.4.3.1 Breach offiduciary duty 
Fraudulent preference or acting while interested have been considered by the courts 
as cases of breach of fiduciary duty or disloyalty. 
In Liquidator of West Mercia Safetywear Lid v. Dodd & Anor, 166 the ingredient of 
the case was a fraudulent preference allegation. The summons was an appeal by the 
liquidator of the company, West Mercia, against a decision from a chancery court 
that the director "D", had not breached any duty, to or in relation to the company in 
transferring L4,000 of the company's money to its parent company, "D Ltd", of 
which the respondent was also a director. 
In May 1984, both the companies were insolvent. While both the companies were 
put into creditors' voluntary liquidation and transfers of money between their 
accounts was not permissible, Dodd instructed the company's bank to transfer 
L4,000 to the overdrawn account of the Dodd company, with the intention of 
reducing the overdraft of the Dodd company which Mr. Dodd had personally 
guaranteed. 167 
Dillon L. J. was of the view that the decision was "misfeasance on the part of Mr. 
Dodd as a director who owed a fiduciary duty to the West Mercia company in 
making that transfer by way of fraudulent preference", and he knew, since he was 
advised that it was in fraud of the company's creditors. 
166 1198814 BCC 30. 
167 lbid at 32. 
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In this case, his Lordship dismissing the decision of the court of instance, held that: 
"Mr. Dodd was guilty of breach of duty when, for his own purposes, he caused the 
E4,000 to be transferred in disregard of the interests of the general creditors of this 
insolvent company. Therefore, the declaration sought in the notice of motion ought to 
be made as against Mr. Dodd. "168 
Therefore, the defendant director was held liable to pay L4,000 and interest. 
In re Wetfab Engineers Ltd. 169, the two former directors were sued for breach of 
their fiduciary duty to the company. They allegedly gave priority to the preservation 
of the business and the jobs of the employees including themselves, by accepting the 
lower offer for selling the company's freehold premises. In the court's opinion, the 
directors in question were entitled to take the view that if the business was not a task 
they were required to undertake, they were entitled to choose one of the options 
open to them, which was a sale that would allow the company to continue or to go 
into receivership or liquidation, 
Therefore, the summons were dismissed on the ground that the directors concerned 
were not in breach of their duty. Hoffmann J. was also of the view that the directors 
acted honestly and reasonably, therefore, entitled to be excused from liability under 
section 727 of the Company Act 1985. In this case, the learned judge did not find the 
evidence laid by the liquidator before the court sufficient to render the respondents 
liable within section 212 for misfeasance. 
It seems that, although the developments of new insolvency law, as considered by his 
Lordship, had recognised any reasonable attempt to save the business, account 
should have been taken of the fact that any attempt is allowed when it is in the best 
interest of the company, particularly its creditors. In the present case, such an 
attempt was not effective to save the business. In other words, in taking any step 
with the view to saving the business, there should be a reasonable possibility of 
keeping the company surviving, otherwise putting it into liquidation at the first 
stage seems more justified. Moreover, in that case, the difference between the offer 
168 lbid at 33. 
169 119901 BCLC 883. 
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accepted and the nearest one, particularly with regard to the financial distress of the 
company was, unlike the court's belief, quite high. 170 
In Re Derek Randall Enterprise Ltd., 171 the company went into creditors' voluntary 
liquidation on I October 1985. Between February and May Mr. Randall, a director 
of the company, received secret commissions totalling 178,000 which he should have 
accounted to the company, but instead he paid into his personal account. As a result 
of company's financial difficulties, Mr. Randall decided to guarantee the company's 
overdraft up to limit of 190,000,188.500 of which was paid by Mr. Randall into 
the "guarantee account", which was then chýrged to the bank as security for his 
liability under guarantee. The bank was authorised to apply the money in discharge 
of the company's debt, once repayment had been demanded. When in September 
1985 the bank called on Mr Randall's guarantee, the money was transferred to the 
company's account to reduce its overdraft. The liquidator claimed repayment of the 
178,000 with interest. In response to the liquidator's application for restitution of the 
178,000 under rnýisfeasance proceedings, the director in question contended that the 
sum of money concerned was a part of the 188,000 paid into the "guarantee 
account". In other words, the company received its moneys when it applied to 
reduce its overdraft. The director, in his affidavit in defence, admitted the relevant 
facts concerning the commissions, and said that a total sum of 178,000 had been 
received by him in respect of such commissions. 172 
Millett J. agreed with the respondent's reasoning and held that 'there is plainly no 
longer any liability to restore that money to the company. '173 An appeal from the 
decision was dismýissed. 
The court's decision has been challenged on the grounds that; first, the 08,000 was 
not the company's property, because the respondent received secret commissions in 
170 The freehold property was sold for L110,000 conditional to taking over the company's 
workfoce by purchaser, whereas the nearest offer was f 125,000. 171119901 BCC 749. 
172 lbid at 750. 
173 lbid at 75 1. 
I.. / 
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breach of his duty of loyalty. Secondly, when the company had no proprietary claim, 
the payment of the money into "guarantee account" could not be considered as 
restitution. Moreover, the judgment undermines the rule which denies any set off to 
delinquent director. 174 
The argument challenging the Millett J. 's judgement from view of the settled law 
rules seems justified. However, some points may clarify the treatment of the law to 
the matter. The director had a duty to pay the amount of money necessary to fill the 
'blocked account' from his own pocket, when it was a guarantee indicating his 
personal liability for the company's debts. However, he paid the secret commissions 
as a part of his personal guarantee. Does it mean he returned them to the company's 
account? If the law regulates that the sums of money for such a guarantee account 
was to be paid by the person in favour of whom it operated, as it seems so, the 
answer certainly is negative. Therefore, the company did not receive the money 
which the respondent obtained in breach of his fiduciary duty, and the court should 
have ordered the respondent to return it to the company's account. 
Whether an allegation of ultra vires falls within the ambit of breach of duty of care 
or breach fiduciary duty depends on the lack or existence of loyalty. The case of re 
National Fund Assurance Company, 175 is a good example of the former situation. In 
this case, the respondents were guilty of acting ultra vires and breach of trust by 
paying shareholders out of capital. The company had never made any profit and 
wound up with a deficiency of L100,000. 
The liquidator applied for an order to make the directors in question jointly or 
severally liable for deceiving the public and acting for a dishonest purpose. In the 
court's belief, the misapplication of the company's property by directors was evident 
and they were, thus, held liable for breach of trust within section 165 of the 
Companies Act 1862. The court did not accept the argument that the respondents 
had acted bonafide when, as the court thought, it was impossible in a Court of 
174 Oditah, op cit at 225. 
175 11878110 Ch 118. 
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Justice to call a particular act bonafide simply because a man says that he did not 
intend to commit a fraud. 176 
The interesting point in this case was the treatment of the concept of breach of trust 
by the court. It was said to be equivalent to the misapplication of the property, 177 or 
as deceiving public and acting not for an honest purpose. 178 Such an attitude to the 
section, unlike the appearance of its provisions, seems consistent with the real 
intention of the legislators, that any misconduct of this type should fall within the 
concept of misfeasance. 
In re North Australian Territory Company, Archer's Case, 171 a similar question 
arose. But, here, there was an allegation of malafide. In this case, "A" agreed to 
become a director upon the terms that, if he had at any time desire to part with the 
shares whýich he was to take in order to be qualified as a director, the promoter 
should had purchased them from him at the price which he would pay. All 
arrangements were done and after the director's resignation, he was paid as agreed 
and the promoter accepted a transfer of shares. 
It was held that the respondent benefited himself from a secret agreement in breach 
of his fiduciary duty as agent of the company which incurred loss to the company, 
therefore accountable. 180 
Re Claridge's Patent Asphalte Company Ltd., 181 is representing the situation where 
the defendants has acted Ultra vires but honestly. The facts of this case were that in 
order to increase profits, directors decided to embark a new scheme for making tar- 
macadam roads. For this purpose a subsidiary company, Clarmac Roads Ltd., was 
promoted in which a Williamson would have one- third of the venture. 
Before doing anything, the directors sought the advice of the company's solicitors 
that whether or not it was ultra vires. The solicitors who laid the issue before a well- 
176 Ibid at 128. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Ibid per. Counsel for liquidator at 121 179 1189211 Ch 322. 
180 See also Pearson's Case [187715 Ch. D. 336, Hay's Case [1875110 Ch App. 593. 181 [192111 Ch. 543. 
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known barrister were told that the scheme was not an ultra vires, but it would be 
better if an alteration was made to article 68 (Reserve Fund) so as to enable the 
directors to apply any reserve to this purposes. In an extraordinary general meeting, 
the alteration was made and the scheme was approved. 182 As a result, the Clarmac 
company was registered with a capital of 6500 shares. The parent company, the 
Claridge company, subscribed L6334 in payment for 4334 shares and 2000 
debentures, and Williamson took the remaining shares which was one- third of the 
debenture. To recover the reserve fund, the Claridge company borrowed the money 
from its bankers. In 1914 July, when due to war the Clarmac company was in 
financial difficulty, the Claridge company deposited the 2000/. debentures with the 
Clarmac company's bankers to secure an overdraft with the belief that the situation 
would be temporary. However, the Clarmac company went into voluntary 
liquidation. Consequently, the deposit was swallowed by the overdraft and that 
amount lost to the Claridge company. Nearly two years later, the Claridge company 
itself went into compulsory winding up and its liquidator brought an action seeking a 
declaration that the investment by Allback and the general manager of the 6334 "in 
taking up the 4334 shares and 2000/. debentures in the Clarmac company was a 
misfeasance or misapplication of the Claridge's fund. " 
Astbury J. acknowledged that the promotion of the Clarmac company and 
investment of its fund in that venture may have been a misapplication of the Claridge 
company. He, however, said that the respondents acted based on professional advice 
and there was nothing to show them dishonest. 183 The learned judge went on to say 
that the defendants did their utmost for the benefit of the cestui que trust company 
but not their own interest. Therefore, he relieved Allback under section 279 of the 
Companies Act 1908, while there was no sufficient evidence against the general 
manager. 184 
182 lbid at 544. 
183 Ibid at 547. 
184 lbid at 549. 
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With regards to the effects of the case in which there was an honest belief to help the 
ailing company on one hand, and the legislators' intention reflected in section 279 to 
relieve a respondent director in such situations from liability on the other hand, 
justify the judgment of Astbury J. in this case. 
4 
3.4.3.2. Negligence 
As was already mentioned, the section covers both breach of duty of care and breach 
of fiduciary duties. This sense is expressed by the misfeasance section when it holds 
a director "guilty of any breach of fiduciary or other duty in relation to the 
company. " 
To determine which acts fall within the ambit of misfeasance, we need to refer to the 
common law or equity rules reflected in numerous judgments. However, as a 
principle developed by the courts, there is no doubt that a breach of duty of care and 
skill or negligence is distinguished from that of fiduciary duty by the element of 
loyalty. 
As we have seen, prior to 1986 legislation, negligence was not clearly specified as a 
matter within ambit of misfeasance, and in some cases it was recognised as a 
separate legal concept. 185 
Negligence is one of the oldest concepts of common law. The Act 1986 overcame 
any doubt as to the inclusion of negligence in misfeasance, though prior to the Act, 
in some cases the actiown-for negligence was brought under misfeasance proceedings. 
The earliest case law authority on negligence is Charitable Corporation v. Sutton, 186 
in which some rules on the matter were established with reference to liability for 
breach of duty of care as: 
"Directors may be guilty of acts of comirdssion or omission, of malfeasance or non- 
feasance ... If some persons are guilty of gross non- attendance, and leave the 
185 Re B. Johnson & Co. (Builders) Ltd, 1195511 Ch 634,635. 
186 [174212 ATK 400. 
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management entirely to others, they may be guilty by this means of the breaches of 
trust that are committed by others. " 187 
As to the meaning of negligence, different concepts have been suggested such as 
negligence "as a state of mind which opposes an intentional action, which is done not 
with the desire of producing a particular result, by carelessness or indifference. " 118 
The expression negligence is also often used in the sense of careless conduct without 
reference to any duty being imposed to take care. 189 
The concept with which this study deals refers to breach of duty of care 
imposed by either common law or statute on corporate directors. 
3.4.12.1 Types of negligence 
The breach of duty of care might arise from gross negligence, ordinary negligence or 
even from an inactivity. In discharging his duties a director is required not Only to act 
honestly but he must also exercise some degree of both skill and diligence. 190 In the 
past, in order to impose liability on a director, the degree of negligence required was 
to be "culpable" or "gross negligence", 191 and the respondent was to be held liable 
only for gross negligence but not ordinary one. The difference between those types 
of negligence was remarked in re Brazilian Rubber Plantations & Estates 
Limiled, 192 as follows: 
"It has been laid down that so long as they act honestly they can not be made 
responsible in damages unless guilty of gross negligence193 ..... 
In truth , one can not 
say a man has been guilty of negligence, gross or otherwise, unless one can determine 
what is the extent of the duty which he is alleged to have neglected. 194 Breach of trust, 
I think, is mentioned to include breach of duty. " 195 
187 Ibid at 405 per Lord Hardwicke. 188 Charleston & Percy Charleston & Pergy on Negligence, (London, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. 8th 
ed. 1990) 3. 
189 Ibid at 5. 
190 re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. 1192511 Ch. 407,427. 191 Turquand v. Marshall [ 186914 Ch App. 376, re National Bank of Wales Ltd. [ 189012 Ch 629, 
671. 
192 [ 1911) 1 Ch 425, 
193 fbid at 436 per. Neville J.. 
194 Ibid at 437. 
195 lbid at 440. 
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However, the negligence whether ordinary or gross is subn-&ted as incurring some 
loss, as was stated in Bentinck v. Benn: 196 
"NEsfeasance under the section must be misfeasance in the nature of a breach of trust 
resulting in a loss to the company. " 197 
In re County Marine Insurance Company, Rance's Case'98 Lord Justice James held 
the respondents liable because" there was a gross neglect of duty on the part of 
directors. " 
In view of some judges distinguishing between those sorts of negligence seems to be 
playing with words rather than a distinctiozj. ývith a legal effect as Baron Rolfe J. 
pointed out in Wilson v. Brett: 199 
"I could see no difference between negligence and gross negligence. That it was the 
same thing, with the addition of a vituperative epithet. 11200 
Such a requirement as gross negligence, was justifiable when directors were, mainly, 
part time and without particular expertise. Therefore, the courts were reluctant to 
impose upon them a high test of care and skill. Moreover, some courts were of the 
view that since shareholders appointed the amateur directors to pay less for them, 
they must have born the consequences and risk of their own appointment. 201 This 
opinion received some criticisms on the ground that shareholders are not the only 
sector may suffer from a depression of the company. Other groups including 
creditors, employees and the society as a whole would be affected as a result of 
insolvency. 
In determining the extent of the duty allegedly have been neglected, the courts have 
been faced with some difficulties, In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. Romer J. 
confessed that he had difficulty in understanding the difference between those two 
types of negligence, except when they were used for the purpose of distinguishing 
196 [1887112 App. Cas. 652,669. 
197 See also Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Co. v. Multinational Gas and Petrochemical 
Services Ltd. and Others: 119831 BCLC 461,481 Per May I 
198 1187016 Ch. App. 104,119. 
199 [1843111 M&W 113. 
200 Ibid at 115. 
201 Turquandv. Marshall [1869] 4 Ch App. 376 Per Hartherly at 386 
V 
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between two kinds of duties in two separate situations. It seems that the distinction 
between ordinary negligence and gross negligence is subjected to the degree of 
diligence shown by a director rather than in type of the duty omitted or breached. 
The developments of business relations and the tendency of the legislators which is 
reflected in section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 reveals a newly recognised rule 
that a director may be liable for negligence irrespective of that distinction. 
3.4.3.2.2 Situations giving rise to a negligence action 
It is difficult to identify all situations giving nse to a liability for negligence. Any 
commission or omission in breach of duty of care even an inactivity may lead to 
liability. Over two and half centuries, the history of case law on negligence shows a 
wide discretion exercised by the courts in determining the matter, 
The question may arise that whether can a director be liable for negligence resulting 
from a misstatement made honestly? Prior to 1964, as a general rule, such a 
possibility had not been recognised. In re National Bank of Wales, 202 this sense was 
stated as: 
"A director does not warrant the truth of his statements-, he is not an insurer. But if he 
makes misstatements to his shareholder he is liable for the consequences, unless he can 
shew that he made them honestly, believing them to be true, and took such care to 
ascertain the truth as was reasonable at the time. 1203 
Here, obviously a director is not to be held liable if he made a misstatement 
unintentionally and honestly, but with a "reasonable" care "at the time". The last 
condition may imply liability for making such a misstatement only for gross but not 
ordinary negligence. 
In Heskell v. Continental Express Ltd. 204 this rule was clarified. In that case, it was 
expressed that 'negligent misstatement can never give rise to a cause of action. 1205 
202 [189912 Ch. 629. 
203 Ibid at 675. 
204 [195011 All E. R 1033. 
205 lbid at 1042 per Mr. Justice Devlin. 
j 
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For the first time in Hedley Byrne v. Heller, 206 an important exception was 
established to the rule for persons occupying a contractual or fiduciary position, e. g. 
corporate directors. In this case, it was unanimously agreed upon that any 
misrepresentation, whether written or spoken, even made honestly could result in 
liability for its maker, provided it could be proved that the person in question had 
assumed responsibility for his information or advice. It seems the special relationship 
was intended to mean a contractual or fiduciary relationship. Finally, in the court's 
view, in order to hold the director liable, the existence of loss to the company was 
required. 
The refusal or failure to purchase and maintain some required shares qualification 
has been taken into account by the courts as a breach of duty and a ground for 
rrýsfeasance. In Coventry and Dixon's case, 207 for example, two directors of the 
company failed to satisfy an article of the company by which they were required to 
hold a hundred shares as 'qualification shares'. There was no claim of misfeasance. 
However, as soon as the company became wound up, the liquidator sought an order 
to render them liable for misfeasance in acting as directors to contribute to the 
company's assets the value of those shares, or to contribute such other sums by the 
way of compensation as the court would think just. 
In this case, although the Court of First Instance did not doubt to hold the 
respondents liable to contribute to the assets of the company as requested by the 
liquidator, this judgement was unanimously reversed by the Court of Appeal, when 
in the view of the Appeal's judges no loss was incurred by the conduct of the 
respondents. 
The Court of Appeal took a measure for its judgement which was whether the 
company had lost anything through the respondents' conduct. In the court's opinion, 
there must have been some act resulting in some actual loss to the company. In the 
finding of the court, nominating and acting as director in violation of the articles 
206 [19641 A. C. 465. 
207 11880114 Ch. D 660. 
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without proper qualification did not make the appellants liable for misfeasance when 
their conduct was in a manner as if they had duly been appointed as directors with 
qualification shares. 208 
The decision of the Court of Appeal, here, seems challengable from some aspects. 
First, the qualification shares required by a company articles usually aimed at 
persuading directors to manage the business and to guarantee their conduct in the 
best interest of the company. The interest of the directors in the company's running 
reflected in such qualification shares may prevent them of taking risky steps, 
particularly in the case of financial difficulty. Secondly, the statement of James J. of 
the Appeal Court that the respondents could not be held liable for misfeasance 
because such requirement was not provided by law, is not respectfully justified. The 
learned judge did not think that since the contents of a company's articles are not in 
contrary to the settled law rules or public policy, they had effect as the law, nor did 
he believe that by accepting the articles of the company, the respondents were bound 
by an implied contract to fulfil some expressed or implied duties including holding 
the required number of shares. 
In the old case law, an inactivity or non- attendance was not a breach of duty of care. 
The second proposition introduced by Romer J. in re City Equilahle Fire Insurance 
Co. 209 represents such an approach. Here, the entrusted powers by his fellows to a 
managing director were abused for fraudulent purposes. The director in question had 
entered figures in Balance Sheet as 'cash in hand' and 'loans in calls' which were 
principally loan to himself and the cash substantially included 03,000 in a firm of 
stockbrokers, of which he was a partner. The co- directors were held negligent, but 
they were excused under the Articles of Association intended to protect them. In 
that case, the non- attendance of a director to the board meetings was not taken as a 
breach of his duty of care because he had difficulty to attend the board meeting in 
London while he was living in Aberdeen. 
208 lbid at 670. 
209 1192511 Ch. 407. 
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In re Cardiff Savings Bank Marquis of Bute's CaSe, 210 although the president of the 
bank attended only one board meeting within 38 years, the court did not hold him 
liable for breach of his duty of care, when in the court's point of view the non- 
attendance was not the same as the neglect or omission of duties which ought to 
have been fulfilled. 
However, the attitude of the court in the earliest case of Charitable Corporation V. 
Sutton211 on negligence is different. In this case, forty five out of fifty directors were 
held liable for gross negligence because they left the affairs of the company to five of 
their fellows and the latter caused the company to lose a great deal of money. 
3.4.4 General Conclusion on Misfeasance 
The discussion of misfeasance has an appearance of complexity. It has been 
described as a procedural summons without creating a new right or liability, and a 
mode of recovery or collection of the pre- existing rights. 
As was already discussed, the improperly drafted provisions on misfeasance could 
reveal a misleading conclusion. There is no statutory provision as misfeasance, but 
misfeasance has been included in the section as an act among others and under 
different headings. 
One doubts of proper applicability of misfeasance to all those acts set out in section 
212 and look for a new title for the section. Does such enactment show the doubt of 
legislature of suitability of the expression "mýisfeasance" for the purposes of the 
section? If so, is not it time to seek for a more comprehensive heading to cover the 
acts and matters mentioned in the section including misfeasance itself? If not, the 
section should be properly redrafted under misfeasance. 
Although the nature of the section has been described as having a purely 
compensatory nature, the account should be taken of the liability provided in section 
210 1189212 Ch. 100. 
211 [174212 ATK 400. 
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9 of the Company Director Disqualification Act 1986 which prohibits the 
respondent, for a while, from being involved in the management of a company. 
3.5 Conclusion 
In analysing liability provisions, one may examine them severally or together as a 
collective measurement of a legal system. E#ch concept of those we have so far 
studied has its own advantages and weaknesses, which can be elicited more clearly in 
comparison with the others. 
Since 1928 until 1986 when the new Companies Act came into force, the courts 
have been faced by some difficulties in determining fraudulent trading cases. The 
provisions of fraudulent trading from time to time had created a civil liability and a 
criminal offence which had the same constituent elements. The cases show the 
courts' reluctance to attribute a civil liability in the Absence of dishonesty and their 
insistence on a high standard of proof for dishonesty. 
There is a small number or no prosecutions each year for fraudulent trading not all of 
I 
them successful. The most difficulty which has barred the development of the law in 
this respect has been recognised as "strictness of standard of proof' of the crime. 
This problem seemed so disappointing to some legal writers that they suggested the 
removal of the section from company law. 212 
Although the problem has been solved by introducing the new sanction as 'wrongful 
trading', regarding the provisions of fraudulent trading as something more than a 
legal instrument is not a legal attitude. Fraudulent trading section has played an 
effective role in the nearly last seventy years and it is difficult to assess how high was 
the rate of delinquency by companies directors, if this sanction would never have 
been introduced. 
212 Allderidge, op cit. 
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On the other hand and in comparison with wrongful trading, misfeasance is not 
attractive to an insolvency practitioner, particularly when the grounds for wrongful 
trading overlap with those of a misfeasance proceedings. 213 Therefore, when 
wrongful trading proceedings is available, misfeasance is not a recommended way of 
recovery. The subjective requirement for a misfeasance action does not persuade a 
liquidator to pursue the company's assets through it. Such a test may not be difficult 
to be proven in the case of retention of the property of the company, whereas in 
other cases of misfeasance it is for the applicant to show the respondent's 
misconduct, for which he is required to rrTy upon the traditional common law 
subjective standard of proof. 
The other feature of a misfeasance proceedings which disuades an applicant in 
pursuing the assets of the company through it, is availability of the relief under 
section 272. The attitude of the courts to the application of such relief so far has 
been hope- giving to the applicant directors and consequently, disappointing for the 
applicant for a misfeasance action. As a result, if an applicant for an action for 
misfeasance can define his action within the concept of wrongful trading, he will 
most likely drop misfeasance action. 
The only interesting point in misfeasance proceedings, if compared with wrongful 
trading, is its wide range of various plaintiffs. A creditor, official receiver, liquidator 
or a contributory, with the leave of court, have power to bring a n-ýisfeasance action. I 
In return, there are some criticisms-on the wrongful trading section; the seriously 
complex position of a floating charge and its effects on a contribution recovered 
challenges the purpose of the provisions; the ambiguity of some concepts such as 
'every step' whýich reduces the effectiveness of the provisions, are problems which 
have weakened, and in the future decision- making will affect such effectiveness. 
One asks how a director of a troubled company can make sure he has taken all step 
necessary as required by the expression "every step", 
213 Sally Wheeler, "Swelling the Assets for Distribution in the Corporate Insolvency", JBL (1993) 
259. 
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Misfeasance has a very old case law background, whereas the file record of 
commentary work by commentators is sadly poor. It is true, particularly in 
comparison with other proceedings of the directors liabilities, and more particularly 
with regard to number of misfeasance cases brought before the courts which is 
considerably high. Such reluctance or disinterest of English legal writers to discuss 
the subject might be a result of influence of the belief that misfeasance is only a 
procedure of recovery which does create no new right or liability. 
It is not justified to suspect whether those liability provisions are useful, neither is it 
acceptable to claim one of them should be 
Zolished 
as suggested by Allderidge, 214 
only because it involves some weakness, nor am I prepared to agree with Cooke 
who claims that the wrongful trading provisions has abolished limited liability 
principle. 215 
Who can doubt on the fact that how greatly these liability provisions been effective 
in regulating and correcting the conduct of corporate directors, specially those 
directly or indirectly, as shadow director, involve in corporate management with the 
intention to defraud its creditors particularly the public as whole. 
214 Allderidge, op cit. 
215 Cooke, op cit at 118. 
Chapter 4: Disqualification of Directors 
1 Introduction 
Under Section 34 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 19881 a driver must be 
disqualified if he commits some types of driving offences. Such a punishment in the 
public's as well as justice's eyes seems not only just but also it appears to be 
necessary to prevent other drivers from endangering people's lives and threatening 
the public peace. 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider the reasons why disqualifying a driver for 
his dangerous or reckless driving, which may incur loss to others or in its worst 
possibility claiming a life, is acceptable, but the imposition of the same penalty on a 
company directors who drive the corporation into destruction, leave tens, or 
hundreds unemployed with the disastrous effects on their family, cause losses to its 
creditors as well as members under the privilege of limited liability is not fair. 
In scrutinising directors' duties and liabilities, particularly in the event of insolvent 
liquidation, having a detailed discussion on the different aspects of disqualification of 
company directors is necessary. That is because a breach of duty or n-dsconduct 
gives rise to liability and in many cases leads to the imposition of a disqualification 
order. Section 10 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 19862 shows a 
close link between disqualification and these liabilities. 
I The section provides that: 
"Where a person is convicted of an offence involving obligatory disqualification, the court must 
order him to be disqualified for such period not less than twelve months as the court thinks fit 
unless the court for special reasons thinks fit to order him to be disqualified for a shorter period or 
not to order him to be disqualified" 
2 Thereafter any reference to the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 is shortened as the 
1986 Act. 
6 
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Although this power to disqualify operating as a punitive, prohibitive or protective 
device, is a new concept, it has found a special room among other legal instruments 
and concepts as to directors liabilities and has played an effective, though sometimes 
controversial role in company law, particularly in corporate management 
relationships. Consequently, it is necessary to survey the issue in detail. 
A disqualification is to be imposed upon a director even if he has not committed an 
active wrongdoing, but he has failed to demonstrate the standard of skill and care 
reasonably expected of him, or to perform his functions for which he was appointed 
to fUlfil. 3 
In this chapter, some primary features of disqualification such as the background, 
nature and aim of disqualification will be studied. Grounds for making a 
disqualification order, including unfitness under section 6, wrongful or fraudulent 
trading are exan-dned. 
After discussing how to relieve a disqualified director of the harshness of a 
disqualification order, I will consider the effects of such an order. 
Finally, I will evaluate the discussion on disqualification in the conclusion. 
4.2 Background 
In order to prevent directors from committing a misconduct or breach of duty by 
abusing the privilege of limited liability, the legislature felt it was necessary to 
provide a new instrument with a more prohibitive effects. This necessity was 
explained by Nourse J in re Civica Investments Ltd. :4 
"The power of disqualification by the companies courts was evidently introduced in 
order to add a new and more effective sanction to the powers to impose fines which 
have for many years been possessed by courts of summary jurisdiction. " 5 
3 Schedule I and section 6 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. 
4 [19831 BCLC 456. 
5 Ibid at 457. 
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The idea of using such a legal instrument as disqualification was for the first time 
discussed by the Departmental Committee on the Companies Act 1925 and 
introduced by the Companies Act 1928. Section 75 (4) of the Act provided that in 
the case of fraudulent trading, the court had power to order the director in question, 
without the leave of court, not to be a director or in any way be concerned or take 
part in company management for a period not exceeding five years, 
Disqualification as a formula was subsequently reintroduced in the Companies Act 
1929. However, the scope of disqualification was considerably widened by this Act. 
Under this legislation, not only the provisi-o"n's stated in its predecessor precisely 
restated in section 275, but also the previous provisions were extended to embrace 
any fraud committed to the company in its formation or promotion since its 
formation. 6 It is worth noting that the Act applied to the company directors as well 
as any legal person by the expression of "a person". This expression was used in the 
1929 Act in order to cover not only natural persons, but also legal persons, e. g. 
companies which were appointed as directors of other companies. However, the first 
cases brought before the courts in 1920's were those of undischarged bankrupts and 
personal insolvent who mismanaged companies. 
The Companies Act 1948, in section 187 dealt with undischarged bankrupts acting 
as directors and with persons who had been involved in company management. The 
Act in section 188(a) prescribed disqualification following a conviction in connection 
with the promotion, formation and management of a company. It also empowered 
the court to make a disqualification order if in the case of winding up it appeared to 
it that a person was guilty of fraudulent trading, whether convicted or not, or of an 
offence in relation to the company or guilty of any breach of dUty. 7 The use of 
expression "any breach of his duty to the company" seems a significant development 
in the Companies Act 1948. 
6 Section 217. 
7 Section 188(b). 
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The Insolvency Act 1976 provided that the court may disqualify a person if he had 
been a director of two companies which have successively gone into insolvent 
liquidation within five years, 8 and his conduct as a director of those companies made 
him unfit to be concerned in the management of a company. 9 Under section 28(l) of 
'CA 
Acf, "the court also had power to disqualify a person for "persistent default". 
Under this new concept, the court was empowered to make a disqualification order 
if a director had been persistently in breach of the companies legislation requiring any 
return, account, or other document to be filed with, sent, or notice to be given to the 
0ý -0. 
registraVompames. 
Some points seem to be noticeable in the Insolvency Act 1976; first, the 
requirements for making a disqualification order were provided in a more logical 
order than the previous Companies Acts; secondly, a new requirement which was 
two successive insolvencies within five years should have been satisfied; and most 
importantly the requirement that the conduct of director to show him unfit to be 
concerned in a company management was a basic development in the legislation. 
Section 93 of the Companies Act 1981 widened the scope of section 28 of the 1976 
Companies Act to prohibit directors concerned from acting as liquidators, receivers 
and managers of a company's property. Those provisions were consolidated in the 
Companies Act 1985 section 300 which was the predecessor of section 6 of the 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. Moreover the time period of 
disqualification which previously did not exceed five years, was, except in the case of 
persistent defaults, increased to fifteen years. 
The enactments of 1986, taken together, reflected the major changes introduced as a 
result of the Cork Committee Report, more particularly the Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986 should, rightly, be described as a revolutionary 
development in the evolution of company law on the matter. 
8 Section 9 (a). 
9 lbid at (b). 
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Under section 6 of the Act 1986, the court has a duty to make a disqualification 
order where satisfied; that (a) the person is or has been a director of a company 
which has at any time become insolvent, (b) his conduct as a director of that 
company makes him unfit to be concerned in the management of a company. 
In determining a disqualification, account should be taken of some general factors 
including breach of duty owed by director to the company, and misapplication of the 
company assets. 10 In the case of insolvency, the court is also directed to consider 
some further maters, including the extent of director's responsibility for the 
insolvency and for the failure of the company to supply goods which have already 
been paid for, or any involvement with any preference invalid in the court's view and 
failure to comply with the duties imposed on a director by the Insolvency Act 1986 
during the course of insolvency proceedings. H. 
The Secretary of State will apply or may direct an application to be made by the 
official receiver for a disqualification order. 12 
4.3 Nature and Aim ofDisqualification 
At first glimpse, the materials used and the cases referred to in the discussion of aim 
and nature of disqualification seem to be implying the same thing in different ways or 
looking at the same point from different views, thus, meaning that dividing them into 
two separate issues, is unnecessary and fruitless. Perhaps, this is the reason for not 
making a distinction between the nature and aim of disqualification by some such 
commentators as Dine. However, she acknowledged the fact that a "considerable 
confusion exists in determining the nature of this legislation and its proper use. " 13 
10 Part I of Schedule I of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. 11 lbid Part 2. 
12 Section 7 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. 13 Dine Janet WrongfUl Trading- Quasi- Criminal Law? (ed. Harry Rajak) Insolvency Law & 
Practice, (Sweet & Maxwell 1993) 174. 
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Given those two subjects are built on some similar materials, or even the same 
grounds, the results sought are basically different. In other words, the nature of 
disqualification deals with the substance and true nature of the matter, the question 
which may, therefore, arise is from which view disqualification should be looked at. 
Whereas the aim of disqualification dealing with the purpose of the subject looks at 
the end of the tunnel, and the approach is to find out the conclusion which is 
intended to be achieved. However, a circular relationship between the two concepts 
is obvious. 
4.3.1 Nature ofDisqualification 
The determination of the nature of disqualification may help to identify the 
consequences and effects of such an order particularly on the disqualified person. 
Although a clear classification of the nature of disqualification has not been 
introduced, some different classifications may be proposed. It has been suggested 
that to determine its true nature many different aspects shown by proceedings must 
be examined. For example, if the proceedings have some similarity to criminal cases, 
some features important in criminal cases are evident. 14 
As regards the judgments made on the matter, two opinions as well as a third 
doctrine with a hybrid feature can be distinguished. The first approach describes the 
imposition of a disqualification order as a penal sanction with punitive effects, 15 
precluding a disqualified person from participating in an important part of his 
livelihood, namely from being involved in the management of a company in any way. 
In brief, such an order limits the freedom of the disqualified person which is a 
punitive punishment. Vinelott J. in re Stanford Services, 16 regarded disqualification 
14 Janet Dine, "The Disqualification of Company Directors", 9 Co. Law. (1988) 213. 15 Kewin Wardman, "Directors, Their Duty to Exercise Care and Skill: Do the Provisions of the 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 Provide a Basis for the Establishment of a More 
00jective Standard? " Bus. Law Re .. (1994) 71,72. 16 119781 BCLC 607,620. 
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as a penalty for breach of duty, and recognised the public interest as a significant 
element for such penalty. 
The second approach looks at disqualification as a sanction with a protective or civil 
substance. In re Churchill Hotel (Plymouth) Ltd. and 01hers17 Peter Gibson J. in 
response to the argument of counsel for the respondent that the proceedings for 
disqualification were quasi- criminal proceedings with very serious consequences for 
the respondent, rejected the quasi- criminal nature of proceedings and stated that 
'these are civil, not criminal proceedings'. 19 
In the leading case of re Lo- Line Electric Motors Ltd. 19 Sir Nicolas Brown- 
Wilkinson V. C. after making a full statement of the facts, particularly the purpose of 
the legislation as protective, concluded that 'since the making of disqualification 
order involves penal consequences for the director, it is necessary that he should 
know the substance of the charges that he has to meet'. In this statement although 
there is a gesture to penal consequences of a disqualification order, other facts and 
indications2O in the judgment show a trend to the protective doctrine. 
Under third approach disqualification is described as a quasi-crin-ýnal. In re CresUoy 
Products Ltd, 21 Harman J. with reference to other judgments in such cases as re Lo- 
Line Electric Motors Ltd. 22 stated that section 6 'has been described by many judges 
as not intended purely as a penal section'. Restating the judgment of Sir Nicolas 
Browne- Wilkinson V. C in the latter case as his own view, his Lordship went on to 
make a comparison between section 6 of the Company Directors Disqualification 
Act 1986 and its predecessor, section 300 of the Companies Act 1985. Harman J. 
described the proceedings under section 6 as very serious, whereas these under the 
17 119881 BCLC 342. 
18 lbid at 344. 
19 [19881 BCLC 698. 
20 For such indications see the statement of Sir Nicolas Browne- Wilkinson V. C. in the same case 
on the aim of disqualification. 
21 (Secretary ofState v Godard and others) [ 19901 BCC 23. 22 119881 BCLC 698. 
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former were not penal, because they, in the judge's point of view, in no way 
prevented a man from trading. The learned judge concluded that: 
"when I am faced with a mandatory two- year disqualification, if facts are proved, the 
matter becomes more nearly penal, or at least, for the individuals faced with it than 
under the former situation where a judge could, in the exercise of his discretion, say 
that although the conduct had been bad yet he was now convinced that a 
disqualification should not be made because, for example, the respondent had learnt 
his lesson". 
Here, although the application made by Secretary of State was dismissed, because it 
was beyond the time limit, the facts of Itte case and comments posed in the 
judgment, are very helpful in determining the nature of disqualification. 
With regard to all the afore-mentioned opinions, the results of discussion can be as 
follows: Since disqualification has been adopted as a legal sanction, the tendency 
seems have been in favour of the theory of disqualification having a penal nature. 
Nowadays there is, among legal writers, an increasing trend to introduce the 
protective principle as an alternative for its rival. 23 However, there are some obvious 
indications challenging this tendency. The attitude of the legislature by laying down 
such harsh provisions as section 6 and schedule I of the Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986 with a mandatory character, has disappointed the 
supporters of the civil doctrine. 
The distinction made by Harman J. in re Cresyoy Products LId'24 between section 6 
of the Act 1986 and section 300 of the Companies Act 1985 is justified upon the basis 
that the proceedings under the former are penal or nearly penal whereas under 
section 300 have no such effect when in no way it prevented a man of trading. 15 
Furthermore, the immediate consequence of a disqualification order is to prohibit the 
respondent from being involved in a particular part of his business life which is an 
23 See for example Andrew Hicks, "Disqualification of Directors- Forty Years on", ML, (1988) 27, 
29. [Thereafter Hicks, ML, (1988)], Charles Drake, "Disqualification of Director The Red- Card", 
(1989) 474,479. 
(Secretary ofState v Godard and others) 119901 BCC 23. 
25 lbid at 26. 
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obvious limitation on his individual freedom. There is no doubt as to the punitive 
nature of such harsh limitation. 
4.3.2 Aim ofDisqualylicalion 
As it was mentioned in the last discussion, there is an immediate and circular 
relationship between aim and nature of disqualification. Therefore, we formulate the 
aim of disqualification based on classification of its nature. However, we propose a 
third view with a different meaning as civilAqual to protective. 
For the aim of disqualification two views as the nature of disqualification as either 
punitive or civil have been suggested. According to the protective theory, the aim of 
disqualification is to protect creditors and the public from the misdoing of reckless or 
dishonest directors. Parliamentary papers, particularly the Cork Committee Report 
stated that the policy of disqualification to protect the public interest from dishonest, 
and incompetent directors was the primary aim of disqualification. 
It has been argued that where disqualification has a punitive and deterrent effect, its 
primary purpose is protective, which removes an offending person from the sphere 
of corporate direction and management. 26 The courts have often recognised that the 
purpose of disqualification provisions is to protect the public, but not to punish 
directors. In re Lo- Line Electric Motors Ltd 27 Sir Nicolas Browne- Wilkinson V. 
C. stated the theory in a clear statement: 
"The primary purpose of the section is not to punish the individuals but to protect the 
public against the future conduct of companies by persons whose past records as 
directors of insolvent companies have shown them to be a danger to creditors and 
others. Therefore the power is not fundamentally penal ...... 
In re Rolus Properties Ltd, 28 Harman J. pointed out that "the legislation was not 
primarily punitive; it was for the protection of the public against inadequate, 
dishonest or otherwise unfit persons being directors of companies. " 
26 lbcks op cit at 29. 
27 1198811 Ch 477. 
28. [198814 BCC 446. 
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On the other hand, the punitive theory of the aim of disqualification interprets the 
purpose of disqualification as a penal sanction or a means to punish delinquent 
directors and prohibit them from acting as directors or being involved in the 
management of a company in any way. 
The purpose of a disqualification is described by Wheeler as not a private issue such 
as the recovery of money, that is the reason for the DTI involvement as upholders of 
the public interest. 29 He is of the view that disqualification should be decided on the 
basis of a penal principle which takes into account the culpability of the director in 
question. 30 Another commentator although accepting that disqualification is more 
concerned as a technique not to punish directors but to protect the public, thought it 
was more draconian than a fine and even imprisonment. 31 
Dine in her earlier article took the view that "the imposition of a disqualification has 
decidedly criminal overtones, " from which no compensation reSU]tS. 32 However, she 
seems to have somehow changed the view in her latest comments, where she states 
that the disqualification provisions are of both criminal and protective use, and adds 
that the judges are not in agreement over the point that disqualification is a 
significant interference with the liberty of the individual. 33 
In re Sevenoaks Stationers (Retail) Ltd. 34 where Dillon J. obviously accepted the 
idea of disqualification within protective purpose saying "it is beyond doubt that the 
purpose of section 6 is to protect the public and in particular potential creditors from 
losing moneys through companies becoming insolvent ...... some problems are said" 
to have arisen for supporters of this doctrine. According to the Companies Acts, the 
accounting obligations are imposed on the company and all directors equally, 
whereas in this case one of directors involved, H, was held disqualified for three 
29 Safly Wheeler, Disqualification of Directom, A Broader View (ed. Rajak) 195. 30 Ibid at 175. 
31 Drake op cit at 474. 
32 Janet Dine, "Disqualification Orders", 9 Co. Law. (1988) 97,98. 33 Janet Dine, Wrongful Trading- Quasi- Criminal Law? (ed. H. Rajak) 173- 74. 34 [1990] BCC 765. 
35 Sally Wheeler, "Re Sevenoaks- Continuing the Search for Principle", 6 1. L. & Practice (1990) 
174,175. 
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years, two years shorter than the appellant. It was because his financial awareness 
was not at the same level as the latter's and that the appellant, C, was more 
experienced than H, and had some accountancy training. As taking account of such 
matters as triitigating factors can be found only in criminal cases rather than civil, this 
attitude was in compliance with the penal rather than protective theory. The second 
problem was the function of some mitigating factors. In the view of both the court of 
first instance and the Court of Appeal, the absence of personal gain and the loss of 
the respondent's own money was considered as a main mitigating factor, which is 
again in compliance with the penal but not protective purpose of disqualification. 36 
The facts considered in the study of the aim of disqualification can lead to the 
following conclusions. 
i) In the discussion of both the aim and nature of disqualification the protective 
approach has been used as the main theory opposing the punitive view. However, it 
seems, a very important point which has never, in any context, whether proposal 
drafts, parliamentary papers, or legal writings and cases been discussed, is the 
assessment of the validity of the use of "protective" in the sense of civil or as 
opponent for the "punitive" or criminal concept. By the protective concept, 
disqualification is intended to protect creditors, public interests or others who may 
be affected by the result of reckless, dishonest or even incompetent conduct of 
directors. Can not it imply a prohibition not precisely in the punitive sense nor in the 
civil one, but as a third sense through which the protection of the company's 
creditors, its members, and the public interests is aimed to be achieved? 
In order to clarify the point, it is appropriate to consider the imposition of a 
disqualification order on a driver in which the law may not intend to punish him for 
his improper conduct committed in driving, nor is it obviously intended by such 
prohibition to recover any remedy or compensation. The most likely possibility is a 
protective consideration on the basis of which, the legislators' intention was neither 
36 lbid, 
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to punish the driver concerned, nor was it to compensate a victim, but to protect the 
public by removing such reckless persons from the road. In the result, protective 
view theory may be classified as a third principle different from those of punitive and 
compensatory. 
ii) In reply to the criticism that the legislation has not satisfied the expectations of 
protecting creditors or investors'37 and in response to the question of whether 
disqualification of a delinquent director has achieved its aim to protect the public 
interest, or on the basis of the punitive theory, to punish misdoer directors, it should 
be said that disqualification is a efficient sanction added to others in public interest. 38 
Moreover, having a survey on the process of 20 years decision- making on corporate 
insolvency, and a comparison between the growth rate of number of corporate 
insolvency cases and that of individuals, figure 1, shows an increase in corporate 
insolvency cases from 4,000 in 1974 to 20,825 in 1993, and within the same period, 
the individual insolvency cases shows an startling increase from 6,000 to 36,000. 
Whereas, the number of cases leading to corporate insolvency had a considerable 
drop from 14,000 in 1986 to 12,000 in 1987 and 10,000 in 1988. The latter 
development took place at the time when the new legislation, particularly section 6 
came into practice. 39 
Right side columns company insolvencies 
Left side columns Individuals Insolvencies 
Table 1: Level of Insolvency in 20 years 1974 to 1993 
37 Vanessa Finch, "Disqualification of Directors: A Plea for Competence", 53 hjja (1990) 385. 38 Such a meaning is implied in the words of Nourse J in re Ovica Investments Ltd. [19831 BCLC 
456,457. 
39 Information extracted from the General Annual Report for 1993 on insolvency Presented by the Insolvency Service of the Department of the Trade and Industry. 
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4.4 Applyingfor a Disqualification Order 
An application for a disqualification order is brought either by the Secretary of State 
or, in the case of compulsory liquidation if the Secretary of State directs, it may be 
brought by the Official Receiver. 40 
This rule is strictly applied by the courts. A court shall strike out proceedings if the 
application for a disqualification order is not brought by one of those authorities. In 
re Probe Data Systems (No. 1)41 Nfiller J. refused to allow an application by the 
Secretary of State for leave to amend an originating summons for disqualification, 
because the summons had been brought in error by the Official Receiver. That was 
because the company was in creditors' voluntary liquidation, but not compulsory 
winding up. The reason on which the learned judge based his decision was that the 
mýistake for which an amendment could be adopted had to be a genuine one as to the 
name or identity of the actual party, whereas in the present case, he believed, it was a 
mistake of law as to who had a cause of action. 
The legislators refused to allow such an action be brought by a private party. In 
discussing the white paper and in reaction to the question whether to authorise not 
only a liquidator but also creditors and other interested parties to apply for a 
40 Section 7 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, 41 [19891 BCLC 561. 
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disqualification order, it was said that the proceedings were a matter of public 
interest which should have been separated from private or personal emotions or 
interest. 42 
Once a company falls in insolvency, a report by an insolvency practitioner is to be 
made to the Department of Trade and Industry containing the practitioner's findings 
of the company's situation. The insolvency practitioner swears an affidavit, and if the 
company is in compulsory winding up, the Official Receiver as the liquidator is 
required to make a report containing such matters as accounting records, company's 
minutes and any statement helpful in discovering its directors' conduct. 
According to section 7(2), an application seeking such an order shall not be made 
after the end of the period of 2 years beginning with the day on which the company 
of which that person is or has been a director became insolvent, except with leave of 
the court. In re CopecresI., 43 an extension of time under section 7 (2) was granted, 
because in the court's view the delay was caused by the directors in their dealings 
with the insolvency practitioners and this delayed the reports of their conduct to the 
Secretary of State. 
The words and language of section 7(2) seems clear and simple, but the courts in 
practice have faced some difficulties in this respect. 
Some courts in granting the leave specified in the above section, relate their decision 
in this regard to the degree of possibility of getting the respondent disqualified. For 
example, in re Polly Peck Intemational PIc (No. 2), 44 the Secretary of State sought 
leave under section 7(2) to bring proceedings for a disqualification order against four 
directors of PPI under section 6. The first question which the court was to answer 
was whether it could extend the time when there was a delay. 
In the court's view, even before determining the extension of time, it should have 
been decided whether there was enough chance to have a successful case of 
42 Sally Wheeler, Disqualification of Director (ed. Rajak) 195. 43 (Secretary ofStatefor Trade & Industry V. McTfghe & Another) [ 199412 BCLC 284. 44 (Secretary ofStatefor Trade & Industry v. Ellis & Others) 1199411 BCLC 574. 
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disqualification. In other words, the issue of the extension of time was subjected to 
the strength of the case for disqualification. After examýining the evidence against the 
defendants, the court was not satisfied that the case could result in a disqualification 
order. Therefore, the court did not think necessary to grant the leave sought by the 
Secretary of State. 
The crucial point for a court to decide whether an application is out of time, is to 
determine the point from which the company became insolvent. Obviously, the 
definition of insolvency is a significant point in order to determine the period of two 
years. The authority defining the meaning of insolvency for this purposes is section 6 
of the 1986 Act, which defines insolvency as: 
"(2) For the purposes of this section and the next, a company becomes insolvent if- 
(a) the company goes into liquidation at a time when its assets are insufficient for the 
payment of its debts and other liabilities and the expenses of the winding up, 
(b) an administration order is made in relation to the company, 
(c) an administrative receiver of the company is appointed 
The language employed in that subsection particularly parts (b) and (c), as 
acknowledged by Sealy, 45 reveals that the meaning of insolvency intended in the 
section is not necessarily insolvency in a business sense, but an artificial one. Now, 
the important point is to determine the event with which the two- year time begins 
running. In re Tasbian Dd. 46 the Official Receiver brought an appeal against the 
registrar's decision that an application for a disqualification order was out of time. 
The Official Receiver had sought an order against the defendant on 8 November 
1988, since an administrative receiver was appointed on 24 September 1986, and a 
winding up order was made on 10 November 1986. 
In the present case, to determine the insolvency, two factors existed; the time of 
winding up order and the appointment of an administrative receiver. The registrar 
had based his decision upon the 5(01gfactor, 
45 L. S. Sealy, Disqualification and Personal Liability of Directors, (Oxfordshire: CCH Editions 
Limited 1993) 27. 
46 [198915 BCC 729. 
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In response, the Official Receiver said that the construction of section 7(2) inserted 
the word "first" before the word "day" and concluded that where there were more 
than one event occurred, there had to be more than one two- year period starting 
with the last event. Gibson J. disagreed with this argument and held: 
"That seems to me to be impermissible, given that the subsection can be given a 
rational meaning without the addition of other words. "47 
Section 16(l) introduces a provision which requires a person intending to apply for a 
disqualification order to give not less than ten days' notice of his intention to the 
person against whom the order is sought. The-requirement which is a decisive point 
in determining the two- year limit time under section 7(2), has been a controversial 
matter in some cases. In re Cedac Ltd., 48 to decide whether to grant a leave sought 
by the Secretary of State under section 7(2) to commence new proceedings seeking 
a disqualification order against the respondent out of time, the court examined the 
respondent's argument that the ten days specified in section 16(l) was meant ten 
clear days' notice. In this case, although the court struck out the originating 
summons because the notice was not made in ten clear days, it granted the Secretary 
of State leave to commence new proceedings. 
Here, the court found that no application could be made to the court for a 
disqualification order unless and until that obligation had been performed by the 
giving of notice in compliance with the terms of section 16(l). 49 Furthermore, the 
court emphasised the fact that since allegations such as disqualification were 
seriously damaging to the respondent, the statutory provisions such as section 16(l) 
had to be observed as a valuable safeguard for an intended respondent to those 
proceedings. Therefore, "parliament must have regarded the notice procedure as an 
important part of scheme for disqualification proceedings. " However, the court 
k 
47 lbid at 73 1. 
48 11990] BCC 555. 
49 lbid at 562. 
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acknowledged that there was no provision in the Act to the effect that the 
proceedings would be nullified by failure to comply with the statutory procedure. 50 
Nevertheless, in re Cresyoy Products Dd. 51 Harman J. like Mller I acknowledged 
the serious effects and nearly penal nature of disqualification, but refused to extend 
the time for disqualification application to be made, because, in his view, the 
Secretary of State had not presented any sound and satisfactory ground for his 
application. 
4.5 Groundsfor Disqualification 
To make a disqualification order, some grounds have been provided by the statute, 
whether applicable in insolvency or when the company is a going concern. The 
legislature in the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 has classified three 
categories of grounds for disqualification including "general misconduct", 52 
"unfitness", 53 and "other cases". 54 The courts do not seem have followed this 
classification in their decision- making process. For instance, in re GSAR 
Realisations Ltd. 55 a disqualification order was granted under section 6. The charge 
was obviously a wrongful trading conduct under section 10 of the 1986 Act. 
Therefore, section 6 can be defined as the ingredient of an application for 
disqualification rather than a ground for it. 
4.5.1 Section 6- Unfitness 
Section 6 is, undoubtedly, the main development in the issue of disqualification and 
liability of corporate directors. In comparison with other statutory provisions relating 
to disqualification, this section has been the most attractive one to applicants for a 
50 Ibid at 563. 
51 [19901 BCC 23. 
52 Sections 2- 5 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. 
53 Ibid sections 6- 9. 
54 Ibid sections. 10- 12. 
55 11993] BCLC 409. 
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disqualification order and in many cases has led to the grant of a disqualification 
order against the respondent. 
Section 300 of the Companies Act 1985, the predecessor of section 6, was in some 
aspects different from its successor. Under the previous provision, to disqualify the 
respondent, two successive insolvencies within five years were necessary. Moreover, 
under the previous provision, unlike the present one, a disqualification order was not 
mandatory. 
Under section 6, in order to make a disqualification order, the court must be satisfied 
that the defendant is unfit to be concerned in management of a company. In re Bath 
Glass Ltd. 56Gibson J. expressed this aspect of the section as: 
"To reach a finding of unfitness the court must be satisfied that the director has been 
guilty of a serious failure or serious failures, whether deliberately or through 
incompetence, to perform those duties ...... 
57 % 
To deal with unfitness account should be taken of some matters such as the 
director's performance in the failure and his past conduct to judge his future conduct, 
his genuineness of intent, particularly if shown by investing his own money when the 
company is in financial trouble, and finally his acting on professional advice. 58 
4.5.1.1 Mandatory disqualification 
As a rule, to determine disqualification, the court has a discretion to make a 
disqualification order against a director where it is authorised to do so. When a 
disqualification is imposed, it has also discretion as to the period of the order 
depending on the seriousness of the director's misdoing. However, section 6 has 
introduced a significant exception to this rule, where once the court is satisfied that 
the conduct of the respondent is so inappropriate as to make him unfit to remain in 
56 [198814 BCC 130. 
57 lbid at 133. 
58 David Hcnry, Disqualificati (ed. Rajak) 23. 
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his position as director or being involved in management of a company, it is obliged 
to disqualify him for a minimum period of two years. 59 
The Cork Committee in its final recommendations proposed a mandatory 
disqualification, when the requirements for unfitness are satisfied, stating "the court 
should be required, not merely empowered to prohibit him from doing so for at least 
some minimum period. 1160 
The legislators followed the Committee in this respect, when under section 6 the 
"court shall make a disqualification order against a person in any case where, on an 
application under this section it is satisfied ....... The 
legislators deliberately used the 
word "shall" instead of "may", or "is empowered" or "has discretion", to oblige the 
court to grant such an order when it is satisfied that the respondent is unfit to serve 
as a director. 
Under section 300 of the Companies Act 1985 the court obviously had a wide 
discretion to refuse to disqualify the director concerned. Such discretion can be seen 
in re Churchill Hotel (Plymouth) Ltd. 61 where Gibson I stated: 
"If all three conditions are satisfied then the court may make a disqualification order. 
Thus, the court in the exercise of that discretion, is not obliged to make a 
disqualification order". 62 
It seems although under the new section making a disqualification order is 
obligatory, the court still has some discretion not to continue the proceedings 
leading to disqualification by concluding that it is not satisfied that the respondent is 
unfit. For example, in re Bath Glass Lid., 63 in the court's view, although the conduct 
of director in question had been imprudent and, in part, improper, it was not so 
serious to justify a finding of unfitness, 
59 See, e. g., Re Swift 736 Ltd. [19921 BCC 93, where two directors, husband and wife, were held 
disqualified for three and two years accordingly. 60 Insolvency Law & Practice- Report of the Review Committee Cmnd. 8558 Par. 1817 (1982). 61 [19881 BCLC 341. 
62 Ibid at 343. 
63 [19881 BCC 130. 
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4.5.1.2 Matters to determine unfitness 
To determine unfitness, the courts are required to have regard to the matters set out 
in Part 1, when the company is a going concern and to the matters in Part II of 
Schedule I of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986,64 in the case of an 
insolvent company. Part I includes such matters as any misfeasance or any breach of 
duty by the director in relation to the company or any misapplication or retention or 
any conduct by the director giving rise to an obligation to account for any money or 
other property of the company. The main considerations leading to unfitness in the 
course of insolvency are the extent of directors' responsibility for the insolvency, for 
any failure by the company to supply any goods or services which have been paid 
for, and the extent of their responsibility for the company entering into any 
transaction or giving preference ... . 65 
Although my own view, reflected in the conclusion, is that the matters on the ground 
of which an unfitness should be determined are those strictly set out in section 6- 9, 
as regards the treatment of the courts in their decision- making under section 6 it 
seems they feel free to apply this concept and its mandatory nature in a very wide 
range of matters. For example, the court in the 1995 case of re Moorgate Metals 
Dd66made a disqualification order against the two respondents, H and P, for four 
and ten years respectively. In this case, the defendants formed a two-man enterprise, 
M Ltd., wh. ich went into compulsory winding up with losses of half a million pounds. 
Mr. R, an already three times bankrupt whose application for discharge had been 
refused, was an undischarged bankrupt at the time of the company's incorporation, 
which was an offence under section II of the 1986 Act. H, a recently discharged 
bankrupt, invited by R to join the company, while he was aware of R being an 
undischarged bankrupt, R was in sole charge of buying or selling and H was 
responsible for finance and administration of the company. R contended that he was 
64 Section 9 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. 65 These matters will be discussed later under misfeasance as a ground for disqualification. 66 [199511 BCLC 502. 
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not a director but a dejacto director for which there was no definition in the Act as a 
director. He claimed he had acted as an expert in metal industry. However, he 
accepted that he 'controlled the company's entire trading operation. ' 
The court, referring to some cases such as re Lo- Line Electric Motors LId, 67Re 
Tasbian LAI (3)68 and re Cargo Agency Ltd. 69where in the court's view the word 
"director" included a defacto director, did not agree with this contention, and found 
him a'thoroughly dishonest, irresponsible and unscrupulous person. 170 
4.5.1.2.1 Breach of commercial moralityf&failing to pay the crown debts 
Perhaps breach of commercial morality has been one of most controversial issue for 
determining unfitness. The main ground for determining unfitness of a defendant 
director has been breach of commercial morality for not paying the Crown debts. 
There are two approaches as to Crown debts and their difference from ordinary 
debts. In the traditional case law view, breach of commercial morality is equivalent 
to a failure to pay crown debts leading to the respondent unfitness. The position of 
the Crown as an involuntary creditor took a great deal of the Cork Committee's 
attention. 71 In the Committee's point of view, although the Crown is an involuntary 
creditor in respect of unpaid tax, it has powers to impose penalties, and possessed 
remarkable powers enabling it to obtain information, particularly powers of entry 
where necessary, search and seizure. 72 Moreover, many suppliers of goods see 
themselves in the same situation as the Crown without having any real choice. The 
conunittee, thus, concluded that 'sympathy for the misfortune of an involuntary 
creditor was not a sufficient ground for setting aside the cardinal principle of rateable 
distribution of an insolvent company's estate. 173 
67 [19881 BCLC 698. 
68 119911 BCLC 792. 
69 [19921 BCLC 686. 
70 Re Moorgate Metals Ltd. 1199511 BCLC 502,520. 
71 para. 1412. 
72 Para. 1413. 
73 Para 1414. 
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There appears to be a reluctance among commentators to support this view. 
However, it has received support from the case law authorities. In re Stanford 
Services Ltd. & Olhers74the failure to pay Crown debts was treated as more serious 
than the failure to pay commercial debts, because in the court's belief the Crown was 
an involuntary creditor. In the instant case Vinelott J. stated: 
the directors ought not to use moneys which the company is currently liable to pay 
over to the Crown to finance its trading activities. If they do so and if, in consequence, 
PAYE, National Insurance contributions and VAT become overdue and, in a winding 
up, irrecoverable, the court may draw the inference that the directors were continuing 
to trade at a time when they ought to have knowPh that the company was unable to meet 
its current and accruing liabilities, and was unjustifiably putting at risk moneys which 
ought to have been paid over to the Crown as part of the public revenues to finance 
trading activities which n-dght or might not produce a profit., 175 
The same view was clearly adopted by Sir Nicholas Browne- Wilkinson V. C. in re 
Lo- Line Electric Motors Ltd. & Others, 76 when he thought that an ordinary 
commercial misjudgment was in itself insufficient to satisfy a disqualification order, 
but stated that the director in question had behaved "in a commercially culpable 
manner in trading through limited companies when he knew them to be insolvent and 
in using the unpaid Crown debts to finance such trading. "77 
The opposing view to the traditional approach considers the Crown debts and 
ordinary debts as being in the same position. This approach is supported by some 
legal writers particularly Wheeler who believes that the Crown debts are no longer 
viewed as more commercially immoral than other debts but as a piece of evidence 
like any other. 78 
74 [19871 BCLC 607. See also Ipcon Fashion Ltd. [19891 5 BCC 773. Here, the director was 
disqualified for five years for conducting contrary to commercial morality for not accounting for 
PAYE and VAT but paid himself and his wife, while the company was insolvent. Similarly, in re 
Swift 736 Ltd. [19931 BCLC 19, the defendant was disqualified for two years, because some of 
companies, all insolvent, of which she was director obtained credit by withholding PAYE and VAT 
due to the Crown. 
75 lbid at 617. 
76 [198811 Ch. 477. 
77 Ibid at 492. 
78 Wheeler op cit at 175. 
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Dillon J. in re Sevenoak Stationers (Retail) Lid. 79was of the view that non- payment 
of any Crown debts was not 'automatically treated as evidence of unfitness' of the 
directors concerned. The learned judge, thus, found it necessary to look more closely 
in each case to see what the significance of the Crown debt was. 80 This judgement 
seems in the line with the holding of Hoffmann J, in re Dawson Print Group L1d81 In 
this case, the person in question was a director of two companies which both fell into 
insolvent liquidation with massive debts and liabilities including PAYE, national 
insurance contributions, VAT, and ordinary debts. An application under section 300 
of the Companies Act 1985 was made by the Official Receiver for a disqualification 
order. Here, Hoffmann J. rejected the counsel for the official receiver's argument that 
the unpaid money of PAYE, national insurance contributions and VAT were quasi- 
trust's money but not company's property and, thus, failure to pay them constituted a 
breach of commercial morality leading to the directors' unfitness to be concerned in a 
company's management. Hoffmann I concluding the failure to pay the Crown debts 
in the commercial world's view were not a breach of commercial morality giving rise 
82 to unfitness, dismissed the application for disqualifying the defendant director. 
With regard to the recent decisions, an obvious tendency to treat the Crown and 
ordinary debts equally, appears to replace the traditional approach. There is an 
increase in the number of cases in which the courts showed reluctance to accept the 
traditional view when there is no obligation for directors to keep Crown's money in a 
separate account. 83 However, it should be noted that although there are some 
judicial comments in favour of such a tendency, the majority of courts still look at 
the Crown debts as special. The judgment of Harman J. in re Cladrose Lid. 84 can be 
referred to as a good example of this majority's view when it was held: 
79 [19901 BCC 765. 
80 Ibid at 779. 
81 [198714 BCLC 60 1. 
82 Ibid at 604. Compare with re Bath Glass Ltd. [19881 BCC 130 , 133, where in the Gibson J. 
's 
view causing the company by directors to use Crown moneys to finance trading activities was 
considered as relevant misconduct leading to unfitness. 83 re Sevenoak stationers (Retail) Ltd. [ 19901 BCC 765,768. 
84 11990] BCLC 204. 
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"In determining whether a disqualification order should be made, the non- payment of 
Crown debts was to be treated as a more serious matter than the failure to pay other 
ordinary creditors. "85 
His Lordship made attempts to justify his viewpoint by considering employees' 
interests and the Crown position as an involuntary creditor. In the result, the 
traditional view is still obviously dominant one. 
4.5.1.2.2 Misfeasance 
A particular section for disqualification as.. misfeasance is not provided by the 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. However section 9 of the Act for 
determining disqualification under section 6 refers to the matters mentioned in 
Schedule 1. Those matters are the same as those ones provided in section 212 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986 which is recognised as a misfeasance section. 
In re Rolus Properties Ltd. & Anor, 86 the director was charged with misfeasance 
under section 9 of the Insolvency Act 1976, now section 6- 9 of the Company 
Directors Disqualification Act, for not keeping books, making no statutory returns, 
and preparing no accounts. 
In the present case, the defendant was director of some companies which went into 
compulsory winding up within two years. Harman J. did not find the respondent "a 
fit person to be a director of a limited company " while "... the public ought to be 
protected from his incompetence. " Therefore, he was disqualified for two yearS. 87 
Likewise, in re Travel Mondial (UK) Ltd., 88 the respondent was charged with 
rnisfeasance, particularly failing to ensure that the accounts were audited or annual 
returns filed, and using Crown moneys. The defendant was also accused of using the 
name of a previous company that had already gone into liquidation, "phoenix 
syndrome". Here, Browne- Wilkinson V- C found the case serious, because of 
85 Ibid. 
86 [198814 BCC 446. 
87 Ibid at 449. 
88 [19911 BCC 224. 
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"abuse of the position of a limited company, with substantial lack of probity. " 
Therefore, a nine years disqualification was imposed. 89 
Likewise, in re GSAR Realisations Lld., 90 at the instance of the company's bank, 
Barclays Bank Plc., the company instructed a firm of accountants to carry out a 
limited investigation of its financial affairs. The report seen by the director in 
question suggested that the company was insolvent. One year later when it became 
evident that the financial situation of the company was deteriorating, another report 
estimating the financial state of the company, showed a deficiency of 1347,000 
against creditors. However, the director did not perform his duty to prepare a 
statement of affairs for the company. 91 The director's treatment of the company's 
financial affairs, specially his failure to make the required statement, was considered 
by Ferris J. as 'a degree of indifference to his duties which constitutes unfitness. ' 
In re CSTC Ltd. 92 an application was brought under section 6 by the Secretary of 
State for Trade and Industry against two directors, V and 'Y, for several charges 
including misapplication and lack of care to clients' funds, causing the company to 
trade while insolvent, and permitting the company to pay excessive remuneration to 
the directors. As to the first charge, the court found V seriously responsible and, in 
the court's view, 'Y failed to control accounting chaos. As to the second complaint, 
the court did not find him blameworthy, while in its view, there was a genuine 
prospect that "the introduction of fresh capital and changing trading circumstances 
would enable the company to survive properly. " Finally, the court found them guilty 
of two years excessive payment which the company could not afford. They were 
ordered to be disqualified for six and two years accordingly. 
89 Also in re Heypak Homecare Ltd. (No. 2) 119901 BCC 117, a three years disqualification order 
was imposed upon two directors of the company for transferring the company's stock in a new 
company in a way which rendered them unfit. Similarly in re Pamstock Ltd. 119941 1 BCLC 716, 
the respondent received a disqualification order of two years for issuing cheques which were 
dishonoured. not filing accounts and returns, and continuing to trade while insolvent. 90 119931 BCLC 409. 
91 Ibid at 411. 
92 (Secretary ofStatefor Trade and Industry v. Van Hengel&Anor) [1995]BCC 171 
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It is necessary to explain the relationship between section 212 of the Insolvency Act 
1986 and section 6. As was discussed in the previous chapter in our discussion on 
directors' liability for misfeasance, it is well established that section 212 is the 
statutory authority for misfeasance. On the other hand, the matters set out in section 
6 for unfitness are almost the same as those provided in section 212. It is justified to 
regulate those matters under misfeasance as a ground for disqualification different 
from section 6. It seems more justified because the matters set out in Schedule I 
(referred to by section 6) are not more serious than, for example, fraudulent trading 
under section 10 of the Company Directors flisqualification Act 1986. Therefore, a 
mandatory disqualification under the former, where the courts' power to make a 
disqualification order under the latter is discretionary, seems unconvincing. 
4. J. 2 Wronglul Trading 
By section 10 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, where the court 
makes a declaration under section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 that a person is 
liable to make a contribution to a company's assets whether or not an application for 
such an order has been made by any person, the court may make a disqualification 
order, if it thinks proper. 
The exercise of the court's power under this head is plainly discretionary but not 
mandatory. Therefore, if a contribution under section 214 is made and even if a 
disqualification order against the respondent has been requested, the court has 
discretion to dismiss the request by refusing to disqualify such person. 
Unfortunately, the case law record on this particular matter is not helpful. It is not 
because the concept of wrongful trading is newly introduced, 93 but most importantly 
because of the court's discretionary power which likely does not lead to a successful 
proceeding and, thus, it discourages the applicants to file their action for a 
disqualification order under wrongful trading section. Instead they prefer to bring 
93 It is not the reason since, as we have seen,. a considerable number of cases on wrongftd trading 
have successfully been decided. 
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proceedings against the directors for wrongful trading under section 6 in order to 
guarantee a successful proceeding for disqualification as making a disqualification 
under the latter, unlike the former, is mandatory. 94 
It is not clear, where the matters for determining a disqualification action under 
section 6 are set out in section 9 and Schedule 1, why the courts accept the 
allegations for disqualification grounded on wrongful trading to be brought under 
section 6, unfitness. To justify the treatment of the courts, one may argue that the 
matters set out in the above provisions do not confine the power of the court in 
those matters but the courts are required to disqualify the person in question under 
section 6 when they are satisfied that he is unfit to serve as a director, whatever the 
cause of application is, as was expressed in re Bath Glass Lld.. 95 In that case, Gibson 
J. drew a distinction between disqualification for wrongful trading under section 10 
and disqualification for unfitness under section 6, but his Lordship was of the view 
that for the court to be satisfied under section 6, no specific single offence was 
necessary and the term of the director's conduct was deliberately chosen with so 
great generality. The learned judge concluded that any misconduct of the respondent 
for this purpose may have been relevant even if it did not fall within a particular 
section of the Companies Act or Insolvency Act. 96 
In this case, Gibson J. seems indicating that not only wrongful and fraudulent trading 
but also any other wrongdoing whether or not within the scope of Companies Act or 
Insolvency Act can be viewed in determining a director's unfitness. This view is 
respectfully very wide whose recognition is a matter of the future judges' attitude. 
In re Cargo Agency Dd. 97 Harman J. was of the view that it was obvious from the 
accounts that from about August 1987 a prudent director plainly ought to have 
realised that the company was insolvent, and that without a very substantial 
94 See for example, re Travel Mondial (U. K) Ltd. [ 199 11 BCC 224, re GSAR Realisations Ltd. 
LI 9931 BCLC, 409 re Cargo Agency Ltd. [ 19921 BCLC 686. 
95 [198814 BCC 130. 
96 Ibid at 133. 
97 [19921 BCLC 686. 
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additional funds, for which there was no apparent immediate prospect, it was unable 
to pay its creditors as they fell due and was continuing to increase its debts month 
over month. 98 A disqualification order was imposed for two years. 
In re GSAR Realisations Lld., 99 inter alia, it was alleged, that the director in 
question had caused the company to trade after September 1988 when he knew or 
ought to have known that the company was unable to pay its debts. From Ferris J's 
point of view, there was clear evidence that the respondent permitted the company 
to trade after it had become insolvent. The learned judge concluded that the 
defendant's conduct demonstrated "his unfitness to be concerned in the management 
of the company. " 100 
The above mentioned cases, but one, were decided under section 6, namely 
unfitness, where the main or the only ground for those cases was carrying on trading 
while insolvent, namely wrongful trading. It seems in the next enactment it should be 
clarified whether wrongful trading is a separate ground from section 6 for 
disqualification or a matter to determine unfitness under that section. Depending on 
which one is the case, the result will be different. In the first situation, no application 
for disqualification under section 6, when the cause is a wrongful trading, shouldbc 
accepted, whereas by accepting the second possibility, the courts are obliged to 
disqualify the respondent for unfitness on the basis of wrongful trading liability. 
4.5.3 Fraudulent Trading 
Fraudulent trading as a ground for unfitness' leading to disqualification has been 
provided by the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 in two different 
98 Ibid at 387,389. In Firedart Ltd. (199412 BCLC 340, the defendant was also ordered to be 
disqualified for six years for trading while insolvent. 
99 [19931 BCLC 409. 
100 See also re Travel Mondial (U. K) Ltd. [ 199 11 BCC 224. Likewise in re Stanford Services Ltd & 
Others [198713 BCC 326 which was brought under section 300 of the Companies Act 1985, the 
director concerned was, among three more charges, charged of causing the company to trade after 
the point when he ought to have known that it was insolvent. The court found him unfit to act as a 
director of a company, therefore as a public interest consideration disqualified him for two years. In 
re Lo- Line Electric Motors Ltd. & Others 119881 1 Ch. 477 also Sir Browne- Wilkinson V. C. 
found the respondent liable for allowing the company to trade while insolvent. 
Corporate Directors'Duties &Liabilities in Insolvency in England and the US 144 
occasions based on the nature of liability resulting from the offence. In other words, 
the nature of fraudulent trading set out in section 213 of the Insolvency Act, and 
referred to in section 10 of the 1986 Act is a civil one, contribution, although 
emerged from a criminal liability, whereas the substance of liability in section 458 of 
the Companies Act 1985 referred to by section 4 is a purely punitive punishment. 
This distinction is also acknowledged by Sealy who is of the view that to disqualify a 
defendant under section 10, a declaration of contribution under section 213 of the 
Insolvency Act is needed. Moreover, unlike section 10, the requirement of 
insolvency is not required by section 4.101 '", 
As a natural result, this question may arise that what exactly is difference between 
the two sections? In both sections 4 and 10 the exercise of the courts' power to 
disqualify respondent is obviously discretionary but not mandatory. Moreover, the 
maximum period of disqualification under both is the same, fifteen years. 
Consequently, the treatment of the legislators of both matters without considering 
the criminal nature of liability under section 458 may seem unconvincing. 
To clarify the point, having a brief look at contents of those two sections is 
necessary. Under section 458, a director who carries on business with intent to 
defraud -creditors "is liable to imprisonment or a fine or both", and section 213 
provides that such person is to be liable to make such contributions (if any) to the 
company's assets as the court thinks fit. 
The only reasoning for the different attitude of the legislature to the same matter may 
be the different nature of those sections. The legislature classified the grounds for 
disqualification in separate sections; in section 4 including "fraud" which is the 
ground for disqualification with its penal substance, and section 10 where the ground 
of disqualification is contribution, with a civil nature. 
101 Sealy, Disqualification and PersonaLLiaWlily of Directors, 24. 
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4.6 Relieffrom Disqualification 
The harshness and discouraging effects of disqualification orders particularly when it 
is mandatory, not only on the business livelihood of the disqualified person but also 
on his private- fan-dly and the company's employees have attracted heavy criticisms 
from lawyers as well as businessmen. In response to such effects of disqualification 
some possibilities have been suggested, which may mitigate against the harshness of 
a director's disqualification. It should be noted that apart from the matters recognised 
as relieving factors against such harsh impact, except in section 6, all other sections 
relevant to directors disqualification bear a very wide discretion left to the court 
whether or not to disqualify a delinquent director by using the word "may". 
It is also worth noting that before the enactment of the 1986 Act, there was no 
mandatory disqualification under the predecessor of section 6, section 300, and the 
courts were empowered to exercise their discretion under this section like other 
disqualification cases. 
4.6.1 Limited and Conditional Orders 
Although the mandatory nature of disqualification under section 6 seems tough, the 
courts are empowered to exercise their discretion by permitting a director to 
continue to act as a director under some particular circumstances while disqualified. 
In making a disqualification order, this question may arise why the court should be 
directed to disqualify a director by imposing an absolute prohibition from being 
concerned in any form of any company's management, but it should not be able to 
disqualify a person from being concerned in management of all except some certain 
companies? this is because in respect of that company the disqualified person may be 
more useful than harmful, or the court may let him act as a manager without having a 
seat on the board of directors, while in all cases the public interest may not be 
protected by fuli'disqualification. The reverse is true. Sometimes the protection of 
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the public interest requires that not to make a director, particularly when he is well 
experienced, completely unemployable. 
If such partial, limited or conditional orders are made instead, it can also reduce the 
court's reluctance to make disqualification orders because of their deep and 
unrecoverable effects on the social life of the disqualified person. If the court is 
empowered to make a disqualification order, or give a leave, why it should not be 
authorised to make a limited or conditional order. The decision- making process 
shows the courts have not hesitated to regularly exercise their discretion for such 
purpose. 
In re Matthews Lid, 102 although Gibson J. refused to accept the director's argument 
that although his conduct as director of two successive failed company was 
unsatisfactory, he had learned his lesson and his subsequent management of a third 
company was justified and the public did not, therefore, need to be protected by 
disqualification, the learned judge indicated that he would view sympathetically any 
future application for leave by the respondent to continue as a director of the third 
company on the condition that it was converted into an unlimited liability company. 
In some circumstances a specific aspect of public interest may influence the court's 
judgement. In re Majestic Recording Studios Lid, 103 the defendant was permitted to 
continue as a director of a specified company under supervision of an independent 
accountant appointed by the court on the condition that the audited account$. 
would be filed by a specified date. Likewise, in Re Lo- Line Electric Motors Lid & 
Ors, 104 the director was allowed to keep his position as director of two family 
companies so long as a named person remained a director with voting control. 105 
102 [198814 BCC 513. 
103 [19891 BCLC 1. 
104 [198814 BCC 415. 
105 In re Cargo Agency Ltd, 119921 BCC 989, although the two defendant directors were 
disqualified for two years under section 6, Harman J. granted one of them the leave to carry on as a 
general manager or director of a particular company of which he was a director for sometime. 
Likewise, in Gibson Davies, [19951 BCC 11. the leave granted to the disqualified person to act as a 
director of a particular company for the period of disqualification, 
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The same situation can be seen in re Chatmore Ltd. 106 in which the director in 
question formed a company to acquire the business of his father's company which 
subsequently went into insolvent liquidation. The new company was also after a 
short time wound up due to insolvency. A disqualification order for two years was 
made, but on the application of the defendant's counsel for special leave to continue 
to act as a director of a particular company of which the respondent had been a 
director for two years, the court allowed him to keep his position as a director of 
that named company for one year on the condition that he held a board meeting 
every month at which a representative of the company's auditors would attend. The 
director was granted the right to apply for a new leave at the end of one year period. 
4.6.2 Mitigating Factors 
For granting a partial, limited or conditional order some factors may be taken into 
account by the courts. For example, the personal position of the respondent and the 
impact of a disqualification order on his family or on the employees and society as a 
whole when the director in question is a key- man in management, are considerable 
factors to mitigate against a disqualification order. 
There should be a distinction between disqualification cases where the cause of 
unfitness of the defendant director is fraud, and those cases where he is held unfit for 
breach of duty of care or negligence. In the first situation, the respondent should not 
expect a leave to be granted even if some mitigating factors are available, but in the 
latter case, the court feels free to exercise its discretion to relieve him from liability. 
4.6.2.1 Reliance on professional advice 
Reliance on professional advice is one of the most important mitigating factors by 
which, in some cases, the courts have refused to disqualify the respondent. In re 
Douglas Construction Services Ltd, 107 for example, the court refused to disqualifý 
106 [19901 BCLC 673. 
107 [19881 BCLC 397. 
Corporate Directors'Du ties& Liabilities in Insolvency in England and the US 148 
the directors in question. It should be noted that because this case was brought under 
section 300 of the Companies Act 1985, the court was not anyway obliged to 
impose disqualification on the defendants. The main factor in the directors' favour 
was their reliance on the professional advice. Harman J. was impressed by their 
conduct of putting their own money into the company and the equally important, the 
fact that they relied on professional advice. The learned judge, therefore, concluded 
that the directors' conduct did not amount to cynical exploitation of limited liability 
or gross incompetence. 108 
However, in some cases reliance on the professional advice and leaving the whole 
company's affairs to other officers has not been considered as a convincing reason. In 
Cladrose Ltd. 109 the court held that such reliance on the advice of an advisor or 
professional did not give rise to the shrinking of the obligations of a director by 
leaving all company's affairs to others. The same view was taken in re Majestic 
Studios Lid. 110 Here, the director had not deliberately involved himself in the 
company's financial affairs. Annual accounts and returns were not filed for various 
periods and the company went into insolvent liquidation with a massive debts to the 
Crown and others. The court said that he was unfit to be concerned in the company 
management by reasoning that he was not entitled to shirk his duties by leaving 
everything to others. 
4.6.2.2 Effects on employees 
Some courts are also reluctant to make a disqualification order because of its effects 
on employees. They have, when the conduct of the directors in respect of that 
company has appeared to it suitable and specially the need to save the employees' 
jobs, exercised their discretion to mitigate against the disqualification order. 
108 The same view was taken in Rolus Properties Ltd. 119881 BCC 446,499. Here, Harman J. took 
the fact into his account as a mitigating factor in the defendant favour that "he had obtained 
suitable qualified professional assistance to fill what appear to have been" the respondent 
deficiencies. 
109 119901 BCLC 204. 
110 [19891 BCLC 1. 
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In re Majestic Recording Studios Ltd III the director concerned was held unfit, but 
because of the harshness of its effects on the employees the court gave the director a 
leave to continue as director of one company under certain conditions. 
Such factor alone seems difficult to persuade the judges not to make a 
disqualification order or to grant a conditional or limited order. Other factors such as 
the respondent's conduct and the order impact on his business freedom and the 
public are relevant. 
4.6.2.3 Otherfactors 
Some other factors such as inexperience, youthful, losing the defendant his own 
money and the impact of an order as such may impress the judges to refuse to make 
a full order or to grant a leave. For example, in re Douglas Construclion &rvices 
Ltd. 112 although the court was satisfied that the director in question had mismanaged 
two insolvent companies of which he was a director, it refused to disqualify him. 
That was because he had put a substantial sum of his own money into the business, 
and this point was considered by the court as a basic mitigating factor. 
The courts may also take account of youthfulness and low experience of a director 
to mitigate against disqualification. ' 13 The reverse is true. Sometimes the high 
expertise of the respondent may seem to be damaging to the public if a 
disqualification order against such an effective person is made. In such circumstances 
the court may prefer to make a general disqualification order with a leave to take 
part specifically in a particular company management. 
4.7 Effects of Disqualification 
Ill [19891 BCLC 1. 
112 [19881 BCC 397. 
113 Janet Dine "Disqualification of Directors", 12 Co. Law. (1991) 8. [Thereafter Dine Co. Law. 
(1991)] 
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The primary consequence of a disqualification order is that the disqualified person 
shall not, without leave of the court, be a director, liquidator, administrator, receiver 
or manager of a company's property or in any way , whether 
directly or indirectly, be 
concerned or take part in the promotion, formation or management of a company. ' 14 
Also if a person who acts as a director on the instructions of person whom he knows 
to be an undischarged bankrupt or to be subject to a disqualification order, he is 
liable to its creditors for debts and liabilities incurred by the company during the 
period he involved so. 
A disqualified person is not merely prohibited from participating in any form of 
company management, his taking part in as an independent management consultant 
to a company may give rise to an offence. By a full disqualification, the person in 
question not only is taken off the board, but also he may virtually become 
unemployable and incapable of living in the company's sphere. I 15 If a person against 
whom such an order has been made, contravenes it by engaging in the management 
of a company, his involvement is considered as a criminal offence for which he may 
in the case of indictment be punished by no more than two years imprisonment or a 
fine or both, and if it tried summarily, by no more than six months imprisonment and 
a fine up to L1,000 or both. ) 16 
In R v. Campbell., 117 the director was disqualified for five years. However, he 
continued to act as a financial adviser to a company which faced financial difficulties. 
In response to his charge for acting while disqualified, he argued that, as an 
independent person, simply advising the company but not being involved in the 
decision- making process, he could not be recognised as being involved in company's 
management. The court rejecting this argument, stated that the provision is intended 
to make it impossible for a disqualified person to be a part of management or central 
direction of the company's affairs, whereas the defendant acted as a consultant 
114 Section 1 (1)], the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. 
115 Andrew Hicks "Disqualification of Directors", ML (1988) 4 1. 116 Section 13. 
117 119941 BCLC 83. 
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advising financial management and reconstruction of the company. Moreover, the 
court refused to accept the argument of the counsel for the defendant that by 
adopting such a wide interpretation of the section it would lead to the conclusion 
that a disqualified person can not be sure of the extent to which he could be involved 
in the company's affairs. The court took the view that the section had clearly directed 
the disqualified person to seek the court's leave if he had intended to take part in the 
management of any company. 
The question may arise whether a disqualification order leads to an automatic 
vacation of the director's office. It seems difficult to accept this because a 
disqualified person must resign from the date of the order, otherwise he will face 
liability. According to table A article 81 of the Companies Act, the office of a person 
prohibited from being a director or becomes bankrupt "shall be vacated". The same 
phrase was contained in section 182 and Table A of Aýrticle 88 of the Companies Act 
1948. The words "shall be vacated" may imply an automatic vacation of the office in 
the case of disqualification. ' 18 Hicks believes that it seems automatic disqualification 
cannot be acceptable because it contains the risk of catching innocent people which 
is in contradiction with natural justice. It also discourages appointment of non- 
executive directors as well as company doctors when the company has gone into 
financial distress. ' 19 It is respectfully difficult to agree with the first criticism because 
when a director is held unfit, whether a disqualification is automatic or not, it does 
not catch innocent people. 
One may feel that the concept of "automatic disqualification" is an Australian legal 
concept, but this point has been also considered by the drafts- makers of the 1986 
Act. The Cork Committee clearly proposed the imposition of "automatic 
disqualification" against an individual debtor who 'has been adjudicated bankrupt 
and, so long as he remains undischarged. "20 
118 Andrew I-licks " Making and Resisting Disqualification Orders" 8 Co. Law. (1987) 343, citing 
IRC v Heaver ltd [ 194912 All ER 367, and Craven-Ellis v Canons Ltd [ 193612 All ER 1066. 119 I-licks, ML, (1988) at 39,41. 
120 Par. 1764. 
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The harshness of an order as such, particularly its discouraging effects on 
individuals, always has been criticised as the main disadvantage of the proceedings. 
It has been said that although this reason that to take the matter into account as 
serious with regard to the possibility of permitting the director to continue under 
licence may mitigate harshness of disqualification, it is still a considerable limitation 
of individual freedom if the licence is to be obtained from the court. 121 
This sanction seems to be a crucial punishment even more oppressive than fine or 
even imprisonment, particularly in its mandatory form under section 6. In other 
words, disqualification as a strict limitation may be in contradiction with the doctrine 
of individualism and free trade of common law. A disqualification order is, indeed, a 
serious restriction on the individual liberty as expressed in the case of Secretary of 
State for Trade and Industry v. Langridge, 122when Balcombe L. J. said that "while a 
disqualification order is not in itself penal, it is clearly restrictive of the liberty of the 
person against whom it was made... ." 
To justify the effects of such an order, one may consider the public interest as the 
main purpose of the proceedings by arguing that although the removal from 
corporate employment causes severe hardship to the disqualified director and his 
family, the protection of the collective interests of the public must outweigh the 
harsh impact on the individual. 
4.8 Conclusion 
The subject of disqualification is capable of being described as one of the most 
I controversial subjects 
in the area of directors liability in particular, and in company 
law in general. This sanction has played a very significant role in this sphere since its 
introduction in 1928. As to the aim of the proceedings two main approaches are 
penal and civil or protective theories. Here, in all cases and commentaries, the 
121. Janet Dine Co. Law. (1991) at 9. 
122 [199112 W. L. PL 1343,1350. 
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meaning of protective and civil have been used with the same sense and within the 
same theory. As it was already discussed, putting both civil and protective under the 
same conceptual umbrella is not appropriate. The legislators may not have intended 
to punish a driver nor to recover the damages suffered by victim, but to protect the 
people on the road and the society as a whole. The same reasoning goes to 
disqualification for a corporate director who drives the company. 
The significant problem inherent in the issue of disqualification is the mandatory 
nature of disqualification under section 6 of the Act 1986. As was already discussed, 
it is not clear whether the mandatory disqualification can be issued only based on 
matters set out in schedule I (referred to by section 6) of the Act. If so, two more 
questions must be answered; first, why do the court let an application for an order as 
such be filed under section 6 for other causes such as wrongful trading? And more 
crucially, why such matter as breach of duty even without faithlessness can lead to a 
mandatory disqualification but a crucial cause such as fraudulent trading has, 
statutorily, no such effect. Accepting this possibility requires a basic amendment as 
to section 6 and mandatory disqualification. If not, namely the disqualification order 
is not confined in the matters mentioned in the above schedule as stated by Gibson J. 
in re Bath Glass Ltd. 123. 
The criticism on the harshness of the period of disqualification particularly when 
there is a mandatory minimum of disqualification has not been alleviated by the 
reasoning that the disqualified director has opportunity to apply to the court for a 
permission to continue to act as a director under specified conditions. 
In order to classify the grounds for disqualification more logically, it would be an 
idea to put the offence of fraudulent trading provided in sections 4 and 10 together 
under the same head. 
The lack of unanimity among the judges as to the real position of the Crown debts is 
another problem. Even most recent judicial authorities are in disagreement on the 
123 [198814 BCC 130. 
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issue. Some cases have recognised the Crown as having a special position as an 
involuntary creditor, 124 and some others have refused to follow this approach as a 
rule. 125 It is a matter which should be resolved by a enforceable decision from the 
House of Lords or the legislature's interference. 
124 See for example re Stanford Services Ltd, & Others [19871 3 BCC 326, and re Lo- Line 
Electric Motors Ltd. & Others 119891477, 
125 For example, re Cladrose Ltd. 119901 BCLC 204, 
Chapter 5: Protection of Directors in English Law 
1 Introduction 
There is no need to be highly expert in English law to see how tightly a director is 
surrounded by a variety of civil and penal 
7iabilities. 
In the past decade, since the 
legislature has permitted insurance to be purchased by companies under the amended 
version of section 310, a large range of liabilities have been provided. While the 
liability entailed in wrongful trading with its objective standard has given the court a 
wide power to impose liability on directors, the Company Directors Disqualification 
Act 1986 in section 6 has provided another device by which directors may be 
prevented from operating in the business sphere. 
One may wonder whether there are sufficient protections against this potential 
wealthy liabilities. If not, how may a qualified, competent, and honest individual be 
interested in serving on the board and leave himself as an open target to attacks on 
the part of several possible groups of claimants, such as the company itself, its 
shareholders, creditors, and public or governmental departments? 
Section 310 of the Companies Act 1985 renders void any provision contained in a 
company's articles of association or in a contract with the company or otherwise, 
exempting directors from and indemnifying them against liability. However, it allows 
insurance to be purchased and maintained against an officer's liability, the possibility 
which before the amendment and until 1989 was strictly prohibited. There are also 
some exceptions to the rule of prohibition of indemnification including indemnity 
against a successful defence costs, liability in a case where the defendant is relieved 
from liability under section 727 of Companies Act 1985, or when he is acquitted. 
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On the other hand, section 727 offers a wide discretion to the courts empowering 
them to relieve a director from his personal liability under particular circumstances 
when certain requirements are met. 
In this chapter, first, the issues contained in section 310 including exemption from, 
and insurance or indemnification against directors liability are examined. 
In the second part of this chapter, section 727, its judicial importance in the 
development of company law, particularly its relationship with wrongful trading, 
rnisfeasance, and other cases which do not fall within the ambit of those sections, and 
the extent of its application with regard to the courts' discretion is reviewed. 
5.2 Exemption, Insurance and Indemnity 
Section 3 10 of the Companies Act 1985 in subsection (1) invalidates any provision in 
a company's articles of association or any contract with the company or otherwise 
which seeks to exempt a director or other officer or auditor of the company from, or 
to indemnify him against any liability which by virtue of any rule or law would 
otherwise attach to him in respect of any negligence, default, breach of duty or 
breach of trust of which he may be guilty in relation to the company. In section 3 10 
(2), the legislature has permitted the purchase of insurance against directors liability, 
that authorises companies to indemnify their officers in some cases. 
The provisions of section 3 10 have been subject of legal writers' examinations. But, 
there has been little by way of interpretation of this section, and the leading judicial 
authority Movilex Ltd. v. Buyleld' is the only helpful case in this regard. 
5.2.1 Exemptionftom Liability 
5.2.1.1 Statutory andjudicial background 
1 [19881 BCLC 104. 
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The precursor of the present section 3 10 was section 78 of the Companies Act 1928, 
and it was followed by section 152 of the Companies Act 1929. The in-u-nediate 
forerunner of section 310 was section 205 of the Companies Act 1948, which 
repealed the Companies Act 1929 in this regard. 
The aim of section 152 has been said, 2 was to resolve the mischief arising from 
Neville J. 's holding in re Brazilian Rubber Plantations & Estates Ltd. 3 and Romer 
J. 's judgment in re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. Ltd. 4 The result of re City 
Equitable Fire Insurance which is describeLas a "public scandal", 5 persuaded the 
Board of Trade to appoint the Greene Committee. The committee considering the 
judicial precedent of the above two cases stated: 
"We consider that this type of article gives a quite unjustifiable protection to directors. 
Under it a director may with impunity be guilty of the grossest negligence provided 
that he does not consciously do anything which he recognises to be improper ... To 
attempt by statute to define the duties of directors would be a hopeless task and the 
proper course in our view is to prohibit articles and contracts directed to relieving 
directors and other officers of a company from their liability under general law for 
negligence and breach of duty or breach of trust. "6 
The Companies Act 1948 in section 205 adopted the same language but with a minor 
change as its predecessor. This section was described, by the Cohen Committee, as 
an anti- indemnity provision, 7 when they said "we consider that a general provision 
for exempting trustees from liability should be prohibited but that enabling clauses as 
distinct from indemnity clauses should be permitted. "S 
The matter was, for the first time, judicially considered in re Brazilian Rubber 
Plantations & Estates Ltd. 9 where the wrongdoing was alleged to have been gross 
2 Jalil Asif, "The Effect of Section 3 10 of the Companies Act 1985 on Directors' and Officers' 
Insurance and on Auditors' Professional Indemnity Policies", Prof. Neg, (1989) 209, Colin Baxter, 
"Demystifying D&0 Insurance" 15 Oxf. JLS (1995) 537,541. 
3 [19111 Ch. 425. 
4 [19251 Ch. 407. 
5 C. D. Baker, "Disclosure of Directors' Interests in Contracts", ML (1975) 181,186, Asif, op cit at 
210. 
6 Greene Committee on Company Law Amendment, Cmnd. 2657 para 46 (1925- 6). 7 Ralph Instone, "The Scope of Companies Apt 1948, S. 205", 98 LQ& (1982) 548. 
8 Crand. 6659 Para. 64. 
9 119111 Ch 425. 
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negligence in circumstances in which the defendant directors were said to have 
caused the company to enter into a contract, and then failed to terminate the 
contract once they found out about a report which stated that the contract was 
fraudulently prepared. 
Although in the final analysis, the directors were held not to have been negligent, 
their default being attributed to mere "error of judgment", the court had to consider 
the effect of the articles of association which contained a provision purporting to 
exempt directors from liability. The following article fell to be construed: 
"151. No director or any other officer of the-company shall be liable for the acts, 
receipts, neglects, or defaults of any other director or officer, or ... for any other 
loss, 
damage, or misfortune whatever which shall happen in the execution of the duties of 
his office or in relation thereto, unless the same happens through his own dishonesty. " 
The court, considering the contents of that article, held that: 
"This article is intended to relieve directors who act honestly from liability for damages 
occasioned even by their negligence, where such negligence is not dishonest. " 
Neville J did not think it was illegal "for a company to engage its directors upon such 
terms, " and therefore, his Lordship thought that no action by the company "against 
its directors for negligence, where no dishonesty was alleged, could have 
succeeded. "10 
In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. the directors in question were charged by 
the official receiver with negligence in discharging their duties as directors. One of 
the articles of the company's association provided: 
"... none of [the directors, auditors, secretary and other officers for the time being of the 
company] shall be answerable for the acts, receipts, neglects or defaults of the other or 
others of them, ... or for any insufficiency or deficiency of any security upon which any 
moneys of or belonging to the company shall be placed out or invested, or for any other 
loss, n-dsfortune or damage which may happen in the execution of their respective 
offices ... unless the same shall happen through their wilful neglect or default 
respectively. " 
10 lbid at 440. 
1111.9251 Ch. 407. 
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In that case, after an exhaustive examination of the meaning of negligence, in 
particular "willful negligence", Romer J. categorised the directors' conduct under 
"unwilful" neglect and, therefore, subject to the protection provided by the above 
articles. Ms Lordship explaining the construction of the article, stated: 
"its true construction, to excuse the auditors from being answerable for loss occurring 
in relation to their office, except in the particular events which are therein specified- 
namely, those which happen by or through their own wilful neglect or default- and that 
it would be improper to describe as a misfeasance any act or omission of the auditors 
which, having regard to that article, would not result in their being answerable for the 
loss which may be occasioned thereby". -0. 
The court concluded that the article modified the prima facie obligation of the 
defendants. 
As to the court's decision in the above case, the account should be taken of the fact 
that almost all commentators have referred to the case for explaining or supporting 
their view as to directors' position. However, it seemp -, not easy to extract 
from 
the above judgment a rule applicable to directors' position. That is because in that 
case, the possible modification of duties of auditors but not directors was at issue. 
But, one feels that the court's attitude to the matter was to designate a rule, 
irrespective of the class of officers to which the defendants belonged. 
The importance of the case is that it raised the issue of exemption of officers' duties 
years before the first statutory provision came into effect. 
The first and the only case which has so far examined section 3 10 is Movilex Lid v. 
Buylleld. 12 In this case, an action was taken against directors of the company for self- 
interest, because they had caused the company's certain property to be transferred to 
another company of which they were also members and directors, when it appeared 
that the company was unable to complete the sale. The company's articles had 
modified the self- interest rule and permitted a director to be interested in a contract 
with his company provided he made full disclosure of his interest. Article 100(iv) 
provided that the latter prohibitions did not apply to "any contract or dealing ... with 
12 [19881 BCLC 104. 
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a corporation where (his) sole interest is that he is a director or other officer, 
member or creditor thereof Here, Vinelott J. suggested a formula as the "true 
principle". This principle, in his Lordship view, was: 
"that if a director places himself in a position in which his duty to the company 
conflicts with his personal interests or his duty to another, the court will intervene to 
set aside the transaction without inquiring whether there was any breach of the 
director's duty to the company. That is an overriding principle of equity. The 
shareholders of the company, in formulating the articles, can exclude or modify the 
application of this principle. In doing so they do not exempt the directors from the 
consequences of a breach of a duty owed to the -50"Mpany. "13 
Birds suggests that this solution may indicate that directors can be relieved from 
liability for breach of any duties which do not cause damage to the company. 
However, he rejects this solution, because directors "can not be relieved from 
liability under any statutory duties, nor from failure to act bonafide in the interests 
of the company" and even from "failure to display reasonable care and skill"" 
Vinelott I did not define or explain the full extent of the principle, the application of 
which would allow modification or exclusion by means of the corporate articles. But 
one agrees with Birds' interpretation of this part of the judgment, may find the above 
solution in contrary to English case law and legislature's attitude that have never 
recognised such a solution, which seems to be a sort of exemption from liability. 
Considering the judgment through a different view from that taken by Birds, 
irrespective of the importance given to this part of Vinelott J. 's holding by many of 
legal writers, it does not seem that it has clarified questions as to the extent of 
exclusion and modification of duties authorised by the law. However, the fact should 
not be ignored that it is the only judicial precedent ever referred to the matter. 
13 Ibid at 12 1. 
14 John Birds, "Excluding the Duties of Directors", 8 
_CgjM, 
(1987) 32. [Thereafter Birds, 8 
_Cg, LM, (1987)]. 
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5.2.1.2 Extent of exemption under section 310 
It is believed that section 3 10 does not prohibit an exemption or indemnity granted 
after the occurrence of the event resulting to the liability, because the language of 
section refers to the future rather than the past when it reads "of which the directors 
may be guilty". 15 
Having a review of the section, either linguistically or conceptually, does not 
respectfully lead the reader to the conclusion that it concerns only prospective 
occurrences. The wording of section seems absolute, drawing no distinction between 
liability arising from the past and future events. But, in support of the above 
interpretation one may argue that the reference to the future means ratification. 
As to the scope of application of section 3 10, there has been a strong disagreement 
among commentators. According to the traditional view, the section has a 
prohibitive effect in relation to any company's articles or contract excluding the 
officers' liability for breach of their duties. This approach'considers the section as 
rendering void any provision which exempts a director from liability for breach of an 
existing duty, but it does not affect provisions which modify the extent to which a 
duty is owed. Prior to the judgment of Vinelott J in Motivex Ltd. v. Buylleld'16 
Gower and Gore- Browne were of the above view. 17 Gower who supported this 
approach, believed that the effects of section 3 10 was that liability for breach of duty 
could not be excluded, but the scope of the duty could be modified by the articles. Is 
The solution proposed in the 43th edition of Gore- Browne on Companies that a 
provision may, without infringing section 205, reduce a duty but not exempt a 
director from liability for breach of it, was rejected by Vinelott J. in that case, 
because the learned judge believed that the words 'for exempting' lead to: 
ý5 Steven Turnbull & Vanessa Edwards, "Companies Act 1989: Directors' and Officers' Liability 
Insurance", 134 51, (1990) 768. 
16 119881 BCLC 104. 
17 Core- Browne on Companies, (Bristol: Jordan 43rd ed. ) para. 27- 34, Gower, Principles o 
Modem Company Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell 4th ed. ), at 60 1. 18 Gower, Principles of Modem Company Law (London:. Sweet & Maxwell 3rd ed. ) at 531- 32. 
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"the absurd result that an article could, without infringing s 205, modify a director's 
duty to use reasonable skill and care in the conduct of the company's affairs and so 
avoid a liability for damages for breach of duty which would otherwise arise, a 
conclusion which seems to me manifestly in conflict with the purpose of the section. "19 
The second approach construes the contents of section 3 10 as prohibiting exemption 
both from the scope of the duty and from the consequences of a breach of a duty. 
The literal effect of section 3 10 is, thus, to avoid all forms of exclusion from liability, 
drawing no distinction between exemptions from the scope of duty and exemptions 
from the consequences of a breach of dUty. 20 
According to this opinion, the interpretation of section 310 that it allows 
modification of the duty even where the effect of such a modifying provision is to 
release a director from owing any duty at all, 21 is rejected as "exactly the sort of 
'contracting out' which the Greene Committee sought to prohibit", 22 and "defeat 
what seems to have been the aim foremost in the minds of the Greene Committee in 
recommending section [310]". 23 That is because the section avoids an article that 
shields a director from any liabilitywhich would otherwise attach to him. ' 
Some conunentators who support the modem view, have criticised the idea of 
possibility of modification of duties as contrary to the purpose behind the section 
intended by the Greene Committee, since the main feature of being fiduciary is 
exercising some duties. 24 Pennington believes that a company's articles or a service 
contract cannot exempt a director from his duty of care and skill, or from fiduciary 
duties imposed by law. He proposes a typical formula in this regard upon which a 
director's duties provided by the general law may be increased but not diminished. 25 
19 Motivex Ltd. v. Bulfteld, 119881 BCLC 104,117- 18. 
20 Roger Gregory, "The Scope of the Companies Act 1948, Section 205", 98 LM (1982) 413,414- 
5. 
21 J. L. Parkinson, "The Modification of Directors' Duties", ML (1981) 335,339. 
22 Asif, op cit at 211. 
23 John Birds, "The Perniissible Scope of Articles Excluding the Duties of Company Directors" 39 
'Dý 
R (1976) 396. [Thereafter Birds, 39 hLR (1976)]. 
Ross Cranston, "Limiting Directors' Liability: Ratification, Exemption and Indemnification", 
ML (1992) 207- 8. 
25 Robert R. Pennington, Directors' Personal Liability. (London: Collins Professional Technical 
1987). 
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The editors of Gower and Gore- Browne in their latest edition have adjusted their 
opinion in compliance with the Vinelott J. 's judgment. 26 Gore- Browne's editors 
adding something more, categorise some duties as the non- excludable duties of 
directors which, in their view, seek to prevent a director from damaging the 
company's interests, as; the duty to show proper care and skill, or the duty not to 
misappropriate the company's property or any statutory provisions imposed on 
directors. Gore- Browne Editors referring to the Vinelott J. 's judgment states: 
"the general rule imposing accountability for secret profits as well as that avoiding a 
transaction involving a conflict of duty and inteitst, would, on Vinclott J. 's analysis be 
excluded, so long as the director acts in good faith. "27 
Distinction between duties as excludable and non- excludable is also followed by 
another commentator who believes that section 310 only invalidates articles which 
exempt directors from liability for breach of duty. Whilst the non- conflict duty may 
be released in this way, the duty to act in good faith and the duty of care may not, 
because where release is equivalent to permission to injure the company, such a 
release will be repulsive to the fiduciary relationship between director and company. 
It is not open to a company, therefore, to circumvent section 3 10 by including a 
provision in its articles releasing the whole range of directors' duties. 28 
Birds was also of the above opinion and thought section 448 of the Companies Act 
1948 (now section 727), was an appropriate alternative to mitigate the harshness of 
section 310.29 Birds says that 'it is surely preferable to have technical, though honest, 
breach of duty forgiven by the court than never brought to the light because of 
provisions in articles of association'. 30 He concludes that excluding any duty is void 
under section 310 'despite the fact that, literally read, section refers only to 
exclusions of liability being void'. However, in conclusion he does not reject the 
26 Gower, Principles of Modem Company Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell 5th ed. 1992) at 573- 
4 Gore- Browne on Companies, (Bristol: Jordan 44th ed. ) para. 27.21- 3. 2ý Ibid. 
28 Parkinson, op cit at 344. 
29 Birds, hLE (1976) at 394. 
30 Ibid at 397. 
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possibility "to modify these duties somewhat, by absolving a director from liability 
for making a profit by disclosure to the board. '131 
As was already mentioned this view has been criticised as contrary to the purpose 
behind the section intended by the Greene Committee. 32 
This criticism respectfully seems a misunderstanding of Birds' interpretation, because 
it disregards his earlier statement of view where he firmly recognised any 
modification of duties on the basis of section 310 as "defeat" of the philosophy 
behind the provisions. Moreover, this fact should be taken into account that Birds 
d3 wrote his article in 1976, long before the Movitext Ltd. v. Bu lel 3 case was 
decided and the major amendment of 1986 in this regard had taken place. Therefore, 
Birds' opinion, as one of editors of Gore- Browne's work should be regarded in 
consistent with the view pointed out in the latest edition of that work. 
To answer the question whether or not section 3 10 allows modification of duties, is 
a difficult task. That is because drawing distinction between exemption from 
liabilities and modification is not always possible. 
So long as the statutory authority in this regard is not amended to give a guidance, 
the solution is to rely on the only judicial authority ever delivered in Movitext Ltd 
which prohibits the modification of duties. 
5.2.1.3 Validity of ratification and approval 
The important related question in this regard is the possibility of ratifying or 
approving an action considered as breach of duty by a majority in a general meeting. 
The effects of ratification is to prevent any action to be taken by minority 
shareholders against directors. However, such a ratification does not prevent 
shareholders to bring their own action providing that it is within the exceptions 
31 lbid at 40 1. 
32 Cranston, op cit. 
33[19881 BCLC 104. 
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introduced in Foss v. Harbottle, 34 in the form of derivative action. On the other 
hand, by an approval, a director can be released from liability. The validity of such 
approval was confirmed by Lord Russell in Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver, 35 as: 
"[The defendants] could, had they wished, protected themselves by a resolution ... of 
Regal shareholders in general meeting. In default of such approval liability to account 
must remain. " 
On a wide interpretation of the word "or otherwise" in section 3 10, it seems any 
attempt by shareholders to approve in advance or ratify a breach of directors duties, 
or by the board to release a delinquent director-have been rendered void. 36 
It has been stated that by accepting the view that section 3 10 in its true construction 
nullifies any exemption from the scope of a director's duty and from the 
consequences of a breach of his duty, a shareholders' resolution should not, 
therefore, absolve such duties or their consequences, because section 3 10 applies to 
"any provision, whether contained in the articles of a company's association or ... 
otherwise, "37which includes a resolution. However, a distinction must be made 
between a authorisation and ratification. It is said that a ratification by shareholders 
in a general meeting of a breach of a fiduciary duty is valid. Even a release in the 
absence of a ratification can be effected, when a board of directors decides that it 
was hona fide in the interests of the corporation not to sue one of its members 
because of legal costs, damages to the company's reputation and more importantly 
losing a qualified member. 39 
One may argue that, when ratification Er Post Pacto of breach of duty is permitted, 
there is no point in preventing authorisation of a breach of duty in advance by a 
provision in the articles. But, ratification of breach of duty should be distinguished 
from authorisation, because the latter means nothing but the exemption which is 
34 [18431 Hare 461. The exceptions are as such: i) When the n-tisdoing complained of is an illegal 
or ultra vires transaction ii) When the matter concerned can not be decided by a simple majority but 
a special majority. iii) When the right of individual shareholders have been infringed iv) Where 
ratifying a matter by majority involves fraud on minority. 
35 [1967] 2 A. C. 134. 
36 Cranston, op cit at 206. 
37 Instone, op cit at 549. 
38 Cranston. op cit at 200. 
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prohibited by section 3 10. That is because approving or authorising breach of duty in 
advance means granting the fight to the director to misconduct ensured of getting 
away with his wrongdoing without punishment which may be rightly considered 
contrary to public policy and deterrent effect of the duty. 
Indeed, there are many examples demonstrating that the company in a general 
meeting can ratify breaches of duty by its directors except when the conduct 
concerned has been committed dishonestly or fraudulently. 39 
Law Society Standing Committee on Company Law was not prepared to accept a 
strict interpretation of section 310 which would render void a shareholders' 
resolution to approve in advance or ratify a breach of duty, but it believed the section 
should have been amended to catch such resolutionS. 40 Likewise, the Department of 
Trade and Industry in a consultative document on section 310 also suggested that 
the section should have been amended to clarify the fact that it did not invalidate 
resolutions of shareholders waiving or ratifying directors' breaches of duties. 41 
In some cases, it has been held that any act giving rise to taking away a company's 
assets or involving self- interest cannot be ratified or approved by shareholders. 42 
On the other hand, some commentators have drawn distinction between the duties 
breach of which are ratifiable and those which can not be ratified. Gore- Browne, for 
example, enumerates ratifiable breaches of duties as; obtaining a secret profit in 
circumstances not involving any misappropriation or misapplication of company's 
property, 43 failure to disclose an interest in a contract to which the company is a 
party, 44 breach of duties of care and skill, 45 and using a power of allotment for 
39 Bamford v. Bamford [ 197011 Ch. 212, North- West Transactions Co. v. Beatty 11887112 App 
Ca. 589, Grant- United Switchback Railways Co. (1988) 40 ChD 135. 
40 John Birds, "Director's Insurance and s. 310", 7 Co. Law., (1986) 209. 
41 John Birds, "Reform of Section 3 10", 9 Co. Law. (1988) 22 1. 
42 E. g., see Cook v. Deeks [19161 1 A. C. 554. In this case, the court held that the directors' 
decision in appropriating a contract belonged to the company to themselves, could not be ratified. 
43 Regal(Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver, 1196712 A. C. 134,150. 
44 North- West Transactions Co. v. Beatty 11887112 App Ca. 589. 
45 Pavlides v. Jensen (19561 Ch. 565. 
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improper purpose . 46However, such breaches of duties which involve dishonesty, an 
unlawful act, and fraud on the minority cannot be ratified. 47 
With respects, it seems even in such duties as obtaining a secret profit, where often a 
Malafide exists, a ratification may be considered in contrary to public policy, unless 
a full disclosure is made, and the company decides to letoff. 48 
5.2.1.4 Section 310(l) and Article 85 of Table A 
There have been some comments on the relationship between section 3 10 and Article 
85 of the Table A of the Companies Act 1985, or its predecessors Articles 78 and 84 
of Table A of the Companies Act 1948. The question is whether those articles are 
exceptions to the exemption prohibited by section 31 0(l), or a natural consequence 
of development of the common law without necessary connection with that section? 
Because the issue relates to self- interest question, it is worth restating the rule of 
conflict of interest which was illustrated by Lord Herschell's judgment in Bray v. 
Ford19 as follows: 
"It is an inflexible rule of the Court of Equity that a person in a fiduciary position ... is 
not, unless otherwise expressly provided, entitled to make a profit; he is not allowed to 
put himself in a position where his interest and duty conflict. "50 
That statement as one of the oldest equity rule in this regard obviously prohibits any 
conflict of interest on the part of fiduciary, but at the same time allows some 
exception to that inflexible rule. To answer the question of whether there can be any 
analogy between the above rule and its exception on the one hand, and the 
prohibition rule in section 3 10 and Article 85 or its forerunners on the other hand, it 
is necessary to review the comments made on the matter. 
46 Bamford v. Bamford. [ 19701 Ch 212. 
. 47 Daniels v. Daniels 119781 Ch 406. Also Parkinson takes the opinion that breach of good faith 
duty is not ratifiable. Parkinson op cit at 342, whereas the duty of the proper purpose is potentially 
ratifiable and the duty could be released by the shareholders in a general meeting. lbid at 344. 48 Imperial Mercantile Credit A ss. v. Coleman (1873) LR 6 1HL 189. 49 [18961 A. C. 44. 
50 Ibid at 5 1. 
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Baker believes that because an interested director has a duty under general law to 
disclose his interest to the shareholders' general meeting and that the duty, by those 
articles, replaced with a duty of disclosure to the board of directors, it is, thus, a sort 
of modification of the duty. However, this modification is regarded in-consistent with 
section 205 of the Companies Act 1948, predecessor of section 3 10, unless Article 
84(3) is conditional to Article 84 (1) of Table A of the Companies Act 1948.51 
This conclusion is doubted by Parkinson, because the duty in question is a duty of 
director not to place himself in a position, where his private interest may conflict 
with his duty to the company, and the rule that a director may not be interested in a 7 
contract with his company is an application of that duty. The interested director is in 
breach of his duty, unless it is ratified by the shareholders in a general meeting. 
Parkinson concludes that the effect of the Articles is not merely a modification, 
because the board is not substituted for the general meeting, and the former is not to 
authorise breach of duty, but such a breach has been authorised by Article 84, or this 
Article has released a duty. Therefore, it is a conditional exclusion rather than 
modification. As to Article 78, Parkinson is of the view that it excludes the duty 
altogether and conditionally permits a director to be interested in a contract in which 
his company is also interested. 52 
Birds has a typical view, when he says: "the Articles in Table A which do seem to 
exclude a duty must be treated as exceptional, but valid because of their appearance 
in a statute. "53 He first construes section 205 as establishing a rule prohibiting any 
exclusion of duty, the rule which is apparently violated by those Articles, and then he 
considers this exclusion, though a violation, valid because of its statutory force. 
Rule and Brar first submit that "nobody would have doubted that it contravened s. 
205 and therefore void, " however, they admit that there can be a possibility of 
reconciling the Articles with the section. 54 Their attempt seem to have led to the 
51 Baker, op cit at 191- 92. 
52 Parkinson, op cit at 337 
53 Birds, hLR (1976) at 40 1. 
54 Rule & Brar, op cit at 7. 
Corporate Directors'Duties &Dabilities in Insolvency in England and the US 169 
conclusion that even without authority in those Articles, a director's interest in a 
contract with his company can be ratified or approved, on the condition that any 
material information is disclosed. Consequently, those articles are not necessary. 
Finally, the Gower's editors now reject any possibility of reconciling section 3 10 with 
exclusion of the over- riding equitable principle in Article 85 without doing violence 
to the section. They, therefore, suggest that the article, after being appropriately 
amended, might be translated into the sections of the Act, and to amend section 3 10 
to "exclude from its ambit any transactions pernitted under those sections. "55 
With respects to those commentators, it seems in order to make a reasonable 
analogy of section 310 and Article 85, and Lord Herschell's definition of conflict of 
interest, and also to solve the uncertainty of relationship between the section and that 
Article, the solution advanced by Gower is the appropriate one, based on which the 
legislature in the next amendment of the Act may add a condition to the prohibition 
in section 310(l) which might be as follows: "unless exclusion, or exemption 
authorised within the ambit of Article 85 of Table A of this Act. " 
S. 2.2 Indemnification and Insurance 
In English law, it is believed, a company has never been prevented from purchasing 
and maintaining insurance for itself against breach of duty, nor has it prohibited 
directors from personally insuring themselves against claims brought by their 
company or third parties. 56Moreover, there was nothing in the previous form of 
section 3 10 to prevent a company from insuring itself against damages it may have 
suffered by reason of a director's breach of dUty. 57 
In practice, prior to the 1989 amendment of section 3 10, some companies tried to 
circumvent the prohibition under section 3 10 by arranging a division of premiums 
between directors and their company in which the directors subscribed towards a 
55 Gower, Principles of Modem Company La (5 th ed. ) at 574. 56 Louis G. Doyle, "Defining the Scope of Directors' Indemnity Insurance"ju (1991) 957. 
57 John Birds, "Directors' Duties of Care andi, 113bib. 11hnsurance" (ed. Rider) The Regulations of 
the British Securities Industry (London: Oyez Publishing 1979) 119. 
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fraction, usually one- tenth of the premium of such a policy from their salary or other 
personal assets. 58 
During 1835 to 1880, liability insurance was not sold at all in England, because 
doing so was considered in contrary to public policy, 59 based on reasoning that 
insurance would undermine the incentive provided by negligence liability for 
potential defendants to take reasonable care, if those defendants could shift that 
liability to their insurers. However, the importance of national interests outweighed 
the above reasoning and shipowners were excLuded from the rule. 60 
5.2.2.1 Desirability of insurance 
The business managers are faced not only by the uncertainty of when loss may occur, 
but also with the uncertainty as to the level of the costs. In the business life, when 
the risks are great and the potential losses are high, the businessmen normally seek 
for protection against such potential risks, by taking out insurance policies.,, 
The significant advantage of buying insurance coverage for corporate directors is 
that in English law, unlike the United States law, the availability of indemnification 
from the company is strictly confined in the situations set out in section 310 (3) (b). 
In other words, a director can be indemnified only when he has been successful in 
defending an action, or when the court is satisfied that section 727 of the Companies 
Act 1985 can be invoked. Consequently, in the case of inapplicability of section 727, 
insurance is the only protective legal way which can cover such a considerable gap 
resulting from the lack of any appropriate protection. 
Irrespective of the very discretionary application of section 727 and the rare 
availability of indemnification, in the present English law, insurance is the only 
protection on which corporate directors can rely. Moreover, it could be the best 
58 Doyle op cit at 957. 
59 Martin Davies, "The End of the Affair: Duty of Care and Liability Insurance", 9-10 Lee. Stud., 
1989- 90) 69. ýO 
bid. 
61 Gwilym Williams, Understanding Insurance, (London: Waterlow Publishers Ltd. 1983) 1. 
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means of recovery, when the corporation financially is unable to pay for 
indemnification. 
Insurance is also suggested as an external management control. According to this 
suggestion, since company's directors insurance market is a competitive one, it 
differentiates between good and bad risks, and fixes premium levels accordingly. For 
doing so, the insurance companies gather information and scrutinise companies and 
their insured directors. 62 The most considerable advantage of insurance is its 
encouraging effect on responsible directors to take justifiable risks without fear of 
potential personal liability. The existence of an insurance, as the main or, in some 
occasions, the only protective devices, may encourage qualified directors to take part 
in management of companies, particularly as non- executive directors. 
Wyatt Co. in its survey, in an attempt to explain the necessity of the use of liability 
insurance, argued that purchasing and maintaining an insurance policy not only does 
not impose an extra cost upon companies, but it may reduce the costs to the firm. 
That is because the directors as risk bearers, where insurance is not available, 
demand a very high level of salary compensation. 63 Furthermore, insurers monitor 
the performance of directors, particularly when intending to renew a policy. Besides, 
the costs of litigation will not be imposed upon the defendant director, but it is the 
insurer who takes over the conduct of defence. 64 
On the other hand, the harmful effects of insurance on directors to perform their 
obligation with due care and diligence, is of a significant concern. It has been argued 
that insurance may undermine the public policy rules and encourage reckless and 
unqualified individuals to get involved in a company management and insulate 
themselves from liability at the expense of the company. However, considering the 
other side of the coin, directors liability insurance may limit moral hazard by the fact 
62 Vanessa Finch, "Who Cares about Skill and Care? " 55 N1LR (1992) 211. 63 Wyatt Co. UK Directors and Officers Liability Survey (1993- 4) (Quoted by Vanessa Finch, 
"Personal Accountability and Corporate Control: The Role of Directors' and Officers' Liability 
Insurance", 57_b&B (1994) 888,900). 
64 Birds "Directors' Duties-of Care andlilahdiliýy Un urance" at 122, 
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that the insurance industry monitors potential delinquent directors, notably when 
insurers impose some restrictions or conditions upon some specific individual 
directors or corporations. 65 
The biggest danger of an insurance is that the court, aware of the existence of such a 
coverage, could impose undesirably high standards of care and skill and hold 
directors liable for taking a simple bad decision. 66 
The practice of selling the insurance only through the company has been criticised 
based on the reasoning that it encourages management either to pay directly 
j. ý 
premiums for the individual directors' policy or to reimburse them for their 
expenditure. Such a practice and use of corporations' funds is considered improper. 
Therefore, it has been suggested that the insurance should be sold to corporate 
directors individually instead of to corporations. 67 
With regard to all advantages and disadvantages, and reasoning behind agreements 
and disagreements on insuring directors against personal liability, it is obvious that 
corporations and owners of business have found it advantageous to purchase 
insurance, when doing so, unlike a driver insurance, is not mandatory. 
J. 2.2.2 Scope of section 310: insurance and indemnification 
Under the original version of section 310,68 any insurance policy indemnifying a 
director or other officers against liability for negligence, irrespective of whether 
insurance was effected by the director himself or its corporation was void. 69 
65 Finch, 57_hLR (1994) 898. 
66 Birds, "Directors' Duties of Care and Liability Insurance" at 123. 67 Josef W. Bishop, "New Cure for an Old Ailment: Insurance Against Directors' and Officers' 
Liability", 22 Bus. Law. (1966) 112. 
68 The section reads: "(1) This section applies to any provision, whether contained in a company's 
articles or in any contract with the company or otherwise, for exempting any officer of the company 
or any person (whether an officer or not) employed by the company as auditor from, or 
indemnifying him against, any liability which by virtue of any rule of law or otherwise attach to 
him in respect of any negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust of which he may be 
guilty in relation to the company. 
ý) Except as otherwise provided by the following subsection, any such provision is void. " S9 Allen B. Afterman Company Directors an , 
Controllers, (1979), at 123, Birds, 7 Co. Law. (1986) 
20. 
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The question may be raised over the scope of the current version of section 3 10, 
when it allows the company to purchase and maintain insurance against "any liability 
... 
in respect of any negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust" of which 
the director may be guilty in relation to the company. Does it mean a policy covering 
other wrongdoing such as wrongful trading is to be set aside by a court as invalid? 
The current version of section 310(3)(a) introduced a major change to the extent of 
the section and widely permitted purchasing insurance by adding the following 
subsection: 
"This section does not prevent a company (a) f: ro'in purchasing and maintaining for any 
such officer or auditor insurance against any such liability". 
The question requires a scrutiny of whether prohibitive language of section 310 
applies to indemnity against liability resulted from occurrences which are not in 
relation to the company, when the wording of the section obviously refers to "any 
negligence, default, breach of duty ... in relation to the company. " Does 
it imply that 
a company is permitted to indemnify its directors against any liability to third parties? 
The more crucial question is the interpretation of the expression of "in relation to the 
company". 
The Law Society's Standing Committee on Company Law suggested that such 
extenuation was "n-isconceived". 70 But, Gower believes that the section is applicable 
to third partieS. 71 
It seems that conduct in relation to the company covers any action directly or 
indirectly relates to the company. On this wide interpretation, any conduct on the 
directors' part leading to liability under any provision of the Companies Act or the 
Insolvency Act or other relevant regulation, falls within the above expression. 
Moreover, there is no implication in the provisions of section 310 to prohibit 
insurance or indemnification against liability to third parties' actions, as long as such 
liability is a result of acting and incurring losses "in relation to the company". 
70 Memorandum of April 1999 at I. (Quoted by Colin Baxter, "Dcmystifying D&0 Insurance", 
QJLS (1995) 537,543). 
71 Gower, PrincipIcs of Modem CoMPXjy-j,, U (5th a) at 574. 
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The issue of insurance against liability for wrongful trading is more controversial. It 
is believed that insurance against such liabilities as wrongful trading, as long as not 
committed deliberately, is perrnissible. 72 However, the issue has not been subject of 
comments by legal writers, nor is there any case law authority to clarify the real 
position of the matter in company law. The editors of Gower also seem of the view 
73 that liability under section 214 can be covered by insurance. 
As to indemnification against corporate directors liability, in English law, the rule 
provided in section 310 is an obvious prohibition. 74 However, this rule is not 
absolute but it permits some exceptions. The extent of application of the section to 
indemnify a director is confined in two strict situations: First, indemnification is 
available for the costs of a defence in which a director has been successful. The 
expressioh of "any liability incurred" has been interpreted as costs of defence. It is 
justified when the language of section 3 10 (1) in prohibiting indemnification at first 
stage lays down a rule which later in subsection (3) permits some exclusions. 
As to indemnification for a successful defence expenses, this question may arise that 
when, as a procedural rule, the loser party of the case is required to pay for the other 
party's costs of proceedings, in what circumstances the indemnity provided by 
section 310 can operate, where it says 'indemnify any such officer or auditor against 
any liability incurred by him in defending any proceedings (civil or criminal) in which 
judgment is given in his favor or he is acquitted'? Perhaps we should wait for a 
judicial decision on this interpretation. 
On the other hand, it is clearly justified to provide a director with indemnification as 
such in a proceedings where "he is acquitted". 
72 Tumbull & Edwards, op cit at 769. 
73 Gower, Principles of Modem Company Law (5th ed. ) at 575. 
74 "310(3)(b) reads: 
`Ms section does not prevent a company (b) from indemnifying any such officer or auditor against 
any liability incurred by him (i) in defending any proceedings (whether civil or criminal) in which 
judgment is given in his favour or he is acquitted, or (ii) in connection with any application under 
section 144(3) or (4) (acquisition of shares by innocent nominee) or section 727 (general power to 
grant relief in case of honest-and reasonable conduct) in which relief is granted to him by the 
court. " 
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Second sort of indemnification which refers to section 727 of the companies Act 
1985,75 is a result of incentive behind section 727 rather than section 3 10. It should 
be noted that any payment as indemnification under this part of section can be made 
only when there is a successful defence, having the defendant relieved under section 
727, or when he is acquitted. 
5.2.2.3 Changes of market or crisis? 
According to the Wyatt Survey, the uptake of directors and officers cover has 
sharply increased so that the percentage of companies surveyed by the Wyatt, 
purchasing insurance increased from 46 per cent in 1991 to 62 per cent in 1993- 4.76 
Since the 1989 amendments, the volume of directors liability has sharply been 
increased, so that majority of the top 500 companies have purchased such cover. 77 
Moreover, there has been an increase in pren-dums. However, such an increase in 
premiums which may assume in other markets as a natural consequences of 
economic development should not be defined as a crisis in insurance market. 
The effects of insurance market changes in the United States was of such depth that 
it affected even social aspects of American community. Such disastrous result of 
insurance crisis in that country in any way can not be compared with some limited 
changes in the United Kingdom directors insurance market. 
Reinsurance process has been submitted as the cause of the loss of market flexibility 
in the UK. Insurance companies in fear of the risks, bought insurance cover in order 
to protect their business against such a risk, paying out their own policies. The 
problem which insurers in commonwealth countries including UK faced was a result 
of the dominance of the US on the world markets, 78 that inevitably transmitted the 
effects of its insurance market crisis to the Continental insurance industries. 
75 Section 144 (3), (4), (acquisition of shares by innocent nominee) is outside of our discussion. 76 Wyatt Co. U. K Directors and Officers Liability Survey (1993- 4). 77 Cranston op cit at 197. 
79 Davies, op cit at 8 1. 
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5.3 Relief under section 72 7 
5.3.1 Background 
In comparison with other protective mechanisms available to a director in English 
law, namely insurance and indemnification, the relief79 under section 727 of the 
Companies Act 1985 is over a century old. In other words, until the amendment of 
statutory provisions on insurance in 1989, the relief under section 727 and its 
predecessors was the only effective protection for corporate directors. 
Although the extent of application of the sectionsO is limited to the matters set out in 
section 212 of the Insolvency Act 1986, there seems to be a tendency to justify the 
application of the relief to wrongful trading and other cases by giving an unrestricted 
and wide interpretation to the meaning of wrongful trading in order to categorise it 
within concept of breach of duty for the purpose of section 727. 
The model for section 727 was first introduced in the shape of section 3 of the 
Judicial Trustees Act 1896.81 Under this section, if it appeared to the court that a 
trustee who had acted honestly or reasonably was liable for any breach of trust and 
ought fairly to have been excused for the breach of trust, the court may relieve him 
wholly or partly from personal liability for the same. Section 3 of the Judicial 
Trustees Act 1896 was intended to cover trustees, and more importantly was 
confined to the breach of trust. However, the section was expanded by section 279 
of the Companies Act 1908 and applied not only to 'any proceeding against a 
director, or person occupying the position of director of a company"82 but most 
notably to cover liability for negligence. 
79 In this discussion any reference to "relief' is intended the relief under section 727 of the 
Companies Act 1985 or its predecessors accordingly. 
80 In this discussion any reference to "the section" is meant section 727 or its predecessors 
accordingly. 
81 The provisions of this section was repeated in section 61 of the Trustee Act 1925, 82 The expression of "trustee" did not appear in this section. 
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A major change came with the Companies Act 1929, section 372.83 According to 
this Act, the scope of section was widened to include "default, breach of duty, or 
breach of trust. " Furthermore, the beneficiary of the relief which in the previous Act 
was "a director or person occupying the position of director of a company" was 
replaced with "a person to whom this section applies. " 
Section 418 of the Companies Act 1948 which was, with minor changes, repealed by 
section 727 of the 1985 Companies Act, introduced some more changes to the law in 
this regard. The words of "a person to whom this section applies" were replaced 
with the expression of "an officer of a company or a person employed by a company 
as auditor (whether he is or is not an officer of the company). " This change was 
made to grant the relief to all officers including directors, as well as auditors, 
irrespective of whether or not the latter are officers. 
Section 727 provides a relief for director when the court holds him liable in respect 
of negligence, breach of duty or breach of trust, if it is satisfied that he had acted 
reasonably and honestly, having regard to all the circumstances of the case. 84 
Although there have been several decisions concerning this section, there is little in 
the way of academic comments on the impact and importance of the section. 
5.3.2 Scope of Section 727 
A wide range of matters are covered by the relief under section 727. Despite the fact 
that the matters set out in the section and those stated in section 212 are almost the 
same, confining the relief to those matters has been questioned by the courts and 
83 It is worth noting that re Gilt Edge Safety Glass, Ltd. 119401 Ch. D. 237 was decided under this 
section, 
84 Section 727 of the Companies Act 1985 reads: 
"(I)lf in any proceedings for negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust against an officer 
of a company ... it appears to the court hearing the case that the officer ... is or may be liable 
in 
respect of the negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust, but that he has acted honestly 
and reasonably, and that having regard to all the circumstances of the case (including those 
connected with his appointment) he ought fairly to be excused for the negligence, default, breach of 
duty or breach of trust, that court may relieve him, either wholly or partly, from his liability on such 
terms as it thinks fit. " 
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commentators. As will be seen, there are clear indications in some cases to support 
this tendency. 
5.3.2.1 Relationship between section 72 7 and section 214 
Although the extent of application of the section in its strict sense may be confined 
to traditional duties imposed on company directors, there has been a tendency to 
justify the application of the relief to wrongful trading cases by giving an unrestricted 
and wide interpretation to the meaning of wrongful trading in order to categorise it 
within the concept of breach of duty for the Turposes of section 727. At first sight, it 
is difficult to find any implication in the Insolvency Act 1986 on the basis of which 
one can claim that the legislature intended section 727 relief to be available to 
directors against whom wrongful trading proceedings have been initiated. Parliament 
refused to accept the proposal of the Cork Committee for availability of a relief in 
exactly the same terms as those used in section 727 when considering the extent of 
liability under section 214.95 
The first case which dealt with this issue was re Produce Marketing Consortium 
Ltd. 86 The point arose at an interlocutory stage. In this case, Knox J. did not agree 
with the directors' submission that they had conducted the business honestly and 
reasonably, and they were, thus, entitled to the relief under section 727. His Lordship 
accepted the argument of counsel for liquidator that there were some indications in 
the wording of the two sections which revealed the legislature's intention that the 
two sections were not to be used in conjunction. In Knox J. 's view, section 214 
required that the directors' conduct to be assessed both by objective and subjective 
standard, whereas under section 727, the same conduct was to be viewed solely 
85 Insolvency Law & Practice: Report of the Review Comn-dttee, Cnind. 8558 1982. According to 
Para. 1806 (3) (b) of the report: 
"as an officer of the company ... ought to have known, that the company's trading was wrongful; 
provided that if upon such application it appears to the court that such a person has acted honestly 
and that having regard to all the circumstances of the case he oughtfairly to be excused that the 
court may relieve him, either wholly or in part, from personal liability on such terms as it may 
think fit. " Emphasis added. 
86 1198915 BCLC 513. 
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subjectively. In the court's view, it was difficult to find out how Parliament could 
have intended "both section 214 and section 727 of the several acts to be operated 
by the same judge and at the same time. " The learned judge, therefore, concluded 
that section 727 was inoperative in the context of section 214 proceedings. 
In DKG Contractors Ltd., 87 a subsequent section 214 case, the court took a different 
view from the above mentioned judgment. John Weeks Q. C., sitting as a Chancery 
judge, dismissed the respondents' application under section 727 not because the 
section could not be applied in conjunction with section 214 , 
but because he thought 
that the respondents did not act reasonably. He held that: 
neither Mr. nor Mrs. Gibbons acted dishonestly. Neither of them had any 
knowledge of company law of the concept of lin-dted liability. ... I do not think that 
they deliberately traded in the manner in which they did in order to avoid personal 
liability, However, I do not think that they acted reasonably. "88 
The learned judge also took into account the situation of the unpaid outside creditors 
as a factor not to apply the section 727 relief. 89 
The above judgment seems to have implied applicability of section 727 in the case of 
wrongful trading, if in its discretion, the court considered the respondent acted 
honestly and reasonably. If the court was, thus, convinced that the directors in 
question had acted reasonably, it would likely exercise its discretion to relieve them 
from responsibility. In result, Mr. Justice Week Q. C. 's holding in DKG Contractors 
is in disagreement with the Knox J. 's judgment in re Produce Marketing. 
However, accepting these sections as working in conjunction may frustrate the 
objective of wrongful trading. In support of this approach, it should be noted that the 
introduction of wrongful trading took place long after the enactment of section 727, 
and Parliament could not have intended to provide the relief against a future 
statutory liability of directors. Therefore, it may be argued that the relief is applicable 
only in the case of directors' liability under the Companies Act, but not under the 
87 [19901 BCC 903. 
88 lbid at 912. 
89 lbid at 913. 
Corporate Directors'Duties &Liabilities in Insolvency in England and the US 180 
Insolvency Act. On the other hand, one can also argue that, though Knox J. pointed 
out that "section 214 in terms, of course, does not impose a duty in literal sense, "90 
the main element of a wrongful trading liability which is carrying on trdding while 
insolvent, is a breach of negative rather than a positive duty. To support this view, 
the account should be taken of the Cork Committee proposal in paragraph 1806 (3) 
(b) where they offered a relief for wrongful trading liability the same as that provided 
by section 727. Furthermore, the concept of wrongful trading can be considered 
within a wide interpretation of "default" set out in section 727. It seems, with regard 
to the view taken in the case of DKG Mnfraclors Ltd., this is an attractive 
approach. The corollary of this is that to avoid liability, the directors must cease 
trading once they know or ought to have known that the company was in financial 
trouble or insolvent. It may even be a duty to take some appropriate actions, for 
example calling for an extraordinary meeting of the company's shareholders, or 
enlisting the assistance of an insolvency practitioner. 
5.3.2.2 Applicability ofsection 727 to misfeasance 
The applicability of section 727 to liability for misfeasance has been examined in 
several cases. To relieve a respondent under the section, three requirements are to be 
satisfied, namely he has acted honestly, reasonably, and ought fairly to be excused 
with regard to all circumstances of the case. If these requirements are met, the courts 
usually grant such a relief to the respondent, but if one of these requirements is not 
present, the court will turn down an application under section 727. In the case of J 
Franklin & Son Ltd., 91 e. g., the court refused to grant the relief to the respondent, 
The matters complained of were making some payments as remuneration improperly, 
and invalidity of the appointment of one of the defendant directors. 
In that case, payment of some sums was in a general meeting passed when there was 
no appropriate quorum and one of the members present in the meeting was not 
90 re Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd. [ 19891 BCLC 513,518. 
91 [19371 All. E. L. K 43. 
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actually a director because he did not fulfill a duty to register as holder of 
qualification shares. The respondents contended that the payments in question were 
properly made, and even if not, they should have been relieved from liability under 
provisions of section 372 of the Companies Act 1929. Crossman J. although finding 
it difficult to attack such payments, he could not justify a relief under the 
circumstances of the case and concluded: 
"I feel that I can not, in the circumstances, hold under section 372 that this lady, 
having improperly received sums from the company, ought fairly to be excused from 
receiving money which did not belong to her, anj be allowed to retain that money. 0,92 
The court after examining the three requirements required for the relief, notably 
having regard to all the circumstances of the case including those connected with 
appointment of the respondents, found it difficult to relieve them from liability. In 
Crossman J. 's view, the two directors who authorised the payment pursuant to the 
resolution and the third director who actually received the sums pursuant to the 
resolution, were liable to refund these sums to the company. 
Similarly, in Guinness Pic v. Saunders & Another, 93 the court rejected the defendant 
director's plea for the relief, because with regard to the circumstances of the case, 
where the defendant received a 15m wrongfully from the company, the court found 
it impossible to exercise its discretion under the section to relieve the respondent 
from liability. That was because his claim for the relief was based on the same 
ground as he claimed compensation for the services he had rendered. Moreover, he 
had been in possession of the company's property. 
Likewise, in Dorchester Finance Co. Ltd. & Another v. Stebbing & Others, 94 two 
directors of Dorchester Finance Ltd. were charged with negligence, and a knowingly 
reckless participation in the misapplication of the company's assets. The court 
rejected the defendants' reliance on the relief under section 727 because, in the 
92 lbid at 46. 
93 11988] BCLC 43, denied [ 19901 BCLC 402. 
94 [19891 BCLC 498. 
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court's view, they did not satisfy the two main requirements for relief, namely acting 
reasonably and that they ought fairly to be excused. 95 
In re Kirbys Coaches Ltd., 96 where directors were sued for negligence. Hoffmann J. 
held that the burden of satisfying the court that the respondents ought to be relieved, 
was upon themselves. 97 The respondents, here, refused to give particulars required 
by the liquidator and ordered by the registrar in support of their claim that they had 
acted honestly and reasonably and, thus, ought to have been excused from liability. 
The court held that it was for the respondents to show that they had acted honestly 
. a. 
and reasonably and ought fairly to have been excused. 
The case of re Wetfab Engineers Dd. 98 was an obvious application of the relief 
under section 727 in relation to a negligent conduct. In this case, the alleged 
misconduct was breach of duty. The same judge stated his view in favor of the 
applicability of the relief to negligence as follows: 
"I therefore consider that the respondents were not in breach of duty and that the summons must 
be dismissed. If I were wrong in this, I would consider that the respondents had acted honestly 
and reasonably and ought fairly to be excused from liability under s 727 of the Companies Act 
1985. "99 
The court concluded that the defendant directors had acted honestly and reasonably 
and, if they had breached their duty, they ought to have been excused. 
In the recent case of re D'Jan of London Ltd. Copp v. D'Jan, 100 Hoffmann J. 
exercised his discretionary power to excuse the respondent from liability. However, 
the learned judge posed some comments which opened a new horizon on the matter. 
In this case, Hoffmann J. examined the test of reasonableness required by section 
727. His Lordship's view that how one could have acted reasonably and at the same 
time negligently, challenges the test recognised in section 727. He thought it: 
95 lbid at 506. 
96 [19911 BCC 130. 
97 lbid at 13 1. 
98 [1990] BCLC 833. 
99 lbid at 838. 
100 [199411 BCLC 561, 
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"may be odd that a person found to have been guilty of negligence, which involves 
failing to take reasonable care, can ever satisfy the court that he acted reasonably. 
Nevertheless the section clearly contemplates that he may do so and it follows that 
conduct may be reasonable for the purposes of section 727 despite amounting to lack of 
reasonable care at common law. "101 
Thus, Hoffmann J. appeared to distinguish between a negligent conduct for purposes 
of section 727 and that at common law. However, he did not elaborate, nor did he 
give any ground for doing so, In that case, the respondent was excused from some 
of, but not all, liability which he would otherwise have incurred. 
Here, the court seems proposing a new standard of care even lighter than that 
traditionally recognised in common law, which is only applicable for purposes of 
section 727. Finally, the learned judge seems to have relied on the particular facts of 
the case before him. In that case, the court stressed that although the company had 
its own separate identity because the respondent, the former controlling director, 
was holder of 99% of shares, it would be reasonable that the respondent personally 
took risk in relation to his own property, with regard to the extent of his 
shareholding, whereas his action would have been unreasonable in relation to one 
else's property or shareholding. 
Did his Lordship mean if the respondent was not the majority shareholder, he would 
not have been granted the relief? It seems so. He also seemed respectfully prepared 
not to take into account the fact that the majority shareholder's interests is replaced 
by those of its creditors, and the society as a whole when a company is troubled. It 
seems respectfully difficult to agree with the opinion that the holding shareholder 
was not responsible because he dealt with his own property when, as a preliminary 
rule of company law, a company's assets belong to itself as a legal person. 
Hoffmann J. 's holding in the above case did not follow his previous judgement in re 
Kirb Coaches Lid.. 102 In this case, the court applied the relief under section 727 YS 
generously, whereas in the former the same judge seems to have granted a partial 
101 lbid 564. 
102 119911 BCC 130. 
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relief only by considering some factual circumstances of the case such as the 
defendant being a holding shareholder. 
Considering the line of decisions made, shows an increasing reluctance to grant the 
relief under section 727 easily even in the case of a misfeasance action. 
5.3.2.3 Extending the relief to other cases 
Most of cases arose out of misfeasance proceedings are decided under what is now 
section 212 of the Insolvency Act 1986. But there are number of other cases where 
the matters originated otherwise. Therefore, the courts should first decide whether to 
proceed the case before them within the ambit of the section. In re "ithtlaker v. 
Bamford (AllSop) , 103 for example, where the charge was breach of trust, the 
respondents applied for relief under section 3 of the Judicial Trustee Act 1896. In 
that case, Cozens- Hardy M, R. refused to apply a restricted meaning to the relief 
and stated: 
"I can see no ground for narrowing or limiting the application of the wide words of the 
section, "any breach of trust" are emphatic words. The statute was obviously designed to 
protect honest trustees, and it ought not to be construed in a narrow sense. "104 
Hamilton L. J. who found the section to be "comprehensive and unrestricted" agreed 
with Hardy M. R. 's view. Likewise, Swinfen Eady L. J. said: 
"The language of s. 3 is wide, and a narrow construction ought not to be placed on it. It 
was intended to give power to the Court to relieve a trustee in proper cases. The word 
"is or may be liable" appear to point doubtful questions of construction. In my opinion 
the case of a trustee comnititting a breach of trust by paying the wrong person, in 
consequence of acting upon an erroneous construction is within the section, and the 
Court hasjurisdiction to relieve against the personal liability. "105 
However, in Customs & Excise Commissioners v. Hedon Aloha Ltd. & Others'06 the 
court took a totally different stance by refusing to recognise a wide application of the 
section. In that case, when it appeared that the company was unable to pay a 
103 [191411 Ch. 1. 
104 Ibid at 11. 
105 Ibid at 2 1. 
106 1198112 W. L. R. 79 1. The significance of this case is its being examined by several judges of 
the Appeal Court. 
Corporate Directors'Duties &Liabilities in Insolvency in England and the US 185 
118,080 in a general betting duty, an action was filed against two of its directors. 
One of the defendant directors pleaded that he had entirely acted honestly and 
reasonably and, thus, entitled to the relief under section 4q8 of the Companies Act 
1948. In the Court of Appeal, several judges examined the matter and refused to 
grant the relief Ackner L. J. examined the meaning of default for the purpose of 
section 413 and suggested that an unrestricted construction should not be given to 
the word "default". Griffiths L. I in agreement with Ackner J. pointed out that: 
NIn my judgment section 49A has no application to the present claim. Although the 
section is expressed in wide language it is in my view clearly intended to enable the 
court to give relief to a director who, although he has behaved reasonably and honestly 
has nevertheless failed in some way in the discharge of his obligations to his company 
or its shareholders or who has infringed one of the numerous provisions in the 
Companies Acts, that regulate the conduct of directors. "107 
The court concluding that there was no allegation of misconduct or breach of duty, 
went on to say that the allegation was not a default within the word in section 4q8. 
The other point which was considered by the judges in the instant case was whether 
or not a third party claim fell within the scope of the section. In that case, there was 
an unanimous agreement among the judges on the point that such claims were 
outside the reach of the section. Stephenson L. J. took the opinion that: 
0... the proceedings in which relief could be granted must be proccedings for the 
negligence, default, etc. of the director ... . Furthermore, the language of scction 4V8 of 
the act of 1948 was apt to describe the area in which a company director might bc in 
breach of his duties to the company, and the ambit and concern. the context and 
matrix, of the section was company law and the relation of the officcr ... of a company 
to the company and not to third persons. "108 
Ackner L. J. agreed with his colleague's view and stated that the true ambit of the 
0 section was restricted 
to claims by or on behalf of the company or its liquidator 
against the directors for their personal breach of duty. 109 Consequently, it was held 
that the relief under section 438 was not available to third parties claims. 
107 Ibid at 800. 
109 lbid at 796. 
109 lbid at 798. 
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It is worth noting that though in re Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd. I 10 there was 
no question of a third party claim, Knox J. referring to the views posed in Customs & 
Excise Commissioners, took a stance in agreement with that taken in the latter case 
that the relief under section 727 was not available to third parties claims. III 
The question whether acting ultra vires'12 falls within the ambit of section 727 has 
been examined in some cases. For example, In re Claridge Patent Asphalle 
Company, Ltd. 113 the liquidator of the Claridge Company, in compulsory liquidation, 
sued the directors for acting ultra vires, claiming that the investment by the directors 
of 16334 in taking up the 4334 shares and 2000 debentures in the Clarmac company 
was ultra vires the Claridge company, and thereby invalid or was a misfeasance or 
misappropriation of the company's funds. 11413oth counsel for the defendant directors 
and Astbury J. acknowledged that the respondents' conduct was ultra vires. 
However, the learned judge considered. the fact that although the respondents had no 
power to carry out the scheme, they were advised that they could do so, with full 
approval of the company's shareholders. Astbury J. rejecting the liquidator's 
contention that section 279 was not applicable in the case of ultra vires held that it 
was an application of breach of trust on the part of defendant directors. The learned 
judge went on to say: 
"in my opinion s. 279 clearly applies to a case of ultra vircs. All applications of a 
company's money ultra vires the company are in fact breaches of trust on the part of 
directors. The language of s. 279 is perfectly wide and general, and I see no reason for 
limiting the generality of that section to breaches of trust where no question of ultra 
vires comes in. " 115 
Therefore, his Lordship held that the court ought to have relieved the respondent 
from his personal liability under section 279. 
.P 
110 [ 198915 BCLC, 513. 
111 Ibid at 516. 
112 This concept has been abolished by section 35 of the Companies Act 1989. 
113 [192111 Ch. 543. 
114 Ibid at 545. 
115 lbid at 548. 
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Such statement does obviously challenge Ackner J. 's opinion in Customs & Excise 
Commissioners v. Hedon Aloha Ltd & Othersl 16where his Lordship applied a strict 
and narrow concept of the word "default". 
The noteworthy point as to this case was the investment of the company's fund by 
the respondent wrongfully, which was an obvious implication of breach of trust, and 
therefore within the scope of the relief under section 279, with no need to find out 
whether or not it was ultra vires. 
In re Duomalic Lid, 117 an action was brought by the company's liquidator alleging 
"0, 
that the defendant director had wrongfully received remuneration. The court refused 
to exercise its discretion under section 448 of the Companies Act 1948 to relieve the 
respondent, not because the matter was outside the section's scope, but rather 
because the defendant, in the court's view, did not act reasonably. Buckley J. thought 
the director had not been acting "in a way which a man of affairs dealing with his 
own affairs with reasonable care and circumspection could reasonably be expected to 
act in such a case. "I 18 
As to the matters discussed under the scope of the section, whether misfeasance, 
wrongful trading or other cases, it seems, as Astrbury J. rightly stated, the language 
of section 727 was deliberately designed general to cover any breach of duty. In a 
wide interpretation of the meaning of breach of duty and default set out in that 
section, any misconduct should fall within the scope of the relief, which even 
includes wrongful trading. However, as to the latter, the still unresolved problem is 
its objective test which cannot be reconciled with the totally subjective standard 
required in section 727. Therefore, in order to apply the relief to a section 214 case, 
0a statutory amendment seems necessary. 
116 [198112 W. L. P, 791. 
117 [196911 All ER 161. 
118 Ibid at 171. 
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5.3.3 Extent of the Courts Discretion 
The extent of the discretion granted to the courts to accept or reject a defendant 
director's application for the relief is a matter which requires a detailed examination. 
To examine the issue, the reference, first of all, should be made to the provisions of 
the section itself. There are clear indications in the section that the power of the 
court is absolutely discretionary but not mandatory. The section states "If ... it 
appears to the court", but not "if it is proven" or "if it is shown". Thus, the sole 
authority to decide whether it has appeared to the court or not is the court itself The 
requirements provided for invoking the relief, namely the respondent "has acted 
honestly, reasonably, and that having regard to all the circumstances of the case' 19 
... 
he ought fairly to be excused", grant a wide and flexible discretion to the court 
hearing the case. As to the requirement whether a defendant director has acted 
reasonably, the question may be raised what sort of criterion should be employed by 
the court. Gore- Browne argues that while the first two requirements can be proven, 
the third one which is left to the courts' discretion is not easy to prove. 120 There is no 
precise definition for the expression "reasonable", and it is subject to people's 
understanding. The other parts of the section are not helpful in this regard. The case 
DKG Contractors Ltd. 121 is a good example, in which the court dismissed the 
respondents' application for a relief, not because the relief was inoperative in a 
wrongful trading case, but mainly because, in the courVs view, they had not acted 
reasonably. It is not surprising if in another case with the same facts, a different 
judge would find the respondents' conduct reasonable. 
The last requirement, "having regard to all the circumstances ... of the case" 
is more 
0 ambiguous. It appears to permit the judges to examine all or any aspect of the 
companýs business and director's conduct in weighting the evidence for and against 
the relief 
119 Emphasis is added. 
120 Gore- Browne on Companies, (44th ed. ) Para. 21- 05, 
121 [19901 BCC 903. 
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Finally, the other expression in the section which contains an absolute discretion and 
wide power for the courts is "that the court may relieve him", which means, even 
when the three above mentioned requirements are satisfied, the court will have no 
obligation to relieve the respondent from liability, otherwise the legislature would 
use the obligatory word of "shall" or "Will", 122 instead of "may". If one of those 
requirements is not thus, met, the court has no power to grant the relief. But when 
all the requirements are available, to decide whether or not to relieve the respondent, 
depends only upon the court's discretion when "it thinks fit". 
It is quiet understandable that the section should have been drafted in such a wide 
terms. Otherwise, any hint of providing an obligatory exercise of power for the 
courts in this respect would put the judges in a difficult situation, where they would 
not think fit to grant the relief to a delinquent director, even where all those 
requirements are satisfied. 
The above situation which is related to subsection 727(l), is the case when the court 
itself reaches the conclusion that the defendant director ought fairly to be excused. 
But, as subsection (2)123 provides, a respondent himself is also entitled to apply for 
the relief, if he has reason that he will or might be held liable. The court on the 
respondent's application has, again, the same power whether to relieve him. 124 
Therefore, with regard to all requirements of the section and particular 
circumstances of each case, a respondent being relieved from liability is also a matter 
of circumstances. If his case is brought before a judge who applies a wide and 
general interpretation of the concepts, the respondent may, most likely, be given the 
122 In supporting this argument, the account should be taken of section 6 of the Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986, where the legislature by employing the word "shall" intended to provide 
an obligatory disqualification for directors in the circumstances concerned. 
123 Subsection (2) of section 727 provides: 
"If any such officer or person as above- mentioned has reason to apprehend that any claim will or 
rriight be made against him in respect of any negligence, default, breach of duty, or breach of trust, 
he may apply to the courtfor relief, and the court on the application has the same power to relieve 
him.... " Emphasis added 
124 See, e. g., re Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd. (19891 BCLC 513, DKG Contractors Ltd. 
[19901 BCC 903, Saunders & Another 119881 BCLC 43,. denied [ 19901 BCLC 402. 
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relief, 125 whereas if his case is proceeded by another judge who interprets legal 
expressions in a strict way, an application for the relief may likely be rejected. 126 
in conclusion, the relief under section 727 of the Companies Act 1985 has effectively 
played a role in protecting corporate directors. However, the courts have failed to 
overcome ambiguities inherent in the section. The section is in need of amendment, 
in particular to clarify or expand its ambit in relation to wrongful trading cases. 
5.4 Conclusion 
Irrespective of subsection (3) of section 3 10, which permits indemnification for costs 
in some specified situations, protection of corporate directors in English law can be 
considered under two heads; First, insurance under section 310 (2), and secondly, 
the relief under section 727 of the Companies Act 1985. 
There are some ambiguities inherent in those two statutory protections. As to 
insurance, the first problem, particularly in small companies, is its being bought and 
maintained subject to the financial ability of the company. When a company finds 
purchasing such a cover financially difficult, it pays a lower price for an insurance 
policy with a limited coverage. The main difficulty for insuring directors is the lack 
of any judicial precedent to reveal the real attitude of the courtroom to different 
aspects of an insurance, such as precise definition of the extent of its application and 
more importantly the limitations on insurance. 
The weakness of section 727 is that the relief under the section may not be applied 
even when all requirements for its operation are satisfied. In other words, the 
discretion of the courts to decide whether or not to apply'their discretion under the 
section is so vvide that it cannot be counted on by directors as a reliable protection. 
125 See, e. g. Astbury J. 's holding in Claridge's Patent Asphalte Company [ 192 11 1 Ch 543 and 
comments of Cozens- Hardy M. K, Hamilton L, J., and Swinfen Eady L. I in re "ithtaker v. 
BaMford (A Ilsop), 1191411 Ch 1. 
126 For example see the judgment of Ackner J. in Customs & Excise Commissioners v. Hedon 
Aloha Ltd & Others [198112 W. L. P, 791, who applies a restrict meaning of the relief which is 
not applicable to "default". 
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The interesting point in this discussion is the relationship between section 727 and 
section 310. Section 310 has been described as another side of the coin to section 
727 with some basic similarities, The differences between the two sections, 
according to this view, is that section 3 10 is confined to negligence etc., "in relation 
to the company", whereas section 727 extends to negligence, etc. generally, 
including duties to third parties. 127 On the other hand, section 727 has been 
suggested as an appropriate alternative to mitigate the harshness of section 310.128 
With respect, although the relationship between the two sections is beyond doubt 
particularly reference to section 727 by section 3 10, it is difficult to recognise such a 
close relationship between them as the two sides of the same coin. Because 
background, operation, and the scope and requirements of application of either is 
obviously different. Furthermore, in considering such a relationship, the fact should 
be taken into account that the relief under section 727 is a product of common law, 
whereas insurance under section 310 is a result of the increasing need of 
development of industrial and commercial relationships. 
-4 
Finally, the result of this discussion raises the question whether there is any further 
protection necessary. It seems, with regard to traditional attitude of English law 
towards corporation relationship, the law obviously lacks a tolerance, which would 
prevent it from providing more protection on a large scale. This is because doing so 
may prejudice appropriate performance of directors duties. However, as insurance is 
a form of indirect indemnification, it is desirable and justified to expand the extent of 
the application of indemnification as a rule to all liabilities which are insurable. 
0 
127 Cranston, op cit at 206. 
128 Birds, hLR (1976) at 397. 
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Chapter 6: Corporate Directors Duties in the U. S. Law 
]Introduction 
As the "institutional integrity of a corporation depends upon the proper discharge" of 
a director's fiduciary duties, ' to study directors liabilities, their duties should 
inevitably be examined first. 
Directors act as corporate fiduciaries and are, thus, obliged to conduct business with 
prudence and diligence. 2 They are fiduciaries to the corporation on the one hand, 
and to its shareholders and creditors on the corporation behalf on the other hand. 3 
Directors' duties are said to have developed mainly from the rule that if the directors 
were interested in a corporate action, then that decision was voidable at the suit of 
the corporation or that of its shareholders unless it was approved by independent 
directors, and also was fair to the corporation. 4 
In speaking on directors duties in the US law, the reference should be made to the 
concept of "fiduciary". That is because the only duties provided for corporate 
directors in the corporate relationship are those been classified within "fiduciary" 
cont"t. 
This classification of directors duties which has a long history of recognition, is now 
I 
under question. For the first time, the American Bar Association5 proposed that the 
word of "fiduciary" should not have been used for corporate directors. This view 
Francis v. UnitedJersey Bank, 432 A 2d (N. J. 1981) 814. 2 Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S. (1891) 132.1 3 Deborah Demott, "Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation", Duke L. J. (1988) 87, 
116-18. 
4 William Roberts, "Searching for a Paradigm for the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors", 21 
(1991)501. - 
American Bar Association Committee on Corporate Laws 1984. 
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which has been followed by the American Law Institute, 6 has been criticised on the 
ground that even agent and everyone working for a corporation is a fiduciary, and if 
a corporation director does not want to be a fiduciary, he will then have to denounce 
the power in managing other people's property. 7 
The doubt posed by those two institutions on the directors status as fiduciary is not 
justified, since this fiduciary status in the US law is of a long history. 
It is believedg that the foundation of the rule of directors as a class similar to that of 
trustee was laid in Pepper v. Lillon, 9 where Justice Douglas pointed out that: 
"A director is a fiduciary ... So is a dominant-or controlling stockholder or group of 
stockholders. Their powers are powers in trust. ... Their dealings with corporation are 
subjected to rigorous scrutiny. "10 
Traditionally, there is a strong recognition among the courts and commentators that 
fiduciary duty of directors, as the most powerful and important element underlying 
the Corporate system, " consists of two separate categories: the fiduciary duty of 
care and the fiduciary duty of loyalty. 12 In Norlin Corp. v. Booney, Pace, Inc., 13 the 
court expressly pointed out its recognition for this classification and stated: 
"A board membees obligation to a corporation and its shareholders has two prongs, 
generally characterised as the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. " 
6 ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations (Tentative Draft NO. 
11,1991). 
7 Norwood P. Beveridge, "The Corporate Director's Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: Understanding the 
Self- Interested Director Transaction", 41 M12auLj, -&, 
(1992) 655,687- 88. 
8 William Knepper and Dan A. Bailey, Liabilily of Colporate Officers and Directors, 
ýharlottesville, Virginia: The Michie Company Law Publishers 1988) 11. 
308 U. S. (1939) 295. 
10 Ibid at 306. 11 Nell Minow, "Shareholders, Stakeholders, and Boards of Directors", 21 Stetson L. Re . (199 1) 196. 
12 Morey W. McDaniel, "Bondholders and Corporate Governance", 41 Bus. La . (1986)413,449, 
Marcelle R. Joseph, "When is a Company up to Sale? The Case Against Revlon Duties", Annual 
2WXSX9LAmmjjan-L= (1990) 271,274, Morey W. McDaniel, "Bondholders and Stockholders- 
Fiduciary Duties to Bondholders", 13 J. Com-L (1988) 267, Frances T v. Village Green Owners 
Association, 42 Cal. 3d. (1986) 490,508, Sandra K. Miller, "What Standards of Conduct Should 
aPP1Y to Members and Managers of Lirnited Liability Companies", 68 St. John Law Rev. (1994) 2 1, 
39, Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A. 2d (Del. 1985) 858,872- 73, Minow, Supra No. 8 at 202, B. M. 
Animashaun, "The Business Judgement Rule; Fiduciary Duties and Liabilities of Corporate 
Directors". 16 Southern Univ- L. &yý, (1989), 345,347, James Farinaro, . 
"Target Directors' 
Fiduciary Duties: An Initial Reasonableness Burden", 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. (1986) 723. 
13 77 F. 2d 255, (2d Cir. 1984) 564. 
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However, some commentators have suggested that directors are under three duties: 
duty to act carefully which generally is known as duty of care, duty to act loyally, 
and duty to act lawfully, 14 while they do not make a clarification on the precise 
concept of acting lawfully, the concept which is an extremely wide one. 
On the other hand, the leading legal writers Knepper and Bailey addressing the case 
of Gearhar Industries,. Inc. v. Smith International, Inc., 15 are of the view that 
01 corporate officers and directors owe three duties to the corporations they serve: 
Obedience, diligence, and loyalty. "16 The duty of obedience, deals with directors 
Powers and their applicability within the authority conferred upon their corporation 
whether by charter, articles of incorporation, and bylaws. If their conduct exceeds 
their authority, this will be considered as ultra vires. 17 
The difficulty with which a reader of the US corporate law sometimes faces in this 
area is the fine between the duty of loyalty and the duty of care which is not always 
clear. " For example, in an article a commentator discusses the duty of care in the 
context of duty of non- conflict, 19 while duty of non- conflict of interests is an 
obvious implication of duty of loyalty but not duty of care. 
As the 'duty of care is the basic negligence concept"20 in the discussion of liability for 
negligence, the reference will inevitably be made to the elements and materials 
related to the duty of care. 
On the other hand, because the duty of care is the main element of the business 
judgment rule, and inquirýý into duties of directors begins with that rule, 21 we will 
also address fiduciary duties of care in our discussion on the business judgment rule. 
14 Melvin A. Eisenberg, "The Duty of Care of Corporate Directors and Officers", 34 Corporate 
P1aZi0-CDnm0= (1992- 3) 320, See generally Dennis J. Block et al., The Business Judgment 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall Law & Business 4th ed. 1993) 
15 741 F. 2d (5th Cir. 1984) 707,719, 16 Knepper and Bailey, Liability of Corporate officers and Directors, at 9. 17 Ibid. 
18 Leo Herzel, Richard Shepro & Lawrence Katz, "Next to the Last Word on Endangered 
Directors", Hary. Bus. Rev., (1987) 38,43. 19 Animashaun, op cit. 20 Joe, Seligman, "The New Corporate Law", 59 Brook. L. Rev., (1993) 1.49. 21 Joseph Hinsey IV, "The Business Judgment Rule and the American Law Institute's Corporate 
Governance Project: The Rule, the Doctrine, and the Reality". 52 George Washington L. Rev. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to review directors duty to their corporation as going 
concem which includes fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. In the second part of this 
chapter, it is intended to discuss directors duties when their corporation is financially 
troubled, whether insolvent or nearly insolvent. The theories of "trust fund doctrine" 
and "agency rule", that are suggested to define such duties in this crucial point are 
also examined. 
62 Duties in General 
6 2.1 Duty of Care 
As a general principle, a director is required to use reasonable care, namely being 
properly informed before taking any action or making a decision. The expression 
reasonable care" implies a general and flexible test which is subject to 
considerations such as the scale of the decision or action, the limitation and 
availability of time for making the decision, the cost of transaction concerned, and 
the recommendations made by subordinate officers. 
Duty of care is interpreted as a "reasonable director standard", which can be 
considered as another way of determining the reasonableness of the decision- making 
process. 22 This duty also requires directors in performance of their corporate 
responsibilities, to inform themselves prior to making a business decision of all 
material information reasonably available to thern. 23 
The concept of duty of care has been evaluated by some commentators as vague. 
That is because there is no common understanding of what directors are supposed to 
do, only that they are expected to do it with due care. 24Some have gone further to 
(1984) 605, Barry Reder, "The Obligation of a Director of a Delaware Corporation to Act as an 
Auctioneer", 44 Bus. Law. (1989) 257. 
22 Nfinow, op cit at 202. 23 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A. 2d (1983) 805,812. 24 William Manning, "Touring the Horizon with the Business Judgment Rule", at 13 (Draft 
October 10 1983) available at the George Washington Law Rev. Library (Quoted 
by Tamar 
Frankel, "Corporate Directors' Duty of Care: The American Law Institute's Project on Corporate 
Governance", 52 George Washington Law Rev. (1984) 705,707. ) 
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describe the duty as useless which should be eliminated, by reasoning that only a few 
judicial decisions are based on duty of care, 25while some others have denied the 
duty at all as "out of existence". 26 
6.2.1.1 Standard of duty of care 
Traditionally it is recognised that a standard of due care is coupled with application 
of the business judgment rule. The duty employs the same standard as is used by tort 
law, namely "a reasonably prudent man" standard. 27 
Idw 
It is claimed that there is a disparity between the courts and legislative attitude 
towards directors duty of care. While in the former a director's decision is judged in 
terms of what a reasonably prudent man would have done in similar circumstances, 
in the latter the standard has been interpreted as requiring directors to devote only 
very modest amounts of time and effort in managing a corporation's business. 28 
However, there is almost a consensus among commentators and courts on the 
appropriate standard applicable to directors' performance in the discharge of their 
duties. Delaware case law is clear in this regard, although with no evidence of any 
attempt to develop the level of standard of directors' conduct. According to the 
Delaware Supreme Court in Graham Alice Chalmers Mfg. CO., 29 directors "are 
bound to use that amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would 
use in similar circumstances. 1130 
25 Kenneth E. Scott, "Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance 
project", 35 Stanford Law Rev. (1983) 927,937. 
26 Weiss, op cit at 587. 
27 Charles Hansen, "The Duty of Care, the Business Judgment Rule and The American Law 
Institute Corporate Governance Project". 48 Bus. La (1993) 1355,1356, Krishnan Chittur, "The 
Corporate Director's Standard of Care: Past, Present, and Future" 10 Del. J. Colp. L. (1986) 505, 
539. 
28 E _ J. Weiss, "Disclosure and Corporate Accountability", 34 Bus. La . (1979) 578,587, See also Bates v. Dresser, 25 1. U. S. (1920) 524, Graham v. A llis- Chalmers Mfg. Co. 41 Del. Ch. 78,189 
A. 2d (Sup. Ct. 1963) 125. 
29 188 A. 2d. (Del. 1963) 125. 
30 Ibid at 130. See also Blasius Industries Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1988) 651, 
where a strict standard applied to directors' actions which required directors to demonstrate a 
"compelling justification". 
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In this respect, case law of other jurisdictions has followed the main corporate 
jurisdiction, Delaware. In the New York case of Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 31 
directors were held to have owed a duty to "discharge their duties with that degree 
of diligence, care and skill which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under 
similar circumstances in like positions. "32 
The Restatement (Second) of Trusts lays a standard of care which had already been 
employed in some cases on corporate directors as: 
"The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary in administering the trust to exercise 
such care and skill as men of ordinary prudýjce exercise in dealing with his own 
property.,, 33 
The same standard applied in Pool v. P001.34 In that case, the court analysed the 
measure for assessing the conformity of director conduct to the standard as: 
"the measure of care required is ordinary and reasonable care, such a reasonably 
prudent, careful and skilful man exercises in the conduct of his own affairs, and they 
are liable for losses when they fail to exercise such care. A failure to conform to this 
standard is held to constitute gross negligence. " 
As Beveridge says, it is not clear that whether the expression "his own property" sets 
a higher standard than that of a man of ordinary prudence 'under similar 
circumstances in like positions'. 35 Moreover, the measure for assessing a director 
performance, here, seems too vague, where a director is required to display the same 
care as he does to his own affairs. Such a test is inconsistent with the standard of 
conduct advanced earlier in the same judgment, where the directors were asked to 
exercise such "diligence, care, judgment and skill which ordinarily prudent men 
would exercise under similar circumstances in like positions". 36 That is because a 
person may conduct his own affairs recklessly, but that behaviour can not be 
31432 A. 2d (N. 11981) 814. 
32 Ibid at 820. 
33 The Restatement (Second) of Trusts section 174 (1959). 
34 So. 2d (La. Ct. App. 1943) 132. 
35 Norwood P. Beveridge, " The Corporate Director's Duty of Care: Riddles Wisely Expounded, " 
=V Suffolk Univ. L. Rev., (1990) 923,936. 
36 pool v. pool. So. 2d (La. Ct. App. 1943) ý32,134- 5. Similarly, in Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. 
S. (1891) 132,133, it was held that Directors should "exercise ordinary care and prudence. " 
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accepted in relation to others' business or property, particularly in a fiduciary/ 
beneficiary or director/ corporate relationship. 
Likewise, statutes and proposals have recognised the case law position. Under 
Indiana statute, like Delaware, for a director to discharge his duties, he should act in 
good faith, with care an ordinarily prudent person in the same position would 
exercise under similar circumstances and in a manner he reasonably believes to be in 
the best interests of the corporation, 37 
According to section 717 of the New York Business Corporation Law: 
"Directors and officers shall discharge the dutfts of their respective positions in good 
faith and with degree of diligence, care and skill which ordinary prudent men would 
exercise under similar circumstances in like positions. "38 
Similarly, section 35 of the Model Business Corporation Act is a good example 
which states: 
"A director shall perform his duties as a director ... in good faith, in a manner he 
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with such care as 
an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances. " 
As to the standard proposed in section 35, some negative and positive comments 
have been advanced by commentators. It is said, 39 that it does no more than 
codifying the existing Delaware standard expressed in Graham Alice Chalmers Mfg. 
CO.. 40 
37 Ind. Code Ann. (West Sup. 1987) Section. 23- 1- 35-1(a). 
38 See also the Revised Model Business Corporation Act which seems clearer on the 'matter 
provides that a director shall discharge his duties as a director: 
"(I) in good faith; (2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise 
under similar circumstances; and (3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests 
of the corporation. " The Revised Model Business Corporation Act, section 8.30(a) (1984). 
American Law Institute, proposes a standard with similar elements: 
"(a) A director or officer has a duty to the corporation to perform the director's and officer's 
functions in good faith, in a manner that he or she reasonably believes to be in the best interests of 
the corporation and with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected to 
exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances. " ALI, Principles of Corporate 
Governance: Analysis and Recommendations 4.01 (Proposed Final Draft 1992) 180- 1. 
39 S. Samuel Arsht & Joseph Hinsely IV, "Codified Standard- Same Harbor But Chartered 
Channel: A Response", 35 Bus. Law. (1980) 945,95 1. 
40 188 A. 2d. (Del. 1963)125. 
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The interpretation of section 35 as it demands a varying standards of care among 
directors according to their skill and experience, 41 is rejected by arguing that the 
standard of care to "which all directors must adhere is the same, while they all must 
exercise such care as an ordinary prudent person in a like position would use under 
similar circumstances. 1142 
Veasy and Manning are of the view that such expression may lead the courts to 
make fundamental changes in the business judgment rule application, since section 
35 requires that a court determines the reasonableness of the defendant director's 
belief that his conduct was in the best interests of the corporation. Therefore, it 
entitles the court to make inquiry into business decisions which are insulated from 
scrutiny by the business judgment rule. 43 However, they conclude that there is no 
statute preferable to that section in its present form. 44 
6.2.1.2 Functions of duty of care 
The duty of care is said to have been broken down into two elements: time and 
attention devoted to corporate affairs on one hand, and the skill reflected in business 
decision on the other hand. 45 Other views include other such duties as duty of 
inquiry in the duty of care. 46 
I? uty of skill, in the United States law, is not separated from but a part of -, - 
duty of 
care. This duty is defined as a special form of competence arisen from acquired 
learning and talent developed by special training and experience in a trade and 
profession. A fiduciary will be liable for any loss incurred due to lack of such Skill. 47 
41 E. Norman Veasy, William Manning, "Codified Standard- Safe Harbor or Uncharted Rcef, 35 
BUs. La . (1980) 919. 42 Arsht & Hinsely IV, op cit at 952. 
43 Veasy & Manning, op cit. 
44 Ibid at 946. 
45 Kenneth E. Scott, op cit at 932. 
46 American Bar Association, Comments on Corporate Laws, Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 
pULJ, Myý (1978) 1596,1600- 3. 
47 Restatement (second) of Torts. Sections 298- 99A (1965) (Quoted by Eisenberg op cit at 33 1). 
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However, the skill required from a corporate director is more lenient than that in tort 
or other professions. 48 
6.2.1.2.1 Duty of inquiry 
The main implication of the duty of care in the US law is duty of inquiry which 
requires a director to inform himself of all material information relevant to the 
decision concerned, since failure to do so may deprive him from protection of the 
business judgment rule. 49 Therefore, corporate managers should be required by 
statute or case law to take all corporation's"client groups into account in taking a 
business decision. 50 To become properly informed, a director should, thus, take 
convincing signals indicating financial problems of the company into his account 
through reliable sources. He should not even await the matter to be brought to the 
general meeting if the trouble is seriouS. 51 
This point was addressed in Platt Corp. v. Platt, 52 where the court held: 
"It is the obvious duty of directors to know what is transpiring in the business affairs of 
their corporation. They cannot assume the responsibilities of their fiduciary position, 
then simply close their eyes to what is going on around them and thereby avoid the 
consequences by the mere failure to act. While corporate directors are not liable for 
effors of judgment, nevertheless, the law holds them accountable for that which they 
reasonably should have known or discovered in the discharge of their duties... . "53 
According to the Delaware Supreme Court in Graham Alice Chalmers Mfg. Co. 9 54 
where the defendant directors were charged with failure to become adequately 
informed of the material information and to prevent a possible antitrust action, the 
court held them liable. However, the court acknowledged that: 
48 Eisenberg, op cit at 33 1. 
49 Barnes v. Andrews 298 F. (S. D. N. Y. 1924) 614. 
50 Larry D. Soderquist, Robert P. Vcchio, "Reconciling Shareholders' Rights and Corporate 
Responsibility: New Guidelines for Management", Duke L. 1 (1978) 891,842. 
51 William Manning, "The Business Judgment Rule and the Directoes Duty of Attention: Time for 
Reality", 39 Bus. Law (1984) 1477,1484, See also Bates v. Dresser, 251 US (1920) 254. 
52 249 N. Y. S. 2d (Sup. Ct. 1964) 1. 
53 Ibid at 6. 
54 188 A. 2d. (Del. 1963)125. 
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11 ... absent cause for suspicion there is no duty upon directors to install and operate a 
system to ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect exists.,, 55 
The holding of Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 56 has formulated the duty of inquiry 
as follows: 
"Directors are under a continuing obligation to keep informed about the activities of 
the corporation Directorial management does not require a detailed inspection of 
day- to- day activities, but rather a general monitoring of corporate aMirs and policies. 
ViWle directors are not required to audit corporate books, they should maintain 
familiarity with the financial status of the corporation by a regular review of 
statements. "57 
In the court's view, the respondent was undJ7r an obligation of basic knowledge and 
supervision of the companýs affairs, which: 
"included reading and understanding financial statements, and making reasonable 
attempts at detection and prevention of the illegal conduct of other officers and 
directors. She had a duty to protect the clients ... . "59 11 
The American Law Institute referring to the duty of inquiry, has proposed the 
standard applicable to it as: 
"The duty in Subsection (a) includes the obligation to make or cause to be made, an 
inquiry when, but only when, the circumstances would alert a reasonable director or 
officer to the need therefor. "59, 
The similar language which has been employed by almost all courts, law institutions, 
and commentators on the standard of directors' conduct, removes any doubt about 
the fact that the US legislature and its judicial system have no desire to make any 
change in the level of standard by laying a higher standard, e. g. adopting a more 
objective standard of conduct. 
6.2.1.2.2 Duty of attention and attendance 
Duty of attention and attendance as another branch of duty of care has been referred 
to in some cases. Duty of attention is defined in terms of attention of the flow of 
55 Ibid at 130. 
56 432 A. 2d (1981) 814. 
57 Ibid at 821- 22. 58 Ibid. 
59 Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis And Recommendations (Proposed Final Draft 
1992) 4.01(a)(1). 
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matters brought before directors. A lapse of attention to some discrete item would 
not constitute a breach of duty unless it was showed that at the time that item was of 
major significance. " 
In Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 61 the court stated that the defendant director did 
not actively take part in the business: 
" and knew virtually nothing of her corporate affairs. She briefly visited the corporate 
offices in Morristown only in one occasion, and she never read or obtained the annual 
financial statements. She was unfamiliar with the rudiments of reinsurance and made 
no effort to ensure that the policies and practices of the corporation, particularly 
jý pertaining to the withdrawal of funds, complied with industry custom or relevant 
law. o, 62 
Ordinary attention is sufficient "if nothing has come to [the directors'] knowledge to 
awaken suspicion of the fiduciary ... 0.63 However, though the trend of case 
law is 
that boards of directors have a duty to remain informed only about significant 
corporate matters, it is said that they may have also an overriding duty to investigate 
when they have notice of circumstances that would raise the suspicions of reasonably 
prudent men. 64 
The US courts and commentators' stand towards' delegation of powers and reliance 
on other, does not follow the same line. While some courts takes the view that 
directors can not delegate their duty to manage corporate enterprise', 65 others 
particularly the Delaware Supreme Court in Graham Alice Chalmers Mfg. C0.66 
indicate that directors: 
"are entitled to rely on the honesty and integrity of their subordinates until something 
occurs to put them on suspicion that something is wrong... .,, 
67 
60 William F. Kennedy, "The Standard of Responsibility for Directors", 52 George Wash. L. Rev. 
Q984) 625,649. 
01432 A. 2d (N. J. 1981) 814. 
62 Ibid at 819 -20. 63 Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S. (1891) 132. 
64 Stephanie M. Phillips, "Duty of Directors with Respect to Potential Violations of U. S. Law by 
Foreign Subsidiaries", 13 Vand. Trans. L. (1980) 1,23. 
65 Adams v. Clearance Corp. 121 A. 2d. (1956) 302. 
66 188 A. 2d. (Del. 1963)125. 
67 Ibid at 130. 
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Section - 141(e) of the Delaware General Corporation Law permitý boards of 
directors to delegate authority to, and rely on information received fron-ý officers and 
employees of the company. 68 Moreover, the New York Business Corporation Law in 
section 717 permits that: 
"In discharging their duties, directors and officers, when acting in good faith, may rely 
upon financial statements of the corporation presented to them... . 11 
Furthermore, the reliance on others by directors is in some circumstances permissible 
under the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, 69 and the American Law 
Institute. 
The American Law Institute's proposed draft contains both delegation of powers and 
reliance on others, as states: 
(" 1) In performing his or her duty and functions, a director or officer who acts in good 
faith, and reasonably believes that reliance is warranted, is entitled to rely on 
information, opinions, reports, statements ... decisions, judgments and performance ... 
prepared, presented, made or performed by: 
(a) One or more directors, officers, or employees of the corporation,... 
(b) Legal council, public accountants, engineers, or other persons when the director or 
officer reasonably believes merit confidence. "70 
Although mere non- attendance at directors' meetings does not lead to breach of 
fiduciary duty of care, it does not excuse his failure to supervise the business 
properly. 71 It is suggested that, if delegation and reliance will continue to limit 
liability to cases in which the director completely abdicates his function, perhaps the 
i 
analysis is better carried out under the duty of loyalty. 72 
68 Section 141(e) states: "A member of the board of directors, or member of any committee 
designated by the board of directors, shall, in the performance of his duties, be fully protected in 
relying in good faith upon the records of the corporation and upon such information, opinions, 
reports, or statements presented to the corporation by any of the corporation's officers or 
ernPloyeas. " 69 Revised Model Business Corporation Act (1984) [RMBCA], section 8.30(b). Under this section: 
"In discharging his duties a director is entitled to rely on information, opinions, reports, or 
statements, including financial statements and other financial data, if prepared or presented by : 1) 
one or more officers or employees of corporation, 2) legal counsel, public accountants, or other 
ersons as to matters or 3) a committee of the board of directors of which he is not a member... ". 0 ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations 4.01 (Proposed Final 
Draft 1992). 
71 Dinsmore v. Jacobson, 242 Mich. (1928) 192,218. 
72 James L. Griffith, "Director Oversight Liability: Twenty-First Century Standards and Legislative 
Controls on Liability", 20 Del. J. Corp. L. (1095) 653,685. 
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6.2.2 Duty of Loyalty 
6.2.2.1 Definition of director'sfiduciary status 
Duty of loyalty, as the most important fiduciary duty of corporate directors, 73 is 
designed to prohibit unfaithfulneSS, 74fraud, bad faith, and self- dealing by corporate 
directors, and to discourage and prevent directors from denying corporate benefits to 
the shareholders particularly minority shareholders for their own intereStS. 75 
Therefore, one of the most important features of the duty is to prevent directors 
from diverting profits from shareholders' pocket into their own. 76 The duty of loyalty 
requires that a director should not stand on both sides of the transaction or have any 
financial interest in the transaction other than the "benefit which devolves upon the 
corporation or all stockholders. "77 
The American Bar Association has described the duty of loyalty as follows: 
"By assuming his office, the corporate director commits allegiance to the enterprise 
and acknowledges that the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders must 
prevail over any individual interest of his own. The basic principle to be observed is 
that the director should not use his corporate position to make personal profit or gain 
other personal advantage. "78 
Under duty of loyalty, a director owes loyalty and allegiance to the corporation, a 
loyalty that is undivided, and an allegiance that is influenced in action only by 
considerations of the welfare of the corporation. 79A fiduciary is forbidden by the 
73 Seligman, op cit at 3. 
74 Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F. 2d (. Cir. 1984) 255,264. 
. 
75 Lawrence E. Mitchell, " The Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders", 65 N. Y. Univ. L. Rev. 
1990) 1165,1191. 
6 E. Merrick Dodd, "For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees? ", 45 Hary. L. Rev. (1932) 
1145, A. A. Berle, "For Whom Corporate Management Are Trustees: A Note", 45 Hary. L. Rev. 
(1932) 1365. 
77 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A. 2d (1984) 805,812. 
78 American Bar association Comment on Corporation Laws, (rev. ed. 1978), 33 Bus Law. (1978) 
1591,1599. 
79 Litwin v. Allen, 25 N. Y. S. 2d (Sup. Ct. 1940) 667,677- 78. 
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law from doing anything which is adverse to the best interests of the corporation and 
its shareholders. 80 
The statement made in Pepper v. Lilton, 81 which contains a range of prohibitions 
that a fiduciary is required to consider in managing the beneficiary's business, is a 
good description of a fiduciary position as well as his duties as follows: 
"He who is in ... a fiduciary position cannot serve himself first and his cestuis second. 
He can not manipulate the affairs of his corporation to their detriment and in disregard 
of the standards of common decency and honesty. He cannot by the intervention of a 
corporate entity violate the ancient precept against serving two masters. He can not by 
the use of the corporate device avail himself of phvileges normally permitted outsiders 
in a race of creditors. He can not utilise his inside information and his strategic 
position for his own preferment. He can not violate rules of fair play by doing 
indirectly through the corporation what he could not do directly. He can not use his 
power for his personal advantage and to the detriment of the stockholders and creditors 
The position of corporate directors as fiduciary also has been addressed in Guth v. 
Loft, 82 where the Delaware Supreme Court stated that: 
"[Clorporate officers and directors ... While technically not trustees, they stand in a 
fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders. ... The rule that requires an 
individual an, unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands that there shall be no 
conflict between duty and interests. The occasions for the determination of honesty and 
good faith and loyalty conduct are many and varied, and no hard and fast rule can be 
formulated. The standard of loyalty is measured by no fixed scale. "83 
The recognition of the above statements defining the position of corporate directors 
as fiduciary in the context of duty of loyalty, requires an undivided faithfulness to the 
corporation and its shareholders., the main feature of which is avoiding self- dealing 
and conflict of interests. 
6.2.2.2 Functions of and miscellaneous issues on duty of loyalty 
80 David J. Gass, "Departing Directors, Officers and Employees and the Limits of Their Fiduciary 
Duties", Mich. Bar. J. (1993), 650 651, Tamar. Frankel, "Fiduciary Law", 71 Cal. L. Rev. (1983) 
795. 
81308 U. S. (1939) 295. 
82 5 A. 2d (Del. 1939) 503. 
83 Ibid at 5 10. 
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As was seen, in a corporation relationship there are great temptations and 
opportunities for a director, officer or controlling person to advance his own 
interests against those of the corporation, controlling corporation or its shareholders. 
The function of duty of loyalty is to monitor the use of the control of power over 
corporate transactions. Therefore, the proper exercise and the extent of the directors' 
powers on the one hand, and monitoring the use of powers in discharging their 
duties on the other hand, is a significant factor. In principle, the extent of a fiduciary 
responsibilities depends upon the scope of his owers. In other words, the "greater ,P 
the independent authority to be exercised by the fiduciary, the greater the scope of 
his fiduciary duty". 84 In a transaction of which a director and his company are 
parties, the interests of directors are always in conflict with those of shareholders. " 
While directors are shown to have a financial interest in a corporate transaction, the 
business judgment rule ceases to shield them or the transaction. The duty of loyalty 
imposes an obligation on directors to avoid conflict of interest in transactions, and to 
act in the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders. In this respect, the 
duty of loyalty relates to the business judgment rule, since the rule protection "can 
only be claimed by disinterested directors whose conduct otherwise meet the tests of 
business judgment. "86 On the other hand, it is said that in duty of loyalty analysis, 
there is no proper place for the business judgment rule, since the latter was 
developed as a defense to duty of care violations. 87 
If the plaintiff challenging the transaction in question establishes that there was 
involvement of directors' personal interests or self- dealing in the transaction, then 
there will be no place for the business judgment rule application. " However, it 
84 Austin W. Scott, "The Fiduciary Principle", 37 Cal. L. . (1949)538,540. 85 John C. Coffee, "Shareholders versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web", 85 Mich. L. 
RM (1986) 1,16, Oliver E. Williamson, "Corporate Governance", 95 Yale L. J. (1984) 1197, 
1198-200. 
86 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A. 2d (1984) 805,812. 
9 Kenneth Scott, "Corporate Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project", 
35 Stan. L. Rev. (1983) 927,940. 
88 Cinerama, Inc. v. Technocolor, No. 8358, ý991 W. L. 111134, at 10 (Cited by Dennis J. Block, 
Michael J. Maimone and Steven B. Ross, "The Duty of Loyalty and the Evolution of the Scope of judicial Review", 59 Brook. L. Rev. (1993) 65,73). 
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seems the business judgment rule protection is workable where a fully informed 
majority of disinterested directors properly exercise its judgment in good faith to 
approve the transaction. 
The director's duty of loyalty mainly deals with taking up a corporate opportunity. 
However, the concept of corporate opportunity may vary from state to state, and 
may change depending to the Statds criteria for its identification, " such as the 
relationship to the corporation's business and disclosure of the opportunity to the 
corporation. " Duty of loyalty requires a director to avoid appropriating a business 
opportunity available to his corporation. 91 ^"* 
In response to the question how a court should determine if a breach of loyalty has 
taken place, it is suggested that the court should take account of the difference 
between the terms of the challenged transaction and the terms of comparable 
transactions involving independent parties with no "control" relationship. According 
to this suggestion, if the transaction concerned involves homogeneous and traded 
goods, it will be easy for the court to find out the difference between the transaction 
and the market price. 92 However, it will be difficult to apply this reference, because 
many of cases involve goods and services that are not fungible and for which there is 
no trading market price available. 93 
The question may be raised that since the breach of loyalty is a matter of motivation, 
how can a court detennine and connect a respondent's action with his intention? In 
some cases tl-ýs point has, whether explicitly or implicitly, been determined. In Cheff 
v. MatheS,, 94 the court upheld the directors' purchase of a dissident shareholder's 
stock, since in the court's view, there was a reasonable threat to the continued 
existence of the corporation under the dissident shareholder's plan of amassing 
89 Stanley A. Kaplan, "Fiduciary Responsibility in the Management of the Corporation", 31 
14M (1976) 883. 
90 Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. (1939) 255. 
91 Kerrigan v. Unity Sav. Association, 68 111.2d. (1974) 20 ( Quoted by Knepper and Bailey, 
* ability of Corporate Officers and Directors, at 100). 
92 Kenneth Scott op cit at 939. 
93 ibid. 
94 41 Del. Ch., (1964) 494. 
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control. Conversely, in Condec Corp. v. Lunkenhelmer Co., 95 where corporate 
directors decided to issue additional shares with intention to frustrate the plaintiffs 
effort to purchase a controlling interests in the company, the court agreed with the 
plaintiff that the issuance of the additional shares was an invalid attempt by the 
respondents to advance their personal interests and, thus, did not pursue a business 
purpose. 96 
As can be seen in the light of those two cases, a determination of director's intent in 
struggles for control is a difficult task. That is because in each case the motivations 
of directors to maintain control led to different conclusions as to the propriety of 
such motivations. 97 
6.3 Duty In Insolvency 
In examining directors duties in insolvency, the first question which may arise is the 
corporate creditors position and whether the directors owe any duty to this sector of 
corporate constituencies, if so when and under which circumstances. A corporate 
director may not know when his duty to its creditors begins. It is because he may not 
be able to rely on the company's balance sheet as a reliable indicator of solvency. 98 
Therefore, defining the point when this duty begins is crucial. 
6.3.1 Is a, (7orporate Creditor Owed A Duty Before Insolvency? 
The main advantage of imposing a fiduciary duty of loyalty on directors to creditors, 
is that victim creditors have an additional right to recover against directors who 
95 143 Del. Ch., (1967) 353. 
96 Ibid at 357. 
97 Walter R. Hinnant, "Fiduciary Duties of Directors: How Far Do they Go? " 23 Wake Forest L. 
RM (1988) 163,170. 
'B Lewis Davis et al., "Corporate Reorganisation in the 1990's: Guiding Directors of Troubled 
Corporations Through Uncertain Territory", 47 B3LjJM. (199 1) 1,3. 
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failed to exercise due care and allowed others to misappropriate corporate assets at 
the creditors' expense. 99 
Most US jurisdictions, particularly Delaware, indicate that the dominant duty of 
directors is that to shareholders, on the basis of the argument that any duty owed to 
creditors is contractual rather than fiduciary. 100 However, creditors become 
beneficiary of such fiduciary duties once the company falls into insolvency, 101 or 
approaching insolvency. 102 
Generally, the fiduciary duty of loyalty and duty of care do not extend to a 
corporation's creditors. This is based upon the fact that creditors do not have an 
existing property right or an equitable interest which supports these duties when a 
corporation is solvent. 103 The claims of creditors of a financially healthy corporation 
that the directors have a duty to them have failed. 104 That is because the courts 
traditionally have been reluctant to extend the fiduciary duty to creditors of the 
corporation who are considered as mere holders of contractual rights. 105 Therefore, 
the courts have not required the directors to consider the creditors' best interests. 
A corporate director may, thus, be held liable if he benefits creditors at the expense 
of shareholders. For example in Revlon Inc. v. McAndrews & Forbes Holding 
Ina, 106 where the directors allegedly favoured the bidder in his proposed transaction 
because he was committed to support the company's debt security, the court took 
the view that a board of directors in discharging its duties "may have regard for other 
constituencies", if " rationally related benefits to the shareholders. " 
99 Laura Lin, "Shift of Fiduciary Duty upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors'DutY 
to Creditors", 46 Vand. L. R. (1993) 1485,1516. 
1100 Katz v. Oak Indus. 508 A 2d. Del. Ch. (1986) 873,879, (Quoted by Coffee op cit at 18) Harff 
v. Kerkorian, 324 AN (Del. Ch. 1974) 215,222. 
101 Pennsylvania Co. forInsurance on Lives & Granting Annuities v. South Broad St. Theatre Co., 
174 A. (Del. 1934) 122,116. 
102 Vladimir Jelisavcic, " Corporate Law- A Safe Harbor Proposal to Define the Limits of 
Directors' Fiduciary Duty to Creditors in the 'Vicinity of Insolvency': Credit Lyonnais v. Pathe", L 
_CoM. 
L. (1992) 145, Katz v. Oak Industries 508 AN (Del. Ch. 1986) 873,879. 
103 Simons v. Cogan, 549 AN (Del. 1988) 300,304. 
104 Meredith M. Brown, "When Corporation Is Financially Troubled, Directoes Role Changes", 
Natll, -1. (1991 
May 20) SIO. 
NTS-imon v. Gogan, A. 2d (Del. 1988) 300,104. 
106 506 A. 2d (Del. 1986) 173. 
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6.3.2 An exception to the Rule- Directors Duties upon Insolvency 
The rule that directors owe their duties to corporation and its shareholders is not an 
absolute principle with no exception. The exception to this principle is insolvency. 
The insolvency exception to the rule may give rise to liability for a troubled 
company's directors in respect of conduct which they did not view as wrongdoing. 
Directors of an insolvent corporation have a primary duty of care to the creditors, 
the duty which should apply when the corporation is arguably solvent but financially 
troubled and all directors' actions and decisioTs must be weighed from the view point 
of the creditors whose assets are at stake in insolvent situations. 107 
However, the exercise of the exception has been criticised by arguing that once the 
corporate is insolvent, the recognition of a fiduciary duty enforceable by creditors 
against directors of a nearly insolvent company which is still a going concern would 
allow an inappropriate interference in corporate management by creditors which may 
prevent responsible directors from preserving the corporation for the benefit of both 
stockholders and creditors. 108 
These critics observe only one feature of the reality and ignore the fact that leaving 
the control of an insolvent corporation to its board of directors, specially when the 
board is still shareholders- appointed one, may leave the corporation and its assets as 
an open target for depletion or abuse on the part of its directors or shareholders. 
The insolvency exception should not give rise to personal liability for directors until 
it is clear that a director knew or should have known the corporation was insolvent. 
In order to protect directors, the burden should be placed upon the creditor to show 
that the director either knew or should have known of the corporatioWs serious 
financial condition, 109 but did not take proper measurements to prevent loss. 
107 Michael L. Cook & Carlyn S. Schwards, "At a Troubled Company, Officers and Directors Owe 
Creditors First", Nat'l L. J. (1987) 22,24, Martin J. Bienenstock, "Conflict Between Management 
and Debtor in Possession's Fiduciary Duties", 61 Cincinnati L. R. (1992) 543,567. 
108 Norwood P. Beveridge, "Does a Corporation's Board of Directors Owe a Fiduciary Duty to Its 
Creditors? " 25 St. Mary's L. Rev. (1994) 589,621. 
109 Stephen P, McDonnell, "Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co.: Insolvency Shifts Directors' 
Burden From Shareholders to Creditors" . 19 Del. J. COM 1 1. (1994) 177,208- 209. 
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The rationale for the shift upon insolvency is that creditors become the equitable 
owners of the corporation, because they are the only parties with an interest in the 
corporation's assets. 110 Thus, directors of a company which faces financial trouble, 
no longer represent stockholders, but due to the insolvency become trustees, "' or 
quasi- trustees of the corporation's assets for the benefit of its creditors. ' 12 
This exceptional situation has been addressed in Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission v. Weintraub. ' 13 In that case, the US Supreme Court held that: 
"Bankruptcy causes fundamental changes in the nature of the corporate 
relationships ... [olne of the painful facts of bankruptcy is that the interests of 
shareholders become subordinated to the interests of creditors. "I 14 
In another case, a federal court of appeal stated that "when the corporation becomes 
insolvent, the fiduciary duties of the directors shift from the stockholders to the 
creditors. "115 The outcome of this situation is that a board of directors may be 
personally liable to creditors for rendering the company insolvent by intentionally 
causing the company to consummate a fraudulent transfer of its assets, even in the 
form of a leveraged buyout, particularly when such transfer benefited shareholders. 
For example in Clarkson Co. Ltd v. Shaheen, ' 16 the defendants claimed that the duty 
of directors sprang forth only to the corporation but not creditors, "until it is clear 
that the corporation is no longer a going concern. " In the court's view, such a N 
contention reflecting New York State policy of preserving the corporate assets of 
insolvent corporation for the creditors, 117 emphasised that corporate insolvency 
shifted the directors duty of care from its shareholders to its creditors. 118 If directors, 
110 Steven R. Gross et al., "Shifting Duties: Directors Face Risks in Workout", Nat'l L. J. (1991 
A r. 15) 19. 
1 
F11 
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F. 2d (4th Cir. 1982) 973,977. 
112 Clarkson Co. Ltd. v. Shaheen, 660 F. 2d. Cir. (1981) 506,512, Pennsylvania Co. For 
insurance v. South Broad St Theatre Co. 20 Del. Ch. (1934) 220, Asmussen v, Quaker City Corp., 
18 Del. Ch. (1931) 28. 
113 471 U. S. (1985) 343. 
114 Ibid at 355. 
115 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F. 2d (4th Cir. 1982) 973,976- 7. 
116 660 F. 2d. Cir. (1981) 506. 
117 Ibid at 5 12. 
118 Ibid. 
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thus, do not make their attempts to preserve corporate assets for its creditors, they 
have breached their fiduciary duties and may be held liable. 
As to whether directors of an insolvent corporation still owe any duty to its 
stockholders, the courts are divided. Some courts have taken the view that in the 
verge of insolvency its directors no longer represent the stockholders' interests, and 
their fiduciary obligations shift "from the stockholders to the creditors, "119 while 
some other courts have held that directors of an insolvent corporation have their 
fiduciary duties to its creditors first and stockholders second. 120 
I. W. 
6.3.2.1 Trust Fund Doctrine v. Agency 77ieory 
As to fiduciary duties of directors of a corporate in the "vicinity of insolvency", two 
opposing opinions have been identified. The first view which is called as the "agency 
doctrine" is based on agency law, and provides that an agent for a disclosed principal 
is not liable for the contracts of the principal, neither is he liable to a third party for 
failure to discharge the duty of care to the principal. 121 However, the agent may be 
held liable to third party for his own torts and for such actions as trespass or 
conversion. 122 This rule applied for many years by the company courts. For example 
in Clark v. Lawrence,, 123 it was held that creditors could not sue directors for 
mismanagement. 
According to the agency theory, corporate directors are the exclusive agents of 
stockholders, and the creditors' rights are entirely governed by private contracts. 124 
The "trust fund doctrine" which expresses the majority's view, provides that under 
certain circumstances, namely in the verge of insolvency, directors have duties to 
creditors. 121 The doctrine is based on the fact that upon the occurrence of a 
119 FDIC v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F. 2d (4th Cir. 1982) 973,977. 
120 Stanford Fork & Tool Co. v. Howe Brown & Co., 157 U. S. (1895) 312, Bank Leumi- Le Israel, 
B. M. v, Sunbett Industries, Inc., 485 F. Sup. (S. D. Ga. 1980) 556,559. 
121 Restatement (Second) of Agency sections 320 and 328 (1957). 122 Ibid section 343. 
123 5 F. Cas. (C. C. D. Mass. 1856) 888. (Quoted by Beveridge op cit at 593). 124 William A. Klein & J. Mark Ramsyer, 
-- ness 
Associations: Agegy. 
Nnerships. and Colporations (1991) 720. (Quoted by Jclisavcic, op cit at 146). 25 William M. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law-of*Pfivate CorRorat (Penn. ed. 1996) 849. 
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corporate insolvency, its stockholders have no stake in the corporation's assets, 126 
and they, thus, no longer represent the interests of stockholders, 127 instead they owe 
their duties to the corporate creditors. Furthermore, the nature of the directors duties 
shifts from long- term value maximisation to preservation of existing asset value for 
eventual distribution among creditors. 128 
It is said129 that the idea of extending the directors' duties to creditors under the 
doctrine dates back to 1824, when Joseph Story J. in Wood v. Drummer, 130 held that 
the assets of an insolvent corporation represent a "trust fund" that must be kept for 
the favour of creditors. , a. 
In some cases, the courts have based their holdings on "trust fund doctrine". For 
example in Pepper v. Litton, 131 the Supreme Court held that corporate directors had 
fiduciary duties to creditors as well as stockholders. 132 The Delaware courts have 
also addressed the "trust fund" theory in several cases. For the first time when the 
doctrine appeared in a Delaware Supreme Court case was in 1944 where in Bovay v. 
H. M. Byllesby & CO., 133 which was a clear case of fraud, the court stated: 
"An insolvent corporation is civilly dead in the sense that its property may be 
administered in equity as a trust fund doctrine for the benefit of creditors. The fact 
which creates the trust is insolvency, and when that fact is established, the trust arises, 
and the legality of the acts thereafter performed will be decided by very different 
principles than in the case of solvency. "134 
In another Delaware case, Asmussen v. Quaker City Corp., 135 the court faced the 
question whether directors of an insolvent company could prefer certain creditors 
126 Ibid at 423. 
127 Harff v. Kerkorian, 32 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1974) 215,219, Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc. 508 A. 2d (Del. 
Ch. 1986) 873,879. 
128 Gregory V. Varallo & Jess A. Finkelstein, "Fiduciary Obligations of Directors of the 
Financially Troubled Company", 48 Bus. Law. (1992) 239,244, Citing Hollins v. Brerfileld Coal & 
Iron Co. 150 U. S. (1893) 371. 
129 John Coffee, "Court Has New Idea on Directors' Duty", Nat'l L. J. (1992 March 2) 18, 
McDonnell, op cit 110. 
130 30 F. Cas (1824) 935. 
131308 U. S. (1939) 295. 
132 Ibid at 307. 
133 38 A. 2d (Del. 1944) 808. 
134 Ibid at 813. 
135 156 A (Del. Ch. 1931) 180. 
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over others where the favoured creditors were not corporate insiders. Here, the 
court found it clear that "all courts recognise a 'trust fund' doctrine of some sort, 11136 
In the court's view, the difficulty was the definition and the limits of the concept that 
corporate assets are a "trust fund" for the benefit of creditors upon the occurrence of 
insolvency. 137The court concluded that even in the case of a clear insolvency, no 
trust exists to prevent directors from preferring some creditors over others. 
However, the court did not reject the possibility of liability arising from a strict 
application of the doctrine. 138 
The Delaware case of Credit Lyonnai. v-Rank N. V. Netherland v. Pathe 
Communication Corp., 139 as a well- known leading case in this regard, deserves a 
detailed examination. In that case, Chancellor Allen of the Delaware Chancery Court 
underlined directors duties to the creditors of an insolvent company as: 
"At least when a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of 
directors is not merely the agent of the residual risk bearers, but owes its duty to the 
corporate enterprise. " 
The case of Credit Lyonnais Bank N. V Netherland v. Pathe Communication Corp. 
arose of a leveraged buyout (LBO), an effort to sell a division of MGM- Pathe 
Communication Corp. quickly and cheaply so that fil. ing bankruptcy petition would 
be delayed. Paramount Communication Corp. (PCQ controlled by Giancarlo Parretti 
acquired MGM in a LBO transaction. After the transaction was completed, Parretti 
took measures to assert control over MGM board of directors which contravened an 
agreement between him and Credit Lyonnais Bank Netherland, N. V. (CLBN), 
sponsor of the transaction. 
136 Ibid at 181, 
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid at 182. The same court three years later took a different view in Pennsylvania Co. for 
Insurance v. South Broad Street Theatre Co. 174 A. (Del. Ch. 1934) 112. In this case, the court 
held that directors and others in a position of control over an insolvent company could not prefer 
their own claims as creditors over the claims of outside creditors. Ibid at 116. 139 No. 12150 (Del. Ch. 1991) Lexis 215 at I (Cited by Robert Morrison, "Directors' Duties in 
Nearly Insolvent Corporations: A Comment on Credit Lyonnais", 19 Iowa J. Colp. L. (1993) 6 1). 
I 
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In order to complete the transaction, Parretti misrepresented borrowed funds as 
equity investments. 140 As a result of Parretti misrepresentation, CLBN insisted 
Parretti limit his control over MGM, which led to a Corporate Governance 
Agreement, (CGA) based on which a new board including CLBN was set up. The 
new board of MGM was empowered to block any sale in excess $1 million. 
According to the CGA, Parretti could regain his control over MGM's board on the 
condition that he could reduce MGM's aggregate debt to CLBN below $125 million. 
CLBN claimed that under the CGA it could remove Parretti from the board because 
he had breached the CGA by interfering wijh MGM's management. Parretti moved 
to dispose of MGM key divisions at a low price, which would impose most of the 
risk upon MGM's creditors, while its stockholders received almost all benefits from 
the action, and he could according to the CGA have remained in control of MGM. 
In that case, the court held that because the corporation, MGM, was in the "vicinity 
of insolvency", Parretti's actions were unacceptable, 141 and he breached his fiduciary 
obligation. Chancellor Alan based his decision on the ground that the board of 
directors "had an obligation to the community of interests that sustained the 
corporation to exercise judgment in an informed, good faith effort to maximise the 
corporation long- term wealth creating capacity. "142 
It seems that, with regard to his decision, Chancellor Allen means maximýisation of 
creditors interests 'rather than those of shareholders, once the corporate is in the 
verge of insolvency or technically insolvent, 
In Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 143 the Delaware Court of Chancery held that 
a corporate directors owe a fiduciary duty to it's creditors upon "insolvency in 
fact" or at the moment when its liabilities exceed the fair market value of its assets. 
In the above case, Ingersoll, the defendant, was the controlling stockholder, 
president, and chairman of the new corporation, and Mr. Geyer, plaintiff, was an 
140 Ibid at 14- 20. 
141 Ibid at 108. 
142 Ibid at 107- 109. 
143 621 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1992) 784. 
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employee and the only-other shareholder. In 1988, Ingersoll Publishing used a$2 
million note to repurchase Mr. Geyer's shares of the stock. The Ingersoll Publishing 
company defaulted on the note in 1991. Mr. Geyer alleged that the default arose 
from Mr. Ingersoll's fraudulent conveyance of the company's major assets to a third 
party in return for personal benefits, thereby, he breached his duty as a director of 
Ingersoll Publications, while Ingersoll Publications was indebted to Mr. Geyer. Here, 
the court held that in the verge of "insolvency in fact" a director had a fiduciary duty 
to the corporation's creditors. 144The court disagreed with the defendant's assertion 
that statutory proceedings were necessary tolinvoke the insolvency exception, which 
would cause a director's fiduciary duty to "shift" from the corporation's shareholders 
to its creditors. 145The court based its decision on the Delaware case of Bovay v. H. 
M. Byllesby &CO., 146and concluded: 
"the fact which creates the trust [for the benefit of creditors] is the insolvency, and 
when that fact is established, the trust arises, and the legality of the acts thereafter 
performed will be decided by very different principles than in the case of solvency. "147 
The Vice- Chancellor Chandler interpreted this language as switching a director's 
fiduciary obligation imposed for the benefit of the corporate stockholders during 
solvency to the corporation's creditors at the moment when it becomes insolvent. 148 
With regard to the recent decision as it puts the director of a financially troubled 
Delaware corporation at grave risk of incurring personal liability during periods of 
questionable solvency, it is said that while Delaware has historically rejected a strict 
application of the trust fund doctrine, the exact standard to which directors have to 
attain and the level of protection afforded to their business decisions has never been 
clarified. 149Therefore, personal liability may be imposed on a director of a financially 
troubled Delaware corporation for good faith decisions which he believed in 
144 Ibid at 786. 
145 lbid at 788- 90. 
146 38 A. 2d (Del. 1944) 808. 
147 Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 621 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1992) 784,787. 
148 Ibid at 788. 
149 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 494 A. 2d (Del. 1985) 946. 
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conformity to the duty of care rules, 150 the process which may give rise to the loss of 
qualified directors fearing personal liability. 151 
6.3.2.2 Steps to be taken 
When a corporation faces financial trouble, the American directors like those in any 
other legal system are expected to decide how to handle the problem or conduct the 
situation. A variety of decisions or actions can be taken by them. They may make 
attempts to sell the company to a third party, or to restructure the company's debts 
through and out of court settlement with itrcreditors and to file a petition under 
chapter II of the Bankruptcy Code for reorganisation or a bankruptcy petition for 
liquidation under chapter 7 when there is no hope of saving the corporation. 
The first task of a director of a corporation in financial difficulties is to assess the 
scale of problems with which he may face in discharging his responsibility by taking 
an appropriate step. In such circumstances the corporate directors should take 
account of all information supplied by accountants, counsel and others. Although 
balance sheet is a source of information, because corporate directors may not be able 
to rely on balance sheet as an appropriate indicator of solvency, they will not know 
when they owe their duties to creditors. 152 
It is true that business organisations do not generally become financially troubled 
overnight. The problems giving rise to such financial difficulty are usually cumulative 
and built up over long period, sometimes years. 153 But as soon as a corporation falls 
into insolvency, its directors begin to examine their pre- bankruptcy decisions which 
are now under examination by various hostile constituencies. 154 
The question which Credit Lyonnais Bank N. V. Pathe'55 left unanswered and has 
been often raised by commentators, is where is corporation in the "vicinity of 
150 McDonnell, op cit at 194. 
151 Ibid at 207. 
152 Ibid at 3. 
153 M. Freddie Reiss & Theodore G. Phelps Identif3jnj! a Troubled Company, (Dominic DiNapoli 
et al., 1991) 7. 
154 Varallo & Finkelstein, op cit at 239. 
155 NO. 12150 (Del. Ch. 1991) Lexis 215 at 1. 
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insolvency"? The answer to this question is of significant importance, because at this 
crucial point the directors knew or should have known that which steps they ought 
to have taken. 
The appropriate model which has been suggested is the use of accounting 
information, summarised in the form of financial ratios to measure the point when a 
corporation approaching insolvency. The advantage of this model is said to be its 
objectivity. 151 The formulation introduced by some commentators and courts for this 
purpose is Z- score which is factor derived from average of a corporation's financial 
'0, 
ratios used in predicting insolvency. ' The formulation that has been explored by 
Atman, 157 is described as a reliable method which has demonstrated its accuracy and 
ability to predict insolvency and can, thus, be used by directors and creditors to 
determine when their corporation is in the "vicinity of insolvency". 158 
The Z- score formulation is constituted of five elements follows as: 
Z= 1.2 (Xl)+ 1.4 (X2)+ 3.3 (X3)+ 6 (X4)+ I (X5)159 
The critical Z- score values are 1.81 and 2.99, since the first score or less alarms 
that the corporate is in the "vicinity of insolvency", whereas the second score or over 
that indicates the corporate financial health. 160 The indicators such as slowing down 
shipments, the fall of products quality, decline in sales, lowering cash balance, and 
more importantly losing some key customers should be taken as serious into account 
by the corporate directors as awaking. 161 
6.4 Conclusion and Suggestions 
156 Jelisavcic, op cit at 164. 
157 Edward I Altman, "Financial Ratios, Discrin-dnant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate 
Bankruptcy", 23 1 Finance (1968) 589. 
158 Jelisavcic op cit at 170. 
159 Xl= Working Capital, namely current assets minus current liabilities. 
X2= The ratio of retained earnings over total assets. 
X3= The ratio of retained earnings before interests and taxes over total liabilities. 
X4= The ratio of book value of equity to total liabilities. 
X5- The ratio of sales to total assets. 
Z- Overall index. 
160 Reiss & Phelps, Identibing a Troubled Company 27. 
161 Ibid at 8- 9 
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As to directors duties to their company as a going concern, the US law still suffers 
from some confusion leading to misunderstanding. 
As was seen, this vagueness has led some commentators to not only the conclusion 
that the duty of care is a useless legal concept which should be eliminated"62 but also 
to deny the existence of the duty. 163 
The claim of these commentators on the duty of care reminds us of the followers of 
the philosophic school who believed that this world is not an existing reality but a 
dream. There is no academic justification for denying the existence of duty of care 
where it is the basic element of liability for negligence on basis of which a numerous 
cases have been decided. The contention of the uselessness of the duty of care is not 
less unjustifiable than denying its existence all together. If the claim of uselessness of 
the duty means that it should be developed to meet the modem business needs, it is 
understandable. However, if it means, as it is the case here, that the duty does not 
have a significant factor in legal relationship and should, thus, be removed, it can not 
be adapted to the realities surrounded today's business relations. 
Regarding directors duties in insolvency, it seems the American law is now settled. 
This stability is a result of the insolvency exception to the rule that directors owe 
their duties only to the corporation and its shareholders. 
It is justified to make a connection between the above mentioned rule and the 
"agency theory" on the one hand, and the "trust fund" doctrine and the insolvency 
exception on the other hand. The US law, particularly Delaware law, on the basis of 
"trust fund" doctrine recognises that in the "vicinity of insolvency" corporate 
directors represent its creditors rather than its shareholders. 164 
162 Manning, op cit at 13 
163 Kennth Scott, op cit at 937 
164 Gross et al., op cit at 19, Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F. 2d (4th Cir. 1982) 
973,977, Clarkson Co. Ltd, v. Shaheen, 660 F. 2d. Cir. (1991) 506,512, U. S. Spitzer, 261 F. Sup. 
(S. D. N. Y. 1966) 754,756, Pennsylvania Co. For Insurance v. Soyh Broad St. Theatre Co. 20 
Del. Ch. (1934) 220, Asmussen v, Quaker City Corp., 18 Del. Ch. (1931) 28, Futures Trading 
Commission v. Weintraub., 471 U. S. (1985) 343, FDIC v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F. 2d (4th Cir. 1982) 
973,977, Harffv. Kerkorian, 32 A. 2d (Del.. Ch. 1974) 215,219, Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc. 508 A. 2d 
(Del. Ch. 1986) 873,879. 
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The problem inherent in the doctrine and the insolvency exception is the typical 
stance of US law in the Bankruptcy Code, chapter 11, namely reorganisation 
scheme. That is because under chapter 11, the American legislature's intention is to 
save and reorganise a troubled company, the immediate beneficiary of which is 
shareholders rather than the creditors. The aim of the scheme obviously is in conflict 
with the creditors! attempt and desire to receive their debts through liquidation 
process as quickly as possible. Consequently, the US law has no choice but to make 
a reconciliation between the insolvency exception reflected in the "trust fund" 
. W, 
doctrine and the regulations of chapter 11. 
The question is now, what kind of solution is to be recommended in order to resolve 
such ambiguities? It is said that the Delaware General Corporation Law should be 
amended to provide a clear standard of corporate insolvency and to specify whether 
a troubled company's directors owe a duty to its creditors, if so, under what 
conditions. It is particularly necessary and justified, while such uncertainty may 
discourage promoters from choosing Delaware as a state of incorporation. 165 
Some other commentators have taken the view that State law in the area of directors' 
fiduciary duties is in serious need. Therefore, it is time that Congress considered 
"buttressing the state law duties of loyalty and care with concurrent federal 
legislation. " However, this legislation "should fully preempt state law and should be 
no broader than its demonstrated need. " 166 
This view has been rejected since it "ignores the significance courts and legislatures 
place on disinterested directors and the important role which directors play in the 
governance of modern- publicly- held corporations. " 167 
To resolve the confusion and vagueness inherent in the US law in this area, all 
aspects of this complicated legal system should be taken into account. As was seen 
in discussion of the "trust fund" doctrine and reorganisation under chapter 11, any 
165 Alan Tompkins, "Directors Duties to Corporate Creditors: Delaware and the Insolvency 
Exception", 47 SMU L. Rev. (1993) 165,194. 
166 Seligman, op cit at 62- 63. 
167 Dennis J. Block, Nfichael J. Maimone and Steven B. Ross, "The Duty of Loyalty and the 
Evolution of the Scope of Judicial Review", 59 Brook L., Rev. (1993) 65,66. 
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newly emerged rule may stand against another principle or statutory regulation. 
Perhaps the stance of Delaware courts law to refuse to apply a strict concept of the 
"trust fund" doctrine in this context is more understandable. 
Chapter 7: Directors Liabilities for Breach of Their Duties 
ZI Introduction 
The main problem in reviewing directors' liability emerges from the difficulty 
inherent in directors duties themselves, as ix'plained by Dalhuisen and Daluilen as 
follows: 
"the duties of directors and officers are not themselves clearly dcflned and as 
consequence there is no perfect clarity as to the liability of directors and officers in the 
case of (alleged) mismanagement. "I 
The result of such unclarity is "a patchy system which as yet lacks coherence for 
want of a clear definition of the general standard of care and of the precise fiduciary 
duties. "2 
The State and federal statutes are silent on directors liabilities for mismanagement vis 
a vis company or third parties. Such liabilities as said by Dalhuisen is addressed by 
case law rather than State or federal law, particularly Bankruptcy Code. 3 
The classification of the claimants in actions against directors in the US is not clear. 
However, according to a survey made by the Wyatt Company of 979 American 
corporations in 1982 with assets ranged from under $10 million to over $5 billion, 
stockholders are the most important source of claims against directors and officers. 
Employees or former employees are in the second place while customers are in the 
third place, and the governmental claims rank fourth. 4 
IIH. Dalhuisen & Jua M. Daluilen on International Insolvency and Bankruptgy. (New York 
Matthew Bender 1986) 3.08 [21 [b] P. 2- 37 1. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid at 2- 364. 
4 The Wyatt Company, 1982 Comprehensive Report: Directors and Officers Liability/ Fiduciary 
Liability" 45 at 17- 18 (1982) ( quoted by julie J. Bisceglia, "Practical Aspects of Directors and 
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The survey does not explain the precise position of the creditors, but it seems this 
position should be sought in the third place for the customers. Moreover, in the US 
the shareholders are sometimes the plaintiffs, even when the corporation assets are 
undervalued or it is financially depressed. 
Ilkso was 
discussed in the previous chapter, directors' duties towards their corporation 
and its creditors are classified under two main concepts; fiduciary duty of care and 
loyalty. The liabilities of directors in this thesis are viewed under breach of those two 
duties. In the first part of this chapter, a director liability for breach of duty of care, 
negligence, will be examined. 
In the second part, directors liability for breach of their duty of loyalty is studied. In 
this part, the attempt is to highlight some cases involving a fraudulent intent but 
decided under breach of duty of loyalty, which is a result of the lack of recognition 
of a fraudulent liability in civil context similar to fraudulent trading in English law. 
7.2 Liabilityfor Negligence 
7.2.1 Defining a Negligent Conduct 
"The ado about the liability of directors for mere negligence is like the proverbial 
shaving of pigs- much squeal and little wool, at least for the stockholders. "5 
It is the view of one of the leading commentators, Bishop, as to the directors and 
officers liability for negligence in the US. One may also find this opinion applicable 
to the liability for breach of duty of loyalty by arguing that while having a corporate 
director held liable for breach of duty of care is so difficult as mentioned in the above 
I statement, it is harder to hold him accountable for breach, of duty of loyalty or fraud 
and any other intentional improper behaviour. This point has been raised in Bayer v. 
Beran6 where the court stated: 
officers Liability Insurance- Allocating and Advancing Legal Fees and the Duty to Defend" 32 
XjCLA L. Rev,, (1985) 690,693). 
3 J, Bishop, "Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks; New Trends in the indemnification of Corporate 
Directors and Officers", 77 Yale L. ., (1968) 1078,1095. 6 49 N. Y. S. 2d (Sup. Ct. 1944) 2. 
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"it is only in a most unusual and extraordinary case that directors are held liable for 
negligence in the absence of fraud, or improper motive, or personal interest. 1#7 
However, the confusion in the above statement is that the liability for negligence is 
related to "fraud, or improper motive, or personal interest, " in the absence of which 
a negligence liability can, as the above statement expresses, not be imposed. The 
above expression diminishes the clear and well- recognised distinction between a 
liability for negligence and liability for disloyalty and fraud. 
Breach of duty of care is defined by either a failure on the part of the director 
concerned to obtain adequate information lefore acting or by his failure to pay 
appropriate attention to a decision. 8 
Some theories have been proposed to explain the philosophy and purpose of 
imposing liability on a director for an allegedly negligent conduct. Soderquist has 
introduced a set of views in an attempt to formulate the liability. According to one of 
these theories, the aim of holding a director liable, for negligence is to direct the 
future behaviour of the negligent directors who are blameworthy. The purpose of 
imposing a negligence liability is not merely to deter or dissuade directors from 
misconducting their corporate business but, as it was the case in the Van Gorkom 
case, rather to direct and correct their behaviour in a desired way. 9 
On the other hand, a negligence liability is viewed as compensatory measure by 
which the company and its injured constituencies, particularly creditors may recover 
losses. The imposition of this liability upon a director which is a result of his 
blameworthiness, should be detern-dned when the loss is attributable to the plaintiff. 10 
The last theory defining the purpose of holding a director liable for his negligent 
behaviour, considers punitive aspect of liability. According to this view, the aim of 
imposing such liability on the respondent is to punish him for his wrongdoing which 
7 Ibid at 6. 
8.4nderson v. Lewis, 473, A. 2d (Del. 1984) 805,812. 
9 Larry D. Soderquist, "The Proper Standard for Directors' Negligence Liability", 66 Notre Dame L. 
Egy. (1990) 37,44. 
10 Ibid at 44- 5. 
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is a blameworthy action, because he has benefited himself at the expense of the 
corporation, its shareholders, or its creditors. " 
A distinction can be made as to the purpose of imposing liability for negligence 
between the two main types of negligence cases, namely vicarious and non- vicarious 
accountability. In the first type of these suits, represented by the English case of 
Charitable Corporation v. Sutton, 12 a defendant director who is wildly imprudent, 
causes loss to the corporation. In such cases, the aim is to hold a director 
accountable because of his failure to supervise the business in the corporation's 
interests, though he is not directly responsiblenor the JOSS. 13 
The second type of negligence cases is said to involve some acts by directors which 
directly give rise to loss to the company. This sort of cases, unlike the former, are 
non- vicarious, which involve recklessness or incompetence. The question which is 
to be answered in this class of cases is whether the wrongdoing is one that the law 
will force the defendant to recover the loss resulted from the negligent conduct. 14 
This theory has been also acknowledged by Weiss, who believes the courts have 
taken the stand that directors are only to be held liable for negligence when the 
plaintiff can prove the corporation has suffered loss through the negligent action. 15 
I 
As has been implied by Dyson, such a classification is neither necessary nor is it of 
any use. Moreover, the distinctive line between these two types of cases is not clear. 
More particularly, it is difficult to identify this classification in the US law context, 
since its first part is represented by an English case. 
Besides enforceable events and uncontrollable external forces, "most [business] 
authorities agree that management is the major cause of financial failure. "16 
However, it is believed that despite both statistics on financial failure and a 
Ibid. These theories seem similar to those proposed for imposing disqualification on a director in 
English law. 
12 (1742) 2 Atk. 400. 
13 Richard B. Dyson, "The Director's Liability for Negligence", 40 Ind. L. Rev. (1963- 5) 34 1. 
14 Ibid at 343. 
15 E. J. Weiss, "Disclosure and Corporate Accountability", 34 Bus. Law. (1979) 578,587. See also 
Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. (S. D. N. Y. 1924) 614. 
16 G. Engler, Business Financial Management, (rev. ed. 1978) (Quoted by Christy, Infra at 108), 
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consensus among business authorities as to the role of management in financial and 
economic failures, "courts rarely find corporate management liable for the failure of 
the business they supervise. " 17 
Breach of fiduciary duty of care, for example non- attendance resulting in 
misappropriation of company's property by corporation's directors, may give rise to 
liability for its directors, while in the Heil v. BixtbyM type cases, even indifference 
has been found a cause of liability. In the present case, the court found the 
respondents liable for "absolute indifference". 
joo. 
7.2.2 Standard of Liabilityfor Negligence 
To impose liability for monetary damages, the courts and commentators often 
recognise some such standards as ordinary negligence or gross negligence. It is 
suggested that an ideal standard of liability can be one which serves one of these 
ends: (i) the future of directors' conduct will be monitored in a desired way by 
imposing liability on a blameworthy director; (ii) the damages attributable to the 
improper conduct of the director to the corporation, its shareholders, or a class of its 
client will be recovered; (iii) punishment is imposed on a blameworthy director. 19 
The measure for due care in the Delaware law is "gross negligence". The case law is 
not helpful enough in clarifying the standard for due care. In Rabkin v. Philip Hunt 
Chemical Corp. 20 the Delaware Chancery Court expressed that in Delaware it is 
now settled that "gross negligence" is "the appropriate legal standard. " However, the 
court acknowledged that "the question of what must be pleaded to state a claim for 
gross negligence in this context remain problematic. "21 The court citing Allaun v. 
Consolidated Oil Co., 22 held that "in the corporate area, gross negligence would 
17 1 Gordon Christy, ''Corporate Mismanagement as Malpractice: A Critical Reanalysis of 
Corporate Managers' Duties of Care and Loyalty", 21 Houston L. Rev. (1984) 105,109. 
Is 276 F. Supp. (E. D. Mo. 1967) 217. 
19 Soderquist op cit at 55. 
20 547 A. 2d (1986) 963. 
21 Ibid at 970. 
22 16 Del. Ch. 318,147 A. (1929) 257,26 1. 
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appear to mean 'reckless indifference to, or a deliberate disregard of the 
stockholders". 23 
The case of Smith v. Van Gorkom24 is an obvious example for the standard of gross 
negligence adopted by Delaware when, "director liability is predicated upon concepts 
of gross negligence. "25 This standard was also adopted in Aronson v. LewiS, 26 and 
pool V. Pool, 27 where the court analysed the measure for assessing the conformity of 
director conduct to the standard as: 
"In some jurisdictions the only for which directors are liable is gross negligence, or 
gross negligence which would warrant an imputation of fraud... "28 
Also in 1990 the standard was described in Tomczac v. Morton Aiokol, InC. 29 as 
11[i]n corporate context .... means reckless 
indifference to or a deliberate disregard of 
the whole body of stockholders or actions which are without the bounds of reason. " 
The courts have generally been reluctant to hold directors liable for mere loss when 
gross negligence is not established. This idea seems even more applicable when a big 
percentage of members of boards are outside directors. 30 Some other cases have 
referred to the concept of "the ordinary prudent man in his own affairS"31 as a proper 
standard. Such a distinction is described as having developed no significant 
differences in outcome. 32 
23 Rabkin v. Philip Hunt Chemical Corp. 547 A. 2d (1986) 963,970. 
24 488 A. 2d (1985) 858,893-94. 
25 Ibid at 837. 
26 473 A. 2d (Del. 1984) 805,812. 
27 So. 2d (La. Ct. App. 1943) 132. 
28 Ibid at 135- 36. 
29 Del. Ch. Ap., (1990) 5. 
30 "Outside director" which is a concept used in the United States corporation law applies to part- 
time directors who are not the company's officers. However, they are highly experienced and mostly 
former corporate officers. This concept is very similar to or the same as that of non- executive 
director in English law. The 1970's witnessed a major change in the structure of the board of 
corporate management which resulted from pressure from Washington and Wall Street for 
increasing the number of independent outside directors. However, the percentage of outside 
directors on the boards of largest 1000 industrial companies has dropped from 63.2% to 57.5% in 
1986, the first decline since 1966. Laurie Baum, "The Job Nobody Wants", Bus. Wk. Sept. 8 1986, 
56. 
31 Hun v. Gary, 82 N. Y. (1980) 65. 
32 Dyson op cit at 344 
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The main question as to the determination of directors' liability is how and on the 
basis of what criterion they should predict the conduct may lead to liability for 
negligence. It has been suggested that in order to evaluate the proper standard for 
liability, it is necessary to clarify the concept of good faith in this context, since the 
"good fafth standard' is an ideal one because of its focus on the blameworthiness 
element. " 
Surely, if there is a state of mind, it must be subjective. The "good faith" standard as 
suggested above, can not be a proper standard for this purpose, because it is not a 
clear standard for directors' business behaviour and a difficult one to prove, 
particularly because it is a matter of mind for which an external demonstration is 
required. Furthermore, the "good faith" standard can not apply to breach of duty of 
care, negligence, while it is the material element of duty of loyalty with its own 
requirements and consequences. 
The question has been also raised as to whether different standards should be applied 
to different types of corporations. For example, whether banks or other financial 
institutions should be treated the same as non- banking corporations. Perhaps the 
only State distinguishing between those two concepts is Massachusetts. This State 
has established different provisions for non- banks and banks when, the standard of 
liability in the former is gross negligence, -34 whereas that is ordinary one in the 
latter. " Such a distinction has not been seen in other States where the majority apply 
the standard of ordinary negligence in both cases. This distinction seems justified 
because, the possible class of plaintiffs for banks are unique. Moreover, the assets 
with which banks deal and more importantly, the special nature of banking business 
may require a higher degree of performance from other types of business directors. 36 
7.2.3 Pre- Van Gorkom Cases 
33 Soderquist, op cit at 52. 
34 Greenfield Save. Bank v. Abercrombie, 211 Mass. (1912) 252. 
35 Uccello v. Golden Foods, Inc. 352 Mass. (1950) 319. 
36 Dyson, op cit at 343. 
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The main feature of the pre-Van Gorkom cases was that the courts would not easily 
dismiss allegations of an absence of due care "unless it appears beyond doubt that 
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him 
to relief. "37 In Francis v. UnitedJersey Bank, 38 e. g., the primary issue was whether 
a corporate director was personally liable for negligence for failing to prevent the 
misappropriation of trust funds by other directors who had been also officers and 
shareholders of the corporation. The present case involved a close corporation with 
three shareholder-directors, and the plaintiffs were trustees in bankruptcy of 
Pritchard & Baird Intermediaries Corp. (Pritchard & Baird), a reinsurance broker or 
intermediary. 39 The trial court described the payments as fraudulent conveyances and 
entered judgment of $ 10,3 5 5,73 6.9 1, including damages on account of the directors! 
negligence in permitting payments from the corporation of $ 4,391,133.21.40 
The Appellate Division affirmed the First Instance Court's decision, but found that 
the payments were a conversion of trust funds, rather than fraudulent conveyances of 
the assets of the corporation. 
The Supreme Court agreeing with Appellate Division, took the view that the critical 
question was not whether the respondents' misconduct was fraudulent conduct or 
acts of conversion but: 
"Rather, the initial question is whether Mrs. Pritchard was negligent in not noticing 
and trying to prevent the misappropriation of funds held by the corporation in an 
implied trust. A further question is whether her negligence was the proximate cause of 
the plaintiffs' losses. "41 
In the court's view, the respondent was negligent because she was not active in the 
corporation's business she managed and 'knew virtually nothing of its corporate 
affairs. 142 The Court concluding that "if Mrs. Pritchard had read the financial 
37 Conley v. Gibson, 355 US. (1957) 41,45- 6. 
38 432 A. 2d (N. J. 1981) 814. 
39 Ibid at 816. 
40 Ibid at 716- 817. 
41 Ibid at 917. 
42 Ibid at 820. 
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statements, she would have known that her sons were converting trust funds, "43 
found the estate liable for the deceased director's failure to attempt to forestall a 
massive fraud perpetrated by the remaining two directors, her sons. The court 
awarded damages of over $10 million. 
The court's decision made it clear that "[a] director is not an ornament, but an 
essential component of corporate governance. Consequently, a director cannot 
protect himself behind a paper shield bearing the motto 'dummy director. "44 
The leading case of Litwin v. Allen, 45which has been described as the first modem 
Aa. 
and wrongly decided case on directors liability, 46 contains some interesting points. 
This case was decided on the ground of a simple negligence. The facts were that in 
1929, when the disastrous economic depression hit the US and Europe, the clients of 
J. P. Morgan & Co., a banking corporation, set up a corporation, Alleghany, for 
investment in railroad securities. 47AIleghany became in need of $10 million to pay 
for some projects in various States, while due to borrowing limitation in its charter, 
this size of loan was impossible. Morgan agreed to transactions designed as a 
substitute for a loan. The plan was that Morgan bought $10 million of debenture 
stock issued by the subsidiary of Alleghany, Missory Pacific Railroad. Alleghany 
retained the option to repurchase the debentures at the price paid by Morgan within 
six months in order to prevent the stock of f1 48 alling into outsiders hands. The 
Morgan company, upon the directors of the Guaranty Trust Company of New York, 
one of its subsidiaries, decided to sell a $3 million participation in the Alleghamy 
transactions to the Guaranty Trust Company. 49However, when as a natural result of 
epidemic financial depression, the market value of debentures fell disastrously, and 
Alleghany did not exercise its option, rIO the shareholders'of the Trust Company sued 
43 Ibid at 826. 
44 Ibid at 823. 
45 25 N. Y. S. 2d (1940) 667. 
46 Soderquist op cit at 37. 
47 Litwin v. Allen, 25 N. Y. S. 2d (1940) 667,679. 
49 Ibid at 692. 
49 Ibid at 693. 
50 Ibid at 695. 
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its directors for negligence in approving the companýs participation in the Alleghany 
transactions. The court held that: 
"Directors are liable for negligence in the performance of their duties .... whether or not 
a director has been negligent, depends on the facts and circumstances of a particular 
case .... A director is called upon 'to bestow the care and skill' which the situation 
demands". 51 
The court did not find any sound reason for the respondents' action and held them 
liable because "the entire arrangement was so improvident, so risky, so unusual and 
unnecessary as to be contrary to fundamental conceptions of prudent banking 
practice. 052 do. 
In that case, as a result of the current situation, it was clear to any reasonable 
prudent man that engaging in such a transaction with a seriously financially troubled 
company was risky. However, the defendant directors, while aware of deteriorating 
econonýc situation, approved the plan to invest their company's assets in an 
arrangement which was designated to rescue another deeply troubled corporation 
with no chance of obtaining gain. In other words, the respondents knew or should 
have known that the possibility was loss rather than gain. However, as the court 
rightly decided, the wrongdoing was breach of duty of care but not breach of duty of 
loyalty. Here, there was no fraud or an intentional improper behaviour, nor a motion 
of self- dealing. 
7.2.4 Van Gorkom Case: More Man a Tuming Point 
It is not exaggeration to describe Smith v. Van Gorkom, 53 a highly leveraged buyout 
case, 54 as one of the most important cases in the history of US corporate law. That is 
because this case not only resulted in a radical development in the directors 
51 Ibid at 678. 
52 lbid at 699. 
53 489 AN (1985) 858. 
54 A leveraged buyout ("LBO") is defined as: "in a "LBO" transaction, an investor group borrows 
funds to purchase the target company. In this situation, the target company assumes its obligations 
and pledges its assets in order to secure repayment of the loans. Robert J. White, "Leveraged 
Buyouts and Fraudulent Conveyance Laws Under the Bankruptcy Code- Like Oil and Water, They 
Just Do not Mix". Annual SuEM of American Law (1991) 357,362. 
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protection statutes, but also it caused major changes in the standard of care of 
directors conduct. 
In that case the court decided that the board of directors had been grossly negligent 
in failing to inform themselves adequately as to the leading defendant's role in forcing 
the sale of the company and in establishing the per share purchase price, and failing 
to inform themselves of the intrinsic value of the company. 65 
The Van Gorkom story began in 13 September 1980, with a meeting between Trans 
Union! s Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Jerome Van Gorkom, and corporate 
take-over specialist, Jay Pritzker. It happened when it became evident to Trans 
Union Corporation's senior management that, as a result of the company's inability to 
utilise large tax write-offs, the corporation's stock was undervalued. 56 Without 
consulting the corporatioifs board of directors, Van Gorkom, who was also the 
owner of 65,000 shares, 57 suggested to Pritzker a $55 per share cash-out merger 
with a company Pritzker controlled. After several meetings within a week, Pritzker 
made the offer Van Gorkom had suggested and they agreed on a price of $55 per 
share. 
In the same week, Van Gorkom called a special and emergency meeting of the board 
of directors comprised of ten members, five outside and five inside directors, for the 
following Saturday September 20, without advising the directors of purpose of the 
meeting. 58 The board of directors was not provided with a copy of the proposed 
merger document. Van Gorkom only disclosed the proposed transaction to his senior 
management team for the first time one hour before the meeting. Despite an obviou's 
negative reaction by all but the two officers with whom Van Gorkom had earlier 
consulted, Gorkorn continued with the board meeting as scheduled. 59 
55 Smith v. Van Gorkom 488 AN (1985) 858,874. 
56 The stock had traded at prices ranging from $24-1/4 to $39-1/2 per share over a five-year period. 
ibid. at 866. 
57 Ibid. at 866. 
59 Ibid. at 867. 
59 Ibid at 867- 868. 
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In the board meeting, Van Gorkom did a twenty-minute verbal presentation in which 
he summarised the conditions of the proposed transaction. Van Gorkom stated that 
the free market would judge whether $55 was a fair price, because the proposed 
agreement permitted Trans Union to receive competing offers for ninety days. Van 
Gorkom did not reveal that he, but not Pritzker, was the one who had suggested the 
$55 price. In the meeting, the president of Trans Union spoke in favour of the 
transaction. The corporation's chief financial officer, Romans, had expressed his 
opposition to the merger at the earlier management meeting, but his recommendation 
was neither requested by nor given to the board. However, Romans did not say 
anything at the September 20 board meeting except that he had no idea of the 
proposal until that morning, and that calculations he had done in the past "did not 
indicate either a fair price for the stock or a valuation of the Company. "60 
Furthermore, he stated that in his opinion 155 was 'in the range of a fair price, ' but 
'at the beginning of the range. " Counsel advised the board that a fairness opinion was 
not required by law, and that the directors might be sued if they failed to accept the 
offer. 61 After about two hours discussions, the board of directors approved the 
transaction, and the merger agreement was signed by Van Gorkom at a social event 
hosted by himself that evening. Neither Van Gorkom nor any other director read the 
agreement prior to signing. 62 Trans Union, omitting any reference to the 
corporation's limited right to receive higher offers, announced its "definitive" merger 
agreement on September 22.63 The transaction was approved by 69.9% of the 
shareholders. 64 
The Trans Union's shareholders later filed an action against the Trans Union 
corporation, its directors, Jay Pritzker and others, seeking either rescission of the 
merger or damages from the board. 65 
60 Ibid. at 868- 869. 
61 Ibid at 868. 
62 Ibid at 869. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid at 870. 
65 Ibid at 863- 64. 
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7.2.4.1 The Supreme Court v. Chancery Court 
In the Van Gorkom case, the Delaware Court of Chancery found the defendant's 
action adequately informed and, thus, held them entitled to the business judgment 
rule protection66 since, in the court's view, the shareholders were properly aware and 
informed, and they refused to set aside the vote. 67 
But, the Delaware Supreme Court reversing the lower court's holding, held the 
respondents liable for breaching their fiduciary duties to the company, and referred 
to gross negligence as the appropriate stanqard of care applicable to directors' 
liability. The court considered the defendant directors as grossly negligent, because 
they failed to inform themselves adequately as to the terms of the merger agreement 
and the relevant facts as to their approval of transaction, particularly by approving 
the sale after a very short exan-ýination. 68 
The court held that, despite the presumption that directorial judgments are informed 
judgments, the Trans Union board's September 20 decision to sell the company for 
$55 per share, did not constitute an exercise of informed business judgment, since 
they did not adequately inform themselves as to the role Van Gorkom played in the 
O'sale" of the Company, neither did they make attempt to verify the per share 
purchase price. Moreover, the respondents were uninformed as to the intrinsic value 
of the Company and were grossly negligent in approving the "sale" of the Company 
upon two hours' consideration without prior notice, and without the exigency of a 
crisis or emergency. 69 
In rejecting the defendants' argument that their actions were subjected to section 
141(e) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, under which a director was 
entitled to rely upon reports made by corporate officers, or rely under stockholders 
vote as a remedy for the board's failure to apply an informed business decision 
66 lbid at 864. 
67 fbid at 984. 
68 lbid at 874. 
69 lbid at 874. 
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process to the situation, the court asserted a director's right as such, but concluded 
that none of the statements made at the board's meeting, at which the merger was 
approved, were qualified as reports worthy of protection because: 
"At a minimum for a report to enjoy the status conferred by section 141(e), it must be 
pertinent to the subject matter upon which a board is called to act, and otherwise be 
entitled to good faith, not blind reliance. Considering all of the surrounding 
circumstances calling the meeting without prior notice of its subject matter, the 
proposed sale of the Company without any prior consideration of the issue or necessity, 
therefor, the urgent time constraints imposed by Pritzker, and the total absence of any 
documentation whatsoever the directors were duty bound to make reasonable inquiry of 
Van Gorkom and Romans... .,, 
70 ja. 
The main factor on which the court based its decision was that the $55.00 price was 
accepted by directors without making a study to make sure whether the price was 
the best to the stockholders' interest, and that no consideration was given to the 
possibility of recessing the meeting for a few hours (or requesting an extension of 
Pritzkees deadline) in order to elicit more information either from management or 
the company's investment banker, who was already "known to the Board and 
familiar with Trans Union's affairs. 1171 
The majority view in Van Gorkom in holding the defendant directors liable was 
stated by Justice Andrew Moore as the case "does not stand for new law. The court 
just was applying old law to egregious facts". 72 
The court was not impressed by the fact that the merger price was a substantial 
premium over the current market price, or by the fact that the directors were not 
required to take a full study to find out whether or not the $55.00 was a fair price for 
the company, since they had enough experience and expertise and long history of 
dealing with the company. More importantly, the court did not take account of the 
fact that the merger was very beneficial for Trans Union. 73 
70 Ibid a 874. 
71 Ibid at 869. 
72 Stephen Radin, "The Directoes Duty of Care Three Years After Smith v. Van Gorkom", 39 
Hastings L. J. (1988) 707,719, ( Citing Victor, "Rhetoric Is Hot When the Topic Is Take-overs", 
Legal Times 1985) 7. ) 
73 Ibid at 873. 
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7. Z 4.2 Rejudging the Van Gorkom decision 
The question is which court was correct in its decision whether to recognise the 
directors as being entitled to the business judgment rule protection or to hold them 
liable for their breach of duty of care, the Chancery Court or the Supreme Court? 
The question can be answered from two different views. The first approach which is 
in agreement with the Chancery Court's decision, does not consider a director 
accountable in a Van Gorkom type situations. This is not because the respondent 
may be entitled to the protection of the bus5ess judgment rule, but mainly because 
the board of directors' decision to approve the sale concerned was not in detriment 
to the corporation's interest, rather in the Van Gorkom case circumstances it was the 
most beneficial to it. Therefore, according to this view, if the plaintiff can not prove 
any loss to the company, its shareholders or creditors resulting from the board of 
directors' decision, the court should not hold them liable for simply taking a harmless 
negligent decision. Perhaps in support of this view the best available precedent is 
Barnes v. Andrews, 74 where it was held that: 
"The plaintiff must accept the burden of showing that the performance of the 
defendant's duties would have avoided loss, and what loss it would have avoided. "75 
Some courts have refused to impose personal liability on negligent directors when 
the plaintiffs have been unable to prove that diligent execution of the directors' duties 
would have precluded the losses. 76 
In the line with this view, the Chancery Court's decision in dismissing the allegation 
against directors and applying the business judgment rule to their action, is justified 
because the Trans Union Company's directors not only did not incur any loss, but the 
merger price was a substantial premium over the current market price, and they had 
enough expertise on the market to make an informed decision in the business 
judgment context. In support of this view again, the fact should be taken into 
74 298 F. (S. N. Y. 1924) 614. 
75 Ibid at 616. 
76 See e. g. Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 US (1801) 132. 
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account that half of the members of the Trans Union board of directors were outside 
directors to whom a more lenient standard of conduct than that of inside directors 
should apply. Moreover, the majority shareholders approved the sale, and all 
material information as to the transaction had then been disclosed. Furthermore, the 
counsel had warned the directors that if they failed to accept the $55 per share offer, 
they may have been sued. 
The second view, which is consistent with the Supreme Court's decision, is that even 
though there was no evidence of loss to the corporation, the substance of the 
decision in question was highly risky and groMy negligent. In the Van Gorkom case, 
the Supreme Court based its decision in holding the defendant directors liable not 
only upon the fact that they did not make proper effort in establishing a per share 
price and to become adequately informed of all information as to the deal, but more 
particularly because they approved the sale after a two- hour meeting which was 
insufficient for approving such a significant sale. 
7.2.4.3 Yhe impact of the Van Gorkom case on development of the law 
"For a half of a century, the law on directors' negligence liability has been in muddle. 
The problem began when a New York trial court wrongly decided Litwin v. Allen, 77 
the long- term leading case holding directors liable for negligence management 
without a jurisprudential underpinning and without an understanding of just what was 
behind the directors conduct. "78 
Therefore, the decision of Van Gorkorn was the most important case of directors' 
liability for negligence at least since 1940.79 
The Van Gorkorn decision has been considered as either consistent with legal 
precedent, 80 or a fatal blow to the directorial management system that had taken two 
77 25 N. Y. S. 2d (1940) 667. 
78 Soderquist, op cit at 37. 
79 Ibid at 4 1. 
80 Bayless Manning, "Reflection and Practical. Tips on Life in the Boardroom After Van Gorkom". 
41 Bus. Law., (1985) 1,5. 
f 
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hundreds years to develop. 81 It is contended that the Gorkorn case does not 
represent a significant change either in the law itself or its application, but it has 
constituted a novel interpretation of the facts. 82 The decision is also said to have 
undermined one of the most well- recognised realities of today's business 
relationships, which is that business opportunities become available under extreme 
time constraints. That is because "quick business decisions can often mean the 
difference between being the first to a market product or business failure. "83 
As a result of this decision many outside directors found out that the risk involved in 
corporate decision- making was not worth'iot*. Therefore, it became difficult to find 
competent individuals willing to serve as directors, unless those individuals were 
compensated by a high reward which would have to be weighted against the risk of 
having a personal liability imposed for negligence. 84 
One of the main consequences of the Van Gorkom case was its serious impact on the 
insurance market which threatened outside directors with the possibility of extensive 
personal liability. As a result of the decision, the availability and cost of directors 
liability insurance became a significant concern of corporations, 85 since it was 
unavailable or astronomically expensive. 86 Moreover, the Delaware legislators could 
not resist the increasing criticisms of the Van Gorkom case outcome and amended its 
corporate laws by introducing a new provision to empower a corporation to amend 
its articles of incorporation to provide that corporate directors may not be held liable 
for financial damages to the corporation or to its stockholders for a breach of 
fiduciary duty of care amounting to gross negligence to the corporation. There was a 
widespread response to the Van Gorkom decision by most of States. The result was 
81 Herzel, Katz, "Smith v. Van Gorkom: The Business of Judging Business Judgment", 41 DUL 
L23L (1986) 1187. 
82 janics S. AlLicha wCorporate Directors' Liability in the US. ", Int'l FiMcial L. Rev-1 (1986) 33. 
93 P- K. Bean, "Corporate dircctor liability", 65 Denver. U- L. IL., (1988) 59,64 
b4 Robert Hamilton, "The Duties of Corporate Directors and the Draft Fifth Directive: Lessons from 
the United States". 4 IML (1988) 152,157. 
85 Manning, op cit at 5- 6. 
96 For a detailed discussion of such impact see the chapter on "Protection of Directors in the US". 
w 
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a radical change in the standard of directors' conduct. The States took part in a "race 
to the bottom" to amend their corporate statutes in order to protect their directors 
against personal liability. 
7.2.5 Post- Van Gorkom Cases 
As will be seen, these cases have been decided under shadow of the shock created by 
the Van Gorkorn decision, the main characteristic of which is not holding a 
defendant director liable except when there is an unquestionable case of breach of 
00. 
duty. 
The case of Lewiss v. Honeywell InC. 87 is of significance, because the court refused 
to hold the defendant directors liable. In that case, three directors of the company 
who were high ranking executives of Honeywell were charged of acting in an 
uninformed manner by declining an all- cash offer by Sperry Corporation, at a 37 
percent premium over market price. It was also alleged that the directors' rejection 
of the offer was done without consulting the corporate investment advisor and failed 
to disclose the offer and his decision to shareholders. 
The court upheld that although the directors' failure to disclose and submit the offer 
to an investment banker could be considered in the plaintiffs favour, it found it 
insufficient evidence of negligence, because: 
"A rejection of an offer at a premium over market price and a failure to disclose that 
action to shareholders may or may not be informed. The comn-tission or ornission of 
those acts does not, by itself, establish the degree of enlightenment or ignorance of the 
decision makers. "88 
The court did not find the allegations satisfactory, since they could not: 
"... establish that the defendant directors rejected (and refused to negotiate) the Sperry 
Offer without having properly informed themselves of the critical facts relating to the 
merits of that offer or that the directors, while having such information, chose to 
ignore it in making their decision. "89 
97 Del. CH. (July 28 1987) 93,565, quoted by Radin, Supra at 727. 
89 Ibid at 97,535. 
99 Ibid at 10. 
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A comparison bet-.,. -een the above case and the 'Van- Gorkom decision leads us to the 
conclusion that the element of "being properly informed" is a decisive factor in 
holding a defendant director liable or entitled to the business judgment rule 
protection. In the Van Gorkom case, the court held the respondents liable for making 
an uninformed decision irrespective of the fact that the transaction in question was, 
in its own kind and under those particular circumstances, the most beneficial to the 
corporation, whereas in Lewiss v. Honeywell Inc. the court found the respondents' 
decision protected by the business judgment rule, no matter whether or not it was 
beneficial to the corporation. 1.0. 
one wonders, if the court of the present case held the directors liable for their 
rejection of a beneficial transaction, would not it still be a justified judgment? 
Similarly, in Grobow v. Perot, 90 the court dismissed the case allegedly involved 
directors' failure to exercise an informed business judgment in considering a 
proposed transaction. The court built its holding upon the fact that the plaintiff had 
alleged that the day before the full board was to meet, a meeting of a special 
committee chaired by an outside director examined and approved the transaction. 
Moreover, the court acknowledged that there was no allegations on the part of 
plaintiff that the special committee "failed to consult with and consider the views of 
financial or legal advisors before recommending to the full board that it approves the 
transaction"91 
In Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corp., 92 some consolidated class actions were 
filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery on behalf of the minority shareholders of 
Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corp. (Hunt) challenging the merger of Hunt with its 
majority shareholder, Olin Corporation (Olin). The plaintiffs claimed that the 
proposed Olin- Hunt merger price was grossly inadequate. They outlined their 
contentions as breach of duty of entire unfairness and allegedly taking an uninformed 
90 526 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1987) 914. 
91 Ibid at 926. 
92 547 A. 2d (1986) 960. 
I 
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decision, which was rejected by the court. The Vice Chancellor granted the 
defendants' motion to dismiss the allegations on the ground that there could be no 
relief on the basis of the plaintiffs' claims and that, in the court's view, absent claims 
of fraud or deception, a minority shareholdees rights in a cash- out merger were 
limited to an appraisal. 93 The court made its judgment based on the plaintiffs 
statement that their counsel met with a special committee of outside directors prior 
to giving its recommendation as to a cash- out of minority shareholders, and that this 
special committee found the price "fair but not generous", and that it "unanimously 
. M. 
recommended that Olin consider raising the merger price. "94 However, when Olin 
refused to increase the price, the special committee following further meetings 
"reported to the Hunt's 'board of directors that it found $20 to be fair and 
recommended the approval of the merger. 095 The court concluded that from the 
facts present, "no inference could be drawn either that the Hunt directors were 
uninformed or were grossly negligent in recommending the merger. "96 However, the 
Appeal Court found that the Trial Court had erred in dismissing the plaintiffs' action 
and permitted them to file their proposed amendment to the pleading. 97 
The'rationale based on which the cases following Van Gorkom were decided, have 
been described as "a judicial hodge- podge, ranging from a strict adherence to the 
business judgment rule to mixing of the business judgment rule and the duty of 
loyalty into one theory. " 98 
Perhaps this statement is correct as far as acknowledging the courts confusion 
emanating from the lack of clear rules or criteria for liability for breach of duty of 
loyalty. The Van Gorkom case not only did not result in setting some rules for 
93 Ibid at 960- 62. 
94 Ibid at 969. 
95 Ibid at 970. 
96 Ibid at 971. 
97 RabkIn v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corp., 498 A. 2d (1985) 1099,1 log. 
98 James E. Kaye, "Corporate Law: Statutory Development in Directors' Liability- State Response to 
Smith v. Van Gorkom". Annual Survcy-Qf American Law (1988) 429,440- 1. 
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negligent liability but persuaded the courts to take a more cautious stance in making 
such a liability order to avoid another Van Gorkom crisis. 
7.3 Liabilityfor Breach ofDuty ofLoyalty 
Liability for a breach of duty of loyalty is traditionally incurred when corporate 
directors are in a way interested in the transaction they are asked to approve. 
Directors are "interested" under Delaware law if they either expect to derive a 
personal financial benefit from a contract orappear on both sides of a transaction. 99 
In some cases, disloyalty may emerge from a gross recklessness more than an 
intentional conduct. For example, directors have been held liable for causing their 
corporation to enter a transaction which they knew it could result in a loss but never 
in a gain for the corporation. 100 
The crucial case of breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty is fraudulent conduct on the 
to 
part of directors, whether, defraud creditors by carrying on an insolvent business 
or obtaining personal gains at the creditors' or shareholders' expenses. 101 
The primary rule in a fiduciary duty of loyalty analysis is having an undivided loyalty 
to the beneficiary / corporation. Any division of loyalty will be taken by the courts as 
serious, since "there is no safe harbour for such divided loyalties in Delaware, when 
directors of a Delaware corporation are on both sides of a transaction they are 
required to demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent 
fairness of the bargain. " 102 
7.3.1 Appropriation of Corporate Opportunity 
99 Aronson v. Lewiss, 473 AN (Del. 1984) 805,812. 
100 Litwin v. Allen, 25 N. Y. S. 2d (Supp. Ct. 1940) 667. 
101 Logue Mechanical Contracting Corp., 106 Bankr. (1989) 436, Clarkson Co. Ltd. v. Shaheen, 
660 F. 2d. Cir. (1991) 506,512. 
102 Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., AN (1952) 57,58. 
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In taking or appropriating a company's opportunity, there are some aspects that need 
to be addressed, for example whether a director is allowed to do so when his 
corporation is unable or refuses to take up the opportunity after adequate disclosure 
of information. To whom this disclosure should be made, to an independent board or 
a general meeting of the shareholders. The fact is submitted that the corporate 
business opportunity is the corporation's property and its appropriation by its 
director will be considered to be a misappropriation of the corporate assets. Thus, it 
has been said that the difficulty in applying this rule is how to determine whether or 
'1* 
not the business opportunity concerned did belong to the corporation. 103 
In Delaware, case law views the corporate opportunity as an indication of the rule 
that a director has the utmost good faith and undivided loyalty to his corporation. 104 
Other States are of similar stance in this regard. In the New York case of Meinhard 
v. Salmon, 105 the defendant, a manager of a company who was also a trustee of a 
trust, renewed a lease for the corporation he controlled instead of the trust. Here, 
Cardozo J. held: 
"The very fact that Salmon was in control with exclusive powers of direction charged 
him obviously with the duty of disclosure, since only through disclosure could 
opportunity be equalised ... He was managing co- adventurer. For him and for those 
like him, the rule of undivided loyalty is relentless and supreme. "106 
However, there are some exceptions to this rule. For example when an opportunity 
comes to a director in his own private capacity rather than in his capacity as a 
director, and the opportunity is the one which because of the nature of the enterprise 
is not relevant for the corporation, and it has no interest in it, the director may take 
the opportunity for himself. 107 
To determine an alleged appropriation of the corporate business opportunity by its 
directors, some elements are decisive to be considered. The business opportunity 
103 Miller v. Miller, 301 Nfinn. (1974) 207,222 (Quoted by Knepper and Bailey, Liability o 
Corporate Officers and Directors, at 102). 
104 Science Accessories Corp. v. Summagraphics Corp., 425 A. 2d (Del. 1980) 957. 
105 249 N. Y. (1928) 458. 
106 Jbid at 466,468. 
107 Guth v. Lo . 
ft, Inc., 5 A. 2d (Del. 193 9) 503,5 10. 
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should be the one which is consistent with the nature of the corporate business 
activity, namely an appropriation which could be acquired by the corporation. 
Therefore, if the corporation is in need of property or any sort of opportunity related 
to the corporate activity, but this available opportunity was appropriated by its 
directors, they may be held liable for breach of their fiduciary duty of loyalty 
irrespective of whether or not the corporation suffered any loss or benefited from the 
appropriation. 118 
The other point which is significant in this regard is the financial ability of the 
corporation to acquire an opportunity availabTe to it. If due to financial inability the 
corporation could not take the opportunity its directors are permitted to take it up 
for themselves. Even in such a situation, in order to prevent any possible claim of 
bad faith, the directors are better to disclose it to an independent board or to general 
meeting of shareholders. 
It has been decided that a director may not be absolved of liability for appropriating 
an opportunity unless the corporation is insolvent. In other words, if the corporation 
is merely unable to pay its current bills, the director is not entitle to do so. 109 
However, if the corporation is unable, refuses, or fails to take the opportunity for 
any reason, a director may appropriate it with no fear of being held personally liable 
for breach of his duty of loyalty. 110 
Perhaps the best example of failure or refusal of a corporation to avail itself of an 
opportunity, is when an approval of shareholder general meeting for this purpose is 
required by by-laws, but the general meeting refuses to approve the acquisition of 
the opportunity by the corporation. In such a situation, nobody can blame corporate 
directors for appropriating the opportunity. 
108 Farber v, Servan Land Co., 662 F. 2d (5th Cir. 1971) 375 ( Quoted by Knepper and Bailey, 
Tjabilitj of Corporate Officers and Directors, at 102). 
109 Kfinicki v. Lundgren, 67 Ore. App. (1984) 160. 
110 Thicho Timber v. Sayer, 236 Mich. (1926) 40 ( Cited by Knepper and Bailey, Liability o 
Colporate Officers and Directors, at 105). 
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7.3.2 Involvement in Conflict ofInterest 
7.3.2.1 Liabilityfor conflict of interest 
Reference to liability for conflict of interest has a long history dating back to 1846, 
when in Michoud v. Girod' II Mr. Justice Wayne stated: 
"The general rule stands upon our great moral obligation to refrain from placing 
ourselves in relations which ordinarily excite a conflict between self- interest and 
integrity. ... In this conflict of interest the law wisely interposes. It acts not on the 
possibility that, in some cases, the sense of that duty may prevail over the motives of 
self- interest, but it provides against the probaftty in many cases, and the danger in 
all cases, that the dictates of self- interest will exercise a predominant influence, and 
supersede that of duty. " 112 
Some courts have shown reluctance to make a liability order against a director while 
his interest does not conflict with that of his corporation, or when he has not 
obtained a gain at the corporation's expense. In re Xonics, Inc., 113 for example, the 
committee of creditors of Xonics filed an action against the chairman and chief 
Executive officer of Xonics, Charles F. Havertly, for alleged breach of fiduciary duty 
of loyalty to the corporation creditors by negotiating the sale of the corporation's 
assets at less than fair value to Elscint, Inc.. The critical point supporting the claim 
was that the defendant director in his negotiation arranged for an employment 
contract with the buyer company, Elscint, Inc., upon which he would be employed 
by Eiscint as its director, once the sale was completed. 
The court considered the point that Havertly recommended the transaction to the 
Xonics' board as the best one available to the corporation, when the corporation 
11would probably be pushed into either voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy or 
reorganisation" if no sale were concluded within two weeks, 114 and that "an 
independent board, after all disclosure of the insider's deal approved the 
4 How. (1846) 503. 
112 lbid at 554. 
113 99 B. PL (Bankr. N. D. 111.1989) 870. 
114 Jbid at 874. 
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transaction. " 115 In the court's view, Xonics' directors had not breached their fiduciary 
duties of loyalty to the corporate creditors, and they did not have to stay with Xonics 
by refusing employment with Elscint to avoid a breach of the trust owed to Xonics' 
creditors. 116 
In the Delaware leading case of Gimbel v. Signal Companies, Inc. 117, the plaintiff, a 
stockholder of signal company, which had some subsidiaries, sought an order to ban 
the sale of one of these subsidiaries. The plaintiff claimed that there was not a proper 
notice of the special meeting of the board of directors of Signal, at which the 
proposed sale was approved and authorised, and that the proposed sale required 
authorisation by the majority of the outstanding stock of Signal pursuant section 
271(a) of Delaware General Corporation Law. 118 Moreover, he alleged that the sale 
price was "wholly inadequate, " and that certain personal motives by certain directors 
motivated them in making the business decision. 119 
Chancellor Quillen was of the view that "it is not our law that shareholder approval 
is required upon every major restructuring of the corporation, " neither was necessary 
to go beyond the statute. 120 The court rejected the plaintiffs claim that the 
respondents had a personal motivation in the proposed sale constituting self-dealing, 
where "no indication of self-dealing on the part of the Board of Directors such 
would taint the proposed transaction or neutralise the effect of the business judgment 
rule". 121 
In some other cases, the courts in scrutinising an alleged breach of duty of loyalty on 
the part of a director or majority of a board of directors, have distinguished the facts 
relating to each director's conduct refusing to make a collective liability order. 
115 Ibid at 876. 
116 Ibid. 
117 316 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1974) 599. 
9 Section 27 1 (a) requires majority stockholder approval for the sale of "all or substantially all" of 
the assets of a Delaware corporation. 
119 Gimbel v. Signal Companies, Inc.. 316 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1974) 599,605. 
120 Ibid at 606. 
121 Ibid 609- 10. 
F 
Corporate Directors'Duties &Liabilities in Insolvency in England and the US 248 
The Delaware case of Cede & Co., Inc., v. Technicolor, Inc., 122 is a good example in 
this respect. Some interesting points emerged from the case, which have not, perhaps 
because of being a recently delivered decision, been examined by commentators yet. 
The causes of action, in this case, were breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty and fraud. 
The story began in 1970, when Technicolor was still a wealthy corporation with a 
long and pron-drient history in the film / audio- visual industries. However, by the late 
seventies, it experienced decline in competitiveness taking losses that were 
"unacceptable" and out of control. 123 To overcome the situation, some efforts were 
Ma. initiated by Kameraman, Technicolor's chief executive officer, in order to reduce 
costs at Technicoloes film laboratories and to resolve other inefficiencies. His plans, 
such as "One Hour Photo" ("OHP"), at first seemed effective, but finally ended up 
with a loss of $5.2m. 
The Technicolor's financial difficulty persuaded Perelman, a controlling shareholder 
and chairman of MacAndrews & Forbes Group, Inc., (MAF), to bid for the 
acquisition of Technicolor. 
For this purpose, Perelman sought Mr Sullivan's, one of Technicolor's directors, 
assistance through an intemediating. 124 On the following Monday, September 13, 
Sullivan instructed his secretary to call his stockbroker and place a purchase order 
for ten thousands shares at market price. A week after his joint meeting with the 
intermediating and Perelman, Sullivan informed Kameraman of his negotiation with 
Perelman, but he did not mention anything about increasing his holdings in 
Technicoloes stock. Through Sullivan's mediation, Kameraman and Perelman met on 
October 4, when the price of the sale, the effect of acquisition on Kameraman's 
employment contract, and the point that Sullivan would continue as director after the 
completion of the sale and a finder's fee for him were also discussed. 
122 634 A. 2d (1993) 345. 
123 lbid at 351. 
124 lbid at 352. 
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In another meeting, on October 12, Kameraman and Perelman agreed upon all 
matters except price and financing. 125 In a further private meeting, Kameraman and 
Perelman agreed that Sullivan would receive a $150,000 for introducing the parties. 
Their further meeting resulted in an agreement on a price of $23 per share, and 
Kameraman's employment as a director of the new company. 126 Two days later, 
Kameraman called a special meeting of Technicolor's board of directors, in which all 
nine nvmbffs of the board were presem three of them Lc%is, Ishani, and Biorkmam 
"had only limited knowledge of tile proposed sale of the company, " three others 
"were told nothing of Technicolor's sale prior to the meeting. " 127 
In the meeting, Kameraman explained the history of his negotiation with Perelman, 
and counselled the board that $23 per share was a "good" price, because it was ten 
times "core" earnings of between 2.30 and 2.50 per share. He also outlined the 
terms of his contract with MAF and Sullivan's finder's fee of $150,000.128 
After a presentation by outside counsel and investment banker, "the board 
unanimously approved the Agreement and Plan of Merger with MAF, and 
recommended to the shareholders of Technicolor the acceptance of the offer of $23 
per share. " In a meeting at the January 24 1983 shareholders, 89% of the 
shareholders voted to repeal the super- majority amendment and in favour of the 
proposed merger. 129 
Yhe Delaware supreme court's stance; An action was brought by Cinerama, the 
owner of 201,000 shares, representing 4,405% of the common stock shares of 
Technicolor, against seven of the nine members of the Technicolor's board at the 
time of merger, MAF, and Perelman as chairman and controlling shareholder of 
MAF, for alleged fraud, breach of fiduciary duties and unfair dealing, requiring the 
125 Ibid at 354. 
126 Ibid at 356. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Ibid at 357. 
129 Ibid. 
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merger to be declared void for lack of unanimous directors' approval of repeal of 
super- majority provision of Technicolor's certificate of incorporation. 130 
According to the Delaware Supreme Court, the Chancery court "found that 'the 
Board as a whole' had not breached its collective duty of loyalty. " However, the 
court held Sullivan liable because, in the court's view, "Sullivan [had] made money 
on the transaction ... and apparently engaged in or instituted some trades in 
Technicolor's stock while in possession of non- public information. " 131 The court 
found, also Sullivan guilty of bad faith "specially [regarding] his co-operation with 
Mr. Perelman before Kameraman met with Perelman. " 132 
In the Supreme Court's view, Chancellor Alan of the Delaware Chancery Court 
"found the evidence sufficient to conclude that Director Sullivan had been disloyal 
because of his interest in the transaction. " 133 Chancellor Alan was of the view a 
directoes self- interest in a third- party transaction as not material unless sufficient to 
create a reasonable probability: i) "that the independence of judgment of a 
'reasonable person in the directoes position would be affected; and ii) that such a 
directoes self- interest would have affected the collective decision of the board. " 134 
As to the decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in Cede & Co., Inc., v. 
Technicolor, Inc., though generally speaking justified, the ground of the holding 
requires some examination. The court, here, based its decision in holding Sullivan 
liable mainly on the ground that the respondent obtained personal benefits ban 
particularly the $150,000 finder's fee. It seems the liability could not hav! &posed 
on the basis of the finder's fee concerned, because Kameraman was aware of the 
matter and he was the one who supported the payment in his meeting with Perelman. 
Otherwise, Kameraman should have also been held liable for breach of fiduciary duty 
of loyalty because of his participation in the negotiation involving such an illegal 
130 Ibid at 359. "Certificate of incorporation" in most States is termed as "articles of incorporation". 
131 Ibid Footnote 24. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid at 358. 
134 Ibid. 
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benefit for Sullivan. Moreover, the finder's fee and its aspects was disclosed to the 
general meeting formed to decide the sale. 
Therefore, there was no ground for the liability verdict against Sullivan except his 
purchase of ten thousands shares of the corporations stock after his meeting with 
Perelman which was not disclosed until the transaction was completed. 
7.3.2.2 no is interested 
A director becomes interested when he votes on a transaction involving his personal 
interests. In such circumstances, the director-should refrain from self- dealing. Under 
traditional common law principles, as a general rule, the transactions between 
corporation and its interested directors was voidabl e, irrespective of whether or not 
it was fair or approved by disinterested directors. 135 However, the law accepted a 
more liberal view by not holding voidable such transaction when it was approved by 
a disinterested majority of his fellow directors and was not proven to be unfair to the 
corporation or its stockholders. 136 
The Delaware law, like many other states, adopted this formulation as a "safe 
harbour". 137 the formulation which appeared in section 144(a) of the Delaware 
General Corporation Law, and provides that no contract between a director and his 
corporation shall be voidable if a majority of disinterested directors approves the 
contract and if the material facts as to his interest are disclosed. 
The ALI also gives a definition of an interested director as follows: 
"A director or officer is interested in a transaction if 1) the director or officer or an 
associate of the director or officer, is a party to the transaction, or 2) The director or 
officer has a business, financial or fan-dlial relationship with a party to the transaction, 
or 3) the director or officer, or a person with whom the director or officer has a 
business, financial or familial relationship, has a material personal interest in the 
135 B. M. Animashaun, "The Business Judgement Rule; Fiduciary Dudes and Liabilities of 
Corporate Directors", 16 Southern Univ. L. Rey-, (1989), 345,350, citing Munson v. Syracuse 
Geneva & Corning R., 103 N. Y. (1886) 59 73. 
136 Harold Marsh, "Are Directors Trustees, Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality". 22 Dim 
IaV_ (1966) 3 6,3 9- 40, Animashaun, op cit at 3 50. 
137 Schereiber v. Bryan, 396 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1978) 512,518. 
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transaction, or 4) The director or officer is subject to a controlling influence by a party 
to the transaction, or a person who has a material pecuniary interest in the 
transaction". 138 
Delaware cases steadily declare that the Delaware corporate directors have a 
fiduciary duty to the corporation and their shareholders not to further their own 
interests in disadvantage of those of their corporation. In Guth v. Lofl, 139 the 
Delaware Supreme Court referred to the rule as: 
"ICIorpomte officers and directors are not pem-dtted to use their position of trust and 
confidence to further their private interests. While technically not trustees, they stand 
in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders. " 140 
jý 
In viewing a self- interested transaction, although the duty of loyalty in corporate 
law area emerged from the duty of loyalty under agency law, the application of the 
duty in the latter is different, because in corporate law, a self- interested director 
deals with a subordinate, an equal, a superior, the board, or the shareholders. 141 
7.3.3 Standard of "Fairness" to Assess Self- interestedness 
To examine a contract between a corporation and its director, the courts often apply 
the "fairness test". As was mentioned in the earlier chapters, 142 the traditional view 
was that any contract between a director and his corporation was voidable. This 
resulted from an analogy being drawn between a trust position and that of a 
corporate director. But very soon it appeared to be a troublesome analogy, since the 
extent of freedom required by the latter to manage the business was broader. It was 
more problematic when a corporation was in need of loan, but its directors could 
not, as a consequence of this prohibition, provide it with the loan. 143 Therefore, the 
138 American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations 
Section 1.23 (Proposed Final Draft 1986). 
139 5 A. 2d (Del. 1939) 503. 
140 Ibid at 5 10. 
141 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, "Self- interested Transactions in Corporate Law", 32 Coll2orate 
plactice Commentator (1990- 91) 256,257. 
142 See the discussion of "Directors Duties in US". 
143 See e. g. Twin- Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 US (1875) 587. 
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law changed its view in this regard by allowing such contracts, provided there was 
an approval of disinterested majority of board of directors representing corporation. 
However, there was still fear of the practical possibility of an interested majority 
using its influence for its own personal interests. This concern persuaded the courts 
to establish a new standard as "fairness" test. 144 The burden of proving "fairness" of 
contracts is upon the proponent of the transaction once an interest of a director is 
shown. 14-1 The courts consider the standard of "fairness" as a factual determination 
which is dependant upon the facts of each case as well as the courts' interpretation of 
these facts. 146 This test is a matter of fair price which is a set between " the lowest 
price a seller will accept and the highest price a buyer will pay. " 147 
The standard has been expressed in the Delaware case of Sterling v. Mayflower 
Hotel CorPI48 as follows: 
"The requirement of fairness is unflinching in its demand that where one stands on 
both sides of a transactions, he has the burden of establishing its entire fairness, 
sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts. " 149 
Similarly, in Allied Chemical & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., 150 this measurement 
was considered as: 
"Fairness or unfairness of the price ... must be judged in the light of the conditions as 
they existed at the time of the execution of the contract. "151 
There has, so far, not been an attempt by the legislator or the courts to formulate the 
test of "fairness of price". However, some cases such as the Delaware case of Allaun 
v. Consolidated Oil Co., 111 have explained the use of price as a factor to determine 
the "fairness test". In that case the court stated that: 
144 Ibid. 
145 Pepper v. Litton, 308 US. (193 9) 295,306. 
146 Ransome Concrete Mach. Co. v. Moody, 282 F. (1922) 29,34. 
147 Ronald I Gibson, "A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case against Defensive Tactics 
in Tender Offers. ", 33 Hary. L. Rev. (1981) 819,825. 
148 93 A. 2d (1952) 107. 
149 Ibid at 110. 
150 14 Del. Ch. (Ch. 1923) 1. 
151 Ibid at 95. 
152 147 A. (Ch. 1929) 257. 
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"It is not every disparity between price and value that will be allowed to upset a 
proposed sale. The disparity must be sufficiently great to indicate that it arises not so 
much from an honest mistake in judgment concerning the value of the assets, as from 
either improper motives. "153 
The fairness standard can be applied even when the board of directors are not a party 
to the contract in question but its approval is required, where they may be indirectly 
involved. This is the case, when the approval of the board of directors of the target 
company is required before a proposed transaction, merger or sale of assets, is to be 
put before the shareholders. Such an approval or consent of the target's board is a 
pre- requirement, provided by statutes, 154 not only for the importance of the 
directors' co-operation with the transaction proceeding, but most significantly 
because any merger or sale of assets is, without such an approval, impossible. 
The situation seems more crucial when the target's board rejects a proposed 
transaction beneficial to the shareholders, and uses its pre- eminent position to 
forestall a potentially valuable merger or take- over which is a result of its high 
authority position in a public corporation. 155 
The question remains whether the 'fairness test' may be used as a "stand alone" test 
or only as a subsidiary measure after the question of disclosure and consent have 
been adequately addressed. Eisenberg has suggested that the employment of a 
disjunctive test would be satisfied, if either the director or senior executive makes a 
full disclosure or the transaction is concluded at a fair price. 1563 As to the question 
whether "fairness" test or "fairness of price" without disclosure is sufficient, he has 
argued that the suggestion that fairness of price is sufficient without need of 
disclosure, may increase the court scrutiny into the corporate decision- making 
process. In other words, it would remove decision- making from the corporation's 
hands and place it in the hands of the court. 157 In his discussion, Eisenberg refers to 
153 Ibid at 26 1. 
154 Delaware General Corp. Law s. 251 (merger), s. 271 (sale of assets). 
155 Gilson op cit at 825. 
156 Eisenberg op cit at 257. 
157 Ibid. 
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an argument that a distinction should be made between a director's failure to disclose 
a conflict of interest, and his failure to disclose some or one material fact as to the 
transaction itself, since a failure to disclose a conflict of interest may be fatal, 
whereas failure to disclose a material fact may not. Eisenberg holds the premise of 
this argument as "wrong" that the disclosure of a conflict of interest by the director 
concerned places the corporation on as if it was dealing with a third party, and 
consequently there is no need to press the director to disclose more information than 
a third party has to do-118 
It seems the afore- mentioned judicial decisions do not offer a clear formulation, on 
the basis of which a board of directors can satisfy the test of " fair price", particularly 
when the board or some of its members are obviously or heavily interested in the 
transaction concerned. The situation is more crucial when among various offers for a 
transaction, the lower price offer is, in long- term more beneficial to the corporation 
because of its social and economic advantages, e. g., for giving more security to the 
corporation's employees, or providing the corporation with an option to repurchase 
the shares or assets in sale under particular circumstances. 
Perhaps, the more justified suggestion is to interpret a "fair price" test as the most 
beneficial offer available to the corporation under the present circumstances of the 
case, which may vary case to case. Any decision, thus, to evaluate a "fairness of 
price" test, must be made with regard to all socio- economic aspects of the 
transaction in question. 
7.4 Liabilityfor Quasi- Fraudulent and Wrongiul Conduct 
As was earlier mentioned in the introduction, among those cases brought for breach 
of duty of loyalty, there are some fraudulent events that are treated as a matter of 
civil rather than criminal liability. These cases are, however, filed under liability for 
Ibid. 
Corporate Directors'Duties &Dabilifies In Insolvency in England and the US 256 
disloyalty. When such a case is brought before the court, the liability imposed is 
similar to a case of breach of loyalty. The question whether or not the plaintiff filed 
such action as a case of fraud but the court proceeded it as a case of breach of 
fiduciary duty, does not change the conclusion that directors liability, except liability 
for fraudulent conveyance, in the US is often confined in liability for breach 
of fiduciary duty. Logue Mechanical Contracting Corp. 159 is a good example of this 
class of cases where in an action taken by Logue Mechanical Contracting Corp. 's 
creditors, it was alleged that the directors and the only shareholders of the company, 
had breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty. In this case, Logue Mechanical 
Contracting Corporation was formed in 1977 of which Arthur H. Logue was 
controlling shareholder and the chairman of the board of directors as well as the 
president of the corporation. His son William M Logue was the only other 
shareholder and the corporation's vice- president, and Helen M Logue secretary and 
director of the corporation. 
At the fiscal year ending August 31,1983 financial statements showed a loss of $55, 
876 and a decrease in working capital of $77,383. In order to overcome the 
depression, Arthur Logue made loans to the company "as a separate entity, not as an 
, alter ego' of himself " 160 These loans were made as "real and genuine", and for "the 
purpose of benefiting the corporation. " 161 However, by the end of 1985, it had no 
secured or priority debts, but a $147,572,30 on deposit in the bank. 
The corporation filed a petition under chapter II of the Bankruptcy Code for 
reorganisation. As a result of continuing trading from January to September, the 
amount on deposit declined to $37,186,59, and it lost some jobs immediately after 
filing the reorganisation petition, and could get no contracts during the nine month 
chapter II proceedings. While the corporation was caused to continue, "substantial 
159 106 Bankr. (1989) 436. 
160 lbid at 488. 
161 lbid at 439. 
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payments were made to Arthur and William Logue in the form of wages, benefits, 
and rents despite the lack of business activity. " 162 
The court rejected the defendant directors' assertion that their decision should be 
judged by the business judgment rule, and that the payment of salary and rents in 
question were a fair exchange for the valuable services they had rendered. 163 The 
court took the view that: 
"Continued operation benefited only the Logues to the detriment of the Corporation 
and its creditors. Evidence clearly shows that almost immediately after the filing of the 
petition, the Corporation ceased all operations and had no hope of reorganising. Yet, 
5, the Logues, as the Corporatiores stockholders, officers and directors elected to 
continue operations and receive payments in the form of salaries and rents in 
furtherance of their self-intcrests. "164 
The court went on to determine that the Logues had violated their fiduciary 
obligation to their corporation and its creditors, because: 
"The evidence indicates that it was clear immediately after the filing that the 
Corporation could not reorganise. ... the 
Logues continued to operate the business 
solely for the benefit of receiving salaries, benefits and rents. A reasonable person 
using ordinary skill, care and diligence would have immediately ceased operations and 
proceeded to liquidate the business to maximise the return to creditors. "165 
Finally, the defendant directors were held liable for the decrease in cash balance from 
$96$ 55 It 93 in March 3 1, to $37,186,59 through September 1986. Therefore, they 
were to reimburse the corporation for the difference of $59,363$ 34. 
Similarly, in the leading case of Clarkson Co. Ltd. v. Shaheen, 166an action was filed 
by trustees against Shaheen and five other directors to recover moneys advanced or 
loaned by Newfoundland Refining Company Limited NRC to John Shaheen and 
companies related to him (the Shaheen group). At trial, the jury found that Shaheen 
and his companies owed a total of $ 50 n-dllion to NRC which included $ 30 million, 
162 Ibid. 
163 Ibid. - 
164 Ibid at 440. 
165 Ibid at 440- 41. 
166 660 F. 2d. Cir. (1981) 506. 
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consisting of loans made by NRC to the Shaheen group during 1974 and 1975.167 Of 
the six Shaheen corporations to which NRC loaned money, Shaheen was a director 
and controlling person of each. The loans were made at the instigation of the 
directorf and they participated by signing cheques. 168 The loan and advancement was 
made when NRC was insolvent, with no fair consideration. Therefore, it was found 
fraudulent to creditors and in violation of the New York Debtor and Creditor Law. 
Moreover, a Promissory Note and Letter Agreement executed in October 1975 was 
also found fraudulent for the same reasons. The defendants immediately before 
transmitting 'effective control' of NRC to its creditors, converted a demand note for 
, W, 
$45 million due from Shaheen affiliates into a long- term note and postponed all 
payments for 10 years, for which NRC received no consideration. 
It was ordered that the Shaheen group repay the $50 million in loans)the five 
directors jointly and severally were held liable with the Shaheen group for the $ 30 
million fraudulently loaned in 1974 and 1975, as well as liable for the $23 million 
damages caused by entering into the Promissory Note. The court also declared Note 
null and void. The $30 n-dllion sum assessed against the directors for breach of their 
fiduciary duty owed to creditors was apportioned according to the percentage 
amounts assigned by the jury against each. 169 The jury also found that: 
"the five individual defendants had breached their fiduciary duty to NRC and its 
creditors with respect to (a) the making of loans and advances in 1974 and 1975, and 
(b) the making of the Promissory Note of October 1975. "170 
The court was of the view that liability of the directors must be based on: 
"a finding that the directors knew or should have known of advances being made for 
less than a fair consideration while NRC was insolvent. 171 ... Likewise, there was 
sufficient evidence to support the finding that the directors knew or should have known 
that the "loans" were made when NRC was insolvent and without fair 
consideration. 172 
167 Ibid at 508. 
169 Ibid at 5 10. 
169 ibid. 
170 Ibid at 5 11. 
171 ibid at 512. 
172 Ibid at 513. 
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The court finally upholding the jury's decision that directors were liable for "breach 
of their fiduciary duties owed to creditors", concluded that the $30 million loan 
without consideration, while NRC was insolvent, 173 and the conversion of the 
demand note to a term note was a fraudulent transfer "with intent to delay and 
defraud creditors. " 174 
In the above mentioned case, which in substance is similar to Logue Mechanical 
Contracting Corp., 175 some points which formed the basis of the court's reasoning 
are important. The main consideration is existence of a fraudulent or bad faith on the 
part of the defendant directors with "intent trdefi-aud creditors. " 
The two recent cases are the obvious examples of decisions in which the court 
clearly have addressed a fraud under concept of breach of duty of loyalty. In the US 
corporation law, such liabilities are, indeed, considered under liability for breach of 
duty of loyalty. That is because not only there has not been a statutory provision 
defining a fraudulent liability for this particular purpose, but because the courts and 
commentators prefer to avoid imposition of a criminal liability on a director for his 
misconduct. In the two above cases, the only liability imposed on the director was 
civil liability, which was the recovery and reimbursement of the plaintiff creditors, 
rather than a criminal one such as imprisonment. 
7.5 Conclusion 
In reviewing liability of a corporate director in the US law, some ends can be 
summarised. It seems the distinction between the liability for breach of duty of care 
and that of duty of loyalty is not clear enough in some cases. 176 There is no doubt 
that the Van Gorkom decision caused some radical changes in protection statutes in 
favour of corporate directors, but as was seen in post- Van Gorkom cases, it pushed 
173 Ibid at 515. 
174 Ibid at 511. 
175 106 Bankr. (1989) 436. 
176 For example see Bayer v. Beran, 49 N. Y. 'S. 2d (Sup. Ct. 1994) 2. 
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the courts to a position to decide directors' liability with extra caution which always 
is not necessary. Consequently, an obvious reluctance can be seen among the judges 
to hold directors liable for negligence. It is not all a positive development. The Van 
Gorkom decision while caused the legislature to introduce some historical protective 
statutory provisions, should have in the same line persuaded the courts as well as 
lawmakers to provide some definitions and rules to clarify any uncertainty which 
may affect the efficiency of the deterrent effect of the liability. 
It is not difficult to claim that the US post- Van Gorkom courts in the arena of 
corporate directors liabilities for breach of du*t*ies generally and for that of negligence 
particularly have worked under shadow of the Van Gorkom case's nightmare. 
Moreover, there is a considerable uncertainty in the courts' view in determining 
whether or not a defendant director is liable for breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty. 
As was already mentioned, a comparison between some cases such as Smith v. Val? 
Gorkom 177 and Lewiss v. Honeywell Inc., 178 gives rise to the question that what are 
exactly the factors or criteria for the courts to make their judgment; having a 
properly informed decision or its beneficiality to the company or a third one? Which 
one is more decisive? 
The Van Gorkom case represent the application of the first factor, where the court 
was not prepared to take the significant fact into its account that, though the 
defendants were not informed in their decision- making process, this was not a total 
lack of information. As the Delaware Chancery Court held in the above case, the 
directors had sufficient expertise on the market price. Their decision was, therefore, 
properly informed. Furthermore, the court did not consider the fact as important 
point that there was no more beneficial offer than the one accepted by the company's 
directors. Instead the court could have used this fact as a ground for its judgment 
that the defendant directors should have given a chance for a higher offer before 
accepting the offer in question. 
177 488 A. 2d (1985) 858. 
178 Del. CH. (July 28 1987) 93,565, quoted by Radin at 727. 
Corporate Directors'Duties &Liabilities in Insolvency in England and the US 261 
In the second case, Lewiss v. Honeywell Inc., though the court was clear on the 
point that the directors did not consult an investment banker for declining the all- 
cash offer, nor did they disclose the offer which was very beneficial to the 
corporation, it refused to hold them liable for negligence. That was because the 
defendants were, thus, not totally uninformed in making their decision. 
It seem the circumstances of the above cases are similar to those of the Van 
Gorkorn case, however, the court of Lewiss v. Honeywell Inc. dismissed the 
allegation of negligence, whereas the conditions for holding the defendants liable 
were more available than those in Van Gorkorn case. Is it because of cautious stance 
of the court resulted from the Van Gorkom phenomenon, or due to lack of a 
statutory or uniformed set of rules governing neglect conduct of corporate directors, 
particularly in Delaware? The same criticism goes to a liability for breach of duty of 
loyalty. For example, while in Cede & Co., Inc., v. Technicolor, Inc., 179 the 
defendant director was held liable for having a financial interest in the transaction in 
question and bad faith in negotiating the sale with the buyer before the corporation's 
chief executive met with the buyer. However, in this case, the defendant who 
discussed his employment contract with the buyer company was not found guilty of 
disloyalty. 
With regard to the above discussions, it is now time for Delaware introduced a new 
concept to replace the concept of disloyalty where a fraudulent intent to defraud the 
corporate creditors exists. 
0 
0 
179 634 A. 2d (1993) 345. 
Chapter 8-, Insurance and Indemnification against, and Elimination of 
Directors' Liabilities 
1 Introduction 
The US law in arena of corporate directurs liability has witnessed some major 
changes and developments in the last decade. On the one hand, there were 
circumstances arising in basic changes in the directors liability insurance market 
which gave rise to serious difficulties for corporations in obtaining or renewing their 
directors and officers' liability insurance, and on the other hand, the increasing 
interference by courts in the corporate decision- making process threatened to 
diminish the business judgment rule's traditional insulation of corporate decision- 
makersl from liability. Both these circumstances caused fears over the discouraging 
effects of these changes on directors and officers. Therefore, as a result of increased 
demand on the part of directors for more protection from personal liability, other 
protective alternatives were proposed. 
The issue requires a carefully observation, because overprotecting directors by the 
corporation might reduce the deterrent effect of legal sanction and diminish the 
purpose belind the imposition of liability on delinquent directors and, thus, 
encourage wrongdoing behaviour. On the other hand, having underprotected 
directors may deprive the corporation of the ability to attract competent individuals 
to the boardroom-' 
James J. Hanks, "Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and Officer Liability Limitation 
and Indemnification", 43 Bus. Law. (1988) 1207- 08. 
2 Josef W. Bishop, "Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks; New Trends in the Indemnification of 
Corporate Directors and Officers", 77 Yale L. J., (1968) 1078, Note, "Liability Insurance for 
Corporate Executives", 80 Hary. L. Rev. (1967) 648, [Thereafter 80 Hary. L. Rev. (1967)], Josef F. 
Johnston "Corporate Indemnification and Liability Insurance for Directors and Officers", 33 DuL 
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Corporate directors need to protect themselves either by direct indemnification or 
insurance against the consequences of breach of their duty or negligence, or by 
persuading their corporation to enter a chapter cap provision into the corporate 
certificate or otherwise, eliminating or limiting their liability. 
Providing directors with protection against legal actions is considered a necessity for 
safer and more confident business. The availability of protection reduces the 
discouraging effects of the insurance crisis to directors and, therefore, the possibility 
of their resignation. When protection is available to a director whether in the form of 
insurance, indemnification, or charter cap, iris easy for him to take risks in good 
faith. Conversely, if such protection is not available, he may avoid taking any sort of 
risky business decision in order to decrease the possibility of being caught by various 
liability provisions. 3 If directors are left without proper protection, they may refuse 
to serve on the board as a director. It may, thus, not only discourage inside directors 
but also outside directors, because the latter are part time with a modest benefits, 
and are not required to demonstrate a high level of skill and diligence. In the US, the 
protection of directors has been formulated first by States laws in the forms of 
indemnification, insurance and elimination or limitation of liabilities and secondly, by 
an American developed common law rule known as the business judgment rule. 
This chapter considers indemnification, insurance against and elin-dnation or 
limitation of liability. The business judgment rule which also operates as a protection 
measure is studied in the next chapter. 
8.2 Indemnification and Insurance 
Although it is well recognised that insurance is an indirect form of indemnification, 
most commentators usually examine directors liability insurance separately from 
LMy,, (1978), 1993, Note, "Public Policy and Directors' Liability Insurance", 67 Colum. L. Rev. 
1967) 716 [Thereafter 67 Colum. L. R (1967)]. 
Dale A. Oesterle, "Limits on a Corporation's Protection of Its Directors and Officers from 
Personal Liability", Wis. L. Rev. (1983) 513p 514, Alfred F. Conard, "A Behavioural Analysis of 
Directors' Liability for Negligence", Duke L. J. (1972) 898-900. 
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direct indemnification or reimbursement. It is understandable, because in a direct 
indemnification there are only two parties; the corporation which reimburses its 
directors, and the directors as beneficiaries, whereas in the case of insurance, a third 
party, namely insurer company exists. 
To justify indemnification of directors by their corporation, some commentators have 
compared a relationship of a director and his corporation with that of an agent and 
his principal. According to this view, it is an established rule that an implied promise 
on the part of principal to indemnify his agent for losses which are the direct and 
natural consequence of the execution orthe agency including counsel's fees 
expended in litigation based on such acts, as well as damages resulting from acting in 
good faith to third parties for an alleged wrongdoing. 4 But case law does not show a 
tendency to recognise an obligation for the corporation to do so in the absence of 
any by-laws, contract or resolution. 5 
8.2. ]Indemnification 
At common law, an employee or agent was entitled to be indemnified, provided that 
the employee was successful in the primary SUit. 6 
Judges also allowed indemnification on the condition that the litigation had been 
beneficial to the corporation. 7 Some courts applied a wide interpretation of beneficial 
litigation concept. According to this approach, the indemnification of a litigation was 
beneficial when, it could attract competent individuals into service. In Solimine v. 
Hollander, g the court approved an indemnification when, in the court's view, it could 
attract "responsible business men to accept the post of directors". This rationale can 
4 Bishop, op cit at 1065. 
5 Du Duy v. Crucible Steel Co., 288 Fed. (W. D. Pa. 1923) 583, (Quoted by Bishop, op cit at. 
1066). 
6 Allan M. Terrel, "Indemnification of Employees", 5 Del. J. Corp. L. (1980) 265- 6, Moricoll v. P. 
& Mgt. Co., 104,111. App. 3d, (1982) 234, Johnson v. Suckow, 53 111. App. 3d (1977) 277. 
7 William E. Knepper & Dan A. Bailey, Li ililY Of-CoUrate Officers and Directors, (Virginia: 
the Nfichie Company 4d. cd. 1988) 20.01. 
8 19 A. 2d (1941) 344,348. 
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be even seen behind recent judicial decisions. For example, a Delaware court in 
Green v. Wesicap Corp., 9 held that: 
"[The statute] had as its objective that capable persons would be more willing to serve 
as corporate officers and directors by being provided with indemnification for their 
expenses in defending against attacks upon their conduct as corporate officers and 
directors. "10 
8.2.1.1 Stalutory andjudicial authorisation 
The first statutory indemnification, which was copied by Delaware and many other 
States, was introduced by New York StaTe in 1941.11 The enactment of the 
indemnification statute was a reaction to the case of New York Dock Co. v. 
MaCCOIIOM, 12 and permitted corporations to indemnify their directors. Prior to the 
decision in this case, directors were entitled to be reimbursed the expenses incurred 
while acting as agents. However, in that case, it was held that there was no implicit 
obligation imposed upon the company to indemnify its directors against legal 
expenses, even if his defence had been successful. 
Delaware, two years later, introduced its first statutory inderniacation provision. 13 
However, the Delaware statute was repealed in 1967 and its new version became to 
be a model for the most modem indemnification statutes. 14 According to the 1967 
statute, a corporation was authorised to indemnify its directors and officers for 
expenses, fines, judgment, and settlement costs in third party suits, provided they had 
acted in good faith and in a manner they reasonably believed to be in or not opposed 
to the best interests of the corporation. 15 
The current Delaware statutory provision relating to directors' indemnification is 
similar to the 1967 law. Section 145(a) of Delaware Law states: 
9 492 A. 2d (Del. Sup. 1985) 260. 
10 Ibid at 262- 63. 
11 N. Y. Laws Ch. 35 s. 1 (1941). 
12 16 N. Y. S. 2d (Sup. Ct. 1939) 847. 
13 44 Del. Laws (1943) 125. 
14 Knepper & Bailey, Liability of Corporate Offi=M and Directors, at 20.04. 15 Del. Gen. Corp. Law s. 145(a)(1967). 
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"A corporation may indemnify any person who was or is a party or is threatened to be 
made a party to any threatened, pending or completed action, suit or proceeding, 
whether civil, criminal, administrative or investigative (other than an action by or in 
the right of the corporation) by reason of the fact that he is or was a director, officer, ... 
against expenses (including attorneys' fees), judgments, fines and amount paid in 
settlements actually and reasonably incurred by him in connection with such action, 
suit or proceedings if he acted in good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to 
be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation, and, with respect to any 
criminal action or proceedings, had no reasonable cause to believe his conduct was 
unlawful.... "16 
The purpose of indemnification, including insurance explained by FolkI7 as "the 
invariant policy of Delaware legislation on indemnification is to 'promote the 
desirable end that corporate officials will resist what they considee unjustified suits 
and claims" and "to encourage capable men to serve as corporate directors, secure in 
the knowledge that the expenses incurred by them in upholding their honesty and 
integrity as directors will be bome by the corporation they serve'. " 
As to this subsection, some points need to be noted. The subsection introduced a 
permissive or discretionary but not obligatory provision. A corporation may, thus, 
voluntarily oblige itself to indemnify its directors through by- laws or contracts. As 
stated in the legislative text, subsection (a) is applicable only to third parties actions, 
but not those brought by, or in the right of the corporation. 
Likewise, New York has authorised an indemnification's which is described as 
representing a balance between "providing protection and maintaining a check on 
aberrant behaviour. " 19 
16 Del. Gen. Corp. Law s. 145 (a) (Amd. 1992). 
17 Ernest L. Folk, III, The Delaware General Colporation Law, (1972) 98. 
18 N. Y. Bus. Corp. Law s. 721 (McKinney 1994). The section reads: 
mThe indemnification and advancement of expenses granted pursuant to, or provided by, this article 
shall not be deemed exclusive of any other rights to which a director or officer seeking 
indemnification or advancement of expenses may be entitled, whether contained in the certificate of 
incorporation or the by-laws or ... provided that no indemnification may be made to or on behalf of 
any director or officer if a judgment or other final adjudication adverse to the director or officer 
establishes that his acts were committed in bad faith or were the result of active and deliberate 
dishonesty and were material to the cause of action so adjudicated, or that he personally gained in 
fact a financial profit or other advantage to which he was not legally entitled. " 19 Sara R. Slaughter "Statutory and Non- Statutory Responses to the Director and Officer Liability 
Insurance Crisis" 63 Ind. L. Rev. (1987) 181-. 
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It seems under New York statute no indemnification is permitted when a director is 
held liable for violation of his duty to his corporation. 
The important question is as to the extent a corporation can indemnify its directors, 
and more importantly, the means through which the corporation may indemnify its 
directors; whether by charters, bylaws or other forms of contract, by decision of a 
majority of shareholders, or by resolution of directors. The more important question 
is whether an indemnity can be provided against future damages. 
As to the earlier question, it seems an indemnity provision can appear in a certificate 
of incorporation, bylaw, a resolution of sfrareholders or the board of directors. 
However, in order for such a protective device to be effective, it should have been 
approved by shareholders. Concerning the second question, one may claim that any 
obligation on the corporation's part to indemnify its directors for damages which may 
be incurred in the future could be challenged on the public policy basis, because it 
leads to the conclusion that the directors, aware of such protection, may act 
recklessly without due care. This argument seems weak and unjustified. Because for 
the same reason upon which an insurance, covering prospective damages is 
considered consistent with public policy, a direct indemnification as such should, 
thus, be held valid. Moreover, in order for an indemnification to be effective, some 
requirements such as acting in good faith and in a manner that the director 
reasonably believed to be in the best interests of the corporation, should be met. 
However, a federal court in an unsuccessful derivative suit defence held the 
defendant director entitled to indemnification on the basis of a contract which 
provided in return for indemnification the director would resign before termination 
of his employment contract. 20 
Section 145(d) provides the procedure of the implementation of an indemnification 
and those who can determine its entitlement as follows: 
"Any indemnification under subsection (a) and (b) of this section (unless ordered by a 
court) shall be made by the corporation as authorised in the specific case upon a 
20 Mooney v. Willys- Overland Motors, Inc. '204 F. 2d (3d Cir. 1953) 889. 
i 
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determination that indemnification of the director, officer, ... is proper in the 
circumstances because he has met the applicable standard of conduct set forth in 
subsection (a) and (b) of this section. "21 
As to this subsection, it is suggested that entitlement to indemnification whether 
permissive or mandatory, whether by statute, by- law or contract is not automatic, 
but must be made by the appropriate decision maker authority. 22 
It appears that the authority of the decision- maker is limited to ensuring the 
requirements have been met, but not to determine its entitlement. Moreover, this 
subsection has referred to subsections(a) and (b) which both are discretionary but 
K 
not to subsection (c) which is obviously mandatory. 
8.2.1.2 Expenses of defence 
In respect of expenses of defence, case law has long recognised the reimbursement 
of directors' expenses for their successful defence in a derivative action. For 
example, in Solimine v. Holland&23 the court stated that the directors' successful 
defence had aided the corporation by defending the "corporation image" and they 
were, thus, entitled to the reimbursement of such expenses. However, the 
corporation could not indemnify a director for the costs of a successfully defence if 
such defence did not directly benefit the corporation. 24 
In the 1930's, indemnifying directors involved in corporate litigation for legal 
expenses was easily justifiable. However, for the first time in the New York case of 
New York Dock Co. v. MacCoJJOM25 the court held that a corporation could not 
indemnify its directors for legal expenses even if they had successfully defended a 
derivative action suit. The court built its reasoning on the ground that the 
21 Del. Gen. Corp. Law s. 145 (d) (Amd. 1992). 
22 E. N. Veasy, Jesse A. Finkelstein, and C. Stephen Bigler, "Delaware Supports Directors with a 
Three- Legged Stool of Limited Liability, Indemnification, and Insurance", 42 Bus. Law., (1987) 
399,408. 
23 19 A. 2d (Ch. 1941) 344. 
24 y. Y Dock Co. v. McCollom, 173 Misc. (1939) 1069. 
25 16 N. Y. S. 2d (1939) 847. 
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corporation could only invest in the projects which directly benefited the 
corporation, whereas in the court's view, legal fees did not meet this criterion. 26 
The Delaware General Corporation Law in section 145(b) has expressly expanded 
indemnification provisions to the expenses of defence. The section provides that: 
"A corporation may indemnify any person who was or is a party or is threatened to be 
made a party to any threatened, pending or completed action or suit by or in the right 
of the corporation to procure a judgment in his favour by reason of the fact that he is or 
was a director, officer ... against expenses (including attorney' fees) actually and 
reasonably incurred by him in connection with the defence or settlement of such action 
or suit if he acted in good faith and in a manner-ite reasonably believed to be in or not 
to opposed to the best interest of the corporation ... " 
27 
This subsection is distinguished in several ways from subsection (a); 18 First, it 
permits only defence expenses including attorney's fees but not indemnification of 
judgment or payments for settlements; Secondly, this subsection does not provide 
indemnification "in respect of any claim, issue or matter as to which such person 
shall have been adjudged to be liable to the corporation unless and only to the extent 
that the Court of Chancery or the court in which such action or suit was brought 
shall determine upon application, despite the adjudication of liability but in view of 
all the circumstances of the case, such person is fairly and reasonably entitled to 
indemnity for such expenses which the Court of Chancery or such other court shall 
deem proper"; 29 Thirdly, unlike subsection(a), this subsection applies to actions 
brought by or in the right of corporation. 30 
It seems, when under subsection (b) the rule is that a defendant director can be 
indemnified against any expense of defence in an action brought by, or in the right of 
26 ibid. The line of this sort of decisions followed by the other New York case of Bailey v. Bush 
Terminal Co., 46 N. Y. S. 2d 877, affd. 48 N. Y. S. 2d ( Sup. 1943), 324 where referring to 
common law rules any right for reimbursement was denied. 
27 Del. Gen. Corp. Law s. 145 (b) (Amd. 1992). 
29 For a discussion on subsection 145 (a), see supra "Statutory Authorisation" for indemnification. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Veasy, Finkelstein, and Bigler, op cit 405. 
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corporation, the expenses of defence in a third party action should be preferably 
permitted. " 
8.2.1.3 Mandatory or discretionary indemnification? 
In most jurisdictions, either a statute or common law provides indemnification for 
legal expenses including attorneys' fees, when a litigant wins the case. 32However, it 
is said that Delaware case law has not established any criterion to answer the 
question of the extent corporations may go in indemnifying their directors and 
officers beyond the statutes. 33 jw& 
In Green v. Westcap Corp. Delaware, 34 the court held that an officer who was 
successful on the merits in being acquitted of criminal charges, was entitled to 
indemnification, and that the respondent did not have the additional burden of 
proving that he acted in good faith in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or not 
opposed to the best interests of the corporation, as required by section 145(a) (b). 33 
Indemnification statutes generally provide for mandatory indemnification when a 
party has been successful on the merits or otherwise. Most State laws adopting the 
expression "or otherwise" on the basis of the fact that a director is not required to 
establish his eligibility for mandatory indemnification on the merits if he has a valid 
procedural defence. 36However, the Delaware law, which allows a partial mandatory 
indemnification is the best example for this purpose. Section 145(c) has introduced a 
mandatory indemnification as follows: 
31 Besides subsection (b), section 145(e) also authorises corporations to pay expenses including 
attorneys' fees incurred by a director or officer in defending any'civil, criminal, administrative or 
investigative action, suit or proceeding in advance, of final disposition of those legal'procedures, 
upon receipt of an undertaking by or on behalf of the director or officer to repay such amount, if it 
is determined that he is not entitled to indemnity by the corporation. Del. Gen. Corp. Law s. 145 (e) 
(ýkmd. 1992). 
32 Oesterle, op cit at 546. 
33 Knepper &. Bailey, Liability of CoWrate Officers and Directors, at 20- 13. 34 492 A. 2d (Del. Sup. Ct. 1985) 260. 
35 Ibid at 264- 5. 
36 Dennis Block Et. Al. The Business Judgment Rule: Fiducialy Duties of Corporate Directors 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall & Business 1993) 564. 
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"To the extent that a director, officer, employee, or agent of a corporation has been 
successful on the merits or otherwise in defence of any action, suit or proceeding 
referred to in subsection (a) and (b) of this section, or in defence of any claim, issue or 
matter therein, he shall he indemnifledV against expenses (including attorney's fees) 
actually and reasonably incurred by him in connection therewith. "38 
By enacting the provision in a mandatory language, here, Delaware legislature has 
imposed an obligation on corporations to indemnify their directors in a successful 
defence. The wording of this subsection raises the question whether even when there 
is no indemnity requirement in the by-laws or contract, and when the requirements 
mentioned in the subsection are met, the o5ligation to indemnify the directors is 
i actually imposed on the corporation. There is no reason to doubt about this 
conclusion, because Delaware legislature by the phrase of "shall be indemnified" 
intended to provide a mandatory indemnification. 
Therefore, any agreement or bylaw removing such mandatory effects, may be set 
aside as ineffective. Conversely, any agreement or by-law imposing the duty to i 
indemnify its directors by the corporation beyond the statutory limits in section 
145(c), should be considered enforceable. 
Prior to 198 1, the New York legislature provided a mandatory indemnification, but it 
was required that the defence should have been wholly successful, whereas in 1986 
and as a result of increasing demand for more protection for directors, New York 
applied a change to its statute by removing the requirement of "wholly successful". 39 
I According to the new provision, even where success has been partial, 
indemrýification is allowed. 40 
I However, in the original form of the statute, indemnifying directors in a not wholly 
successful action was not entirely prohibited. Such an indemnification could be 
awarded by the decision of the board constituted of disinterested directors, or by the 
37 Emphasis added. 
38 The Delaware General Corporation Law s. 145(c). 
39 The drafters of the Model Business Act have defined a wholly successful as "Only if the entire 
proceeding is disposed of on a basis which involves a binding [ofl non- liability. " Rev. Model Bus. 
Corp. Act s. 8.25 official cmt at 250 (1992). - 40 N. Y. Bus. corp. Law s. 722(c) (McKinney 1993). 
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board upon an opinion of "independent legal council", or by the shareholders 
decision when the defendant directors had met the applicable standard of conduct. 41 
Furthermore, according to section 723(a), a "person who has been successful, on the 
merits or otherwise, in the defence of a civil or criminal action ... shall be entitled to 
indemnification as authorised in such section. " The legislature by the expression of 
"shall be entitled", here, intended a mandatory indemnification in the mentioned 
events concerned. 
As was mentioned, Delaware law provides a mandatory indemnification without any 
restrictions. Such view has received a full-support from judicial decisions which 
recognise public policy considerations as the sole restrictions. 42 In Mooney v. Willys- 
OverlandMotors, Inc. 43 the court held that to obtain an indemnification beyond the 
statutory provisions "an independent legal ground must be shown in every case". 44 
Unlike mandatory indemnification, which is automatic, a discretionary 
indemnification is something dependant upon the facts of each case. To permit such 
an indemnification, it is required to prove a finding that the party seeking 
indemnification has met the applicable standards of conduct. The standards of 
conduct are to be satisfied when the director has "acted in good faith and in a 
manner he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the 
corporation. 1145 
8.2.1.4 Expanded and non- exclusive indemnification 
Some States have expanded directors' and officers' indemnification by eliminating the 
traditional distinction between third party and derivative suits. Under this solution, 
by concluding a contract, those statutes permit corporations to provide greater 
indemnification rights to their directors and officers. 
41 Ibid s. 724(c). 
42 James v. Getty Oil Co., 472 A. 2d 33 (Del. Sup. 1983) (Quoted by Knepper &. Bailey, Liabilij3ý 
of ColRorate Officers and Directors, at 20- 14). 
43 204 F. 2d (3d Cir. 1953) 888. 
44 Ibid at 896. 
45 Del. Gen. Corp. Law s. 145(a) (1993 & Amd. 1992). 
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Indiana in this respect has a special view. The Indiana indemnification statute draws 
no distinction between actions brought by, or in the right of the corporation and 
those brought by third parties. Moreover, it extends indemnification to a judgment, 
settlement, penalty, fine as well as reasonable expenses, including counsel's fees. 46 
North Carolina has, on the other hand, permitted its directors to indemnify 
themselves without the need of approval of its shareholders. 47This is considered as a 
departure from the traditional rule that the contracts between the directors and their 
corporation should be approved by a disinterested body. 48 This State also permits 
49 indemnification in the case of a derivative action in wl-iich the plaintiff is successful. 
However, it is difficult to justify permitting indemnification when directors are held 
liable in a shareholder derivative action, because such an indemnification requires 
payment of damages from defendant director to the plaintiff company and then, by 
means of the indemnification, from the latter to the former. 50 
California case law has refused to allow indemnification in derivative actions. In 
Wickersham v. Crillenden, 51 the court held that any indemnification would deplete 
the purpose of a derivative action in which the respondent had been held liable, 
because such a reimbursement was nothing but a payment of shareholders' money to 
those who failed to exercise their fiduciary obligations to the corporation and its 
shareholders, and it was, thus, unfair. 
46 Ind. Code s. 23-1-37-4 and 8. (Quoted by Knepper &. Bailey, Liability of Cowrate Officets and 
Directors, at 20- 7). In most indemnification statutes, the actions brought by, or in the right of the 
corporation are distinguished from those by third parties, where the action is lost on the merits or 
settled. In suits by a third party including direct actions by a shareholder or governmental suits, the 
statutes are more liberal, whereas in actions brought by, or in the right of the corporation, 
indemnification is permitted for legal expenses, provided that the case is settled and the expenses 
actually and reasonably incurred by the director. In the second sort of cases, if the defendant is held 
liable for breach of his duty to the corporation, no indemnification is permitted without the court's 
apjproval. Model Bus. Corp. Act s. 5 (1967 & 1980). 
41 N. C. Gen. Stat. s. 55- 19 (a)- (b) (Sup. 1986). 
48 Thomas Lee Hazen, "Corporate Directors' Accountability: The Race to the Bottom- the Second 
Lap", 66 N. C. L. R. (1987) 171,178. 
49 N. C. Gen. Stat. s. 55 (1982). 
50 Lee Hazen, op cit at 174. 
51106 Cal. 329 (1895) 603. 
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The effect of an expanded provision is that the courts are empowered to establish 
broader boundaries for indemnification. Therefore, by-laws or contracts exceeding 
the statutory limits are valid, provided that, in the court's view, they have not 
offended public policy. 52 
The main feature of this expanded indemnification is its non- exclusivity. According 
to a non- exclusive indemnification, pursuant to a certificate of incorporation, 
shareholder resolution or an indemnification agreement or contract, a corporate 
program may be established in order to indemnify its directors beyond the lin-dtations 
of the statute. 53 This mechanism which is called non- exclusive indemnification, for 
the first time was introduced by section 145(f) without any restrictions. 54 Subsection 
(0 has been criticised by some legal writers as too liberal and in some occasions 
contrary to public policy when, for example, a by-law or agreement provides 
indemnification in favour of a director in spite of a finding in a derivative action that 
he has breached his fiduciary duty to the corporation. 55 
This criticism seems sound only when the breach of fiduciary duty is the breach of 
duty of loyalty, but not breach of duty of care. 
Likewise, New York has authorised indemnification, 56 which is described as 
representing a balance between "providing protection and maintaining a check on 
52 S. S. Archt & Walter K Stapleton, "Delaware's New General Corporation Law: Substantive 
Changes". 23 Bus. Law. (1967), 75,80. 
53 Block Et. Al, The Business Judgment Rule: Fiduci= Duties of CoWrate Directors at 580,616. 
54 Del. Gen. Corp. Law s. 145 (f) (Amd. 1992). According to section 145 (f): 
"the indemnification and advancement of expenses provided by, or granted pursuant to the other 
subsections of this section, shall not be deemed exclusive of any other rights to which whose 
seeking indemnification or advancement of expenses may be entitled under by- law, agreement, or 
vote of stockholders or disinterested directors or otherwise, both as to the action in his official 
capacity and as to action in another capacity while holding such office. " 
55 Johnston, op cit at 1993, Josef W. Bishop, The Law of Cor2grate Directors and Officers: 
Igoemnification and Insurano-Moston: Warren, Gorham & Lamont, Inc. 1982). 6.03 [II [a]. 
56 N. Y. Bus. corp. Law s. 721 (McKinney 1994). The section reads: 
"The indemnification and advancement of expenses granted pursuant to, or provided by, this article 
shall not be deemed exclusive of any other rights to which a director or officer seeking 
indemnification or advancement of expenses may be entitled, whether contained in the certificate of 
incorporation or the by-laws or ... provided that no indemnification may be made to or on behalf of 
any director or officer if a judgment or other final adjudication adverse to the director or officer 
establishes that his acts were committed in bad faith or were the result of active and deliberate 
dishonesty and were material to the cause of action so adjudicated, or that he personally gained in 
fact a financial profit or other advantage to which he was pot legally entitled. " 
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aberrant behaviour". 57 As it is understood from the Revision Note to the present 
section, unlike the Delaware statute, the New York law has a feature of exclusivity, 
according to which an indemnification provision should be consistent with the 
statute. 58 However, with regard to the header of section 721 which describes it as 
11non- exclusivity of statutory provisions for indemnification of directors and 
officers" on the one hand, and its similarity to section 102(f) of the Delaware law on 
the other hand, it is not clear how these two sections are distinguished with this 
characteristic. 
It seems, under New York statute, like DeMvare, no indemnification is permitted 
when a director is held liable for violation of his duty to his corporation. 
8.2.2 Insurance 
Insurance is a means of providing directors and officers with benefits which they 
cannot obtain through indemnification or liability eliminating or limiting statutes. In 
the absence of public policy limitations, insurance can be an officer's or director's 
only available source of relief when a corporation is unwilling or unable to extend 
indemnification. 59 Corporations should be authorised to purchase insurance for their 
directors against losses even those which are not indemnifiable, so long as the 
premium payments are considered reasonable compensation for services rendered. 60 
Directors' liability insurance was introduced as a result of the stock market crash and 
the enactment of the Federal securities laws in the 1930s, in order to protect 
57 Slaughter op cit at 18 1 
58 N. Y. Bus Corp. Act s. 721 (Revision Note 1994), The note reads: 
"The purpose of this section is to make clear that the provisions which follow relating to 
indemnification of directors and officers are exclusive and establish a policy from which no 
material deviadon is permissible. The addition of this section was induced by the need to clarify the 
extent to which statutory provision for indenuffication imposes a limitation upon the freedom of 
corporations to provide for such indemnification. " 
59 J. Erik Groves, "Corporate Law and Director Liability: Who Is Really Sitting On the Three- 
Legged Stool and Why North California Should Care" 24 Wake Forest L. Rev., (1989) 160. 
it is difficult to agree with this view as a pervasive one, when most States have adopted an 
amendment similar to section 102 of the Delaware law, whereas still state of Vermount and some 
districts have not allowed purchasing a directors liability insurance. 
60 Note, 80 Hary. L. Rev. (1967) at 667. 
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directors against liability from shareholder suits, when statutory indemnification 
rights were less express or expansive than under current law claims and insurance. 61 
A corporate directors' liability insurance can be concluded in two forms; two insuring 
clauses in '. two policy forinj and one insuring clause in two parts in one policy. The 
traditional liability insurance coverage of directors and officers consisted of two 
distinct parts in one poliCy. 62 The first part, namely "Directors and Officers Liability 
Insurance", which is direct or personal part of policy, reimburses the directors for 
losses for which they have not been indemnified by the corporation. Under the 
"direct" insuring clause, the coverage does7tot apply if the individual insured are 
indemnified or entitled to indemnification by the corporation, but the language is 
different in various policies. The second part of policy, "Corporation 
Reimbursement", in which directors have no direct role, is dealt with by the 
insurance company and the corporation. This coverage reimburses the corporation 
for amounts which are lawfully permitted or required to expend in indemnifying its 
directors and officers. Most of claims are made under the first part. 63 
8.2.2.1 Statutory authorisation 
Apart from Vermont State and districts of Columbia and Puerto Rico, all other 
States and districts have authorised corporations to purchase and maintain liability 
insurance for their directors and officers. 64 The New York Law allows insurance 
coverage as follows: 
"(b) No insurance under paragraph (a) may provide for any payment, other than cost of 
defence, to or on behalf of any director and officer: (i) If a judgment or other final 
adjudication adverse to the insured director or officer establishes that his acts of active 
and deliberate dishonesty were material to the cause of action so adjudicated, or that he 
personally gained in fact a financial profit or other advantage65 to which he was not 
61 Roberta Romano, "What Went Wrong With Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance? ", 14 
Del. J. Colp. L. (1989) 1,4. 
62 Note, 80 Hary. L. Rev. (1967) at 650, Joneston, op cit at 2013. 63 Knepper &. Bailey, Liability of CoýpMte Officers and Directors, at 21- 02. 64 Ibid at 21.03. 
65 Stress added. 
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legally entitled, or (ii) in relation to any risk the insurance of which is prohibited under 
the insurance law of New york. ', 66 
Knepper and Bailey have suggested that by including the words "or other 
advantage", the New York legislature may have prohibited insurance other than for 
defence costs when a director is held to have violated the duty of loyalty. 67 In the 
same discussion, they take the firmer view that "the New York law prohibits 
insurance coverage except for defenceCoStS". 68 
The Delaware law in this regard is clear. According to the Delaware General 
Corporation Law: 
"A corporation shall have power to purchase ZVI maintain insurance on behalf of any 
person who is or was a director, officer, employee or agent of the corporation ..... against 
any liability asserted against him and incurred by him in any such capacity, or arising 
out of his status as such, whether or not his corporation would have the power to 
indemnify him against such liability under the provisions of this section. , 69 
The very wide and clear language of the section indicating an insurance policy, is 
consistent with public policy, valid and enforceable. The other significant feature of 
this section is a clear distinction between indemnification and insurance. 
Furthermore, as the section expresses, a corporation can purchase insurance for its 
directors even when it is not empowered to indemnify them. 
8.2.2.2 Limits on insurance 
The important consideration concerning limits of liability insurance is the conduct of 
the insured. A person can, thus, only insure himself against losses caused by 
unintentional, but not by wilful wrongdoing. 70 Any intentional misconduct including 
fraud, conversion, corporate waste, taking corporate opportunities, and self dealing 
and any action contrary to public policy rules are all embraced in the definition of 
66 N. Y. Bus. Corp. Law s. 726(b). 
67 Knepper &. Bailey, Liability of Colporate officers and Directors at 21.04. 68 Ibid. 
69 Del. Gen. Corp. Law s. 145 (g) (Amd. 1992). 
70 See generally Mary C. McNeely, ' "Illegality as a Factor in Liability Insurance", 41 Colum. L. 
&y., (1941) 26. 
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advancing other's interests to those of the corporation at its expenses and, thus, 
excluded from insurance coverage. 
It has been implied that a director can insure himself against such liability to the 
corporation. 71 However, with regard to an examination of the nature of the 
director's conduct and purpose behind the civil liability, this approach has been 
challenged by arguing that such insurance is contrary to public policy in virtually all 
cases. 72 
There is no doubt that breach of duty of loyalty or disloyalty is not insurable when 
the immediate goal of the wrongdoer is personal benefit. For establishing a breach of 
duty presumption, the difficulty is that in many cases of disloyalty the director's 
personal benefit is not obvious enough, particularly when such benefit is indirect. 
Sometime his gain may be less than the corporation! s loss. 
As it is the case in all other protective means, public policy is viewed as the most 
significant limitation on directors liability insurance. Under the traditional "public 
policy", courts refused to enforce insurance policy, "the tendency of which is to 
endanger the public interests or injuriously affect the public good or which is 
subversive of sound morality. "73 
The approach that directors and officers liability resulting from wilful or intentional 
misconduct should not be insurable, 74 has been criticised as ignoring a growing line 
of cases, which enforces insurance policy against liability caused by the insured's 
intentional misconduct in order to provide full compensation to injured partieS. 75 
The important point concerning public policy issue is insurability of punitive 
damages. In this respect two opposing opinions can be distinguished. The first view 
considers punitive damages as not having an identifiable deterrence, but a 
71 Josef W. Bishop, "New Cure for an Old Ailment: Insurance Against Directors' and Officers' 
Liability", 22 Bus. Law. (1966) 92. 
72 Note, 67 Colum. L. Rev. (1967), 719. 
73 Ritter v. Mutual Life Co., 169 U. S. 13 9, (1898) 154. 
74 Johnston, op cit at 2027, Note, 80 Harv. L. Rev. (1967) at 655- 57. 75 Oesterle, op cit at 55 1, (Quoting Farbstein & Stillman, "Insurance for the Commissions Torts", 
20 Ha5jjp-"-L, (1969), 1219). 
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supplementary compensation which are not prohibited by public policy from being 
insured. 76 In some cases, particularly Alabama case law, punitive damages have been 
held within policy coverage and recoverable. 77 
The second approach which is adopted by majority, describing punitive damages as 
penal rather than compensatory takes the view that if such punishment is to be 
recognised as insurable, the deterrent effect intended for the damages would be 
destroyed. 78 Under Florida law, public policy absolutely prol-dbits indemnification 
against liability for punitive damages whether or not expressly covered by the 
insurance contract, 79There is also a consensus among commentators that punitive 
'MO, 
damages, as a matter of public policy, should not be included within the scope of 
80 insurance coverage. 
An insurance company which is unwilling to indemnify the insured against punitive 
damages awards, may disclaim such liability in the insurance policy. It is claimed that 
in the absence of such disclaimers, insurance policies should be extended to cover 
punitive awards. 81 
It seems even in the absence of disclaimers, the court may by relying on public policy 
considerations hold that punitive damages are not within the scope of the insurance. 
Even when an indemnification does not wipe out a judgment in favour of the 
corporation, public policy, nevertheless, may require the director to pay personally 
forjudgments against him. Therefore, it has been suggested that indemnification by 
the corporation should be forbidden where the directors liability to outsiders is 
intended to deter disfavoured conduct. 82 
76 Note, "Public Policy Prohibits Indemnification Against Awards of Punitive Damages", 63 
. 
glurn. L. Rev. (1963) 944,950- 95 1, [Thereafter 63 Colum. L. R (1963)]. C. ev. 77 See, e. g., American Fid & Cas. Co. v. Werfel, 230 Ala. (1935)552, Capital Motor Lines v. 
Loring 238 Ala. (1939) 260. 
78 Note, 67 Columbia L. Rev. (1967), at 719 79 Northern National Gas Co. v. McNulty, 307 F. 2d (5th cir, 1962) 432. 80 Logan, "punitive Damages in Automobile Cases" Ins. L. J. (1961) 1036. (Quoted in Note, 63 
Colum. L. Rev. (1963), 947). 
81 Ibid at 95 1. 
82 Note, Indemnification of Directors: The Problems Posed by Federal Securities and Antitrust Legislation, 76 Hary. L. Rev. (1963) 1408. 
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8.2.2.3 Expenses of defence 
Although some leading commentator have mentioned that "no duty or obligation is 
imposed by the typical directors and officers policy for insuring such expenses, 83 it 
seems an insurer is requires to defend an insured against all actions brought against 
him on the allegation of the facts and circumstances covered by the policy. 84 
Also a duty to defend as a result of "reasonable expectation" can be imposed by a 
court, when the court following a general rule resolving contractual uncertainties in 
the insured's favour, orders insurers to defend actions which they maintained were 
not covered by the insurance contract. The court in imposing such additional liability 
mostly rely on the fact that most insurance contracts are adhesion contracts. 85 
Consequently, an insurance company cannot be sure of not being ordered to defend 
an action when it had not explicitly contracted to do so, even when it thought it had 
contracted not to do so. 86 
A director appears to have to hire and pay for his attorney until the end of suit, when 
the insurance company will repay him the amount he has spent for legal fees. 
However, depended on the policy terms, the insurance company may become 
obliged to pay for legal expenses. 
It should be noted that the insurance company is to pay the costs of the directors' 
defence, but not those of the corporation itself. If, therefore, the directors have spent 
money to defend their corporation, no claim of reimbursement will be heard. The 
problem arises when the director and his company are sued in one lawsuit together. 
It is suggested that to solve any difficulty in such an occurrence, the costs of defence 
should be allocated between the insured director and the uninsured corporation. The 
problem will still be remaining if the claims against the corporation and its director 
83 Knepper &. Bailey, Liability of Colporate Officers and Directors at 21- 09. 84 Julie J. Bisceglia, "Practical Aspects of Directors' and Officers' liability Insurance- Allocating 
and Advancing Legal Fees and the Duty to Defend", 32 UCLA L. Rev. (1985) 690,705. 
85 Insurance C. off. Am. v. Sam Harris Constr. Co., 22 Cal. 3d (1978) 409,583. 
86 Ibid. 
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are not in the same level. To overcome the difficulty, the simplest way is that the 
corporation and its director hire their counsel separately. 87 
8.2.2.4 Insurance crisis 
"On Hawaiian island of Molokai, pregnant women who want a doctor in attendance 
when they give birth fly to neighbouring Oahu or Maui. The five Molokai doctors who 
once delivered have stopped doing so because malpractice insurance would cost them 
more than the total of any obstetrical fees they could hope to collect.,, 88 
The insurance crisis in the United States can be divided into two periodical 
classifications: the first precedes 1984 and'1he second relates to 1984 onwards. 
Before 1984, the expanding coverage and falling prices were the obvious 
characteristics of insurance. However, after 1984 the US trade community 
experienced a serious crisis resulting in a sky rocket increasing of premiums and 
deductibles. As insurance protection declined, directors and officers seemed to be 
more vulnerable to financial hardships resulted from liability orders. Consequently, 
some directors resigned their jobs, and corporations had serious difficulty to recruit 
to those posts. 89 According to the 1985 Wyatt Directors and Officers Liability 
Insurance Survey: 
11 18.5 percent of the companies it surveyed for its 1984 Directors and Officers Liability 
Survey, had experienced claims against their directors, up from 7.1 percent ten years 
earlier. rMs is] an increase of 182 percent. At the same time, the average cost of 
defending these claims had risen dramatically from $181,500 per claim ten years ago 
to $461,000 today, [Moreover] the percentage of claims paying over $1 million rose 
from 4.8 to 8.3 percent, and the average settlement award [rose] from $385,000 to 
$583,000. "90 
There had been a reverse circulation in this regard between 1983- 1986 hardening 
the directors' situation. On the one hand, the number of claims was rising and the 
judgment value of claims increasing, when the degree of protection offered by 
87 Bisceglia, op cit at 716. 
88 "Sorry, Your Policy Is Cancelled", ]lg_Ti=, (March 24 1986) 26. 
89 Baum, " The Job Nobody Wants". Bus. Wk. Sept. 8 (1986) 56. 
90 The 1985 Wyatt Directors and Officers Liability Insurance Survey. 
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insurers was decreasing, and on the other hand, the insurers adding exclusive clauses 
astronomically increased the premiums to 15,00%- 2,000% higher than their 
previous levels. 91 For example prior to 1985 directors premiums for large companies 
were less than $200,000 for as much as $100.00 million coverage insurance, 
whereas, less than a year later they were increased in some cases to $1 million for 
$50 million coverage. 92 
The reports indicate that many directors resigned from their positions or refused to 
renew their service contracts when liability insurance was unavailable, and many 
competent individuals refused to serve as c Grectors when their companies had lost 
insurance, 93 so that only within six months in 1987 some leading companies such as 
the Control Data Corporation, the Continental Steel Corporation, the Lear 
Petroleum, South Texas Drilling & Exploration Inc., and Skyes Dataronics lost their 
directors when their insurance policies ended. 94 Not only commercial enterprises 
were hit by the crisis, but also municipal authorities and other governmental entities 
experienced an extreme increase in premiums or a serious unavailability of market 
insurance coverage altogether. In some parts of the country, the jails had no choice 
but to close, releasing some prisoners and suspend police patrols until insurance 
coverage was obtained. 95 Even, because of fears over uninsured liability, the fourth 
of July celebrations were cancelled. 96 Some governmental services rashly reacted to 
the crisis by suspending public services and removing all playground equipment from 
their public parks. 97 Other services such as plans for experimental bus- rail line were 
cancelled when no insurance coverage was available. 98 
91 Olson, "The Directors and Officers Insurance Cap: Strategies for Coping", Legal Times (March 
3 1986) 25, Slaughter, op cit at 182. 
92 Thomas C. Lee, "Lin-dting Corporate Directors' Liability: Delaware's Section 102(b)(7) and the 
Erosion of the Directors'Duty of Care", 136 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. (1987) 239,253. 
93 Romano, op cit at 50. 
94 Lewis, "Director Insurance Drying up", Njjýl=, (Mar. 7,1986) at D1, col. 3. 95 "Sorry, Your Policy Is Cancelled", at 27- 28, "Business Struggling to Adopts Insurance Crisis 
S reads". -Wall 
St. J. (21 Jan. 1986) 3 1. 
9ý George L. Priest, "The Current Insurance Crisis and Modem Tort Law", 96 yajLjjý, (1987) 
1522. 
97 "Sorry, Your Policy Is Cancelled", at 33. 
98 "Business Struggling to Adopts Insurance Crisis Spreads". at 3 1. 
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Despite the statutory authorisation for Delaware corporations to purchase and 
maintain D&0 liability insurance, many corporations faced difficulties in obtaining 
or maintaining sufficient coverage at a reasonable cost. Many insurers offering D& 
0 liability insurance withdrew from the market or restricted the coverage offered. 99 
What was the cause of the crisis? For the crisis a large range of theories are 
suggested by commentators. 100 However, most of them refer to the sudden 
increases in insurance premiums and the occasional withdrawal of insurance 
coverage during early 1986. The cause of crisis is described as unclear. 101 
Nevertheless, it is believed that the important cause for the insurance crisis in the 
1980s was more relevant to economic performance. The increase in bankruptcy 
cases concerned the insurers, when their insured have been often sued by bankruptcy 
trustees and shareholders. 102 
The Gorkom case, from view of law injected a major shock into insurance market. 
The indirect consequence of holding corporate directors liable in that case, was a 
harder and more expensive insurance to get. 
Some commentators have referred to the directors insurance system itself and its 
self- inflicted through competitive underpricing and questionable management as the 
main cause of the crisis. 103 The insurers raised the premiums because they suffered 
heavy losses on directors policies, expecting bigger losses, 104 Which was a result of 
the companies competitive rate cutting on commercial property- liability. 105 
It is difficult to suggest a particular factor as the sole or even the main cause of the 
insurance crisis. Various factors can be identified, each of them had an effective role 
in creating and developing the crisis. The role of legal system in deteriorating the 
situation, specially some decisions such as the Gorkom . case was not less effective 
99 David Hilder, "Liability Insurance Is Difficult to Find Now for Directors, Officers", Wall St. J., 
(July 10,1985) at 1, col. 6. 
100 For a details of theories for the insurance crisis see Priest, op cit at 1521. 10 1 Romano, op cit at 4. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Lee, op cit at 254. 
104 Hilder, op cit at 2 1. 
105 "Business Struggling to Adopts Insurance Crisis Spýeads% at 3 1. 
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than the economic system's fluctuations. Therefore, the belief that the legal system is 
not the cause of the crisis and, consequently, reforming the law will not resolve the 
effects of industry's problems, "' is partially correct. 
The interesting suggestion as to the crisis is that the directors and officers learned 
that "the insurance crisis they experience is not a crisis at all- it is an opportunity". 107 
One may feel tl-ds view as justified as long as it means that the crisis at least brought 
corporate directors the opportunity to press for the unique mechanism of protection 
under section 102 (b)(7), namely elimination and limitation of liability. 
. d1b. 
8.2.2.5 Alternatives to insurance 
Since the raise of insurance crisis, there has been an increasing trend among 
corporations to use other alternatives as substitutes or supplements to the traditional 
insurance policy. Usually such alternatives are employed in conjunction with 
corporate charters and by-laws or with separate indemnification contract 
agreements. 
8.2.2.5.1 Captive insurance companies 
These sort of companies are wholly owned subsidiaries, formed in order to maintain 
insurance on behalf of the parent and affiliated companies. 
Such alternative is considered to be a self- insurance scheme when it is capitalised by 
the parent company and there is no risk- sharing between separate entities. 108 
Therefore, captive insurance is a type of indemnification with the same public policy 
restrictions. Moreover, because insurance premiums are not deductible, the 
corporation may be faced with tax problem. 109 It has been suggested, to overcome 
106 Lee, op cit at 254- 5. 107 Christopher Farrell, "If Directors Are Doing Their Job, They Do not Need Insurance". 13UL 
Wk. (Sep. 8 1986) 55. 
TWJ. Phil Carlton & M. Guy Brooks, "Corporate Director and Officer Indemnification: Alternative 
Methods for Funding", 24 Wake Forest L. Rev. (1989) 61, Veasy, Finkelstein, and Bigler, op cit at 420. 
109 Dennis Block Et. A]. "The BusinessJudment Rule: Fiducialy Dutio-OLColporate Directors". 
Al 62 1. 
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the problem, the corporation should form a subsidiary with a separate identity from 
the parent company and with actual risk distribution. 110 However, the courts may 
disregard the separate corporate status of the entities on the reasoning that due to 
close connection between a parent and its captive subsidiary, the arrangement as a 
scheme is made to avoid indemnity laws. "' 
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) usually refuses to allow deductions for 
premiums paid to captive insurance subsidiaries, 112 even though premiums paid to 
commercial insurers are deductible. According to the IRS, premiums are not 
deductible where there is no shifting or distributing of the risks of loss. 113 
There are some cases which may be used as guidance in this regard. For example, in 
Beech Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 114 the parent company established a captive 
subsidiary in order to provide itself and its directors with products liability insurance. 
The court refused to accept the arrangement as a real insurance scheme because, in 
its view, the taxpayer corporation, Beech, failed to prove a true risk transfer. In the 
court's view, it was doubtful that the capitalisation of the subsidiary, about $150, 
000,00, could cover a loss of several million dollars excess coverage. 115 However, in 
Fitting Co. v, United States, 116 the court rejected the claim of the Internal Revenue 
Service that the premium payments were reserves held by the subsidiary to cover 
parent's contingent losses. Here, the court found the evidence of a distribution of risk 
and allowed the taxpayer to deduct the premiums. 
California permits buying insurance by corporations for their directors and officers 
from a wholly or partly owned company. 117 It appears that the California law 
I 10 Ibid at 622. 
111 Slaughter op cit at 194. 
112 Rev. Rul. 77- 316,1977- 2 C. B. 54. 
113 Rev. Rul. 77- 316,1977- 2 C. B. 53-4. 
114 84- 2 U. S Tax Cas. (CCID 85,400, Afrd, 797 F. 2d(10th Cir. 1996) 920. 
115 Ibid at 85,404. 
116 606 F. Sup. (N. D. Ohio 1985) 136. 
117 Cal. Corp. Code s. 317 (i). The section provides: 
"(1) the insured corporation's articles of corporation authorise such arrangement; or 
(2) the insurance company is a duly licensed and operated insurance company under applicable 
insurance law, the claims processing by the insurance company is not subject to the direct control of 
the insured corporation, and there is some manner of risk sharing between the insurance company 
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recognising the captive insurance arrangement has attempted to resolve the criticism 
of lack of risk- sharing. 
8.2.2.5.2 Captive groups insurance 
To resolve the problem inherent in captive insurance companies, some corporations 
have chosen captive groups as a new alternative. On the basis of this scheme, an 
insurance company is jointly formed by separate corporations in which the risk is to 
be distributed among all the members of the group, therefore, there is no tax 
problem. However, this alternative also Tinvolves some problems such as its 
availability only to the corporations with a stable financial status. Furthermore, 
reaching a common approach by all members always is not easy. I IS 
8.2.2.5.3 Fronting arrangement 
On the basis of this alternative, a typical policy is issued by commercial insurer to the 
corporation, and the corporation or its captive insurer will reimburse or reinsure the 
carrier for some or all of the amount paid in excess of the premium. Under this 
program, the carrier will be paid a fixed non- refundable amount for agreeing to the 
scheme, and in return the corporation will be compensated if the premiums exceeded 
losses. 119 This alternative has been viewed as another form of indemnification 
provided by the corporation to its directors and, thus, subject to the same public 
policy limitations and tax problem as other alternatives. 
8.2.2.5.4 Advisory board 
The other alternative which a corporation may establish to resolve the commercial 
insurance crisis, is to substitute its traditional board with an advisory one. Under this 
and the insured corporation, on the one hand, and some unaffiliated person or persons on the 
other. " 
118 Carlton & Brooks, op cit at 64. 
119 Slaughter, op cit. at 190. 
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scheme, the advisory board is formed of former directors who serve with no 
compensation and binding vote on company policy. 120 
This alternative has been viewed as ineffective, because plaintiffs and the courts may 
consider it as an internal arrangement, and impose liability upon directors who 
actually caused the corporation to suffer losses. The main problem inherent in this 
alternative, is its contravention with public policy principles. That is because when a 
director is confident that he will not be liable for his conduct, he may not exercise his 
business judgment as carefully as he does in normal situations. Furthermore, this 
scheme transfers all burden of responsibility to the chief executive and leaves him 
without any protection from liability. 121 
8.3 Elimination and Limitation ofDability 
The statutory elimination or limitation of directors liability is a newly introduced 
legal institution, designed to respond to the consequences of some judicial decisions 
such as Smith v. Van Gorkom, 122 and to reduce discouraging effects of insurance 
crisis on corporate management and, thus, provide directors with a new protective 
instrument. 
The idea of limiting or eliminating directors liabilities for the first time was proposed 
by the American Law Institute (ALI) in the early 1970's. 123 The ALI in one of its 
earliest proposals recommended a dollar cap on directors' liability for breaches of 
duty of care. 124 
The immediate cause for the enactment of a new law to this effect was a sharp 
change in the market for directors and officers' liability insurance, as well as the large 
increase in the amounts paid out under directors and officers liability insurance 
120 Galante "The Director and Officer Crisis: Corporate Boardroom Woes Grow", NO. L. J., (Aug. 
4 1986) at 30 col. 1. 
121 Louden, "The Liability of Advisory Boards", 10-Directors and Boards, (Spring 1986) 19- 20. 122 488 A. 2d (Del. 1985) 858. 
123 Lee Hazen, op cit at 174. 
124 American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance and structure: Restatements and 
. Recommendations s. 
7.06 (Tent. Draft. No. I Ap. 1.1982). 
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policies. As a result, the insurance policies became much more expensive and 
difficult to obtain. Moreover, the amounts which insurers were willing to cover were 
being reduced. The fact may have been also taken into account by the legislature in 
enacting the new protection device, that smaller corporations financially were unable 
to avail their directors of indemnification, or unable to afford the promised 
indemnity. 125 
8.3.1 Delaware Approach: Amen&nent of Section 102(h) 
In 1986, the Senate Bill which amended section 102 of the Delaware Corporation 
General Laws, adding subsection (7) to the section, was signed by the Delaware 
Governor. The amendment which was a result of the recommendations of the 
Corporation Law Section and Executive Committee of the Delaware State Bar 
Association, observed the insurance crisis, and the need for a substitute protection 
for Delaware corporate directors as the main incentive behind the proposal. 
Under the new section, a corporation is authorised to amend its articles of 
incorporation to provide that its directors may not be held liable for financial 
damages to the corporation or to its stockholders for a breach of fiduciary duty 
amounting to gross negligence to the corporation. Section 102 (b) provides: 
" ... the certificate of incorporation may also contain any of... the following matters: 
(7) A provision eliminating or lin-dting the personal liability of a director to the 
corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a 
director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a 
director (i) for any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its 
stockholders-, (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional 
rrdsconduct or a knowing violation; (iii) under section 174 of this title [the section 
dealing with conflict of interest]; (iv) for any transaction from which the director 
derived an improper personal benefit. " 126 
125 Michael W. Mitchell, "North Carolina's Statutory Limitation on Directors' liability", 24 Wake 
For; st L. Rev. (1989) 118,120. 
126 Del. Gen. Corp. Law s. 102 (b) (7) (Amd. 1992). Section 174 provides that directors shall, 
under certain circumstances, be jointly and severally liable for wilful or negligent violations of 
certain requirements concerning stock repurchases and redemption and the payment of dividends. 
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Delaware charter option statute, thus, permits a corporation's articles to contain 
provisions which limit or eliminate personal liability of directors for money damages, 
but such provisions do not limit or eliminate liability for breach of duty of loyalty or 
for intentional misconduct, or when improper personal benefits are involved. 
Under section 102, exemption of directors from personal liability can be total or 
partial. In the first situation, a director will not be held liable for his breach of duty of 
care or negligence at all, whereas in the latter case, the exemption may be limited to 
a specific amount of money, which is recognised as dollar cap. A charter cap option 
can also provide some limitations on directorrliability, instead of eliminating liability. 
These provisions have been applied by the courts in some cases, 127 particularly in 
the case of Zirn v. VLI Corp. 128 where the court held that the respondent was not 
protected by a charter provision under section 102(b)(7) from the allegation of 
breach of duty of disclosure when the duty of disclosure that, in the court's view, 
was included in duty of loyalty, was not covered by the statute. Similarly, in A. C. 
Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & CO., 129 the Delaware Chancery Court 
prohibited the defendant company's board from proceeding with a self- tender 
offer. 130 The court held that the respondent's conduct was " likely to be found to 
constitute a breach of duty of loyalty", and that the defendant's good faith belief was 
not enough to eliminate his liability when he has breached his duty of loyalty. 131 
It seems that the Delaware courts in this respect have taken different views. In 
Siegman v. Tri- Star Pictures, Inc., 132 the court ignoring the restrictions introduced 
by section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware Code implied that a corporation might amend 
127 E. g. Stroud v. Grace, 16 Del. J. Corp. Law, (1991)15 89. 
128 621 A. 2d (Del. 1993) 773,783. 
129 519 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1986) 103. 
130 Ibid at 107. Tender Offer is defined as: 
"An offer to purchase shares made by one company direct to the stockholders of another company, 
sometimes subject to a minimum and/ or a maximum that the offeror will accept, communicated to 
the shareholders by means of newspaper advertisements and ... by a general mailing to the entire list of shareholders, with a view to acquiring control of the second company. Used in an effort to go 
around the management of the second company, which is resisting the acquisition. " Black, Black's 
LA)X Dictionaly (St. Paul, Min.: West Publishing Co. 1990) 1469. 
131 Ibid at 115. 
132 Unreported case No. 9477 (Del. Ch. May 30 1989). 
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its certificate of incorporation to eliminate or limit the liability of its directors for 
breach of duty of loyalty. In the instant case, the plaintiff had contended that the 
amendment of Article Sixth was "invalid as a matter of law,, because" it eliminated or 
restricted "the directors' liability to the corporation or its shareholders for breaches 
of their fiduciary duty of loyalty, in violation of 102(b)(7). "133 The court held that: 
"At least one scenario (and perhaps others) could plausibly be constructed where [Tri- 
star's Certificate of incorporation] would eliniinate or limit the liability of Tri- Star 
directors for breach of their fiduciary duty of loyalty- a result proscribed by section 
102(b)(7). That possibility is alone sufficient to warrant the denial of defendants' 
motion to disn-dss. "134 M. 
However, on the one hand, the court went on to point out that: 
"Sixth would arguably operate to eliminate or limit the directors' liability for breach of 
their duty of loyalty to Tri-Star or its shareholders. I conclude that it would. "135 
And, on the other hand, it concluded that: 
"Any more comprehensive or definitive declaration of the validity of Article Sixth must 
await a later procedural stage where the merits may be explored in greater depth than 
was done here. "136 
It is now, under the Delaware law, possible for corporations to exempt their 
directors from liability even for gross negligence. 137 It may mean that the Delaware 
I law 
leaves the shareholders and other interested parties without proper cover for the 
damages incurred by some irresponsible directors. 138 As a result of the Delaware's 
liability-eliminating statute, in the case of a director's breach of fiduciary duty of 
care, the corporation and its members are not to be compensated. Moreover, the 
statute has decreased the efficiency of the deterrence which liability provisions imply, 
when the director's liability for some particular misconduct has already been 
diminished. The Delaware law provides the Delaware corporations with an 
133 Ibid at 234. 
1341bid at 236. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Lee, op cit at 272. 
138 Ibid at 273. 
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opportunity to place their directors in a position superior to that held when director 
insurance was a primary means of protection. 
8.3.2 Other States and Institutes 
Most of States in 1985- 6 followed the Delaware law in this respect, including 
Arizona, California, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, Texas and Washington. 
Some States such as Virginia have chosen their own way. Virginia has introduced a 
mandatory dollar cap on directors liability Zhich is limited to the mandatory amount 
specified in the articles or, if approved by the shareholders, in the by-laws, as a 
limitation on officer or director liability, or to the greater of $ 100.000 or the amount 
of cash compensation received by the director during 12 months prior to the act or 
omission for which liability was imposed unless the articles or bylaws, approved by 
shareholders, specify a lower limit. 139 The important point in the Virginia charter 
cap is its applicability to both officers and directors, while Delaware- type statute 
refers only to directors. The other characteristic of the Virginia statute is that the 
ceiling of relief can be lowered by charter provision but obviously can not be 
raised. 140 Under Virginia law, any wilful misconduct or a knowing violation of 
criminal or Federal or state securities is excluded. 141 
The Model Business Corporation Act also permits a certificate of incorporation to 
contain a charter provision "eliminating or limiting the liability of a director to the 
corporation or its shareholders for money damages, for any damages, or any action 
taken, or any failure to take any action, as a director, except liability for a financial 
benefit received by a director to which he is not entitled" and "an intentional 
infliction of harm on the corporation or the shareholders". A violation of the Model 
139 Va. Code Ann. s. 13.1-692.1 (Supp. 1987). 
140 Ibid at 13-692, IA. 
141 Ibid. 
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Business Act imposes liability on director for unlawful distributions, and "an 
intentional violation of criminal law. " 142 
Likewise, the American Law institute (ALI) in its proposed final draft has suggested 
the adoption of a limitation on the amount of damages that can be recovered against 
officers and directors for duty of care violations that do not: 
"(1) involve a knowing and culpable violation of law by director or officer (2) show a 
conscious disregard for the duty of the director or officer to the corporation under 
circumstances in which the director or officer was aware that the conduct or omission 
created an unjustified risk of serious injury 12 the corporation; or (3) constitute a 
sustained and unexcused pattern of inattention that amounted to an abdication of the 
defendanfs duty to the corporation; and the director or officer, or an associate did not 
receive a benefit that was improper. " 143 
The ALI in one of its first proposals recommended a dollar cap on directors' liability 
for breaches of the duty of care. "' However, its proposed final draft provides that a 
provision in certificate of incorporation which "limits damages against an officer or a 
director for such a failure to an amount not less than such person's annual 
compensation from the corporation should be given effect". "5 
Such. a limitation is said to have been justified mainly on grounds of fairness. That is 
because the potential liability where a limiting provision applies would be excessive 
in relation to the nature of the defendant's misdeed and the economic benefits 
expected from serving the company. 146The ALI project's limitation on damages is 
confined only to violation of the duty of care and is not applicable to breach of duty 
of loyalty. 
The main problem of the proposal is the lack of a judicial precedent. According to 
f ALI, "no American decision has been discovered which addresses a charter provision 
142 Model Business Corp. Act s. 2.02(b) (4). 
143 The American Law Institute; Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and 
Recommendations s. 7.19 (Proposed Final Draft 1992). 
144 Tbid s. 7.06 (Tent. Draft. No. I Ap. 1.1982). 
145 Ibid s. 7.19 (Proposed Final Draft 1992). 
146 Ibid Official Comment (c). 
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limýiting liability for due care violations". 147 Because the effectiveness of the 
proposal depends on each court's treatment of it, until the legislature indicates its 
approval, it has been suggested as an unreliable way of protection. 148 
A leading commentator has described the ALI's proposal as the best choice, 
conditional to a proposed modification added at the end of section 17.7(a) as reads: 
*provided that when damages would equal zero under this rule, or likewise be 
insignificant in view of extent of the director's breach of her duty and of the injury 
caused thereby, positive or additional damages should be assessed.,. "149 
8.3.3 Impact of an Elimination or Limitation Provision 
The function of section 102(b)(7) is not to alter or eliminate a director's fiduciary 
duty to act with due care, but merely permits a corporation to insulate directors from 
personal monetary liability to the corporation or its stockholders for a failure to 
satisfy that duty. Thus, under Delaware law, directors continue to be sued for acting 
with the lack of due care in their corporate oversight responsibilities and in the 
decision-making process. 150 
The applicability of a charter cap is a great concern of shareholders who view it as 
equal to the unavailability of monetary damages against directors. That is because it 
may deprive them or the corporation of any effective remedy when a shareholder is 
not aware of corporate action by directors until such action is completed. Therefore, 
shareholders may have no effective remedy for injury occasioned by the directors' 
action. Section 102(b)(7) may, thus, limit remedies available to a shareholder who 
has a valid claim against a board of directors for violation of its fiduciary duties, even 
if the directors' conduct involved gross negligence. This argument is not justifiable, 
f because an amendment under section 102 can not be made without appropriate 
approval of shareholders. Consequently, by adopting such an amendment, 
147 Ibid at 54 (Tent. Draft No. 7,1987). 
148 Slaughter, op cit at 198. 
149 C. Lee, op cit 279. 
150 Franklin Balotti & Mark J. Gentile, "Elimination or Limitation of Directors Liability for 
Delaware Corporations": 12 Del. J. Colp. L (1987) 4,15. 
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shareholders have already and voluntarily obliged themselves to the consequences of 
their own decision. 
The elimination of personal monetary liability should not lead directors to neglect or 
disregard their fiduciary duties. An amendment under section 102 should supplement 
the protections of directors afforded by director liability insurance and would 
supplement various indemnification rights available to directors. Most importantly, 
adoption of an eliminating or limiting provision may assist a corporation ill 
continuing to attract and retain highly qualified individuals to serve as directors. It 
also permits directors to make more entrepreTreurial decisions in the exercise of their 
independent business judgement on behalf of the company by reducing undue 
concern over potential liability. Adoption of a provision authorised by section 102 
may be viewed favourably by insurers, and usually have a positive effect upon the 
availability, amount, cost, and scope of coverage of such insurance. '151 Many 
corporations have adopted charter cap to take advantage of section 102(b)(7), and 
others are considering proposing such amendments. 
In light of the overall benefit to corporations through limiting directors' liability, 
adoption of an amendment authorised by that section is highly desirable on the one 
hand, and risky on the other. 
The question may be raised whether the limitation or elimination of directors liability 
is applicable to all types of suits taken by any constituency of the company. In 
response to the indication that such protection should operate to shield a director 
from monetary damages including actions brought by creditors, it has been argued 
that such exemption for third party actions politically and even constitutionally may 
be difficult to achieve. 152 Although the applicability of protection to directors 
liability for alleged violation against third party, particularly creditors, seems 
151 Leo Herzel, Richard Shepro & Leo Katz, "Next-to-Last Word on Endangered Directors", JIML 
PUs. R ., (Jan. -Feb. 1987) 38. 152 American Corporate Counsel Association, Task Group on Liability of Directors and Officers, Reports on Legislative Models 4 (1987) 11- 2. * 
w 
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uncertain, judicial precedent shows a tendency to the coverage of third party claims 
by such protection. 153 
The major concern is whether or not third parties are bound by a charter provision 
eliminating or limiting directors' liability. It seems not justified to bind a person who 
had no participation in. entering such a charter provision into the certificate of the 
corporation to its consequences. 
It should be noted that a chapter cap option authorised by Delaware law applies only 
to directors, but not to officers, employees or agents of the corporations. 154 
jwib- 
8.4 Conclusion 
Some commentators believe the protection provided by indemnification is even more 
than that permitted by insurance. "' Insurance provides a director with protection 
and insulate him from the burden of personal liability, but it "has never totally 
protected directors against the risk of monetary liability". 156 However, the 
examination of indemnification and insurance has shown that purchasing liability 
insurance for directors is more beneficial to the corporations as well as its directors 
than indemnification. Economically, a corporation can secure its directors from 
liability by a fixed premium to the extent of its financial ability, where in a direct 
indemnification which is a bilateral agreement between the corporation and its 
directors, any reimbursement will be paid directly from the corporation's pocket, 
particularly when such indemnification has not been insured. 
As to elimination and limitation of liability, though protecting directors from due 
care liability is desirable, total elin-dnation from such liability may be unjustified. With 
regard to this point, the ALI has made attempts to make a balance between 
153 For example see Francis v. UnitedJersey Bank 432 A. 2d (N J. 1981) 814. 
154 Dennis Block Et. Al. "The Business ludgment Ruleý-Fiduciajy Duties of Corporate Directors" 
f 614, Balotti & Gentile, op cit at 12. 
55 Donald E. Pease, "Outside Directors: Their Importance to the Corporation and protection from 
Liability". 12 Del. J. Colp. L. (1987) 25,7 1. 
156 C. Wiggins, "Delaware's Directors and. Officers Liability Law: A "Windfall" for Directors", 
Legal Times, (18 Aug. 1996) 11 col. 1. 
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promoting the careful discharge of directors duties and encouraging decision- 
making by supporting limitation of liability but not total elimination. Delaware 
legislature's solution to the directors' insurance crisis is described both conceptually 
and practically inappropriate, and an improper response to the crisis. If directors are 
to have no liability for their conduct and decisions taken by them, the role of laws 
imposing liability becomes recommended standards. 157 Moreover, it is suggested 
that, by eliminating directors' potential liability, the Delaware law effectively 
frustrates the main aim of liability provisions, which is compensation. 158 It may also 
affect business by requiring that potential creditors to check for such a provision in 
the certificate of incorporation of every customer with whom they deal with. Finally, 
the purpose of the provision which is to attract qualified director into service is 
irrelevant in the case of insolvency, where creditors likely are involved in litigation 
against the directors. 
Although it is justified to challenge the deterrence- diminishing effect of a section 
102 charter cap option, this argument ignores the background and environment in 
which it was considered necessity to introduce a new and effective device to 
overcome the ruinous impact of insurance crisis on one hand, and the courts 
increasing interference with business decision- making on the other hand. 
Perhaps the description of section 102(b)(7) as an only enabling provision is more 
justified. 159 Therefore, for the section to have effect, stockholders' approval is 
required to amend a corporation's certificate of incorporation in order to incorporate 
such a provision. 
The "three- Legged Stool" designed by the Delaware legislature is aimed at not 
diminishing risk of directors being personally liable, but rather to alleviate the risk 
placed upon them when they have acted in good faith but with a wrong calculation. 
157 Lee op cit at 256, Slaughter op cit at 199. 158 Note, "Indemnification of Corporate Directors: A Disincentive to Corporate Accountability In 
Indiana", 17-Val. U. L. Rev. (1983) 230. 
159 Balotti & Gentile, op cit at 12. 
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It is time to have added the fourth and oldest leg, namely the business judgment rule 
to the stool. The device which emerged from case law and never happened to appear 
in legislation, has operated as an effective protective means. The very significant 
distinction between the fourth leg, which will be examined in the next chapter, and 
others is that the last one is dependant on the courts' discretion, whereas in other 
devices it is the choice of corporation to provide their directors with indemnification, 
insurance, or a limiting or eliminating provision, of course except in the case of 
mandatory indemnification. 
Chapter 9: The Business Judgment Rule 
9.1 Introduclion and Background 
The business judgment rule has always been viewed as a centrepiece of corporate 
governance in US company law, and in dea ring with directors' duties and liability a 
detailed reference should be, therefore, inevitably made to the rule. That is because 
the main element of the rule is duty of care Moreover, it defines and regulates the 
standard of due care. The rule has other functions which are relevant for the 
purposes of this thesis. Its use as a protection measure against directors liability was 
perhaps the main and even only incentive for its introduction by the courts, though it 
developed so far that to operate as an offensive tool clothed in the "special litigation 
committee" and the "demand rule", by resorting to the latter a committee of 
disinterested directors moves to dismiss an action against their defendant colleagues. 
Therefore, a detailed study of the rule, its functions, and its today's position in 
corporate governance relationships is necessary. 
The rule is a result of judicial recognition that decisions made by directors in good 
faith and in the exercise of business judgment should not be reviewed by the courts. 
As is stated by a New York court, it is true that "the directors' room rather than the 
courtroom is the appropriate forum for thrashing out purely business questions. " I 
It is suggested that the business judgment rule owes its development to the English 
common law principlesý growing from the case of Charitable Corporation v. 
I Kmin v. American Express Co., 383 N. Y. S. 2d (1943) 807,810- 11. 
2 Dennis J. Block & H. Adam Brussin, "The Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder Derivative 
Actions: Via Zapata", 37 Bus. Law. (1981) 3 1, Dennis J. Block etal., The Business judement Rule. 
Fiducialy Duties of Directors,. (Englewood Clýffs: Prentice IWI Law & Business 4th 3d. 1993) 1. 
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Sutton, 3 and it "has been a part of common law for nearly two centurieS". 4 However 
it is believed that in the United States, the rule for the first time emerged from the 
case of Percy v. Millaudon, 5 in 1829 when the court held that: 
11... the occurrence of difficulties ... which offer only a choice of measures, the 
adoption of a course from which loss ensues cannot make the [director] 
responsible, if the error was one into which a prudent man might have fallen. ... 
The test of responsibility therefore should be not the certainty of wisdom in others, 
but the possession of ordinary knowledge, and by showing that the error of the 
[director] is of so gross a kind that a man of common sense, and ordinary attention, 
would not have fallen into it. " 
The idea of the business judgment rule began to develop in the second half of the last 
century, the period of dominance of the economic and political theory, well- known 
as the laissez-faire doctrine. 6 In 1847 in Godhold v. Branch Bank, 7 the Alabama 
Supreme Court issued a statement in its holding which clarified the rule as follows: 
"The undertaking implies a competent knowledge of the duties of the agency 
assumed by them, as well as a pledge that they will diligently supervise, watch 
over, and protect the interests of the institution committed to their care. They do 
not in our judgment undertake that they possess such a perfect knowledge of the 
matters and subjects which might come under their cognisance, that they cannot 
,, 8 err, or be mistaken, either in the wisdom or legality of means employed by them. 
In this case, the board of directors of a bank appointed one of its members as agent 
for the bank to collect money and manage some particular bank affairs. In return, the 
board voted to pay him an extra $500 a year. An action was brought against one of 
the authorising directors in order to recover the payments as unlawful. 9 The court 
32 Atk. (1742) 400. 
4 Krishnan Chittur, "Corporate Director's Standard of Care, Past, Present and Future", 10 Del. I 
Colp. L. (1986) 505. 
5 (La. 1829) 77- 8. 
6 J. Gordon Arbuckle, "The Continuing Viability of the Business Judgment Rule as a Guide for 
Judicial Restraint", 35 Gorge Wash. L. Rev., (1967) 565. 
7 11 Ala. (1847) 191. 
8 ibid. See also Bodell v. General Gas & Electric Corp. 15 Del. Ch. 420,140 A. (Sup. Ct. 1927) 
264, where the Delaware Supreme Court described the business judgment rule as: "if in the 
particular case there is nothing to show that the directors did not exercise their discretion for what 
they believed to be in the best interest of the corporation, certainly an honest mistake of business 
judgment should not be revicwable by the court. " 
9 Ibid at 199. 
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absolved the defendant from liability because his misconduct, in the court's view, was 
a result of his honest misunderstanding of the law. 
The philosophy behind the promotion and development of the rule was explained in 
Auerbach v. Bennelf. 10 The New York court stated that the "business judgment 
doctrine, at least in part, is grounded in the prudent recognition that courts are ill 
equipped and infrequently called on to evaluate what are and must be essentially 
business judgments". 
As to the recognition of the rule by the legislature, it should be noted that there are 
"no statutory formulations of the business jMgment rule", 11 and the rule is a case 
law establishment. 
9.2 Definition and Presumption of the Rule 
The business judgment rule is a judicial outgrowth of the duty of care, 12 or a specific 
function of the directors' duty of care to the situation, where after a reasonable 
investigation, the directors take an action which they honestly and reasonably believe 
to be in the corporation's best interests, but as a result of a miscalculation, turns out 
to have been in error. The rule, as a part of the development of legal concept relating 
to the control and management of corporations has been examined in some judicial 
decisions. It was defined in United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., " 
as follows: 
"Whether or not a corporation shall seek to enforce in the courts a cause of action 
for damages is, like other business questions, ordinarily a matter of internal 
management and is left to the discretion of the directors, in the absence of 
instruction by vote of the stockholders. Courts interfere seldom to control such 
discretion intra vires the corporation, except where the directors are guilty of 
10 393 N. E. 2d (N. Y. 1979) 994. 
11 ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations s. 4.01 (c) Official 
Comment (Proposed Final Draft, March 31 1992) at 227. 
12 William M. Fletcher, 
-Cyclopedia of The Law of Private Corporations (Perm. ed. 1986) 849. 13 244 U. S (1917) 26 1. 
Corporate Directors'Duties & Liabilities in Insolvency in England and the US 301 
misconduct equivalent to a breach of trust, or where they stand in a dual relation 
which prevents an unprejudiced exercise ofjudgment .... "14 
The case of Warshaw v. Chalhoun, 15 gave a definition of the business judgment rule 
indicating the requirements of the rule as follows: 
"In the absence of a showing of bad faith on the part of the directors or of a gross 
abuse of discretion the business judgment of directors will not be interfered with by 
the courts. The burden of showing the existence of bad faith or abuse of discretion 
rests upon the plaintiff who charges that the corporate action was taken to benefit 
the majority at the expense of the minority. "16 
According to this statement, the court would not interfere with the directors' 
business decisions unless the plaintiff has shown the existence of bad faith, gross 
abuse of discretion or gross negligence. 
Perhaps one of the clearest definitions of the rule was offered in Aronson v. Lewis, " 
as "an acknowledgement of the managerial prerogatives of Delaware directors under 
section 141(a) ... ." The Model Business Corporation Act does not 
define the rule 
and leaves it to the courts: 
"In view of continuing judicial development, section 8.30 does not try to codify the 
business judgment rule or to delineate the differences, if any, between that rule and 
the standards of directors conduct set forth in this section. That is a task left to the 
courts and possibly to later versions of the Model Act". Is 
Indeed, the business judgment rule is a presumption that directors in their decision 
making have satisfied the requirements necessary to take benefit from the rule 
protection. This presumption is based on the rationale that directors who are 
responsible for managing the corporation have the best access to the necessary 
information. Because directors are required to act in the best interests of the 
corporation and its shareholders, and are vested with a broad discretion in their 
'k, 
14 Ibid at 263- 4 
15 43 Del. Ch. 148,221 A. 2d (Sup. Ct. 1966) 487. 
16 Ibid at 157- 8,221 A. 2d at 492- 93. 
17 473 A. 2d (Del. 1984) 805,812. 
Is Model Business Corp. Act s. 8.30 cmt. (1984). 
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decision- making conduct, they are the ones who can make the most appropriate 
decision. 19 
The American Law Institute (ALI) which is described as "perhaps the most elite 
group of lawyers in the United States selected from the ranks of distinguished 
scholars and practitioners", 20 has suggested a set of principles on corporate 
governance. Its proposal on corporate governance which has been subject of 
criticism and analysis, 21 contains some recommendation on the rule. The ALI has, in 
defining the rule, used the expression of "a safe harbour", stating: 
"Mhe business judgment rule has offered a saýLharbour for directors and officers who 
make honest informed business decisions they rationally believe are in the best 
interests of their corporation. "22 
In some commentators' views, the business judgment rule is considered not to be 
strictly a "presumption", but a: 
"statement of the circumstances (informed basis, good faith, honest belieo under which 
a court will not substitute its judgment for that of directors, either to hold them liable 
or to invalidate a transaction they have approved. "23 
In Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Refining Corp., 24 the Chancellor described this 
presumption as follows: 
19 Scott V. Simpson, "The Emerging Rule of the Special Comn-tittee- Ensuring Business Judgment 
Rule Protection in the Context of Management Leveraged Buyouts and Other Corporate 
Transactions Involving Conflicts of Interests", 43 B=Jaw, (I 988) 67 1. 
20 "Jonathan R. Macey, The Transformation of the American Law Institute", 
61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. (1993) 1212,1216 
21 Kathryn N. Fine, Project, "The Corporate Governance Debate and the ALI Proposals: Reform or 
Restatement? " 40 Vand. L. Rev. (1987) 693,695, Joel Seligman, "A Sheep in Wolfs Clothing: The 
American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance Project" 55 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1987) 
325,328, Melvin Aron Eisenberg, "An Overview of the Principles of Corporate Governance, " 48 
Bus. La (1993) 1271,1271, "Symposium on Corporate Governance", 48 Bus. Law. (1993) 1267, 
"Symposium on Corporate Governance" 8 Cardozo L. Rev. (1987) 657; Symposium: "The 
American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance, 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. (1993) 87 1, 
Elliott Goldstein, "CORPRO: A Committee That Became an Institution", 48 Bus. Law. (1993) 
1333,1334-35. Maýorie Fine Knowles and Colin Flannery, "The ALI Principles of Corporate 
Governance Compared with Georgia Law", 47 Mercer L. Rev. (19951) 1, William J. Carney, The 
ALI's Corporate Governance Project: The Death of Property Rights?, 61 Geo. Wash. L. Re 
(1993) 898,898. 
22 ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations Official Comment to 
s. 4.01 (c) (Proposed Final Draft, March 31 1992) at 228. 
23 R. Franklin Balloti and James J. Hanks, "Rejudging the Business Judgment Rule", 48 BUS, 
Law. (1993) 1339. 
24 126 A. (Del. Ch. 1924) 46. 
Corporate Directors'Duties &Liabilities in Asolvency in England and the US 303 
"the [defendant] directors of the defendant corporation are clothed with the 
presumption which the law accords to them of being actuated in their conduct by a 
bona fide regard for the interests of the corporation whose affairs by the 
stockholders have comniitted to their charge. "25 
According to the Vice Chancellor in that case, the presumption of the business 
judgment rule operates as a secure cover protecting honest directors from liability. In 
Davis v. Louisville Gas & Electric CO. 26 the court referring to the main element of 
such presumption, namely good faith stated that: 
"The judgment of the directors of corporations enjoys the benefit of a presumption 
that it was formed in good faith and was designed to promote the best interests of 
the corporation they serve. "27 -0. 
The leading case of Aronson v. LewiS, 28 is a significant guidance in this regard, 
where the Supreme Court of Delaware stated that: 
"It is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the interests of the 
company. Absent an abuse of discretion, that judgment will be respected by the 
courts. The burden is on the party challenging the, decision to establish facts 
rebutting the presumption. "29 
On the basis of the Aronson case, directors' business judgment will be respected by a 
court unless the directors abuse their discretion. It is the plaintiffs burden to rebut 
this presumption. Therefore, in a case where the compliance with the business 
judgment rule is at issue, the plaintiff must plead facts to overcome the presumption 
of the rule, failure of which would end the proceedings in the respondent's favour. 
However, if the plaintiff removes the presumption of the rule, the court will not only 
25 Ibid at 48. 
26 142 A. (Del. Ch. 1928) 654. 
27 Ibid at 659. The same view was taken in Cole v. National Cash Credit Assocoation, 156 A. 
(Del. Ch. 1931) 183, where the court held: "There is a presumption that the business judgment of 
the governing body of a corporation, whether at the time it consists of directors or majority 
stockholders, is formed in good faith and inspired by a bona fides of purpose. " Ibid at 188. 28 473 A. 2d (Del. 1984) 805. 
29 Ibid at 812. See also Kaplan v. Centex Corp. 284 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1971) 119,124. 
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review the question whether the defendant directors fulfilled the due care 
obligations, but also whether the transaction was fair. 30 
9.3 Formulation and Standard of the Rule 
To describe the rule, a variety of formulations have been proposed. The rule is 
commonly described as insulating directors from personal liability, 31 or as "validating 
corporate dealings. "32 In Spring's Appeal 7 33 the rule was 
formulated as: 
"[directors] are not liable for mistakes of judgWnts, even though they may be so 
gross as to appear to us absurd and ridiculous, provided they are honest and 
provided they are fairly within the scope of the powers and discretion confined to 
the managing body. "34 
A leading commentator has proposed a formulation which seems a comprehensive 
statement of the rule which follows: 
"A corporate transaction that involves no self- dealing by, or other personal 
interest of, the directors who authorised the transaction will not be enjoined or set 
aside for the directors' failure to satisfy the standards that govern a directors' 
performance of his or her duties, and directors who authorised the transaction will 
not be held personally liable for resultant damages unless: (I)the directors did not 
exercise due care to ascertain the relevant and available facts before voting to 
authorise the transaction; or (2) the directors voted to authorise the transaction 
even though they did not reasonably believe or could not have reasonably believed 
the transaction to be for the best interest of the corporation; or (3) in some other 
way the directors' authorisation of the transaction was not in good faith. "35 
'30 Marshal L. Small, "Conflict of Interests and the ALI' Corporate Governance Project". 48 DaL 
L&W,, (1993) 1373. (Quoted Shamrock Holdings, Inc., v. Polaroid Corp., No. 10075 (Del. Ch. Mar. 
17,1989)). 
31 Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F. 2d (3d Cir. 1978) 259,274, denied 439 U. S. 
(1979) 1129. (Quoted by Ralph A. Peeples, "The Use and Misuse of the Business Judgment Rule in 
the Close Corporation", 60 Notre Dame L-Rev., (1985) 457). 
32 Nanfilto v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp. (D. Neb. 1972) 240,243, affd, 473 F. 2d (8th Clr. 
1973)537. 
33 71 Pa., (1872) 11. 
34 Ibid at 24 . 35 S. Samuel Arsht, "The Business Judgment Rule Revisited", 8 Hofstra L. Rev., (1979) 93,111- 
112. 
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As to the test applicable to the rule, some standards of conduct have been proposed 
in evaluating a business decision. In the arena of Delaware corporation law, the 
standard of "gross and palpable overreaching" for a while concerned the courts as 
the business judgment rule standard. For example, in Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil 
Co., 36 the Delaware Supreme Court held that "the court will not interfere [with the 
business judgment of a parent corporation) absent a showing of 'gross and palpable 
overreaching"'. 37 A similar view was posed by a Delaware Chancery Court in 
Meyerson v. El. Paso Natural GasCo., 38 when the court described a business 
decision as a judgment "with which the cou; 4-should not interfere absent a showing 
of 'gross and palpable overreaching ". 39 Likewise, in Panter v. Marshal Field & 
Co., 40 the court dismissing the plaintiffs' allegations held that the " ... courts will not 
interfere with the exercise of business judgment by corporate directors". The court 
applied the same standard. 41 
In these cases, the courts have applied the standard of "gross and palpable 
overreaching", which was only fit to the relationship of parent company and its 
subsidiaries, as a rule applicable to other cases. Reviewing the cases in which the 
standard of "gross and palpable overreaching" has been equated to the business 
judgment rule test, attests that almost all those cases have involved a parent- 
subsidiary relationship. 42 It is, thus, believed that Delaware courts by applying this 
standard as the test of the business judgment rule, have contributed to the 
contemporary confusion surrounded the business judgment rule. 43 
36 276 A. 2d (Del. 1970) 883. 
37 Ibid. 
38 246 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1967) 789. 
39 Ibid 794. 
40 486 F. Supp. (N. D. 111.1980) 1168. 
41 Ibid 1194. The holding was upheld by the higher court upon the reasoning that the decision was 
made by maJority of directors who were independent and outside directors with no interest or little 
interest of preserving their position. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), 97,929 at 90,73 8. 
42 In Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A. 2d (Del. 1971) 717, e. g., the court also determined that 
ý" oss and palpable overreaching" was equivalent to the business judgment rule test. TArsht, 
op cit at 102. 
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Against those judicial precedents viewing "gross and palpable overreaching" as the 
business judgment rule test, in several cases, Delaware courts have applied "gross 
negligence". This concept as the standard of the rule was addressed in Aronson v. 
LeWiS. 44 In this case the court stated that: 
"While the Delaware cases use a variety of terms to describe the applicable standard of 
care, our analysis satisfies us that under the business judgment rule director liability is 
predicated upon concepts of gross negligence. "45 
It seems the standard of 'gross negligence' which is also the standard of determining 
liability for breach of duty of care, is the appropriate measure for rebutting the 
presumption of the rule. 
9.4 Requirements 
In order for a defendant director to enjoy a business judgment rule protection, some 
requirements should be satisfied. The main factors which have frequently been 
applied as the requisites of the rule are, acting in good faith, the absence of personal 
interest or self-dealing, 46 taking an informed decision which reflects a reasonable 
effort to become familiar with the relevant and available information, 47 and taking an 
actual decision with a reasonable belief that the decision serves the corporation's best 
interests. 48 
The Aronson court emphasised two elements as the main requirements of the 
business judgment rule, the duty of loyalty or the duty not to have a conflict of 
interest, and the duty to be informed and to act with requisite care. 49 The court 
described these factors as common principles that govern the application and 
1%, operation of the rule that apply generally to all actions of the board of directors. A 
44 473 A. 2d (Del. 1984) 805. 
45 lbid at 812, Emphasis added. The same measure was adopted by the court in Smith v. Van 
Gorkom, 488 A. 2d (1985) 858,873. 
46 Lewis v. S. L&E, Inc., 629 F. 2d 764, (2d Cir. 1980) 769. 
47 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A. 2d (Del. 1984) 805 812. 
49 Treadway Cos., Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F. 2d (2d Cir, 1980) 357,382. 
49 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A. 2d (Del. 1984)'805,812. 
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similar view was adopted in United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co. 50 
where the court stated that if a director seeks this protection only should 
demonstrate good faith and due care, and fulfil a fiduciary duty. The ALI also 
proposed that, a director discharges his duties to his corporation when he has acted: 
"in good faith, in a manner that he or she reasonably believes to be in the best 
interests of the corporation, and with the care that an ordinarily prudent person 
would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position and similar 
circumstances. "51 
9.4.1 Due Care Requirement IWO. 
In dealing with a decision complained of, the courts first review the duty of care 
requirement to determine whether the directors in making the business judgment in 
question have taken account of all relevant information. 52 A proper business 
judgment includes both substantive and procedural due care. 53 
The due care requires directors to inform themselves of all material information 
available to them before making any business decision. Moreover, they are asked to 
act with requisite care in discharge of their duties. This sense has been taken into 
account by the ALI in recognising a duty as "properly discharged" when the decision 
'is informed with respect to the subject of the business judgment to the extent the 
director ... reasonably believes to be appropriate under the circumstances. 154 
In the leading case of Aronson v. Lewis, 55 the court held that the directors seeking 
the rule's protection had a duty to "inform themselves, prior to making a business 
decision, of all material information reasonably available to them. Having become so 
informed, they must then act with requisite care in the discharge of their duties. "56 
qp 
50 244 U. S. (1917) 26 1. 
51 ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations s. 4.01 (a) (proposed 
Final Draft, March 31 1992). 
52 Thomas v. Kempner, 398 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1979) 320,323- 24. 
53 Grobow v. Perot, 539 A. 2d (Del. 1988) 180,189. 
54 ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations s. 4.01 (c) (2) 
(Proposed Final Draft, March 31 1992). 
55 473 A. 2d (Del. 1984) 805. 
56 Ibid at 812. 
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The decision of Smith v. Vait Gorkom, 37 in this regard had a significant effect on 
corporation law relating to directors. In that case, the court did not apply the rule 
when, in its view, the defendant directors failed to inform themselves of all 
information reasonably available to them. 58 
Consequently, the determination of whether a business decision was an informed one 
is subject to "whether directors have informed themselves prior to making a business 
decision of all material information reasonably available to them". 59 
9.4.2 Loyalty Requirement 
A director seeking to take benefit of the business judgment rule protection, should 
act in genuine good faith. In order for a director to avoid an allegation of breach of 
duty of loyalty which precludes him from the rule protection, he should not have an 
interest in the negotiation concerned, otherwise and in the case of establishing an 
assumption of conflict of interests, the court may likely refuse to apply the business 
judgment rule protection and ask directors to show that their actions were fair and 
reasonable to the corporation. 60 
A director who has acted with view to protecting his position in office, 61 or 
guaranteeing his own control over the corporation, cannot expect the business 
judgment rule protection available, even when he believed such attempts were in the 
best interests of the corporation. 62 However, in Johnson v. Trueblood'63 where 
directors were charged with authorising the sale of corporate stock with the 
57 489 A. 2d (1985) 858. Also in Gimbel v. Signal Cos., Inc., 316 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1974) 599,615 
the court did not find the defendant directors entitled to the rule protection because they acted 
'without information that they can be said to have passed on an unintelligent and unadvised 
judgment. ' Ibid at 872. 
58 For a detailed discussion and the facts of the case, see the chapter of "Directors' Liability for 
Breach of Duty. " 
59 Stoner v. Walsh, 772 F. Supp. (1991) 709,80 1. 
60 See e. g., Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A. 2d (Del. 1976) 218. 
61 Kaplan v. Goldsmat, 3 80 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1977) 5 56, Baron v. A Ified A rtists Pictures Corp., 337 
A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1975) 653. 
62 Bennett v. Propp, 187 A. 2d ( Del. Sup. Ct. 1962) 405,408, Petty v. Penntech Papers, Inc., 347 
A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1975) 140,143. 
63 1629 F. 2d (3d Cir. 1980) 287. 
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intention of preserving their control over the corporation, the business judgment rule 
applied to the allegations because, in the court's view, the rule was applicable unless 
the "sole or primary motivation" for the challenged decision was to retain the 
control. The court rejecting the plaintiffs contention that if the purpose of perversion 
played any part in directors' motivation, the business judgment rule was inapplicable 
and it was, thus, upon directors to justify their conduct, held: 
"The business judgment rule ... validates certain situations that otherwise would 
involve a conflict of interest for the ordinary fiduciary. The rule achieves this purpose 
by postulating that if actions are arguably taken for the benefit of the corporation, then 
the directors are presumed to have been exercising their sound business judgment 
rather than responding to any personal motivations. 1164 
The same view was adopted in Panter v. Marshal Field & CO., 65 where the directors 
were sued for acting in bad faith and for personal gain by rejecting a tender offer 
proposed to preserve themselves in office. The court dismissing the plaintiffs' 
allegations held that: 
"When directors act in good faith, they enjoy a presumption of sound business 
judgment ... which court will not disturb if any rational business judgment purpose can 
be attributed to their decisions. "66 
Moreover, the good faith required is a subjective one which is acting in the honest 
belief that the decision in question was in the best interests of the corporation. This 
point expressed by the Delaware Supreme Court in Guth v. Lofl, 6 7where the court 
held: 
'Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their position of trust and 
confidence to further their private interests. While technically not trustees, they stand 
in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders ... . 0068 
To preclude the application of the rule as a defence, the plaintiff should prove that 
the director in question knowingly violated a statute or a public policy rule'69 
64 Ibid at 292. 
65 486 F. Supp. (N. D. 111.1980) 1168. 
66 Ibid 1194. The holding was upheld by the higher court upon the reasoning that the decision was 
made by majority of directors who were independent and outside directors with no interest or little 
interest of preserving their position. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCM, 97,929 at 90,738. 
67 5 A. 2d (Del. 1939) 503. 
68 Ibid at 5 10. 
69 Graham v. Allis- Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188A. 2d (Del. Sup. Ct. 1963) 125. 
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otherwise the presumption of good faith is still valid. The ALI also states that a 
director who takes a business judgment, fulfils his duty if he 'rationally believes that 
the business judgment is in the best interests of the corporation. 170 
9.4.3 Independence Requirement 
Independence of directors is a main requirement for directors to benefit the rule 
protection. The independence requirement in most caseS71 and by some legal 
wrirers', 7 has been equated with disinterested. This view is justified when there is a 
direct connection between being independent and disinterested, because a 
director can not be interested and at the same time independent. The reverse is true. 
Where a director stands directly or indirectly to benefit from a decision, his 
independent business judgment is tainted by doing SO. 73 
The business judgment rule presumes an independent decision and is only, thus, 
applicable when the directors are disinterested. However, because of close 
connection between ownership and directorship, and the presence of potential 
conflict of interests in the close corporation, 74 the assumption of independence may 
not, in the circumstances, be possible. Therefore, the personal interests always is not 
separated from the corporate welfare, 75 and the rule should carefully apply to the 
close corporations, or not to apply at all. 
The Aronson v. LeWiS, 76 case has described this requirement in detail: 
"The requirement of director independence inheres in the conception and rationale of 
the business judgment rule. The presumption of propriety that flows from an exercise 
of business judgment is based in part on this unyielding precept. Independence means 
70 ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations s. 4.01 (c)( Proposed 
Final Draft, March 31 1992). 
71 Abramowitz v. Posner, 513 F. Sup, (S. D. N. Y. 1981), 120, Galef v. Alexander, 615 F. 2d (2d 
cir. 1980) 5 1. 
72 Block etal., The Business Judgment Rule- Fiducialy Duties of Directors, at 22. 
73 Arsht, op cit at 115. 
74 "A corporation whose shares, or at least voting shares, are held by a single shareholder or 
closely-knit group of shareholders. Generally, there are no public investors and its shareholders are 
active in the conduct of the business. " Black's Law Dictionaly, (Minnesota: West Publishing Co. 
1983) ISO, 
75 Peeples, op cit at 485. (Quoted Galler v. G. aller, 32 111.2d 16, (1965) 27). 76 473 A. 2d (Del. 1984), 805. 
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that a director's decision is based on the corporate merits of the subject before the board 
rather than extraneous considerations or influences. "77 
In order for the plaintiff to prove a director's interestedness, he should demonstrate a 
financial gain, 78 or any other specific allegation such as preserving his seat on the 
board of directors. The allegation of being interested should attack the independence 
of the board majority, otherwise the court may likely dismiss the allegation. Even the 
lack of independence may still not remove the presumption of the rule if the 
challenged decision or conduct has been approved by a majority of disinterested 
directors. 79 I. M. 
In addition to the above mentioned requirements for effectiveness of the rule, some 
other conditions can be set out, the more important of which is "requirement of 
action". According to this requirement, as it has been pointed out in Aronson v. 
Lewis: 80 
"the business judgment rule operates only in the context of director action. Technically 
speaking, it has no role where directors have either abdicated their functions, or absent 
a conscious decision to refrain failed to act. "81 
It respectfully seems that even if a director refuse' to act, namely in the case of 
omission, the rule is still applicable. 
5 Functions of the Rule 
Some functions have been recognised for the rule. It offers directors a wide 
discretion necessary to take proper actions which they honestly believe to be in the 
best interests of the corporation, and to formulate the corporation policy effectively 
llký 
77 Ibid 816. ALI refers to the matter, recognising a decision protected by the rule when the director 
"is not interested ... in the sub ect of the business judgment". ALI, Principles of Corporate i Governance: Analysis and Recommendations s. 4.01 (c) (1)( Proposed Final Draft, March 31 
1992). 
78 Grohow v. Perot, 539 A. 2d (Del. 1988) 180,188. 
79 Harciano v. Nakash, 535 A. 2d (Del. 1987) 400,405 (Quoted by Block etal., The Busines 
Judgment Rule: Fiduciaa Duties of DirectOrS, at 24). 
90 473 A. 2d (Del. 1984) 805. 
91 Ibid at 813. 
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without fear of personal liability or judicial scrutiny. 82 The rule has an encouraging 
effect on directors to serve on the board of companies management. 83 It precludes or 
at least limits the courts' interference into decision- making policy of corporate 
management. 
9.5.1 Defensive Use 
The defensive use is the main incentive behind the business judgment rule. Under this 
theory a director, who has made a misjudgment in good faith in performance of his 
duties, should be relieved from personal lia6ility. It has traditionally operated as a 
shield to protect directors from liability for their honest decisions. Furthermore, 
making inquiry into the details of decision- making policy of corporations by the 
courts, when it requires a expertise, is not justified. Therefore, the function of the 
rule is to limit the scope of judicial review as to such policy. However, even in such 
particular case, the inquiry cannot go further than to find out whether the director 
made a reasonable effort to avail himself of all necessary information for the 
challenged decision. 84 
The rule also may protect directors in the case of alleged breach of duty of loyalty. 85 
In order for a director to take the benefit of protection provided by the business 
judgment rule against allegations of breach of duty of loyalty, his actions should not 
be motivated by self- interests, " otherwise the presumption of loyalty ceases. If the 
personal interests of the director concerned is shown, and he can not prove that the 
challenged transaction was fair to the corporation, the liability is most likely to be 
imposed. 87 
82 Cramer v. General Telephone & Electronics Corp., 582 F. 2d (3d. cir. 1978) 274. 83 This point was acknowledged by Percy v. Millaudon, 77 (La. 1829) 78, where it was held that: 
"The contrary doctrine seems to us to suppose the possession, and require the exercise of perfect 
wisdom in falliable human beings. No man would undertake to render a service to another on such 
severe conditions. " 
84 Thomas v. Kempner, 398 A 2d. (Del. Ch. 1979) 320,323- 324. 
85 Cuth v. Loft, 5 A. 2d (Del. 1939) 503,510. 
86 Gall v. Exxon Corp. 418 F. Supp. (S. D. N. Y. 1976) 508,515. 
87 Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., 402 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1979) 382,386. 
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As long as the rule protects directors from imprudent decisions made in good faith 
or from the unfortunate consequences of reasonable decisions it is desirable, but 
when it results in the relaxation of fiduciary obligations, it must yield to the primary 
societal interest in shareholder protection. 88 
9.5.2 Offensive Use 
The rule also has an offensive function which can be exercised through special 
litigation committees consisted of independent and disinterested directors. It has 
been exercised by directors not only as a defeMe means against personal liability, but 
also as a device to block derivative suits brought by shareholders against the board 
of directors or the corporation. As will be discussed later, this application 
6f the rule 
is one of the oddest and most complicated phenomenons in the US corporation law. 
9.5.3 As a Measurement o Due Care 
As was mentioned, the business judgment rule is an implication of duty of care. In 
other words, the definitions and formulations have so far offered for the business 
judgment rule, are mainly based on the duty of care materials such as taking an 
informed decision. Therefore, for defining the rule, the reference should inevitably be 
made to the duty of care elements. For example, ALI formulates the rule, according 
to which a director does not violate his duty with respect to the consequences of a 
business judgment if he: 
(1) is not interested in the sub cct of the business judgment (2) is informed with respect j 
to the subject of the business judgment to the extent the director and officer reasonably 
believes to be appropriate under the circumstances; and (3) rationally believes that the 
business judgment is in the best interests of the corporation. 1189 
Ilk- 
The close connection between this subsection and subsection(a) which formulates a 
duty of care is obvious. In this respect the Model Business Corporation Act is a 
88 Thomas C. Wagner, "The Business Judgment Rule Imposes Procedural Requirements on 
Corporate Directors- Sn-dth v. Van Gorkom", 14 Florida State U. L. Rev., (1986) 126. 
89 ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations s. 4.0 1 (d) (Proposed 
Final Draft, March 31 1992). 
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good example. 90 However, section 8.30(a) of the Revised Model Business 
Corporation Act seems clearer on the matter, Under the section a director shall 
discharge his duties as a director: 
"(I) in good faith; (2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position 
would exercise under similar circumstances; and (3) in a manner he reasonably 
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation. "91 
With regard to the above formulations, it is worth noting that the rule was first 
developed as an application of the duty of care. However, it gave rise to some new 
rules such as the "special litigation committee", the power to dismiss a derivative 
action from which sprang another rule, namely the "demand rule". 
9.6 Special Litigation Committee- Offensive Use of the Rule 
The 1970's witnessed extensive attempts by corporations to designate special 
cornmittees of independent and disinterested directors to investigate the allegations 
put forwarded by shareholders against directors. Such conunittees are empowered to 
move to dismiss the case upon finding that it is not in the best interests of the 
corporation. 92 
Prior to the development of special litigation committees, courts had restricted the 
boards' authority to decide whether to maintain the shareholders claims when a 
majority of the board's members were involved in the alleged wrongdoing. 93 
There are several reasons why corporations prefer to terminate many derivative 
actions as early as possible. First, the legal expenses for such actions are extremely 
90 The Model Business Corporation Act section 35 reads: "A director shall perform his duties as a 
director, including his duties as a member of any committee of the board upon which he may serve, 
in good faith, in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and 
with such care as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar 
circumstances. " 
91 The Revised Model Business Corporation Act, section 8.30(a) (1984). 
92 Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. (S. D. N. Y. 1976) 508. 
93 Alan Higbee, "The Misapplication of the Business Judgment Rule to Dismiss Shareholder 
Derivative Suits Against Directors", XXXIII U FInrida L. Rev., (1981) 598. (Quoted Continental 
Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206, N. Y. (1912) 7,. 15.19, Montgomery Light Co. v. Lashey, 121 Ala. 
(1899) 131). 
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high. It is not only because many of these actions are complex, but more importantly, 
because the corporations are required to pay for several separate teams of lawyers. 
Secondly, derivative actions interrupt the corporation business when the board of 
directors, particularly the top management are engaged in such legal proceedings. 
Perhaps the most important reason for the termination of a derivative action is the 
necessity of avoiding any procedure which may taint the corporation reputation. 
As to propriety of special litigation committees, some views have been posed. 
According to the traditional approach, consistent with the rationale of the business 
judgment rule, limiting judicial inquiry to reviewing the independence of members of 
such committees, validates the decision of the disinterested directors. 94 The modem 
approach, not giving a great attention to the judgment business rule, doubts about 
the independence and disinterestedness of such a committee, 95 when the committee 
is a creation of the board of directors, with sympathy for their colleagues. 96 
The case of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 97 was a turning point in derivative 
action cases in which the Supreme Court clearly drew limitations on taking a 
derivative action by shareholders. According to the court, such an action was not 
permitted except when directors had a duty to file the suit, but refused to do so, and 
this refusal led to a breach of trust. 
Until 1992, legitimacy of the power of such a special litigation committee had been 
acknowledged by five State statutes, 98 namely Alaska, 99 Indiana, 100 Minnesota, 101 
North Dakota, 102 and Virginia. 103 
94 Ibid. 
95 Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A. 2d (Del. 1981) 779,787. 
96 Wagner, op cit at I 11. 
97 304 U. S. (1938) 64. 
98 ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations, Reporter Note to s. 7. 
08) (Proposed Final Draft, March 31 1992). 
99 Alaska Stat. s. 10.06.435(F). 
100 Indina Code Ann. s. 23- 1- 32- 4. 
101 Min. StaL s. 302A, 243. 
102 N. D. Cent Code, s. 10- 19.1-49. 
103 Va. Code s. 13.1- 673 (D). 
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American Law Institute in its Proposed Final Draft has made attempts to suggest an 
obligation for the courts to dismiss a derivative action against a director, a senior 
executive, or a person in control of the corporation, or an associate of such a person, 
if requested by the "board of directors or a properly delegated committee thereof has 
determined that the action is contrary to the best interests of the corporation and has 
resulted the dismissal of the action. " 104 
9.6 1 The Disinterestedness and Power of the Committee 
The question of who is an independent ana disinterested director is significant, 
because the plaintiff may move to challenge the impartiality of the members of the 
special litigation committee by arguing that they are directly or indirectly interested 
in the challenged transaction. Therefore, it is the question of who is empowered to 
determine whether or not proceeding a derivative action is in the best interests of the 
corporation. 
As was mentioned, some commentators have doubted if there is any director truly 
independent and impartial from their colleagues. 115 However, this point in most cases 
has not attracted the judges' agreement. 106The court in Auerbach v. BenneI1107 held 
that 'to disqualify the entire board would be to render the corporation powerless to 
make an effective business judgment with respect to prosecution of derivative 
action. ' 
The major problem inherent in the requirement of disinterestedness is the manner of 
appointment of the special litigation cornmittee's members. It seems justified that 
disinterestedness and independence of a litigation committee is arguable when they 
6 
104 ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations, s. 7.08 (Proposed 
Final Draft, March 31 1992). 
105 Note, "The Business Judgment Rule in Derivative Suits Against Directors", 65 Cornell L. Rev. 
1980)600. 
06 Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. (S. D. N. Y. 1976) 508,515. 
107 47 N. Y. 2d (1979) 619,633. 
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are appointed after the action is taken, and more particularly where the defendant 
directors take part in the appointment. 108 
It is necessary to find out by what source and upon which statutory or judicial 
authority, the board of directors is empowered to move to dismiss a derivative action 
through a special litigation committee formed by themselves. Until Auerbach v. 
Bennett, 109 there was no judicial authority of highest State court examining the 
legitimacy of the exercise of such power of corporate directors. 110 In that case, a 
committee of independent and outside directors was formed to investigate the 
allegation of a foreign payment and to decide whether it was in the best interests of 
the corporation to pursue the case. The committee moved to dismiss the case upon 
finding that it was very costly, wasting the management's time, with a little chance of 
success. Moreover, the committee dismissed a claim against a third party. The court, 
in this case, recognised the exercise of such power and went on to say: 
"As all parties and both courts below recognise, the disposition of this case on the 
merits turns on the proper application of the business judgment doctrine ... that 
doctrine bars judicial inquiry into actions of corporate directors taken in good faith and 
in the exercise of honest judgment in the lawful and legitimate furtherance of corporate 
purposes .... Derivative claims against corporate directors belong to the corporation 
itself. As with other questions of corporate policy and management, the decision 
whether and to what extent to explore and prosecute such claims lies within the 
judgment and control of the corporation's board of directors... ". III 
Here, though all the parties were in agreement on the power of the directors, the 
court ruled that because a derivative action belongs to the corporation, therefore, it 
was subject to its directors decision. 
The first Delaware case in this respect is Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 112which 
'%" involved charges stemmed from illegal payments admittedly made by the corporation 
to certain foreign entities. Control Data Corp. 's (CDC) board of directors reacted to 
108 Dennis J. Block & H. Adam Brussin, "The Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder Derivative 
Actions: Via Zapata". 37 Bus. Law. (1981) 31,58. 
109 47 N. Y. 2d(1979) 619. 
110 Block & Brussin, OP cit at 45. 
111 A uerhach v. Bennett, 47 N. Y. 2d (1979). 619,621,629. 
112 603 F. 2d (8th Cir. 1979) 724, cert. denied, 444 U. S. (1980) 1017. 
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the action by creating an autonomous "Special Litigation Comn-dttee" to investigate 
the charges as well as to determine whether the suit was in the best of the 
corporation. The committee was composed of seven of CDC's "outside" directors 
holding responsible positions in government and business. None of the committee's 
members had been named as a defendant, and there was no indication that any 
member was interested in or informed of the foreign payments. 113 The committee 
found the action not in the best interest of the corporation because: 
"(1) the defendants had not been directly involved in the payments, nor had they 
personally profited from them; (2) the defendaqU had fully cooperated with the Justice 
Department and the committee; (3) legal action against the defendants could 
significantly impair their ability to manage corporate affairs; (4) the foreign payments 
were a customary business practice at the time they were made and were intended to 
serve the business interests of CDC; and (5) disclosure of the details of the payments 
might endanger certain CDC employees. "I 14 
In this case, the court disagreed with the plaintiff that the business judgment rule was 
not applicable in dismissing a derivative action against directors for breach of duty, 
because: 
"it is a decision by the directors of the corporation that pursuit of a cause of action 
based on acts already consummated is not in the best interest of the corporation. Such a 
determination, like any other business decision, must be made by the corporate 
directors in the exercise of their sound business judgment. " 115 
For the first time in the history of the long- standing "business judgment rule", here, 
the court found the rule applicable even in criminal cases by holding that "we find no 
merit to his argument that the rule is inapplicable where the defendant directors are 
charged with criminal misconduct. " 116 
The decision has received heavy criticism as "falling into the trap of assuming that 
the business judgment rule confers authority upon a board to terminate derivative 
113 Ibid at 727. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid at 730. 
116 Ibid. 
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actions, without coming to grips with the question of whether derivative suits against 
directors ought to be beyond directorial control altogether. "' 17 
Fortunately and not surprisingly, that decision was reversed by the Supreme Court of 
the United States, "" otherwise the legal community had to spend much time in 
curing this shocking injury in the body of corporation law. 
However, in Galef v. Alexander'19 the court strongly dismissed the idea that a 
defendant against whom a derivative action is filed can be described as disinterested, 
irrespective of whether or not he benefited from the challenged transaction. In that 
case, the court held that: 
"[In] all of the cases relied upon by the district court ... the court has 
indeed allowed 
directors to preclude pursuit of a corporate claim, but in each the directors who made 
such a determination were not alleged to have authorised or approved the challenged 
transaction, and they were not made defendants in the lawsuit. We are not aware of any 
case that has determined that directors against whom a claim has been asserted and 
who have determined that the claim against them should not be pursued, do not stand 
in a dual relation which prevents the unprejudiced exercise ofjudgment. "120 
ol 
A similar development can be seen in Burks v. Lasker, 121 where the special litigation 
committee moved to dismiss the allegations brought by two of the stockholders. The 
Federal District Court affirmed the decision upon finding that the plaintiff 
shareholders had failed to meet their burden of establishing that the minority 
directors were interested. 122 However, the holding was reversed by the second 
circuit court. The court drawing a distinction between independent and non- 
independent directors stated that: 
"lilt is asking too much of human nature to expect that the disinterested directors will 
view with the necessary objectivity the actions of their colleagues in a situation where 
an adverse decision would be likely to result in considerable expense and liability for 
the individuals concemed. "123 
117 Block & Brussin, op cit at 46. 
1 IS Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 444 U. S. 1017; 100 S. Ct. 670; 1980 U. S. LEXIS 314; 62L. Ed. 
2d(1980)647. 
119 615 F. 2d (2d Cir. 1980) 5 1. 
120 Ibid at 60. 
121441 U. S. (1979) 47 1. 
122 426 F. Supp. (S. D. N. Y. 1979) 844. 
123 567 F. 2d at 1212. 
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In the above judicial decisions, the courts have taken different views over the 
independence and disinterestedness of the members of such committees. However, 
reviewing those cases leads to the conclusion that prior to the Zapata case, the 
courts took the view that where the directors were disinterested, their motion to 
dismiss a derivative action was valid, unless otherwise was proven. 
lp 
9.6.2 Zapata- the New Trend 
Prior to Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 124 the clear direction of the State and Federal 
courts was to approve the decision of disMinterested boards or special litigation 
committees in terminating derivative litigation. 
The Zapata case125is a turning point relating to the application and interpretation of 
a specific function of the business judgment rule, namely the position and role of the 
special litigation committee. It is rightly suggested that these three cases may mark 
the end of "the clear trend in corporate law". 126 
In 1970 Zapata! s board of directors adopted a stock option plan which granted 
certain officers and directors of Zapata options to purchase Zapata common stock at 
$12.15 per share in five separate instalments, ending July 14,1974. The plan was 
ratified by Zapata's stockholders. Zapata was also planning a tender offer for 
2,300,000 of its own shares. The tender offer was expected to be announced just 
prior to July 14,1974, and it was predicted that the effect of the announcement 
would increase the market price of Zapata stock from $18-$19 per share to near the 
tender offer price of $25 per share. Zapata% directors, most of whom optionees, 
knew that if the options were exercised after the date of the tender offer 
announcement, the optionees would incur substantial additional federal income tax 
liability. They were also aware that this additional liability could be avoided if the 
124 473 A. 2d (Del. 1984) 805. 
125 Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. (S. D. Tex. 1980) 348, Maldonado v. FIYYn, 485 F. Supp. 
(S. D. N. Y. 1980) 274, Maldonado v. Flynn 1,413 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1980) 125 1. 
126 S. Andrew Bowman, "The Business Judgment Rule and the Litigation Committee: the End of a Clear Trend in Corporate Law", 14 lad-LJ2ýy., (1981) 617,63 1. 
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options were exercised prior to the announcement. 'That was because the amount of 
capital gain for federal income tax purposes to the optionees would have been an 
amount equal to the difference between the $12.15 option price and the price on the 
date of the exercise of the option. $1 S-$19 if the options were exercised prior to the 
tender offer announcement, or nearly $25 if the options were exercised immediately 
after the announcement. '127 
With the view to reducing the amount of federal income tax liability that would be 
incurred by the optionees in exercising their options, the directors accelerated the 
date on which the options could be exercised to July 2,1974, when the optionees 
exercised their options and the directors requested the New York Stock Exchange to 
suspend trading in Zapata shares pending "an important announcement". On July 8, 
1974 as a result of announcement of the tender offer by Zapata, the market price of 
Zapata stock promptly rose to $24.50.128 
In 1975, and without making demand, one of Zapata! s shareholders, Maldonado, 
brought a derivative action on behalf of Zapata and its stockholders, alleging that 
accelerating the time for the exercise of the defendants' stock options constituted a 
breach of the fiduciary duty by the directors owed to Zapata and its stockholders, 
because it "deprived Zapata of a federal tax deduction in an amount equal to that 
saved by the optionees because the options were exercised on July 2,1974, when the 
price of Zapata stock was $18.8125, rather than on July 14,1974, when the price of 
Zapata stock was at or near $24.50. " 
In 1979, Zapata's directors formed and appointed an independent litigation 
committee ("the committee") composed of two outside newly appointed directors to 
investigate the claims asserted in the actions, in order. to determine whether those 
suites served the best interests of the company. 
After an investigation, the committee found all the three actions were contrary to 
Zapata! s best interests, because, in its view there was no material injury to the 
127 Maldonado v. Flynn 1,413 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1980) 1251,1254. 
128 Ibid. 
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company. Moreover, in its' view, there was no chance of success to proceed the 
actions due to lack of merits and the case was not only highly costly but would waste 
the time of management and the corporation publicity. Therefore, the committee 
instructed counsel for Zapata to seek dismissal of all the pending suits. 
Pursuant to the Committee's directive, Zapata moved for dismissal of this action or 
alternatively for summary judgment in its favour. In support of its motions, Zapata 
relied upon the doctrine of corporate law that the board of directors is empowered 
to make the business decisions of the corporation, and they are the ones but not the 
stockholders, who manage its business affairs- 
The New York court noting that Delaware court had not addressed the issue, found 
the business judgment rule applicable "even where some of the board members are 
disqualified from participating in the board's decision ... ". 
129 However, the court after 
an exhaustive review of some Federal and Delaware cases, held that although a 
special litigation committee was empowered to terminate a derivative action, the 
shareholders could always file an individual action or a class action on behalf of all 
the shareholders. 130 
The Delaware court took a different view and moved to limit the extent of power of 
such a committee. This case was a revolutionary change in the judicial viewpoint in 
which the traditional approach that a litigation committee could terminate a 
derivative action was diminished. The Delaware Chancery Court reviewing the 
application of the business judgment rule held: 
"under well settled Delaware law, the directors cannot compel the dismissal of a 
pending stockholder's derivative suit which seeks redress for an apparent breach of 
fiduciary duty, by merely reviewing the suit and making a business judgment that it is 
not in the best interests of the corporation. "131 
The court after exanýning the application of the rule concluded: 
129 Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. (S. D. N. Y. 1980) 279. 
130 Ibid at 281. 
131 Maldonado v. Flynn 1,413 A. 2d (Del. Ch. - 1980) 1251,1257. 
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"... an analysis of the character of a derivative suits shows that the business judgment 
rule is irrelevant to the question of whether the committee has the authority to compel 
the dismissal of this SUit. "132 
Finally, the court expressed the view that under settled Delaware law, the directors 
do not have the right to compel the dismissal of a derivative suit brought by a 
stockholder to remedy an apparent breach of fiduciary duty by the directors in 
relation to the corporation and its stockholders after the directors have refused to 
institute legal proceedings, because the stockholder then possesses an independent 
right to redress the wrong. 133 
However, the court's decision that a stockholder, once demand is made and refused, 
possesses an independent, individual right to continue a derivative suit for breaches 
of fiduciary duty over objection by the corporation, 134 was found by the Supreme 
Court of Delaware as "erroneous". 135 
The decision of the Zapata case which was later followed by Delaware courts, put 
an end to the traditional trend which gave a wide discretion to a special litigation 
committee to dismiss a derivative action. In the unreported case of Lewis v. 
Fuqua, 136 the plaintiff brought a stockholder derivative suit claiming that directors of 
the defendant Fuqua Industries diverted an opportunity of the corporation to 
repurchase common stock to themselves for their own personal benefits. A special 
litigation committee based on whose recommendations the corporate defendant 
moved to dismiss the stockholder derivative suit, when it found that the suit was not 
in the interests of the corporation, was appointed to investigate the claims. The 
Chancery Court held that the motion was to be denied, because there was no 
showing that the special litigation committee was independent or that the committee 
0 established a reasonable basis for its conclusions. Furthermore, in the court's view, 
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid at 1262. 
134 Ibid. Also see Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. (S. D. N. Y. 1980) 279,28 1. 
135 Zapata Corporation, V William Maldonado, 430 A. 2d 779; 783. 
136 Unreported case, No. 7188. Spring, 1986 (Cited in II Del. I Colp. L., (1986) 928. 
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dismissal of the suit at this juncture would not have been in the best interests of the 
corporation. 137 
9.6 3 Demand Rule 
The main restriction for shareholders to bring a derivative action against the 
corporation or its directors is recognised as the "demand rule. "139 This adds a degree 
of finality to the decision of the board of directors whether or not to initiate or 
maintain a derivative action against their wrongdoer colleagues. According to this 
rule, a shareholder is required, before filing any derivative suit, to apply to the board 
of directors requiring them to take the appropriate action. 
The rule is a result of the necessity of the plaintiff shareholders' showing that they 
have tried all the available means to recover their damages, as a prerequisite to bring 
a derivative suit. The law in virtually every jurisdiction, in which the issue has been 
addressed, is that a determination by a board of directors to refuse a demand to file a 
derivative action is, like any other business decision, to be assessed in accordance 
with the business judgment rule. 139 The rule is believed to have been recognised over 
a century ago'10 by the United States Supreme Court in Hawes v. Oakland 141 In that 
case, the court upheld the board of directors' decision to refuse a demand as 
consistent with the business judgment rule's protection. 142 
In Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 143 where a shareholder tried to 
prevent the corporation of paying an allegedly illegal licence fee to the State of 
Alaska, the court clearly described the board's refusal to let a derivative action be 
137 Ibid. 
138 Kon Sik Kim, "The Demand on Directors Requirement and the Business Judgment Rule in the 
Shareholder Derivative Suit: An Alternative Framework", J. Colp. L. (1981) 511. 
139 Dennis J. Block, Stephen Radin, and James P. Rosenzweig, "The Role of the Business Judgment 
Rule in Shareholder Litigation at the Turn of the Decade", 45 Bus. La . (1989) 492. 140 Ibid. 
141 104 U. S., (188 1) 450. 
142 Ibid at 462. 
143 187 U. S. (1903) 455. 
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filed by shareholders as "in accordance with the business judgment rule", and a 
natural result of the application of the rule, when a demand was not made. 144 
The question may be raised whether applying the rule in all circumstances is 
necessary. The drafters of the Model Business Act argue that requiring a demand in 
all cases is recommended because it "does not impose an onerous burden upon" 
shareholders. 145 
In several cases, failure to make the required demand has not prevented shareholders 
from bringing an action. It is more justified when shareholders can show that making 
a demand on the board would be fruitless. 14'46To demonstrate this fruitlessness, the 
shareholders should prove that the board of directors is dominated by the alleged 
wrongdoers and because of personal interests, some or all members of the board 
cannot be independent or disinterested. Therefore, the demand may be excused and 
the derivative action: 
"... can be maintained only if the stockholder shall allege and prove that the directors of 
the corporation are personally involved or interested in the alleged wrongdoing in a 
way calculated to impair their exercise of business judgment on behalf of the 
corporation, or that their refusal to sue reflects bad faith or breach of trust in some 
other way. "147 
In the Delaware case of Sohland v. Baker, 148 the court disagreed with the directors' 
refusal to sue after sufficient demand was made on them and held that the plaintiff 
shareholder could proceed upon finding that the right to take an action was vested in 
the shareholder. Moreover, there was no sufficient reason for such refusal. 149 
In Delaware, in the absence of any guidance from the Supreme Court, the Chancery 
Court had laid down and developed its own rule that demand was excused if the 
plaintiffs allegations raised a "reasonable inference" that the action of the directors 
144 Ibid at 463. 
145 "Conunent on Corporation Laws- Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act 
Amendmcnt"44Bus. La . (1989)543. 146 Libof v. Wolfson, 437 F. 2d (5th Cir. 1971) 121,122, Nussbacher v. Continental 111. National 
Bank & Trust Co., 518 F. 2d (7th Cir. 1975) 873,877. 
147 Ash v. I. B. M. Inc., 353 F. 2d (3d Cir. 1965) 491 at 493, denied, 384 U. S. (1966) 927. 
148 15 Del. Ch. 431,141 A. (1927) 277. 
149 Ibid at 443. 
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was not protected by the business judgment rule. 150 The Delaware Supreme Court 
rejected the court of chancery's "reasonable inference" test by adopting a standard of 
"reasonable doubt" for the guidance of trial judges. 151 
It is suggested that with regard to the Aronson case, in Delaware law, demand 
always is required, except when a majority of the board is interested in the alleged 
transaction which is seriously doubtful if the business judgment rule is invokable. 152 
9.7 The Business Judgment Rule in Judicial Scrutiny 
The effectiveness of the business judgment rule, as the product of case law, depends 
on the extent to which the courts respect it. The courts' treatment of the rule is, thus, 
a significant factor in developing the law in this area. 
The main confusion is the scope of the courts' discretion in invoking and applying the 
rule, particularly when satisfying the rule requirements by the directors in question is 
doubtful. It is suggested that there is a close connection between the importance and 
potential effects of the board's decisions on the corporation and the level of scrutiny 
the court may apply. The more a decision affects the ownership interests of 
shareholders, the more the court may be willing to scrutinise the decision. 153 
In several cases, it has been recognised that if the value of transaction decided by the 
directors falls within a range of values which even reasonable and fully informed 
people may take different views, their decisions should not be questioned by the 
court. In Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 154 the court expressed that "the business 
150 Lewis v. Aronson, 466 A-2d (Del. Ch. 1983) 375,381; Haber v. Bell, 465 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1983) 
353. 
151 Donald E. Pease "Aronson V. Lewis: When Demand Is Excused and Delaware's Business 
Judgment Rule". 9 Del. J. CoIR. L. (1984) 39. 
152 Dennis J. Block & H. Adam Brussin, "Termination of Derivative Suits Against Directors on 
Business Judgment Grounds: From Zapata to Aronson", 39 Bus. Law., (1984) 1503,1523. 
153 Bayless Manning, "Reflection and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom after Van Gorkom", 
41 Bus. Law., (1985) 1.5. 
154 280 A. 2d (Del. 1971) 717,720. 
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judgment will not be disturbed if [it] can be attributed to any rational business 
purpose. " Likewise, in Puma v. Marriott, 155 the court was of the view that: 
"since the transaction complained of was accomplished as a result of the exercise of 
independent business judgment of the outside, independent directors whose sole 
interest was the finiherancc of the corporate enterprise, the court is precluded from 
substituting its uniformed opinion for that of the experienced, independent board 
membcrs. "156 
The courts, while recognising that it is not their business to interfere with the 
corporate directors decision- making, in the case of any conflict of directors' interests 
with their duties, preserve the right to inSWire into the challenged decision. For 
example in Bayer v. Beran, 157minority stockholders took a derivative action for 
negligence, waste, and improvidence in instituting an extensive advertising program 
using the wife of a director who had control over the board, when the company 
received offers of more business than it could handle. 158 The court here held that: 
"The board ... is placed in a position where selfish, personal interests might be in 
conflict with the duty it owed to the corporation. That being so, the entire transaction 
must be subjected to the most rigorous scrutiny to determine whether the action of the 
directors was ... inconsistent [with the company's] interest. "159 
After a careful examination, the court did not find any breach of fiduciary duty as 
such on the part of the directors. A similar view was taken in Cramer v. General Tel. 
& Elec. Corp., 160when the court examining the extent of courts! discretion held that: 
"[W]e do not think that the business judgment of the directors should be totally 
insulated from judicial review. In order for the directors! judgment to merit judicial 
deterrence, that judgment must have been made in good faith and independently of any 
influence of those persons suspected of wrongdoing. In addition, when the shareholder 
contends that the directorsjudgment is so unwise or unreasonable as to fall outside the 
permissible bounds of the directors' sound discretion, a court should, we think, be able 
to conduct its own analysis of the reasonableness of that business judgment. "I II 
0 
155 283 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1971) 693. 
156 Ibid at 696. 
157 49 N. Y. S. 2d (Sup. Ct. 1944) 2. 
158 Ibid at 9. 
159 Ibid at 9- 10. 
160 582 F. 2d (3d Cir. 1978) 259. 
161 Ibid at 275. 
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On the other hand, the courts scrutinise a director's business decision if it can be 
shown that he made his decision with a reckless disregard of the best interests of the 
corporation and its shareholders. The leading case in this regard is Gimbel v. Signal 
Companies, Inc.. 162 In this case, the plaintiff, a stockholder of Signal company, 
owning some subsidiaries, sought an order to ban the sale of one of subsidiaries of 
the Signal company. The plaintiff claimed that the sale price of $480m was 
considerably lower than the fair price, $761m. Here, although the court stated that a 
presumption that the board had acted in good faith and their judgment would not be 
"0' disturbed when it could be attributed to a rational business purpose, 163 it took the 
view that 'this does not mean, however, that the business judgment rule irrevocably 
shields the decisions of corporate directors from challenge". 164 The court 
acknowledged that "there are limits on the business judgment rule which fall short of 
intentional or inferred fraudulent misconduct and which are based simply on gross 
inadequacy of price. This is clear even if language of fraud is used. " 165 In that case, 
the court was of the view that the rule would not protect directors' decision when 
they have "acted so far without information that they can be said to have passed an 
unintelligent and unadvised judgment". 166 
The same judicial attitude can be seen in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 167 the leading case in 
this regard, which caused significant changes in the law relating to directors. In this 
case, the court obviously refused to apply the business judgment rule to relieve the 
defendant directors from personal liability, and held them liable because, in the 
court's view, the directors 'did not adequately inform themselves as to the 
defendant's role in enforcing the sale of the company and in establishing the per share 
0 purchase price' and 'were uninformed as to the intrinsic value of the company'. 169 
162 316 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1974) 599. 
163 Ibid at 608- 609. 
164 Ibid at 609. 
165 Ibid at 6 10. 
166 Ibid at 615. 
167 488 A. 2d (1985) 858. 
168 Ibid at 874. 
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There is an obvious similarity between the court's judgment in this case and Gimhel 
v. Signal Companies, -Inc., because in both cases the main cause for liability was 
making an uninformed decision. 
The Gorkom case has been criticised as a misperception which caused the Delaware 
Supreme Court to depart from traditional business judgment rule principles. 169 
Another criticism with which the Gorkom decision faced is that the courts substitute 
their determination of the adequacy of information for that of more qualified 
professional directors. 170 However, this perception of the Gorkom case has been 
rejected by some other commentators who Ge'lieve that the case is not a departure 
from previous business judgment rule decisions, nor is it a harbinger of judicial 
activism in the corporate era, but it "remains a coherent explication of a long- 
existing, fundamental safeguard for corporate management. " 171 
8 Conclusion 
The business judgment rule, on the one hand operates as a protective means, and on 
the other hand as a measurement of fiduciary duty of care. The rule with some of its 
particular characteristics is distinguished from other protection concepts. Unlike a 
charter cap provision, the business judgment rule under particular circumstances, 
may protect directors from breach of duty of loyalty. 172 More importantly, the rule is 
not a statutory concept but an implication of judges' thoughts, whereas other 
protective mechanisms including indemnification, insurance, and elimination or 
limitation of liability are statutory provisions. The recent crisis and increased 
%I 
interference of the courts with directors decision- making which obviously has 
169 Schwartz & Wiles, "Business Judgment Rule Clarified by Delaware's Trans Union Decision" 
Nat'l L. J.. (July 8,1985) 1,42. 
170 Daniel Fischel, "The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case", 40 Bus. La .. (1985) 1437,1441. 
171 Wagner, op cit at 124 
172 Cuth v. Loft, 5 A. 2d (Del. 193 9) 503,5 1 P, Gall v. Exxon Corp. 418 F. Supp. (S. D. N. Y. 1976) 
508,515 
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weakened the position of the rule and led to the enactment of 1986 in Delaware and 
other States, should be considered in connection with this particular characteristic. In 
other words, in contrast with other protective means, whose extent and restrictions 
of applicability are defined by the relevant statutes, the rule is subject of the courts' 
discretion. In invoking the rule, courts have a wide discretion whether or not to 
apply it. The best example is the case of Smith v. Van Gorkom, 173 in which the court 
exercised its discretion in not applying the rule. 
The significant advantage of the rule, in comparison with a liability limitation or 
elimination provision, is that it is in all situ"OFtions including insolvency applicable, 
whereas the application of the charter cap in the latter event is unjustified. Moreover, 
a direct indemnification protection is not workable when the corporation is 
financially unable or unwilling to reimburse. 
The offensive use of the rule in the form of the special litigation comn-dttee has been 
strongly criticised as demonstrating "the erosion of a shareholder ability to 
derivatively protect the corporation and its shareholders from ravages of directors' 
malversation, " when "with bastardised application of the business judgment rule, 
burden of proof falls on the shareholder to rebut the independence or good faith of 
the litigation committee. " 174 
The power of the board of directors to veto a derivative action bears a significant 
potential abuse of the business judgment rule by the board, because the business 
judgment rule only protects the litigation committee's decision to dismiss, but does 
not give an independent authority for the dismissal itself. 175 This power is, thus, 
neither necessary nor desirable as a protective device for the legitimate oversight of 
corporate by the board. Consequently, the possibility of abusing the power of the 
board of directors to terminate a shareholder's derivative action requires an 
alternative. This alternative can be the courts that make inquiry into a derivative 
173 488 A. 2d (1985) 858. Also see Gimbel v. Signal Cos., Inc., 316 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1974) 599,615. 
174 Bowman, op cit at 635. 
175 Mgbee, op cit at 613. 
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action and dismiss it if not in the best interests of the corporation. 176 It can be done 
by invoking the requirement of rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures 
which provides that "[flhe derivative action may not be maintained if it appears that 
the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the interest of the shareholders 
or members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or 
association. " 177 The statutory solution by relying on States laws has also been 
recommended as the effective means to overcome the difficulties inherent in the 
derivative actions. 178 
There is no doubt that the last amendmen-ts of indemnification statute on the one 
hand, and the welcome charter cap option by almost all States following Delaware 
law on the other hand, have lowered the role and importance of the business 
judgment rule to the second place. However, with regard to the current situation, the 
law community, courts, and legal writers should consider the rule function as if the 
limiting or eliminating provision has never been introduced. Indemnification or 
elimination devices as statutory provisions can be removed by the legislature or not 
be employed by the corporations, because their employment is not mandatory, 
whereas the business judgment rule as a common law rule will be in effect and 
invokable. 
114- 
176 Kim, op cit at 23. 
177 Fed. R L Civ. P. 23.1. See also. Maldonado v. Flynn 1.413 A. 2d (Del. Ch. 1980) 1251,1263, in 
which Vice Chancellor Hcrtnett said: "aggrieved stockholders Delaware corporafions ought to be 
able to expect that an impartial tribunal, not a committee appointed by the alleged wrongdoers, will decide whether a stockholder's derivative suit alleging breach of fiduciary duty has any merit. " 179 See generally John C. Coffee & Donlald E. Schwartz, "The Survival of the Derivative Suits: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform", 81 Colum. L. Rev. (1981) 261. 
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Chapter 10: Comparative Study and Conclusion 
10.1 Introduction 
In our study, it appeared that the two contrasted legal systems enjoy some common 
ideas as the result of maintaining the traditional common law or equitable rules on 
the one hand, and differ in some points which have resulted from different socio- 
cultural as well as economic- political ideals of each community. To elaborate the 
causes of differences, thus, there must be an examination of these ideals that form 
the dominant ideology of the two societies. By the 'dominant ideology' is meant the 
ground on which the cultural- political and economic perception of a nation is based. 
In this chapter I shall try to explain this dominant ideology and its impact on socio- 
cultural and economic- political aspects of the US and English societies. Corporate 
directors' duties as the main common principles and similarity in the two laws are 
also comparatively examined. In a review of directors' liabilities, there is an attempt 
to answer the question how US law has failed to define and classify these liabilities 
under an appropriate set of conceptions, whereas English law in this regard has 
specially introduced some concepts for this purpose, in particular in the event of 
insolvency. This very fact is more noticeable in the case of disqualification where, 
unlike highly developed concept of disqualification in English law, US law has newly 
recognised the imposition of such a penalty on only executive directors in their 
violation of the Securities Acts. 
However, it is to be proven that the US company law is more protective than English 
law towards its directors. The US legislature generously has permitted corporations 
to provide their directors with protection by triter. ing some provisions to such effect 
into their certificate of incorporation or articles of association, or even in an external 
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contract. Moreover, the business judgment rule with its different functions is an 
exclusive advantage of the former law. 
Finally, in our conclusion, briefly referring to some basic comparative points of the 
two legal systems, we answer the question whether harmonisation or codification of 
those two laws is necessary, and if so whether it is feasible. I will suggest the line of 
the thesis for further study for the future researchers. 
10.2 Different Societies Still within the Same Legal System? 
Although the first generation of the new Americans was European, mainly British, 
and they conveyed the common law rules to their new homeland, some deep changes 
were to happen in all aspects of their life- style. These changes were accelerated by 
the arrival of new non- British immigrants. The new Americans, 85% of the 
population of whose first generation were British immigrants, ' wished to be 
distinctive. The American has wanted to be a new man neither a European nor the 
decedent of a European, rather "an American, who leaving behind him all his ancient 
prejudices and manners, receives new ones from the new mode of life he has 
embraced, the new government he obeys, and the new rank he holds. "2 It is true they 
have tried hard to seem the American exceptionalists. 
The fundamental objective of today's American society was freedom with "the 
quality of character necessary for the creation of a free republic", but this aim seems 
to have been replaced by the well- recognised principle of "individualism", that might 
eventually isolate the Americans one from another. 3 This, in an American view 
w means "anything that violates our right to take for ourselves, judge for ourselves, 
make our own decisions, live our lives as well as see fit, is not only morally wrong, it 
Richard Maidment & Anthony McGrew, The American political process (California: SAGE 
Publications Ltd. 1991) 13. 
2 J. Hator St. John de Crevecocur, Letters from an-Amefican-Farmer (New York: Penguin Books, 
1981)63-4. 
3 Robert N. Bellah et al, Habits of the Hearts- Individualism and Commitment in American Life, 
(California: University of California Press 1985) Introduction at viii. 
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is sacrilegious. "4 Surprisingly, one can easily find out how strongly this belief has 
been exercised by the American even in their international relationships. As Bellah 
states, the thinking about American society is narrowly focused on its political 
economy. In his view, "this focus makes sense in t hat government and the 
corporations are the most powerful structures in our society and affect everything 
else, including our culture and our character. "5 
This contention is perfectly true, but there is something more. Corporations, cartels, 
and trusts are even more powerful than the government. Indeed, they are the real 
'0, master- players behind the scene, who have a say in structuring and forming the 
government and affect its domestic and international policies. An unbiased expert in 
the American political life may confirm that the president in his substantial decisions 
has to strike a balance between the interests of these giants firms and those of the 
public. Thus, the vociferous demand for banning or restricting the freedom of 
carrying guns is not heard in Congress, though it is used a pressure lever in election 
campaign by rival parties. 
On the other had, considering this complicated system optimistically, one may fairly 
observe this development as the adventurous aspect of American life- style, the 
aspect which was the main ingredient of the historical immigration that led to the 
creation of the republic of America. So long as the American community keeps a 
high profile of its economic- political position, this adventurous aspect is likely to 
produce prosperity, of course with its long- term cultural- moral disadvantages. 
Political culture as the "dominant ideology" has been constructed and imposed by 
those who control the levers of economic and political powers to justify their 
dominance and maintenance of capitalism. This dominant ideology is so powerful, 
Katznelson and Kesselman claim, that the economic and political arrangements 
"appear not merely as the best possible arrangements but as the only possible ones. ", 
4 Ibid at 142. 
5 Ibid at 275. 
61 Katznelson and M. Kesselman The P ilitics )f Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Jovanovich 
1979)29. 
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Interest groups play a decisive role in the United States economic- political 
livelihood, and they operate as an important constituent element of the American 
political process. This has led to the well- known phenomenon of "specialism of 
lobbying". The interest groups enjoy their influence through hiring the services of 
professionals lobbyiStS. 7 This informal but practically well- recognised role as a part 
of today's American political life, which obviously also affects the legislative process, 
is mediated by the parties. Lobby groups are n ow more powerful than ever and 
promote the interests of the parties they formally or informally represent. This 
development has gone further than domesti-c** affairs, and has been concerned with 
international relations, particularly after the second world war. 
The interest groups are acting in the form of very well- organised committees as 
political action committees (PACs) that emerged almost together with the new 
republic of America. Tocqueville who had carefully studied this phenomenon in 1835 
said: 
-Americans of all ages, all conditions and all dispositions constantly form associations, 
... Whenever at the head of some new undertaking you see the government of France, 
or a man of rank in England, in the United States you will be sure to find an 
association. "s 
They share information about candidates through active networking among 
themselves mostly based in Washington with branches in other States. 9 The events 
that have taken place in the Middle East after the second world war, particularly in 
the Persian Gulf region involving the United States, have been strongly a follow up 
of economic- political desires of some powerful interest groups in the decision- 
making policy circles in the White House or Congress. 10 
Even the political aspect of the legal system of the American law has raised some 
debates among American lawyers, who have made attempts to define the applicable 
7 Maidment & McGrew, The American Political Process at 134- 35. 8 Alexis de Tocquoville, Democracy in America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1963) 2: 106. 
9 Larry J. Sabato, PACT Power-Inside the World of Political Action Committees (New York: W. 
W Norton & Company 1984) 144, 
10 For a detailed discussion of these particular lobby groups' role in the US politics, see Hedrick 
Smith, The Power Ga= (Glasgow: William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd 1988) Chapter 9 at 297- 373. 
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ideal to today's American society. Romano in a well- recognised attempt tried to 
answer the question whether American society is ruled by the concept of "atomic 
individualism" or "corporatism". In explaining the influence of political ideals on 
conceptions of the corporations in relation to corporate law reform, he suggests that 
in a corporatist society, the focus is on an organic conception of community which is 
a hierarchical organisation, " whereas according to the first ideal, the individual is the 
centrepiece of political and social life. 12 The leading company law commentator, 
Berle, relates the second ideal to the concept of corporation. He gives a great deal of 
credit to the role of corporate managers whose function is considered as that of 
disinterested public servants who provide the community with the stability necessary 
for the achievement of the corporation conception, 13 this conception is "collective 
soul" and the "conscience-carrier of twentieth century American society. "14 The 
managers, in Berle's view, further the goals of the community or whole corporation 
including shareholders, rather than their own interests, 15 and "run their affairs in the 
interests of their security holders". 16 
From those ideals, corporatism or atomic individualism, which one is serving 
another? In other words, which one is the eventual aim? While individualism and 
capitalism in the West, most particularly in the US, are twin concepts, corporatism 
can be considered as a vehicle for promoting those two conceptions. In first glance, 
it seems so. But a careful consideration proves that corporatism is increasingly 
becoming a new concept for individualism, and the corporation as special individual. 
Compared with the extreme individualism in the American perspective, the English 
perception of the dominant ideology is different. This ideal is also individualism, but 
an absolute conservative one, 'conservative individualism. ' In this society, as a result 
f. 
II Roberta Romano, "Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform", 36 SlaIL13M, (1984) 923,934. 
12 Ibid at 938. 
13 Adolf A. Berle, Power Without-PropeM (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1959) 20 3,8. 
14 Adolf A. Berle, The Twentieth_CMtýý Capitalist Revolution (New York: Harcourt, Brace & 
Co. 1955) 148. 
15 Adolf A. Berle, "Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust" 44 Hary. L. Rev. (1931) 1049. 
16 Adolf A. Berle, "For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note" 45 Hary. L. Rev. (1932) 
1365. 
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of the English traditional view, economy is based on capitalism system, and 
individualism is the don-dnant ideal. Therefore, individual in its real sense is in a 
superior position to the corporation. 17 
One agreeing with this theory, should not be surprised why the life of conservative 
governments in this country is much longer than others. In the light of this 
conclusion, the slogan of the conservatives, 'new labour- new dangee is, irrespective 
of its merits, more understandable. For such an extreme conservative society any 
basic changes means'new danger'. 
This conservatism not only in economic- pcditical life but also in socio- cultural 
relationship is evident. That is why many people belonging to different religious- 
cultural sectors, find this country safer than other Continental societies's and even 
than the United States for their values and particularly their families. 
The conservatism ideology can be traced in the process of the development of law. A 
comparison between English law and that of the US in the area of our research, 
proves that even non- protective and somehow oppressive stance of English law 
towards its corporate directors is a reflection of its socio- cultural as well as political 
ideal, "conservative individualism". 
10.3 Directors'Duties- The Main Similarity of the Two Laws 
Although it is acknowledged that comparative work, particularly in relation to the 
US and English law, on directors' duties to shareholders and creditors is much more 
17 It should be noted that during the Thatcher's govcrrunent, there was an extreme wave of 
Americanising the English political and cultural life. However, afterwards there has been serious 
attempts to confront the impact of that development. For example, politically for the first time after 
the Il World War the UK government together with other EC States took stand against the US 
decisions and opposed the American sanctions against Cuba and secondary sanctions against Iran. 
Culturally, the UK policy makers surprised the world by putting a ban on the "CRASH" film which 
had been already screened in the US, Canada, Australia and some European countries. 
18 For example compare this situation. with the Germany where racial violence is bccon-dng a 
feature of daily- life of the society, or with France, as the contender of flag- bearer of freedom in 
Europe, where a Muslim school- girl has to choose between leaving the school or her scarf, which 
she considers as a part of her believes. 
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difficult than it seems at first glance, 19 it appears from our study on different aspects 
of directors' duties, liabilities, and protection of directors that directors' duties are, in 
the main, similar in the two legal systems. However, some developments taken place 
in English law are worth comparing with its comparator. 
10.3.1 A Conceptual Question 
As we have seen, the courts and commentators in the US are in consensus on the 
classification of directors' duties, as fiduciary duties of care and fiduciary duty of 
loyalty. 20 In English law, those duties are categorised under directors' duty of care 
and fiduciary duties. In other words, while in the US all directors duties toward their 
corporation, its shareholders and creditors fall within the general concept of 
"fiduciary duties", in England, the word of "fiduciary" is used as a narrow scope as 
loyalty in US law. 
What is the root of this disparity and which classification is correct? Before 
answering this question, the fact should not be ignored that US law is still considered 
as a branch of [English] common law. 
Blacles Law Dictionary which represents the American law vocabulary, defines the 
term "fiduciary" as: 
"The term is derived from the Roman law, and means (as a noun) a person holding the 
character of a trustee, or a character analogous to that of a trustee, in respect to the 
trust and confidence involved in it and the scrupulous good faith and candour which it 
requires ... . 
19 Claus J. Hopt, Directors' Duties tg Shareholders. EmplgXees and Other Creditors: A View From 
the Continent, (Edit. Ewan McKendrick) (Oxford, New York, Toronto: Clarendon Press 1992) 115, 
116. 
20 Morey W. McDaniel, "Bondholders and Corporate Governance". 41 Bus. Law. (1986) 413,449, 
Marcelle I- Joseph, "When Is a Company up to Sale? The Case Against Revlon Duties", Annual 
Surygy of American Law (1990) 271,274, Morey W. McDaniel, "Bondholders and Stockholders- 
Fiduciary Duties to Bondholders", 13 J-Coip. L. (1988) 267, Sandra K. Miller, "What Standards of 
Conduct Should apply to Members and Managers of Limited Liability Companies", 68 St. John 
Law Rev. (1994) 21,39, Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A. 2d (Del. 1985) 858,872- 73, B. M. 
Animashaun, "The Business Judgement Rule; Fiduciary Duties and Liabilities of Corporate 
Directors", 16 Southern Univ. L. Rev. (1989) 345,347, James Farinaro, "Target Directors' 
Fiduciary Duties: An Initial Reasonableness Burden". 6.1 Notre Dame L. Rev. (1986) 723. 
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A person or institution who manages money or property for another and who must 
exercise a standard of care in such management activity imposed by law or contract; 
e. g. executor of estate-, receiver in bankruptcy; trustee. "21 
The definition has appeared in two separate paragraphs. Here, since the dictionary 
does not use numeric system, there is a confusion that whether i) these two 
paragraphs should be read together under a single definition, or ii) they separately 
connote two different meanings. The first possibility which is inconsistent with the 
US judges and Lawyers' interpretation of the word "fiduciary", gives the expression 
a wide ambit including both duty of care and loyalty, while the second view implies 
two different meanings. The first possibility is more justified, although the language 
employed seems more consistent with the latter. 
It seems the word fiduciary in its Latin origin includes both duty of care and loyalty, 
t the view which is adopted by the US courts, but in its modem and specific sense it 
I 
illustrates some such elements as good faith and non- conflict of interests, the 
interpretation which is consistent with the English law stance. 
The other conceptual question is relating to duty of skill. Although in English law the 
efforts to draw a clear distinction between the consequences and illustrations of duty 
of care and skill is not satisfactory, this system has at least recognised such a 
distinction and separated the duty of skill from the duty of care. 
However, US law seems to have considered both terms in a single concept without 
making any attempt to define a duty of skill. One may regard this as a result of the 
American lawyers' and courts' attitude to apply a general single expression for 
different concepts, as it is the case in their application of "fiduciary" to mean both 
duty of care and loyalty. 
10.12 Standard of Conduct- Objective or Subjective? 
The standard to assess directors' exercise of their duties seems different in the two 
legal systems. In English law, the traditional rule has been to apply a subjective 
21 Black, Black's Law Dictionary (St. Paul, Mn.: West Publishing Co. 1990) 625. 
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standard, as referred to in the case of re Brazilian Rubber Plantations & States 
Ltd., 22 where a director was required "to act with such care as is reasonably to be 
expected from him to act, having regard to his knowledge and experience. " This is a 
very subjective test and the director's behaviour is to be judged based on the 
knowledge and skill he possesses but not what is required by the company's business. 
Here, the honest belief of the director is sufficient, anybody who claims the contrary 
has the burden of proof. In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. Ltd., 23 almost a 
similar standard was employed. In this case, a director was asked to act as "may 
reasonably be expected from a person of his knowledge and experience. " Perhaps the 
court, here, intended to impose a tougher standard than that in the former case 
where a director's conduct was compared with another person of his knowledge and 
experience. Although some leading commentators have suggested that Romer L. J. 's 
statement in that case prescribes a test which is partly objective, 24 it seems the nature 
of test is still subjective. Nevertheless, in comparison with re Brazilian Rubber 
Plantations & States Ltd., the standard employed in the former shows a tendency to 
the objective test. 
But, English law shifted from its traditional subjective view to a radical objective one 
by introducing a double test in section 214(4) of the insolvency Act 1986. However, 
it seems there is a new judicial trend to apply the section 214 standard to non- 
insolvency cases. The strong statement of Hoffmann L. J. in re DJan of London 
Ltd., 25where his Lordship said: "In my view, thý duty of care owed by a director at 
common law is accurately stated in section 214 (4)", may lead to a radical change to 
the standard of directors' performance of their duties. 
22 [ 1911 ]I Ch. D. 425,437. 
23 [19251 Ch. 407. 
24 Gower. Principles of Modem--Comi2any La (5th ed. ) at 587, A. L Mackenzie "A Company 
Directoes Obligations of Care and Skill", ML (1982) 460,46 1. 25 [199411 BCLC 561,563. 
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In the US, and particularly in Delaware, this standard is "a reasonably prudent 
man"26 that is based on a "care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use 
in similar circumstances. 027 Hamilton has suggested that the American standard of 
care and skill embodying the concept of "an ordinarily prudent person in a like 
position" is partly an objective one. Therefore, he advises that aged, infirm, and ill 
directors should resign from the board of directors if they cannot actively participate 
in the board of directors. 28 To justify his view, he compares the above standard with 
that in re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. Lid., 29 and concludes that unlike the 
US, the test in assessing English directors' peiTormance is subjective. 30 
This conclusion is respectfully misleading. That is because the above English case 
was decided over seventy years ago, and since that time the objective test was 
introduced in Insolvency Act and Company Directors Disqu4lification Act 1986, two 
years before Hamilton's article was published. However, it is true that the above 
standard used in many American cases is similar to the objective test introduced in 
section 214 of the Insolvency Act. On the other hand, ft. is difficult to agree totally 
with Hamilton's interpretation that the standard of "an ordinarily prudent person in a 
like position" is partly objective, while this standard is based on what the director 
"reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation". 
10.3.3 Duties to Creditors in Insolvency: English Law Stance Is Clearer 
In English case law, there is a consensus among the judges that once a company is 
in financial trouble, directors' duties shift from shareholders to creditors. 31 The case 
26 Krishnan Chittur, "The Corporate Directoes Standard of Care: Past, Present, and Future" 10 
I)gl. J. CoIR. L (1986) 505,539. 
27 Graham Alice Chalmers Mfg. Co., 189 A. 2d. (Del. 1963) 125,13 0, followed by other States: 
Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A. 2d (N. J. 1981) 814, Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S. (199 1) 
132,133, Pool v. Pool., So. 2d (La. Ct. App. 1943) 132. Also this standard was reformulated in the 
Revised Model Business Corporation Act, section 8.30(a) (1984). 28 Robert Han-dlton, "The Duties of Corporate Directors and the Draft Fifth Directive: Lessons 
from the United States", 4, M3L (1988) 152,153. 
29 119251 Ch 407. 
30 Hamilton, op cit at 153- 4. 
31 Brady & Avon. v. Brady & Avor: [19871 3 BCC, 532 reversed [198812 W. L. R., 1308, re Horsely, Ayerst v. C. & K. (Construction) Ltd. [19761 A. C. 167, re Instrumentation Electrical 
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of Weffiab Engineers Ltd 32 appears to have taken a different view from the ma ority, 
where preserving the employees' jobs outweighed the immediate interests of the 
corporate creditors, and the society's long- term interests was a significant factor. 
Therefore, this case should be considered as an exceptional one. 
This shift of duties in the verge of insolvency is also recognised by US law as an 
exception to the rule that directors' duties to creditors are contractual rather than 
fiduciary. 33 Unfortunately, the Bankruptcy Code is silent over corporate directors' 
fiduciary duties towards its creditors upon insolvenCy. 34 
This exceptional rule is based on the "trust fund" doctrine which opposes the rule of TO, 
"agency theory". Nevertheless, this exception has been challenged by some American 
commentators who consider it as an interference in corporate management's affairs, 
particularly when the company is solvent but faced by financial depression. 35 
Moreover, in the latter legal system, the view that upon the occurrence of insolvency 
the stockholders are no longer real parties in interests and do not, thus, benefit from 
directors fiduciary duties, has been strongly rejected, because it is contrary to the 
scheme and purpose of reorganisation which is designated to rescue the debtor in 
possession of which first of all its stockholders are to benefit. 36 It is true that despite 
such challenges to the propriety of creditors' rights in the onset of company 
insolvency or financial difficulty, the "trust fund" doctrine is the dominant view, but 
in comparison with the English law stand on the matter,, US law still suffers from 
some lack of clarity. 
Services Ltd. [19881 BCLC 550, re Corbenstoke Ltd. (no. 2) [19891 5 BCC 767, West"kfercia 
Safetywear v. Dodd, [ 19881 BCLC 250, Winkworth v. Edward Baron Development Co. Ltd., 119861 
IW. L. R. 1512. 
32 [19901 BCC 600. 
33 Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub. 471 U. S. (1985) 343, Federal Deposit 
ins. Corp. v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F. 2d (4th Cir. 1982) 973,976- 7, Clarkson Co. Ltd. v. Shaheen, 
660 F. 2d. Cir. (1981) 506. 
34 Meredith M. Brown, "When Corporation Is financially Troubled, Director's Role Changes", 
Nat'l L. J. (1991 May 20) SIO. 
35 Norwood P. Beveridge, "Does a Corporation's Board of Directors Owe a Fiduciary Duty to Its Creditors? ", 25 St. Maly's L. Rev. (1994) 589,621. 
36 Harvey R. Miller, "Corporate Governance in Chapter 11: The Fiduciary Relationship Between 
Directors and Stockholders of Solvent and Insolvent Corporations", 23 Seton Hall L. Rev. (1993) 
1467,1469. 
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Barrett has suggested that England until recently, unlike some of the United States 
jurisdictions, had not approved the principle that the interests of the company's 
creditors merit special consideration by directors where the company is insolvent. 37 
The judgment of Jessel M. R. in Wincham Shiphuilding Boiler and Sall CO. 38 is 
considered as a general rule in English law where he said that: "directors are trustees 
for the shareholders, that is, for the company ... 
but directors are not trustees for the 
creditors of the company. " Barrett relies on the American case of niylleld v. 
Kern, 39as the rule adopted by some American States, where it was held that "upon 
the insolvency of the ordinary private corporation a quasi trust relationship arises 
between its directors and creditors. " 
It is significant to answer the question what kind of measures directors of an English 
and US ailing corporation may take to save the company from eventual fall into 
liquidation. This question relates to rescue scheme designated by each legal system. 
The US law solution in this regard is the unique and well- known scheme of 
reorganisation under chapter II of the Bankruptcy Code. 4 
, 
0. In this system and in a 
reorganisation case, the role of directors is regarded significant for two reasons. 
First, because of their past control over the business affairs, they possess a huge 
source of information. Secondly, during reorganisation, the directors are the most 
41 adequate individuals for negotiating contracts with third parties. 
f 'I 
Moreover, their 
experience is significant not only in helping a reorganisation plan'', but also for co- 
operating with the trustee and the committee of creditors under section 1102 of the 
Bankruptcy Code . 
42 However, the key decision- making authority is the US Trustee 
which may appoint a trustee or examiner and supervise the committee of creditors. 
37 Reginald Barrett, "Directors' Duties to Creditors" 40 b_4LE (1977) 226,227. 
38 [187819 Ch. D 322. 
39 192 A. (1937) 48. 
40 11 U. S. C. A. (1993), the relevant sections are 1101 to 1174. 
41 Christopher W. Frost, "Running the Asylum: Governance Problems in Bankruptcy 
Reorganisation" 34 Arizona L. Rev. (1992) 89,90. 
42 11 U. S. C. A. section 1103 (c) (1993). 
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It is worth noting that whether shareholders after filing a bankruptcy petition still 
have some power to influence the board of directors' decisions or to appoint a new 
board is not clear. It has been held that if shareholders are not satisfied with a 
proposed plan of reorganisation, they may move to elect a more pro- shareholder 
board. 43 However, in another case, this view was rightly challenged, because upon 
the occurrence of insolvency, the corporate shareholders lose the right to elect 
directors, since "the shareholders would no longer be the real parties in intereSt. "44 
In English law, the administration procedure seems the most comparable to the 
reorganisation scheme in the US, since both are insolvency but not liquidation 
devices, and intended to reorganise or save the company. Under section 8(3)(a) of 
the Insolvency Act 1986, the main aim of an administration order is "the survival of 
the company, or the whole or any part of its undertaking, as a going concern, " which 
is very similar to reorganisation. The crucial action which directors of an ailing 
corporation, who are willing to save the company as well as to prevent further loss 
to its creditors, may take, is to apply for an administration. This is provided in 
section 9 of the Act, where the company directors, along with company itself and its 
creditors, are the main parties which may apply for such an order. The directors have 
also the power to bring the petition on the company's behalf as a separate entity. 
However, compared with a US chapter II reorganisation scheme where corporate 
directors still perform most of their powers, in English law once a company is put 
under an administration order, its directors become subject to the control of the 
administrator. The latter not only can 'do all such things as may be necessary for the 
management of the affairs"45 but he is also empowered 'to remove any director of the 
company and to appoint any person to be a director of it, whether to fill a vacancy or 
otherwise. ' This extreme extension of administrator's powers goes further when any 
power conferred on the directors by the statutes or by the memorandum or articles 
43 HeCk'S, 112 B. I- (Banks. S. D. W. Va. 1990) 775,798. 
44 Johne- Manville Corp., 801 F. 2d (2d Cir. 1986) 60,65. 
45 Section 14(l)(a) of the Insolvency Act 1986, 
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of association, which could be exercised in such a way as to interfere with the 
exercise by the administrator of his power, are not exercisable without the 
administrator's consent. The consent may be given either in general management of 
the company's business or in a particular case. 46 
10.4 Liability ofDirectors- English Law in Upper Hand 
10.4.1 7he Source of Liability 
In our study of directors liabilities in EngMh company law, there was quite an 
exhaustive examination of the historical background of the statutes and legislative 
process. One feels that English law as the mother of one of leading legal systems, 
com. mon law, is still based on the traditional common law rules derived from cases. 
it is true that most statutory provisions can be traced through new perception of the 
traditional common law rules such as duty of care or through equity principles the 
good example for which is a fiduciary position. However, the judges are nowadays 
required to comply with the wording of the statutory provisions and real intention of 
the legislator, rather than their colleagues' contemplation in their decision- making 
process. For example, a judge's holding will be reversed when he has followed the 
traditional common law rules in assessing a respondent's conduct which imposes a 
subjective standard in a wrongful trading case, rather than the provisions of section 
214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 which has obviously departed from those rules. 
Today's English company law, particularly relating to corporate officers and 
directors is statutory law. The courts are obliged to interpret and apply the statutory 
provisions irrespective of whether it is in agreement with the common law principles 
or previous judicial decisions. As to the subject of this study, directors liabilities in 
corporate insolvency, the first statutory provision on misfeasance proceedings was 
enacted in 1862 . 47This was followed later in other legislation on directors liabilities 
46 lbid subsection (4). 
47 Section 165 of the Companies Act 1962. 
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for acting and conducting business with intention to defraud its creditors. In 1928 
the first fraudulent trading provisions appeared in the Companies Act, section 75(4). 
Here, another significant move can be seen in regulating corporate directors duties 
and liabilities, which was the imposition of an additional or supplementary liability, 
that was later introduced in the form of a formula known as "disqualification" in 
section 275 of the Companies Act 1929. 
The last step in this development was the introduction of a new and controversial 
concept as "wrongful trading" in the shape of section 214 of the Insolvency Act, 
together with new obligatory provisions oT section 6 of the Company Directors 
Disqualification Act. 
In the United States company law, there is no particular statute to regulate directors 
liabilities in insolvency. Therefore, the courts in their decision- making rely on the 
common law and company law rules based on their own interpretation of such 
principles. In this law, liabilities of directors of an insolvent corporation are discussed 
separately from those of a bankrupt debtor in possession under chapter 11.48 It is 
said that under the Bankruptcy Code, bankruptcy of a corporation shall not release 
its directors from any liability under the State or federal laws. This is to preserve the 
creditors' rights against negligent or dishonest directors. 49 However, the Bankruptcy 
Code has been criticised because of the extent of authorisation it provides for the 
bankruptcy courts to impair the rights of creditors, particularly those of secured 
creditors. " Chapter II and bankruptcy jurisprudence focuses on the concept of 
reorganisation as a proceeding during which a debtor corporation can be 
48 H. R. Nfillcr, "Corporate Governance in Chapter 11; The Fiduciary Relationship Between 
Directors and Stockholders of Solvent and Insolvent Corporations. " 23 Sclon Hall L. R. (1993) 
1467,1485. 
49 G. Stanley Joslin, "Corporation Officers and Directors: Involvements in Bankruptcy", Colljorate 
Practice Commentato (1968- 9) 141,146. 
30 Frank R. Kennedy, "Secured Creditors under the Bankruptcy Act" 15 IMUJkL (1982) 477, 
499. 
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rehabilitated, jobs saved, capital preserved, and creditors repaid. 51 But the Code is 
surprisingly silent as to directors' liabilities in or on the verge of insolvency. 
In the absence of any statutory provisions or codified rules, public view and the role 
of pressure groups indeed play an important role in affecting the courts' decisions. A 
good example for this, is the reaction of legal and business sectors to the Delaware 
Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom. 52 
Delaware, as the leading company law jurisdiction, does not seem prepared to take 
the reign of a new movement for curing this old and obvious injury by introducing 
some statutory regulation on corporate directors liabilities in general and their 
liabilities in insolvency in particular, as it did in liabilities elimination provisions. 
10.4.2 no Takes the Action? 
In England, when a company is insolvent, under sections 213 and 214 of the 
Insolvency Act, the only person entitled to bring a fraudulent or wrongful trading 
suit is the liquidator, whereas according to section 212, -, an action for breach of duty 
or any other misconduct set out in that section can be brought by not only the 
corporate liquidator and official receiver, but it may be also commenced and 
proceeded by a creditor or any contributory. As a rule in English company law 
reflected in those statutory provisions and exercised by the courts, if in the course of 
winding up it appears to any of those authorities accordingly that one of the wrongs 
mentioned in the above sections has been conunitted by a director, the latter may be 
sued. Therefore, to take such an action, the company must be wound up. Otherwise, 
and outside the winding up, it is the directors who may do so, and in the case of the 
director's refusal, a shareholder is permitted to apply to the court for an order on the 
ground that the company's affairs have been conducted prejudicial to its members' 
51 Donald P, Korobkin, "Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy", 9 Colum. L. Rev. 
(1991) 717, Mike Roberts, "The Conundrum of Directors' Duties in Nearly Insolvent Corporations", 
23 Memphis State Univ. L. Rev. (1993) 273,274. 
52 488 A. 2d (1985) 858. 
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interest. 53 Moreover, the Secretary of State has the right to apply for such an 
action. 54 
In contrast, in the US, the matter can be considered from two views, when the 
company is insolvent but no petition for bankruptcy is filed, and the situation when 
the formal procedure for filing such a petition is proceeded. Upon insolvency or 
iffiquidity and before filing a bankruptcy petition under Bankruptcy Code, only one 
group of claimants can be recognised. With regard to the Smith v. Van Gorkom55 
case, corporate shareholders can sue its directors for their alleged breach of duties. 
In that case, all the story took place when thtcorporation's stock was undervalued, 
or it was technically insolvent. 56 However, the plaintiffs were its shareholders but not 
creditors or trustees. 
This is obviously a result of the lack of any statute regulating the conduct of 
directors in insolvency in US company law. The case was brought before filing the 
bankruptcy petition, the shareholders were, thus, the only authorised persons for 
doing so, since because members of the board of directors were charged with 
negligence they could not take the case as plaintiffs. 
After filing the petition, two classes of claimants have the right to sue corporate 
directors. The first group are the corporate creditors. There is no statutory authority 
to permit this group of claimants to bring their suit before filing such a petition even 
when they can show that due to the deteriorating situation of the company, they are 
interested parties to the company's affairs. Once a bankruptcy petition is filed, 
section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code imposes an automatic duty that prevents 
creditors from pursuing collection of their debts against the debtor'57 and most of the 
weapons which were in the hands of shareholders or credit brs prior to and upon 
insolvency respectively, are removed or ineffective. In this situation, creditors are 
53 The Companies Act 1985, section 459. 
54 Jbid section 460. 
55 488 A. 2d (1985) 858. 
56 rbid at 866. 
57 U. S. C. A. section 362(a) (Supplement 1995). 
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forbidden from enforcing State law fights and remedies against the debtor in 
possession, thus, directors personally are desirable targets for an insolvent 
corporation' creditors. 59 
Therefore, the decisive point, here, which allows creditors to interfere, is filing a 
petition for bankruptcy but not actual insolvency, and the cases in which creditors 
have been plaintiffs are bankruptcy cases. For example in re Xonics, Inc., 59 the 
committee of creditors of the Xonics company brought the action against its 
directors for alleged breach of fiduciary duty to the corporation creditors. Similarly 
in Logue Mechanical Contracting Corp-, '. b*'6 the company's creditors were the 
claimants. 
The second and the main category of plaintiffs for the alleged directors' misconduct, 
is trustees or trustees in bankruptcy. In Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 61 as well as 
Clarkson Co. Lid v. Shaheen. 62for example, the suit was commenced by trustees in 
bankruptcy. 
In this respect, there is a confusion over the position of company directors who 
become trustees of the company. In most cases, directors of a troubled company are 
appointed as trustees of the estate created by filling bankruptcy petition. Although 
the courts prefer to appoint an independent trustee in order to administrate the 
estate, when an independent trustee is not appointed, the board of directors is to 
operate the company as a debtor in possession and "shall perform all functions and 
duties ... of a trusteelf. 
63 i 
The question may be raised that in such a case, if there is a case of directors' 
delinquency prior or upon its insolvency, do they take the action as trustees against 
themselves or some of their colleagues? What will happen if they refuse to do so? 
Kimberly Colby Harris, "The Impact of Bankruptcy on Liability of Corporate Directors", 
DeY-L (1987) 299. 
59'-99-B. P- (Bankr. N. D. 111.1989) 870. 
60 106 Bankr. (1989) 436. For the story and fate of these two caes see Chapter 7: Directors 
Liabilities for breach of their Duties. 
61432 A. 2d (N. J. 1981) 814. 
62 660 F. 2d. Cir. (1981) 506. 
63 11 U. S. C. section 1106 (Supplement 105). 
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Regrettably, there is no case to address the question. However, one may compare 
the position of directors, here as trustees, with their position when the corporation is 
a going concern on one hand, and the position of creditors, here, with shareholders 
outside the bankruptcy on the other hand, and conclude that the same rules which 
apply to derivative actions and the role of the special litigation committee are 
applicable here. But this analogy does not work in an insolvency case, not only 
because there is no statutory or judicial authority to allow that conclusion, but 
because the rules applicable to an insolvency or bankruptcy situation are different. 
Obviously, the onlyjustified suggestion, in d7e presumed case, appears to be that the 
creditors can take their own suit with no need to refer to the board of directors, now 
operate as trustees, and apply to the court for the replacement of those directors 
with an independent and disinterested trustee. 
10.4.3 Fraudulent and Wrongrul Trading, and Misfeasance- the American 
Perception 
We studied corporate directors' liabilities in English law under three headings, 
ffaudulent trading, wrongful trading and mýisfeasance. While the last one has a 
judicial record even prior to its introduction by the legislature, the two other 
concepts are inventions of the law- makers. 
A court in England and Wales can now with no difficulty apply one of those 
proceedings to a wrongdoing committed by a corporate director. 
But, in dealing with US law in this field, the first problem which the reader faces is 
the lack of such a codification or even any judicial guidance in recognising or 
defining those concepts. It has been acknowledged by some American commentators 
and can be elicited from cases on directors liabilities, that in the United States these 
liabilities are classified within four contexts: i) breach of duty of care (negligence), ii) 
conflict of interests or self- dealing (disloyalty), iii) appropriation of corporate 
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opportunity, iv) and statutory liability. 64 The third category is considered in case law 
as an implication of the second, breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty, while the fourth 
category is related to liabilities under Securities Act, Securities Exchange Act, 
Fraudulent Conveyance Act and Bankruptcy Code, none of which except some 
provisions of the last one, if any relevant, is within our study. In other words, the 
source of our study in US is case law, under two concept of breach of duty of care 
and loyalty. 
Those concepts in the US case law are neither recognised nor are they defined. 
70' Moreover, from view of the American judges and commentators, holding a director 
65 liable even for breach of duty of care is very unusual, which means it is rare and 
more difficult to have a director liable for breach of duty of loyalty or fraudulent 
conduct. This difficulty is made greater by the lack of a clear definition of directors 
liabilities which in some cases makes it particularly difficult to define the line 
between liability for negligence and fi-aud. 66 The confusion over a distinction 
between directors liabilities in the US can be seen even in some leading cases such as 
Francis v. United Jersey Bank'67 where the court explained the conduct of the 
defendant as fraudulent conveyance and ordered him liable for negligence. Whereas 
in an English court it may never happen that the judge"i, n a negligence case speaks of 
a fraudulent conduct, though that view was corrected by the US Supreme Court. 69 
All American cases with similar facts to those of wrongful or fraudulent trading 
cases in English law have been considered and decided under breach of duty of 
loyalty or fraudulent transfer of the company's assets. In L6gue Mechanical 
64 Russel K. Bean, "Corporate Director Liability", 65 Denver Univ. L. R. (1988) 59. 
65 Joseph W. Bishop, "Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks, New Trends in the Indemnification of 
Corporate Directors and Officers", 77 Yale L. J., (1968), 1078,1095. See also Bayer v. Beran, 49 
N. Y. S. 2d (Sup. Ct. 1944) 2,6. 
66 See for example Bayer v. Bayer, 49 N. Y. S. 2d (Sup. Ct. 1944) 2, Richard B. Dyson, "The 
Director's Liability for Negligence". 40 Ind. L. Rev. (1963- 5) 3431,371, citing Prokson v. 
Bettendorf, 218 Iowa (1934) 1376. Conrick Houston Civic Opera Assn, 99 S. W. 2d (Tex. Cin. 
App. 1936) 382. 
67 432 A. 2d (N. J. 1981) 814. 
68 Ibid at 817. 
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Contracting Corp., 69for example, the company's creditors alleged that the directors 
concerned had breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty. The respondents, here, 
continued to trade in order to pay themselves in the form of salaries, benefits and 
rents to the detriment of the corporation and its creditors, while the company ought 
to have ceased all operations. This caused a considerable decline in the amount on 
deposit and loss of some jobs. The defendant directors did so when they knew that 
their company could not be rescued from liquidation and they "had no hope of 
reorganising" the corporation. 70 
In the above case, the corporate directors' con-auct was a clear act of carrying on the 
business to defraud its creditors, since it was evident to the respondents that their 
corporation could not survive financial depression, but instead of filing a petition for 
bankruptcy, they filed a reorganisation proceedings with intent to further their own 
personal interests at the creditors' expense. 
Another case parallel to the English fraudulent trading concept is the case of 
Clarkson Co. Ltd v. Shaheen . 71 Here, the claim was filed under breach of fiduciary 
duty of loyalty, and the court in its judgment expressly held the defendant liable as 
such, but the court acknowledged that because the loan and advancement in question 
was made with no fair consideration, and a Promissory Note and Letter Agreement 
executed when the company was insolvent, it was, thus, fraudulent to creditors. 
In this case, a statement was made by the judge which was yery similar to some 
provisions of fraudulent and wrongful trading sections. The court, here, held the 
respondent liable on "the finding that the directors knew or should have known that 
the "loans" were made when NRC was insolvent... . 
"72 This part of the judgment is 
very much like this piece of section 214 of the Insolvency Act "that person knew or 
ought to have concluded that there was no reasonable prospect that the company 
69 106 Bankr. (1989) 436. 
70 Jbid at 440. 
71 660 F. 2d. Cir. (1981) 506. For the details of this and the above case see Chapter 7: Directors 
Liabilities for breach of their Duties. 
72 lbid 513. Emphasis added. 
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would avoid going into insolvent liquidation. "73 In the same case, the jury found the 
directors liable for "breach of their fiduciary duties owed to creditors", 74 which was 
a fraudulent transfer "with intent to delay and deftaud creditors. "75 Comparing that 
part of the holding with this part of section 213 of the Insolvency Act that "If ... 
it 
appears that any business of the company has been carried on with intent to defraud 
creditors of the company"76 leads us to the conclusion that concepts similar to 
fi-audulent and wrongful trading have already been considered by the US judges, but 
it requires an attempt to regulate them under proper provisions in the form of 
statute, or at least to reach a common recognition by the courts. 
As to liability for misfeasance, section 212 of the Companies Act has set out a wide 
range of acts giving rise to a director liability. The US case law has recognised all 
those matters under breach of duty of care and loyalty. It is the only common ground 
between the two legal systems on the corporate directors liabilities. That is because 
in both laws not only a director is held responsible for similar acts, but most 
importantly because the standard of conduct is subjective. Although, unfortunately 
and unlike English law, in the US that procedure is not - addressed 
in a particular 
statutory provision, case law in this regard is clear. However, it seems the courts in 
the two countries do not employ the same measure in assessing a corporate director's 
conduct. Delaware takes the same measure as used to be taken in the past by the 
English courts which is "gross negligence". 77 But, nowadays in England specially 
after the introduction of the objective standard in section 214, and the judgment of 
Hoffinann L. J. in re D'Jan ofLondon Ltd., 79 the line between "ordinary negligence" 
and "gross negligence" is fading. 
73 Emphasis added. 
74 lbid at 515. 
75 lbid at 511. Emphasis added. 
76 Emphasis added. 
77 Compare for example the Delaware cases of Smith v. Van Gorkom 488 A. 2d (1985) 858, at 893- 
94, Aronson v. Lewis. 473 A. 2d (Del. 1984) 805,812, Rabkin v. Philip Hunt Chemical Corp. 547 
A. 2d (1986) 963, Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co., 16 Del. Ch. 318,147 A. (1929) 257,261 With 
the English cases of Turquand v. Marshall [ 186914 Ch App. 376, re National Bank of Wales Ltd. 
1890] 2 Ch 629,671. 
8 1199411 BCLC 561,563. 
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10.5 Disqualification ofExecutives: New but Arguable in the US Law 
10.5.1 The US Introduces Its Own Version of Disqualification 
For the first time in the US corporate law, the Securities Enforcement Remedies and 
Penny Stock Reform Act 1990 (the Remedies Act) permitted that in an enforcement 
action by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) upon finding that a defendant 
director or officer has violated either section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act 1933, or 
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act T934, a federal court may, additional to 
monetary penalties, order the defendant to be suspended or barred temporarily or 
permanently from acting as a director or officer of any public company. 79 
The legislative history of the Remedies Act dates back to 1987 when the National 
Conunission on Fraudulent Reporting recommended that: the SEC should "seek 
[congressional] authority to bar or suspend corporate officers and directors involved 
in fraudulent financial reporting from future service in that capacity in a public 
company. "" 
The US version of disqualification is in the earliest stage of its development, while 
the English experience has seven decades of history. However, the need for 
regulating disqualification in a statutory form had been acknowledged by the 
American lawyers, who called for providing a power to disqualify an executive 
director and officer in order to prevent any confusion over the existence and scope 
of such authority. " 
79 The Act provides that "In any proceedings under subsection (b), of this section, the court may 
prohibit conditionally or unconditionally, and permanently or for such period of time as it shall 
determine, any person who violated section 77q(a)(4) of this title from acting as an officer or 
director of any issuer that has a class of securities registered pursuant to section 781 of this title or 
that is required to file reports pursuant to section 78o(d) if the persolfs conduct demonstrates 
substantial unfitness to serve as an officer or director of any such company. " 15 U. S. C. S. 77t (e) 
(1995). 
80 Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (1987) 1,66. 
81 Allan M. Dcrshowitz, "Paper Label Sentences: Critique", 86 YAILLL(1977) 626. 
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It should be noted that the Americans were familiar with such a conception in non- 
corporate law areas. In several federal statutes, disqualification had been permitted. 
For example, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act 1950 permits disqualification of a 
person who is held liable for any criminal offence involving dishonesty or breach of 
trust from serving as a director, officer, or employee of a federally insured bank. 82 
With regard to judicial background of corporate directors disqualification in the US, 
and its prospect in the English case law, it is true that while the judges in the latter 
began applying disqualification only after the enactment of the Companies Act 1928, 
the US Federal Courts have recently begun to disqualify corporate executive 
directors and officers. 83 
10.5.2 The Court or a Regulatory Agency to Decide Unfitness? 
The Remedies Act bill provides that the SEC may, in an administrative compliance 
action under section 15(c)(4) of the Exchange Act, 84 make a conditional or 
unconditional, and either permanent or temporary suspension or bar order against 
any person found to have failed to comply, or to have been the cause of the failure to 
comply with sections 12,13,15(d) or 16(a) of the Act, if the SEC is satisfied that 
such an order is "in the public interest. "15 
Moreover, even prior to the Remedies Act, SEC had power to seek an injunction 
where it is satisfied that a person "is engaged or [is] about to engage in any acts or 
practices which constitute or will constitute a violation" of the Securities Acts. 86 
In English law, the Department of Trade and Industry may be a parallel to SEC of 
the US in this regard, though with different power and authority. So long as the SEC 
82 12 U. S. C. section 1829 (1995). Labour law also permits a disqualification on the ground of the 
Labour-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,29 U. S. C. sections 401-531 (1995). 
83 For example in Cooke v. Teleprompter Corp., 334 F. Supp. (S. D. N. Y. 1971) 467,47, the court 
stated that "in a civil action to disqualify a director ... the quantum of proof will be less than that 
required to obtain a criminal conviction. " 
84 15 U. S. C. 78o(c)(4) (1988). 
85 H. P- 975,101st Congress., Ist Session 135 Congress. Record. H272 (1989) Section 201. 
96 15 U. S. C. section 77t(b) (1988) (rhe Securities Act 1933); 15 U. S. C. section 78u(d) (1988) 
(Securities Exchange Act 1934). 
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function is to prepare reports on directors and officers' conduct and to take actions 
against them when it finds it appropriate, it runs in the same line as DTI. However, 
SEC is authorised to go much farther by acting as "more than a party to an action". 
This commission "by order shall censure, place limitations on the activities, 
functions, or operations of , suspend for a period not exceeding twelve months, or 
revoke the registration"87of an individual from acting in a vast range of capacities, 
the role which in the English law is absolutely left to the courtroom. Such a power 
vested in SEC by the Remedies Act is indeed a job of the courts rather than a 
regulatory agency like SEC. " 
Putting this wide discretion into hands of a non- judicial authority may leave the 
runners of business organisations vulnerable to interference or abuse which is 
contrary to the American legislature well- established view, particularly its protective 
stance towards corporate directors reflected in the business judgment rule and other 
protective States legislation. 
10.5.3 Purpose and Nature ofDisqualification 
As was seen, there is no unanimity among English commentators and judges over the 
purpose of disqualification proceedings. However, I suggested that the aim and 
purpose of the proceedings could be equally a civil- penal and protective one. In US 
law there seems to be confusion over the issue. Barnard explains the purpose and 
philosophy, behind the Remedy Act as "barring a defendant from future service as a 
corporate officer or director is an expeditious mechanism, short of incarceration, for 
removing him from temptation and the likelihood of renewed misconduct. 1189 
McDermott gives three different statements of purpose of disqualification which are 
similar to those purposes suggested for disqualification in English law. On one hand, 
87 15 U. S. C. Section 78o(b)(4) (1995). 
88 Jayne W. Barnard "The Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1999: Disenfranchising 
Shareholders in Order to Protect Them", 65 Notre Dame L. Rev_ (1989) 32,70. [Thereafter 
Barnard Notre Dame L6 Rev. I citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US. (1963) 144,167. 
99 Jayne W. Barnard, 'When Is a Corporate Executive "Substantially Unfit to Serve"? 70 ih riarnlinji Lgw Rev. (1992) 1489,1494. [Thereafter Barnard North Camun 
Sw 
- luml=JkLI 
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he describes provisions as intended to penalise an officer or director of a business 
organisation for his misdoing, 90 and on the other hand, he is of the view that because 
a disqualification order damages the defendant's "future employment opportunities it 
serves as a monetary penalty, even for those defendants who have no present ability 
to pay a substantial fine. "91 This view is obviously consistent with a civil approach on 
the purpose of disqualification. McDermott adopting that deterrence is not the only 
theory of punishment underlying disqualification, takes the opinion that the 
protection of society may justify disqualifying those who have demonstrated their 
readiness to commit an offence. 92 It seems McDermott is not certain on one of those 
suggestions, but appears to lay down a single view %krith a three penal- civil and 
protective purpose. 
The US case law is not helpful in this respect. However, it seems disqualification is 
considered by commentators as having a criminal nature. Barnard obviously 
acknowledges the punitive nature of disqualification when she states that a 
"disqualification from employment has historically been regarded as a punishment in 
criminal proceedings. "93 
10.5.4 Other Comparative Aspects ofDisqualification 
There are some features which distinguish the disqualification in English law from 
that in the Remedies Act 1990 in the US. 
The major distinction is the event of insolvency which is the main feature of the 
disqualification in the former law, particularly under sections 6 and 10 of the 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, whereas there is no such requirement 
for making a disqualification order under the latter law. Therefore, it is difficult to 
use cases decided under the Company Directors Disqualification Act as a model to 
90 Martin F. McDermot. "Occupational Disqualification of Corporate Executives: An innovative 
Condition of Probation", 73 J. Crim. L. (1982) 604. 
91 Ibid at 616. 
92 Ibid at 617. 
93 Barnard 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 70, See generally McDermot, op cit particularly 607- 8. 
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determine substantial unfitness under the Remedies Act, since the insolvency 
requirement is described as 'a feature of British national revenue policy rather than of 
any policy relating to the protection of investors. 194 
The grounds for disqualification of which unfitness is the leading factor, have been 
set out in the English Act of 1986. The US Act of 1990 refers to the power of a 
federal court to disqualify when it finds the defendant "substantially unfit", the 
concept which is now the main concern of American commentators in their 
interpretation of disqualification. In English law, although the legislators have not 
defined "unfitness", the measures to determi-nle' unfitness are set out in Part 1, when 
the company is going concern, and in Part II of Schedule I of the Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986, when it is insolvent. 
However, it is said that some certain grounds for unfitness such as incompetence, 
physical or mental incapacity are sufficient to support a finding of unfitness under the 
Remedies Act, while other grounds such as interpersonal discord, neglect of duty or 
usurpation of corporate opportunity may not be helpful in this regard. 95 
Moreover, the fact should be carefully taken into account that a pre- requisite for the 
application of the Remedies Act 1990 is liability under the Securities Exchange Act 
1934 and the Securities Act 1933, though the substantive terms of this legislation is 
out of our discussion, whereas disqualification provisions provided by the 1986 Act 
cover a vast range of matters covered by the Insolvency Act, Companies Act and 
some conunon law rules. 
Furthermore, the English disqualification provisions Apply to corporate directors but 
not officers, apart from their position as executive or non- executive, whereas the 
disqualification permitted under the Remedies Act, embracing both officers and 
directors, applies only to those in an executive capacity. 
The other major distinctive point in this regard, which is also a basic criticism of the 
Remedies Act, is the lack of any relief available to a disqualified director or officer. 
94Bamard, 70 North Carolina Law Rey- at 150 1. 
95 Ibid at 1496. 
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The court has a very wide discretion to determine whether the defendant is unfit and 
hence hold him disqualified. This extensive power is more questionable when no 
measure is provided by the Act to define the limits on the courts' discretion. 
The English law in this regard is in a more favourable position, where a court is 
authorised to grant a leave to the disqualified director to carry on to act as a director 
while disqualified, based on such considerations as reliance on an expert advice, the 
effects of such an order upon the company and its employees. 
However, one may try to justify this obviously weak aspect of the Remedies Act by 
arguing that the disqualification in section 67ýf the 1986 Act, on the basis of which 
most of recent disqualification cases in English law have been decided, is of a 
mandatory nature, whereas the courts' power in the Remedies Act by stating "the 
court may", is absolutely discretionary. But this argument cannot justify such a big 
deficiency of the Act, when the question is not the harshness of the disqualification 
provisions, but rather the improper drafting of a crucial part of the Act. 
It is worth noting that although the Remedies Act provides no means of granting a 
leave or lifting the bar, the Supreme Court on one occasion has indicated that such 
relief can be granted only upon a "clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new 
and unforeseen conditions"96 
The other criticism which relates to the above mentioned point is the question of the 
period of a suspension or bar order against a corporate executive officer or director 
under the Remedies Act, and its comparison with that in the English Act of 1986. 
The minimum period of time for disqualification of an English director is two years 
and the maximum time of such an order in very serious cases of unfitness is fifteen 
years. Whereas not only there is no such a minimum period for a suspension or bar 
order in the Remedies Act, but also the court may permanently bar or suspend the 
defendant executive, the power which may be considered as dangerously unwise, 
96 United States v. Swift & Co., 286 US. 106, (1932) 119, cited with approval in SEC v. Blinder, 
Robinson & Co., 855 F. 2d 677 (10th Cir. 1988), ccrt. denied, 109 Sup. Ct. (1989) 1172, noted by 
Barnard 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 62. 
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particularly since it comprehensively prohibits a suspended or barred executive from 
acting in any public corporation as a director or officer, irrespective of the nature of 
the business. 
It is not clear why, while the US Congress had experienced some enactment on the 
same matter in non- corporate area, 97 it took such a tough stand towards executive 
directors and officers of public corporations. 
In addition to the above- mentioned deficiencies of the disqualification mechanism 
under the Remedies Act, some other criticisms have been acknowledged by the 
American commentators such as its inconsis-t'ency with the legislative history of the 
federal securities laws which have been designed to minimise interference Vdth 
matters of corporate governance. 98 
Moreover, it is in contrast with the philosophy and purpose behind the business 
judgment rule that corporate directors are the ones who are well- suited in managing 
business affairs rather than the courts. 99 
Comparing the attitude of the English legislature to disqualification in the 1986 Act 
with the US legislators' stand in the Remedies Act 1990, leads us to the conclusion 
that the English legislature by introducing its new version of disqualification 
followed the same line on treating corporate directors, but there seems to be a major 
difference between the Remedies Act message and the well- recognised rule of the 
business judgment rule on the one hand, and other States protective statutes such as 
elimination of directors liability, indemnification and insurance on the other hand. - 
Does it mean there is a disagreement on how to deal with corporate directors and 
officers liabilities between federal and States laws? 
97 For example see the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 12 U. S. C. s. 1829 (1988). 
98 George W. Dent, "Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities Law: A Study in Federal Remedies", 67 
hfiMjjýsL (1983) 865 909, Barnard, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev-, at 43. 
99 Kmin v. American Express Co., 383 N. Y. S. 2d (1943) 807,810.11. Dennis J. Block & H. 
Adam Brussin, *The Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder Derivative Actions: Via Zapata", 37 
MM_LM. (1981) 31, Dennis J. Block et. aL, The Business JudgMent Rul - 
j2iM=,. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall Law & Business 1993) 6-7. 
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10.6 US Law Is More Protective 
Every legal system has provided some means to absolve its directors and officers 
from liability in order to reduce their concern over taking risky business decisions 
that they honestly consider to be in the best interests of their corporation. It is 
justified that the directors in managing their corporation take risky business 
judgments which in some occasions incur losses to the corporate shareholders or its 
creditors. Such losses may lead to an action against the directors concerned for 
allegedly causing the losses. Therefore, direttors who have exercised their duties in 
good faith should be protected from personal liability. 
A review of and a comparison between the protection provided by the two legal 
systems, obviously leads to the conclusion that US law, particularly Delaware law is 
more protective to the corporate directors. 100 Perhaps the reaction of the US law 
community to the Gorkorn decision is an obvious evidence to prove this claim. The 
decision of Gorkom was described by the president of National Association of 
Corporate Directors as creating "perilous time for corporate directors", 101 and "the 
straw that broke the camel's back". 102 A Legal writer said that the Gorkom case so 
scared directors and their insurers that the Delaware legislature which is followed 
almost by two- third of other States, passed a statute eliminating directors' liability 
for negligence. 103 Some leading commentators stated that the decision in Gorkom 
shocked the corporate world, 104and "exploded a bomb". 101 It was also criticised as 
100 B. A. Animashaun, "The Business Judgment Rule; Fiduciary Duties and Liabilities of Corporate 
Directors". 16 Southern Univ. L. Rev. (1989) 345,349. 
101 Glaberson and Powel, "A Landmark Ruling That Puts Board Members in Peril, Bus. Wk. 
1985) 56,57. 
02 Mauro, "Liability in the Boardroom", Nation's Bus. (may 1986) 46. 
103 Larry D. Soderquist, "The Proper Standard for directors' negligence Liability-, 66 Notre Dame 
L-B&Y* (1990)37. 
104 Stephen Radin, "The Directoes Duty of Care Three Years After Smith v. Van Gorkom.. 39 
Hoitings L. J. (1988) 707. 
105 Baylen Manning. "Reflection and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom After Van 
Gorkom", 41 Bus. La .. (1995) 1. 
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"dumbfounding", a "serious mistake" 106 and "one of the worst decisions in the 
history of corporate law". 107 It was called "a distinct threat to the ability of 
companies to attract responsible directors". 108 
There is not a similar reaction in the history of English company law even to more 
oppressive decisions against directors. In contrast, the tendency among English 
commentators is a tougher judicial response to the corporate directors delinquency. 
10.6. ]Indemnification and Insurance 
'T Indemnification and insurance are products of the American legal and business needs 
and developments rather than those of the traditional common law rooted in English 
law. This industry is at best represented and developed in Delaware. The extent of 
authority provided by section 145 (a) of the Delaware law in comparison with 
section 3 10(1) of the English Companies Act, is so wide that it provides not only 
indemnity against expenses of defence, irrespective of whether or not the defendant 
director has had a successful defence, but also it permits indemnity against 
"judgments, fines and amount paid in settlements actually and reasonably incurred by 
him in connection with such action, suit or proceedings". This authority is granted to 
the corporationý to indemnify their directors against any such actions. The US 
legislature has employed the words "the corporation may indemnify" to reveal the 
permissible nature of the protection. Therefore, procedure and extent of the 
indemnity is subject of the corporation's decision or any mutual agreement between 
the corporation and its directors. So long as the terms of such an agreement or 
decision do not contravene public policy principles or limits set out in the section 
including action "in good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or not 
opposed to the best interests of the corporation, " they are valid and enforceable. 
106 Leo Herzel, Davis, and Calling, "Sn-dth Brings Whip Down on Directors' Backs", LcZaLjj= 
Washington, (May 1985) 14,15. 
107 Daniel Fischel, "The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case". 41 Bus. Law. (1985) 
1455. 
108 Borden, "First Thoughts on Decision in Delaware on Trans Union", &"J. (Fcbruary 
1985)1. 
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In contrast ' English law has refused to recognise any sort of 
indemnification except 
in a very limited extent against liability for expenses of defence, only when the 
"judgment is given in his favour or he is acquitted" or in connection with any 
application under section 144(3) or section 727. 
On the other hand, the Delaware law offers some more protection in the form of 
indemnity. While English law just does not prevent a corporation to indemnify its 
directors for expenses of their successful defence, the Delaware law imposes an 
obligation upon Delaware companies to indemnify their directors in a similar 
-0, 
situation by saying "he shall be indemnified. " 109 
In comparing the two laws in this regard, the interesting point is that while besides 
vdde indemnification permitted by the Delaware law, it provides an obligatory 
indemnity against expenses in a successful defence, the English law even does not 
recommend, nor does it require the indemnification in the latter situation, but in most 
"does not prevent a company" of doing so. The language employed in section 3 10(1) 
obviously reveals the reluctance of English Parliament to provide corporate directors 
with such an indemnification. 
Baxter comparing with the US law, thinks in English law: 
"The position under the most liberal indemnification statutes is not much different 
from that obtaining as a result of the combination of the Companies Act section 727 
and the virtually unrestricted freedom of shareholders to provide indemnities after a 
loss has ariscn. "l 10 
With respect, as will be seen, the protection provided by section 727 is not more 
generous than that under the business judgment rule. Moreover, the freedom of 
shareholders to provide indemnity is, as was mentioned, restricted to the expenses of 
a successful defence. There is indeed nothing in English law, either in statute or case 
law, to allow any indemnification for loss even after its occurrence. Conversely, the 
statute's prohibitive language is clear, and the only exception to that prohibition is 
subsection (3). 
109 Section 145 (c) of the Delaware General Corporation Law. 
110 Colin Baxter, "Demystifying D&0 Insurance". VJU (1995) 537,564. 
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As to insurance, the main concern is background and the root of this industry in the 
two countries. At the outset, it is necessary to note that directors insurance liability is 
an American export, which has been with its policy provisions, substantially 
unaltered, imported by English law. "' Therefore, a reader of English law in this 
specific area, should not wonder why this legal system had treated it as an unwanted 
external industry, and why English law has not offered anything in this regard. 
The US insurance liability for directors had been purchased in the 1930's, and the 
1941 New York law which was copied by Delaware law in the form of section 
145(g), permitted purchasing and maintaining insurance, whereas its English 
comparator after a half of century only removed its prohibition. 
The Delaware law allows insurance to be purchased not only against directors and 
officers liabilities, but also against liability of employees and agents of the company. 
But English corporations are not prevented from purchasing insurance liability for 
their directors, officers and auditors. Furthermore, the extent of D&0 Insurance 
liability permitted by the Delaware law is much wider than that in English law, since 
the former permits such protection even against those liabilities which the 
corporations are not empowered to indemnify. This apparently means that the scope 
of authorisation to purchase insurance is even wider than that of indemnification. 
while indemnification in English law is prohibited. On the other hand, the wide 
language deliberately employed by the Delaware law, leaves no doubt that such 
insurance can be purchased not only against liabilities to the corporation, but also 
against those to third parties. English law does not prevent insurance against liability 
"of which he may be guilty in relation to the company. " If this expression is 
interpreted in a strict sense, it means such protection is permitted to the company 
itself. However, if the words 'in relation to the company' are considered as any 
matter or action connected to it, including a third party action resulting from an 
III lbid at 538. 
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alleged wrongdoing by director in the performance of his duties to the company, a 
third party action should be also considered within the ambit of the section. 
10.6.2 Elimination of Liability 
Compared with other protection means and provisions, the issue of "charter cap" 
option or liability eliminating or limiting provision is a distinguishing feature. 
Although it is now an American legal institution, indeed, it was English law that for 
the first time judicially recognised a protection device as such, where in re Bra--ilian 
Rubber Plantations & Estates Ltd. 112 the court relieved respondents from personal 
liability based on one of articles of the corporate articles of association which 
provided that no "director or any other officer of the company shall be liable" for 
negligence, default or any commission or omission resulting in loss or damages in the 
absence of his own dishonesty. This provision was an obvious form of elimination of 
liability. Fourteen years later, the decision of Romer J. in re City Equitable Fire 
Insurance CO. 113 which was considered as a "public scandal" caused a roar of 
criticism. In that case, the court considered the defendant's conduct grossly 
negligent. However, relying on a similar article to that in re Bra. -iliall Rubber 
Plantations &Estates Ltd., it said that the article modified the primafacle obligation 
of them, and the directors were not, thus, held liable. 
The English company law lacked an appropriate flexibility to accommodate this type 
of protection. Thus, the Board of Trade appointed the Greene Committee to 
examine the nature of this liability. Their recommendation that there should be a 
prohibition of any exemption from liability appeared in section 78 of the Companies 
Act 1928. 
Comparing the above development in England with that in the US, almost half of 
century later, the Delaware Senate amended section 102(b) of its General 
Corporation Law to permit generously such a protection. 
112 [19111 Ch 425. 
113 [19251 Ch. 407. 
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The authority to eliminate a corporate director, like indemnification, is a matter left 
to the corporation and shareholders, who voluntarily enter into such elimination or 
indemnification provisions. The main characteristic of this mechanism which 
distinguishes it from other protection devices, is the limited extent of its application 
to the company and not to third parties, in particular to creditors when it is insolvent, 
10.6 3 Section 72 7 and the Business Judgment Rule 
Section 727 and the Business Judgment Rule are both the oldest protection devices 
in the two legal systems, and both are virtu"'ally subjects to the very wide courts' 
discretion. At first glance, section 727 of the Companies Act 1985 appears to be 
very similar to the American business judgment rule, since the main requirements for 
a director to enjoy the protection of the business judgment rule and section 727, are 
acting honestly and reasonably with due care. 
However, in spite of this similarity, because of different treatment by the two legal 
systems of the subject, the differences between those two legal concepts are in fact 
substantial. First, the business judgment rule is the product of judicial development 
emerging from the original common law. In contrast, the ancestry of section 727 is a 
statutory provision. Secondly, the relative lack of case-law on section 727 and 
ambiguities inherent in its application mean that theret remain some uncertainties 
about the extent of its operation. ' 14 The situation regarding the business judgment 
rule is different. The rule has, since its inception, been constantly applied, and tile 
courts have exercised their discretion once the main requirements of the rule, namely 
acting informed and in good faith, are satisfied. If a court 'refuses to relieve a 
director, where there is a possibility of relieving him, it can expect a backlash of 
criticisms from academics and commentators. 115 Thirdly, there has been no serious 
academic discussion by the English commentators on the various aspects of section 
114 See especially re Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd. 1198915 BCLC, 51% re D'Jan of 
London Ltd, Copp v. D'Jan, [199411 BCLC 561 
115 As it was the case in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A. 2d (Del. 1985) 858. 
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727 or its potential impact on the development of the law as it affects company 
directors. This seems curious given a general concern among these commentators as 
to the harshness of some statutory liabilities, more particularly disqualification and 
wrongful trading. It is surprising to see no serious attempts to clarify and discuss this 
potentially very effective mechanism of protection, whose application could alleviate 
the harshness of those statutory liabilities and, thus, satisfy those commentators' 
concerns. 
In contrast, the business judgment rule has dramatically developed through a large 
volume of case law. Furthermore, it found its way outside the courtroom into the 
boardroom, when it inspired the formation of the "special litigation committee. " In 
addition, numerous comments have been made on the different features of the rule, 
and semi-govemmental institutions and associations such as American Law Institute 
and the American Bar Association have contributed to the development of the rule. 
in conclusion, it is worth pointing out that the American commentators have created 
much from nothing, while the British are still dithering. It is still not too late. Section 
727 of the Companies Act 1985 presents an ideal opportunity for English law to fill 
an obvious gap in the area of the protection of its company directors from harsh 
statutory and common law liabilities. In doing so, much could be leamt from the US 
experience. 
10.7 The Business Judgment Rule and the Foss v. Harboule Case 
Providing directors with more business judgment protection is suggested as the best 
long- term solution to prolong the US historical econornic prosperity. According to 
this theory, the weight given to directors' business decisions was an effective element 
which raised the US as an econonýc leader. 116 The development of the business 
judgment rule is indeed partly a result of this view. 
116 Paul H. Zalecki, "The Duties of Corporate Directors in a Takeover Context: A Rationale for Judicial Focus upon the Deliberative Process", 17 U. Toledo L. Rev. (1996) 313,334. 
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The question is whether there is any rule or provision in English law with equivalent 
effect to the business judgment rule. Although in this legal system there is no 
statutory or judicial recognition of such provision, there are some indications in 
English case law similar to the business judgment rule in US law. For example, 
Scrutton L. I in Shuttleworth v. Cox Bros. & Co. 117stated that "it is not the business 
of the court to manage the affairs of the company. That is for the shareholders and 
the directors. " A similar view was taken by Lord Davey in Burland v. Earle, 118 
where his Lordship held that: 
"The court will not interfere with the internal management of companies acting within 
their powers, and in fact has no jurisdiction to do so. Again, it is clear law that in order 
to redress a wrong done to the company, to recover moneys or damages alleged to be 
due to the company, the action should prima facie be brought by the company 
itself. ", 19 
These comments in fact belong to the past, when even making liability exemption or 
elimination provisions in company's articles of association was permissible. 120 
In English law, the only comparable but not quite similar situation to the offensive 
use of the rule, as demonstrated by the function of special litigation committee, is the 
well- known and controversial rule in Foss v. Harbottle. 121 The rule that primarily 
indicates that the cause of action to sue the directors, is vested in the company and 
exercised by the board of directors. This rule which is discussed within the concept 
of protection of minority shareholders, "is not a rule of substance, but of 
procedure. " 122 
It should be noted that the main concern of minority shareholders is how to institute 
proceedings against a delinquent director whose conduct is considered by them in 
detriment to the company's interests. Should they initiate the action on their own 
117 [1927] 2 K. B. 9,23. 
118 119021 A. C. 83. 
119 Ibid at 93. 
120 For example see re Brazilian Rubber Plantations & Estates Ltd. 119111 Ch. 425 and re Oly 
Equitable Fire Insurance Co. Ltd [ 19251 Ch. 407. 
121 (1843) 2 Hare 461,67 ER 189. 
122 L. S. Sealy, Cases and Materials in Company La3y, (Butterworth & Co. (Publishers) Ltd. Sth 
ed. ) 453. 
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personal right or on behalf of the company? The concern is, here, the shareholders' 
locus standi in derivative actions. This point is apparently related to the fact that 
directors' duties are owed to the company as a legal entity rather than to 
shareholders individually, 123 based on which Foss v. Harhottle restricted the role of 
derivative action brought by the individual shareholder. 124 As a result of that case, 
wWch produced a great injustice, 125 no individual shareholder is entitled to sue the 
company's director or enforce the company's right, but it'is the board of directors 
that is the appropriate organ of the company to file the action on its behalf 126 
Before Foss v. Harbottle, the courts seemed `p`repared to interfere in partnerships and 
other bodies' affairs, 127 but on the condition that such interfere was necessary. 128 
The rule in Foss v. Harbottle not only has been regarded as a major legal institution 
in English law, but some other common law jurisdictions particularly Australian law 
in this respect have been developed under shadow of that decision. 129 The outcome 
of the Foss v. Harbottle case was that, if the company suffered from a wrong, it is 
suffered by itself as an independent entity rather than by its members and, therefore, 
only the company is allowed to take an action but not its individual shareholders. 
The rule is criticised as ignoring "the equally simple fact that the company as a whole 
is an abstraction, and that somebody must always act on its behalf. "130 If the board or 
directors refuses to allow a proceedings against themselves, it is a general meeting of 
shareholders that determine whether to sue the delinquent directors. 131 
123 Paul L. Davies, Directors' Fiducialy Duties and IndividuaLShareholders (ed. E. McKendrick) 
Commercial Aspects of Trusts and Fiduciary Obligations (New York: Oxford University Prcss 
1992)84., 
124 Such an action in nature but not in form has been described as a dcrivativc action so far as is 
"derived" from the corporate right of action. B. A. K. Rider, "Amiable Lunatics and the Rule in 
Foss v. Harbottle", M (1978) 270,27 1. 
125 Muir Hunter, "The Civil Liability of Company Directors in the United Kingdom", 9 Int'l Bus. 
LIW_ (1981) 23 1. 
126 Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd. [ 19350 1 K. B. 113. 
127 Colin Baxter, "The Role of Judge in Enforcing Shareholders' Rights". 
jCLI 
(1983) 96,99. 
128 Walworth v. Holt (1841) 4 Myl. & Cr. 619, cited by Baxter. 
129 L. S. Sealy, "The Rule in Foss v. Harbottle: The Australian Experience", 10 fanLm. (1990) 
52. 
130 Tom Hadden, Company Law and Capitalism, (London: Weidonfeild and Nicolson 1977) 275. 
131 Wallersteiner v. Moir (No. 2) [197511 All E. R. 849,857. 
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There are some exceptions to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle that are described by 
Lord Wedderburn as "not essentially exceptions at all" but situations in which, the 
rule cannot apply. 132 These exceptions are ultra vires and illegality, special 
majorities, personal benefits, and fraud by those in control. 133 
The post- Foss v. Harbottle cases have followed the rule. For example in Mozzley v. 
Alsion, 134 where two shareholders filed a bill against twelve directors of the company 
for exercising their powers illegally retaining the seal and property of the company, 
Lord Cottenham L. C. referring to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle, recognised that the 
rule was applicable in the present case, because in his Lordship's view, the injury was 
not to the plaintiffs' personally, but to the corporation. 135 
Similarly, in MacDougall v. Gardiner, 136 the Appeal Court upholding a decision of 
the chairman of the meeting, taken based on a majority vote of the shareholders to 
adjourn the meeting and ignore the call by some shareholders including the plaintiff 
for taking a poll, held that "it is the company, as company, which has to determine 
whether it will make anything that is wrong to the company a subject- matter of 
fitigation, or whether it will take steps itself to prevent the wrong from being done. " 
However, there has been some disagreement over the definition of the exceptions to 
the rule, particularly the question whether a breach of fiduciary duty is a cause of 
derivative action by minority shareholders. The case of Daniels v. DanielS, 137 is a 
good example to explain the rule's exceptions. In this case, the plaintiffs, minority 
shareholders, alleged that the defendant directors, a husband and wife, who wcrc 
also majority shareholders, had sold a land belonging to the company, controlled by 
the defendants, at a very substantial undervalue to the wife. Templeman J. disagreed 
with the defendant's contention that there was no cause of action, because the 
132 K. W. Wedderburn, "Shareholders' Rights and the Rule in Foss v. flarbottle" fjU (1957) 194. 
(1958) CLJ 93. 
133 Edwards v. Halliwell, [ 195012 All ER 1067. 
134 (1847) 1 Ph 790. 
135 See also Bamford v. Bamford [ 19701 Ch 212. 
136 [1875] 1 Ch. D. 13. 
137 [19781 Ch 406. 
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pleading did not involve the allegation of fraud. The learned judge proposed a 
principle on the basis of which "a minority shareholder who has no other remedy 
may sue where the directors use their power intentionally or unintentionally, 
fraudulently or negligently in a manner which benefits themselves at the expense of 
the company. "138Templeman J. seems suggesting a wide extent of exceptions to the 
rule. According to his Lordship's view, a minority shareholder may file a derivative 
action against directors not only for breach of fiduciary duties, which have been 
already under question as an exception, but also for breach of duty of care and 
negligence. a. 
Templeman J. is not alone in his generous interpretation of the rule, though Lord 
Wedderburn states that the decision of Templeman J. in Daniels v. Daniels did not 
infringe, nor did it extend the minority shareholders' rights. 139 Furthermore, the 
Court of Appeal in Heyting v. Dupont, 140 did not dismiss the possibility that an 
action for misfeasance in the absence of fraud could be filed by a minority 
shareholder. 141 
This critical judgment has encouraged the courts in their recent decisions to apply a 
narrower interpretation of the rule. For example in Prudential Assurance Co. Lid v. 
Newman Industries Lid. & Others (No. 2), 142 the court gave a wider interpretation of 
the fight of minority shareholders to bring a derivative action. In this case, the 
plaintiff, Prudential, the shareholder of nearly 3% of Newman shares brought an 
action against two directors of the company, B and L, on behalf of itself and all other 
shareholders (except B and TPG), claiming equitable damages in favour of the 
Newman company for breach of fiduciary duties, and on behalf of itself claimed 
common law damages for conspiracy, and finally on behalf of Newman's 
shareholders for preparing misleading and tricky circular and damages for 
138 Ibid at 414. 
139 K. W. Wedderburn, "Mnority Shareholders and Directors' Duties". 41 Un (1978) 569. 
140 [1964] 1 W. L. R. 843. 
141 See also Russell v. Wakefield Waterworks Co. [ 18751 L. P, 2 Eq. 474. 
142 [198012 All ER 84 1. 
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conspiracy. The facts of the case were that the defendants directors who were also 
directors of the TPG company, induced the majority shareholders of the Newman 
company to purchase the assets of TPG at a substantially overvalue while the latter 
was in serious financial difficulty, with the view of transferring the assets of the ailing 
company. 
It was contended that no derivative action would lie because, the defendants did not 
have voting control of Newman. The defendant directors also raised the question of 
whether the plaintiff as a minority shareholder could maintain the derivative action. 
Vinelott J. disagreed with the contention, and held that permitting minority 
shareholders to bring an action on behalf of the company, was not confined to cases 
where alleged wrongdoer had voting control of the company, but it could be applied 
"whenever the wrongdoer was shown to be able by manipulating his position in the 
company to ensure that the majority would not allow a claim to be brought for the 
alleged wrong. " Moreover, the court acknowledged that to bring such an action, it 
was not necessary to establish fraud, and the showing of some breach of fiduciary 
duty sufficed. 
However, the Court of Appeal found the Court of First Instance in error in 
dismissing the defendants' application for the determination, as a preliminary issue, of 
the question whether the plaintiff was entitled to maintain the derivative claim, 
because in such an action brought by the minority shareholder, the question "whether 
in fact the company was controlled by the alleged wrongdoers should first be 
detern-dried before the derivative action itself was allowed to proceed. "143 Cumming- 
Bruce, Templeman and Brightman L. JJ believed that "the Prudential were the wrong 
plaintiffs", and if the defendants "defrauded Newman then the proper plaintiff was 
Newman. " 144The court concluded that: 
"In our view, whatever may be the properly defined boundaries of the exception to the 
rule [that is the rule in Foss v. Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461,67 ER 1891, the plaintiff 
ought at least to be required before proceeding with his action to establish a prima facie 
143 1198211 All ER 354. 
144 Ibid at 368. 
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case (i) that the company is entitled to the relief claimed and (ii) that the action falls 
within the proper boundaries of t he exception to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle. " 
This judgment is rightly described as ill- considered decision which "leaves the 
unfortunate trial judge with the impossible task of ruling on such matters as 'fraud' 
and control" without proper evidence. 145 
Likewise, in Devlin v. Slough Estates Lid 146 a minority shareholder sought a 
declaration that the accounts of the defendants company should continue to show a 
contingent liability for damages in certain foreign litigation to which the company 
was a party. He argued that he had a personal right to take an action as a 
shareholder, or a derivative action on behalf of the company. The plaintiff relied on 
one of articles (Article 150) of the company's articles of association which provided 
that directors were duty bound to prepare and lay before the company in general 
meeting, and distribute to the members individually, accounts in accordance with tile 
Companies Act. Dillon J. disagreed with the plaintiffs motion and held that the 
directors' duty under article 150 was a duty to the company itself rather than to the 
individual shareholders. 
By this, his Lordship obviously meant that based on the Foss v. Harbottle rule, tile 
plaintiff was not a proper complainant and it was, thus, the company that could 
initiate the action. 
The case of Smith & Others v. Croft & Others (No 2)147 is a leading case in this 
regard, where the court chose a different view by giving a narrow interpretation of 
the exceptions of the rule, particularly the self- interests exception. In this case, the 
plaintiffs, the holders of 14.44% shares, sued the holders of shares carrying 62.5% of 
the voting rights, who were the executive directors, of the company, companies f, ý 
associated with the company's directors, and the chairman. The plaintiffs claimed 
that the executive directors had paid themselves excessive remuneration, the 
associated companies had received payments intended to benefit executive directors 
145 L. S. Sealy, "More Bleak News for the Minority Shareholders". Cu (1997) 398,399. 
146 [19831 BCLC 497. 
147 [198713 All ER 909. 
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rather than the company, and the company's moneys were used to enable the 
associated companies illegally to purchase the company's shares. 
The court did not recognise the plaintiffs as the proper plaintiffs and they were, thus, 
barred from bringing their action. Here, Knox I pointed out that "where what is 
sought is compensation for the company for cost caused by ultra vires transactions, 
the wrong in my judgment is a wrong to the company, which has the substantive 
right to the redress. " However, the learned judge acknowledged that "where 
minority shareholder is seeking to prevent an ultra vires transaction or otherwise 
seeking to enforce his personal substantive rights, the wrong which needs redress is 
the rninority shareholder's wrong. "148 His Lordship went on to say that if there was a 
valid reason preventing the company from suing, that reason equally would prevent 
the mýinority shareholder from suing on its behalf Therefore, he was to be defeated 
on two points, "first by any ground preventing him from exercising his procedural 
remedy and secondly any ground preventing the company from exercising its 
substantive rights. " 149Furthermore, the court took the majority shareholders' view as 
an indication in determining whether a minority shareholder can proceed an action as 
such. That is because, the court stated, the ultimate question was whether the 
plaintiff was being improperly prevented from bringing the proceedings, which 
would not be the case if the plaintiff was prevented from bringing his action by an 
appropriate organ of the company. 150 The learned judge concluded that because a 
majority of shareholders independent from the defendants opposed the proceedings, 
therefore, it should have been struck out. 
This conclusion has obvious similarities with the reasoning behind the "special 
litigation comrnittee" as an aspect of the procedure under the business judgment rule 
in the United States. However, here, the special or independent committee 
148 lbid at 945. 
149 lbid at 947. 
150 ibid at 956,957. 
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constituted of independent shareholders, but not disinterested directors. 151 However, 
the procedural and principles of the special litigation committee in the United States 
is obviously different from Smith & Others v. Croft & Others. Moreover, US law, as 
submitted, is both generous in scope and more readily available than tradition- bound 
English judges. 152 
In the above case, knox J. was not prepared to accept that there was a possibility of 
self- interest and that the action was most likely within the ambit of the exceptions to 
the rule, by which the plaintiff was entitled to proceed the action. 
The courts have introduced a strict interpretation of the exceptions to the rule, and 
do not seem prepared to generalise their perception of, e. g., ultra vires as an 
exception, in order to provide minority shareholder with more chance to have his 
action dealt with before the court. However, as the line of judicial decisions shows, 
the courts seem prepared to take a more liberal attitude to the minority shareholders' 
locus standi in derivative actions, 153 proving a tendency to ease the strict rule of 
Foss v. Harbottle. For example in Hogg v. Cramphom, 154 the court held that, 
although the company was the proper plaintiff, the shareholdees action against 
directors for improper disposition of company's moneys would not be barred. 
The legislature appears to have noticed the gap in this part of company law. The 
result of the legislators! consideration is section 459 of the companies Act 1985,155 
which provides a means for a shareholder to sue the company's directors for alleged 
misconduct, as follows: 
"A member of a company may apply to the court by petition for an order under this part 
on the ground that the company's affairs are being or have been conducted in a manner 
which is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of its members generally or of some part of 
151 Boyle is also of the view that Knox Ts judgment was influenced by the special litigation 
committee in US law. Anthony Boyle, "The Judicial Review of the Special Litigation Committee: 
The implications for the English Derivative Action after Sn-dth v. Croft". II Co. Law. (1990) 2. 
152 Clark C. Havighurst, "The Shareholder's Derivative Suit in the United States", ML (1967) 282. 
228. 
153 Anthony Boyle, "Nfinority Shareholders' Suits for Breach of Dir .1 ectors! Duties", I Co. L, w- 
(1980)3. 
154 [1967] Ch 254. 
155 This section was first introduced in the Companies Act 1948 in the form of section 210. and 
was repealed by section 75 of the Companies Act 1980. 
Corporate Directors'Duties &Liabilities in Insolvency in England and the US 377 
its members (including at least himself) or that any actual or proposed act or omission of 
the company (including an act or omission on its behalf) is or would be so 
prejudicial. " 156 
As it can be seen, the stance of this statutory section is not quite consistent with the 
strict and perhaps oppressive function of the rule. This statement of the statute has 
indeed effectively removed or in a great extent reduced the restrictions of the rule. 
The section does not clarify the procedure of the courts' examination. However, it 
seems that it is subject to the courts' discretion to decide whether to accept a 
minority shareholder's application as such. 
One feels that this section provides the minority shareholder an additional right to 
those exceptions to the rule in Foss v. Harhoule to alleviate the strict prohibition of 
the rule. 
Many cases have been decided under this section and its predecessors. For example, 
in re Sam Weller & Sons Lid, "' where the plaintiff shareholders, the holder of 
42.5% of the shares, sued the directors for not increasing its dividend in 37 years 
under the proper circumstances for doing so, Peter Gibson J. held that under those 
circumstances when the policy of low dividend payments was in the interests of the 
defendant and his sons, it was unfairly prejudicial to the plaintiffs. 
In re EJýindata Lid 158 though Warner J. accepted that serious mismanagement of a 
company's business could constitute a conduct as unfairly prejudicial to the interests 
of minority shareholders, he did not find the circumstances of the case as such. 
It is worth noting that in Foss v. Harhoule- like situation, there is no formal 
committee like special litigation committee under the business judgment rule, but any 
defendant director or majority shareholder is entitled to move to challenge a 
derivative action if it is not in the ambit of the exceptions of the rule, or in relation to 
section 459 of the Companies Act 1985. 
156 According to section II (b) of Sch. 19 of the Companies Act 1989, "unfairly prejudicial to the 
interests of some of its members" substituted the phrase "unfairly prejudicial to the interests or its 
members generally or of some part of its members". 
157 [1990] BCLC 80. 
159 [19911 BCLC 959. 
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At the end, it is interesting to add that, the attitude of both legal systems to the rules 
accordingly is radically changing. While in England section 459 may in long. term 
isolate and finally diminish the Foss v. Harbottle rule, and there is also a strong call 
for more statutory reform on both the substantive and procedural aspects of the 
derivative action, 159 in the United States, after the Zapata case, there is an obvious 
readiness to remove or considerably reduce the power of the litigation committee. 
10.8 Final Conclusion and Suggestionfor the Further Researches 
.. 0- 
As the final conclusion, the results of our study can be summarised as follows: 
i- English law concerning corporate directors liabilities specially in insolvency or in 
the vicinity of insolvency is more classified and even more developed than US law. 
Introducing some specific concepts such as wrongful and fraudulent trading and 
misfeasance under which directors duties and liabilities in insolvency are defined and 
the extent of their responsibilities is clarified, is a significant strength of English law 
against its American comparator. Moreover, disqualification with its sophisticated 
and highly developed operation in comparison with the newly limited recognition of 
the concept by the US law- makers, is another major advantage of English law. 
ii- As has been obvious throughout this research, US law is more protective which 
means English is conversely more oppressive towards corporate directors. Several 
protective devices that have been recognised by the former grant a great deal of 
power to the corporations to protect their directors against personal liabilities short 
of fraud or disloyalty. 
Except the Business judgment rule which is a contemplation of judges and product 
of the American common law, the other protection means such as indemnification or 
insurance against and elimýination or limitation of liability are statutory provisions 
159 Anthony Boyle, " Minority Shareholders' Suits for Breach of Directors' Duties", I 
(1980)3,7. 
QIav. 
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that cannot be categorised under the traditional common law rules, but they are the 
results of the development of company law as well as modem business needs. 
Furthermore, the business judgment rule is a power conferred on the courts to 
exercise it as matter of their discretion, whereas other protection measures, as 
mentioned above, are to be decided by the corporations themselves. In other words, 
the latter is an additional entitlement granted to the companies whether or not to 
oblige themselves to legal consequences of those provisions, and there is, thus, no 
interference on the part ofjudicial or regulatory authorities. 
On the other hand, the protections available ro an English director are all, except the 
rule in Foss v. Harhottle, statutory. Unlike the liability insurance which is an import 
of the United States, the relief under section 727 is virtually a discretionary power 
vested in the courts with no obligation to exercise it even if all requirements are met. 
iii- English law in the area of our research is obviously discretionary. Regarding 
directors liabilities, the courts are empowered with a discretionary authority to hold 
a delinquent director liable for fraudulent and wrongful trading. In both sections 213 
and 214 of the Insolvency Act, the legislature has employed the expression the court 
"may declare" the defendant to make a contribution, which reveals the discretionary 
nature of the power vested in the courts and their freedom to exercise it as they 
"think fit". The courts have a similar discretion under section 212 of the Act to hold 
a director liable for misfeasance. As to disqualification, except the mandatory feature 
of section 6 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act, other provisions 
imposing disqualification are discretionary. 
The US law in this regard is of different view. That is not only because there is no 
recognition of a set of concepts on directors liabilities as recognised in English law, 
but mainly because there is no specific statutory regulations imposing liability on 
directors for breach of their duties. Unfortunately, in the absence of any statutory 
provisions it is not possible to determine whether US law is discretionary or not, 
because in this situation the courts' decision whether or nor to hold a wrongdoer 
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liable is left to the judges' discretion, and is a matter of their interpretation of the 
facts before them. 
However, considering the protective aspect of the American company law towards 
company directors, one can claim that any statutory provisions in relation to 
directors liabilities will most likely be more discretionary than the English law. 
10.8.1 The Application of 7his Study to the US and English Laws 
The applicability of this research to those two legal systems can be answered from 
two different perspectives. First, the two laws are still considered under common law 
or in a more scientific classification under Anglo- American legal family. Does this 
common sense justify a harmonisation of them at least in the area of our research? 
Or is it necessary? 
One may suggest that because these two legal systems belong to the same legal 
family, and historically the today US was formed first by the British and ruled by the 
English Crown for centuries, and more importantly because the UK is still politically 
a strategic ally of the United States not only in Europe but in almost all international 
events, therefore the law of these two allies are in need of a harmonisation. 
But, there are some disadvantages for the proposal, on the ground that even if one 
agrees with the above considerations, it might justify a harmonisation of the two 
laws only in the field of international public law. That is because, though the law is 
affected by political considerations, ' private law, in particular company law is a 
matter of business rather than politics. Even if company law involved with politics, 
this politics is domestic rather than international. Furthermore, there are huge social 
and political differences between a society such as the US ruled by a modem federal 
republic and a country under traditional monarchy like the UK. In today's 
commercial competition which has led to different regional or continental 
commercial- political blocks, it is difficult to force these two societies into the same 
legal rules. Besides, such a harmonisation may undermine the very well- recognised 
position of the English common law as a result. of dealing with the politically strong 
Corporate Directors'Duties &Liabilities in Insolvency in England and the US 381 
and economically wealthy United States, which will not be a desirable idea for an 
English lawyer or lawmaker. 
But, there are many experiences could be learnt from each law by the other through 
the present research- study, the implementation of which may in long- term keep the 
legal systems in the same legal family. 
English lawmakers, the judges as well as legal writers considering the highly 
protective feature of the American law towards corporate directors, may step 
forward for striking a balance between the seemingly oppressive liability provisions 
on the one hand, and the insufficient protective measures available to English 
company directors on the other hand. This aim may be achieved if not by introducing 
a liability exemption provision as was recognised in re Brazilian Rubber Plantations 
& Estates Dd. 160 and similar to the US liability elimination provision, because 
obviously such measure cannot be accommodated in the conservative English law, at 
least it can be reached by expanding the extent of indemnification to judgments and 
settlements. Moreover, For this purpose, the English legislators may recognise a 
wider application for the relief under section 727 to cover wrongful trading and to 
clarify the confusion over its application to liability for breach of trust. 
Likewise, there are more lessons for the American to learn from the English 
experiences. As was seen, the United States company law in the arena of directors 
liabilities is quite in the need of basic changes and development. To fill the 
deficiencies, the first step is to recognise a set of appropriate concepts similar to 
those adopted by English law. However, so long as this recognition has not appeared 
in a legislation, the fear of another Van Gorkom crisis exists. 
The other positive move may be the extension of the disqualification recognised in 
the Remedy Act 1993 to companies executive as well as non- executive directors for 
violation of their duties in insolvency. 
160 [1911 ] Ch 425 
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10.8.2 Suggestionsfor the Future Researchers 
Though there are many unresolved problems and questions in English company law 
each of them can be undertaken as a subject for Ph. D. However, with regards to our 
research as a comparative work, a study with similar feature is more desirable, This 
thesis has been an opportunity to bring into consideration some gaps and deficiencies 
of English law in the light of the United States law. Therefore, the results of this 
work in the line with the present thesis can be implemented for a research on the 
single system for the European community in the area of company directors' duties, 
liabilities and protection in insolvency or nearly insolvency. 
Although there is no consensus about the meaning of harmonisation itself, 161 the 
need for becoming familiar with and work more efficiently'on the Community law 
with the view to harmonising the member States' laws, has been acknowledged by 
commentators. 162 
In some areas of company law such as the registration of companies, maintenance 
and alteration of capital and so on, the national legislation has been harmonised, 
However, the Fifth Draft Directive dealing with corporate governance is under 
discussion by council of ministers. 163 The Directive which concerns the supervision 
of corporate management and employees representation, has not been welcomed by 
some English lawyers who consider it as "false dawn". 164 
Article 14 of the Draft Fifth Directive provides civil liability for the board of 
directors which is considered as imposing more sever standard than the existing 
common law and statutory duties in English law. 165 
The UK government has already opposed some of the Directive provisions, for 
example the scheme of employees participation and more significantly the imposition 
161 Thomas M. Gaa, "Harmonisation of International Bankruptcy Law & Policy: Is It Necessary? Is 
It Possible? Int'l Lanýyer (1993) 881,882. 
162 J. G. Collier & L. S. Sealy, "European Communities Act 1972". 32 = (1973) 1. Erik 
Werlauff, "The Development of Community Company Law", E. L. Rev. (1992) 207. 
163 Geoffry Fitchew, "The European Diminution in Company Law", 13 Co- Law- (1992) 5. 
164 Jane Welch, "The Fifth Draft Directive- A False Dawn? " E. L. Rev. (1983) 83. 
165 Anthony J. Boyle, "Draft Fifth Directive: Implications for Directors' Duties, Board Structure 
and Employees Participation". 13 Co. Law. (1992) 6,8. 
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of joint and several liability on directors for breaches of duty by one or more 
members of the board. 166 
If I were to start a new research and had some expertise in one of main European 
languages, Spanish, German or French, I would work on a comparative work 
between English and one of European [civil] legal systems with intent to regulating 
some comprehensive rules for a single European law. Such a study will be more 
advantageous when experiences of American law are also implemented. It is not only 
because, for example, the French courts under the Draft Convention on Bankruptcy 
have exclusive jurisdiction to pronounce upon the liquidation and its effects, 167but 
also because there have been some changes in some of European laws towards 
corporate directors different from other members. For example, while majority 
European countries impose more liabilities on their corporate directors with the view 
to protecting the interests of creditors, a legal system like French law, unlike its 
previously vigorous measures, has taken a more liberal stance towards directors "to 
preserve business, and above all employment, regardless of creditors' interestS. '169 
In addition to the above reason for desirability of taking English and a European civil 
law as the subject of further research, the fact is important that any single law for the 
community has to regard the principles of both common law and civil law. 
If the future study is not to be a comparative one there are, as was mentioned, still 
many unanswered questions and ambiguities which this study has not, because of 
limited time and space, referred to. For example, one may review other directors 
166 Note, "Government Critical of Fifth Directive" II Co. Law. (1990) 72. The subject of European 
law is out of our research, therefore this brief comment suffices to reveal the importance attached to 
the issue. For further discussion about harmonisation of EEC law see John Lo%%Ty, The 
Harmonisation of Bankruptcy Law in Europe, the Role of the Council of Europe" ML (1985) 73, 
Muir Hunter, "The Draft EEC Convention- A Further Examination" 25 = (1976) 3 10, Muir 
Hunter, "The Draft Bankruptcy Convention of the European Economic Communities. * 21 = 
(1972) 682, Muir Hunter, European Bankruptcy: The New Dimension of Insolvency" 127 bU 
(1977) 195, S. N. Frommel, "Reform of the Ultra Vires Rule: A Personal View", 8 Co. Law- (1987) 
11, john H. Farrar, The EEC Draft Convention on Bankruptcy" ML (1972) 256, Ian Fletcher. *The 
proposed Community Convention on Bankruptcy and Related Matters". 2 EL&L (1977) 15. 
167 Clare Connerton, "Directors' Liability and the EEC Draft Convention on Bankruptcy", IDL 
(1977) 8,16. 
168 R. E. Floyd, "A Tougher Time for Directors- Are the French Out of Step" 4 L"P, (1988) 7s 
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liabilities in insolvency that are not within misfeasance, wrongful and fraudulent 
trading, the liabilities resulted from an action taken by the liquidator in the company's 
name. It also desirable to study other sectors' liabilities other than directors in such 
event. 
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